翻译自:http://find-sec-bugs.github.io/bugs.htm
翻译:聂心明

xml解析导致xxe漏洞

漏洞特征:XXE_XMLSTREAMREADER
当xml解析程序收到不信任的输入且如果xml解析程序支持外部实体解析的时候,那么造成xml实体解析攻击(xxe)
危害1:探测本地文件内容(xxe:xml 外部实体)

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
   <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" > ]>
<foo>&xxe;</foo>

危害2:拒绝服务攻击 (xee:xml 外部实体膨胀)

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE lolz [
 <!ENTITY lol "lol">
 <!ELEMENT lolz (#PCDATA)>
 <!ENTITY lol1 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;">
 <!ENTITY lol2 "&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;">
 <!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;">
[...]
 <!ENTITY lol9 "&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;">
]>
<lolz>&lol9;</lolz>

解决方法:
为了避免解析xml带来的攻击,你应该按照下面的示例代码修改你的代码
有漏洞的代码:

public void parseXML(InputStream input) throws XMLStreamException {

    XMLInputFactory factory = XMLInputFactory.newFactory();
    XMLStreamReader reader = factory.createXMLStreamReader(input);
    [...]
}

禁用外部实体的解决方案:

public void parseXML(InputStream input) throws XMLStreamException {

    XMLInputFactory factory = XMLInputFactory.newFactory();
    factory.setProperty(XMLInputFactory.IS_SUPPORTING_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES, false);
    XMLStreamReader reader = factory.createXMLStreamReader(input);
    [...]
}

禁用DTD的方案:

public void parseXML(InputStream input) throws XMLStreamException {

    XMLInputFactory factory = XMLInputFactory.newFactory();
    factory.setProperty(XMLInputFactory.SUPPORT_DTD, false);
    XMLStreamReader reader = factory.createXMLStreamReader(input);
    [...]
}

引用:
CWE-611: Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference ('XXE')
CERT: IDS10-J. Prevent XML external entity attacks
OWASP.org: XML External Entity (XXE) Processing
WS-Attacks.org: XML Entity Expansion
WS-Attacks.org: XML External Entity DOS
WS-Attacks.org: XML Entity Reference Attack
Identifying Xml eXternal Entity vulnerability (XXE)
JEP 185: Restrict Fetching of External XML Resources

xml解析导致xxe漏洞(XPathExpression)

漏洞特征:XXE_XPATH
当xml解析程序收到不信任的输入且如果xml解析程序支持外部实体解析的时候,那么造成xml实体解析攻击(xxe)
危害1:探测本地文件内容(xxe:xml 外部实体)

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
   <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" > ]>
<foo>&xxe;</foo>

危害2:拒绝服务攻击 (xee:xml 外部实体膨胀)

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE lolz [
 <!ENTITY lol "lol">
 <!ELEMENT lolz (#PCDATA)>
 <!ENTITY lol1 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;">
 <!ENTITY lol2 "&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;">
 <!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;">
[...]
 <!ENTITY lol9 "&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;">
]>
<lolz>&lol9;</lolz>

解决方法:
为了避免解析xml带来的攻击,你应该按照下面的示例代码修改你的代码
有漏洞的代码:

DocumentBuilder builder = df.newDocumentBuilder();

XPathFactory xPathFactory = XPathFactory.newInstance();
XPath xpath = xPathFactory.newXPath();
XPathExpression xPathExpr = xpath.compile("/somepath/text()");

xPathExpr.evaluate(new InputSource(inputStream));

下面的两个片段展示了可能的解决方案。你可以设置其中一个,或者两个都设置

使用"Secure processing" 模式的解决方案

DocumentBuilderFactory df = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
df.setFeature(XMLConstants.FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING, true);
DocumentBuilder builder = df.newDocumentBuilder();

[...]

xPathExpr.evaluate( builder.parse(inputStream) );

禁用DTD的解决方案:
通过禁用DTD,大多数的xxe攻击都可以被避免

DocumentBuilderFactory df = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
spf.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
DocumentBuilder builder = df.newDocumentBuilder();

[...]

xPathExpr.evaluate( builder.parse(inputStream) );

引用:
CWE-611: Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference ('XXE')
CERT: IDS10-J. Prevent XML external entity attacks
OWASP.org: XML External Entity (XXE) Processing
WS-Attacks.org: XML Entity Expansion
WS-Attacks.org: XML External Entity DOS
WS-Attacks.org: XML Entity Reference Attack
Identifying Xml eXternal Entity vulnerability (XXE)
XML External Entity (XXE) Prevention Cheat Sheet_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet#XPathExpression)

xml解析导致xxe漏洞(SAXParser)

漏洞特征:XXE_SAXPARSER
当xml解析程序收到不信任的输入且如果xml解析程序支持外部实体解析的时候,那么造成xml实体解析攻击(xxe)
危害1:探测本地文件内容(xxe:xml 外部实体)

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
   <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" > ]>
<foo>&xxe;</foo>

危害2:拒绝服务攻击 (xee:xml 外部实体膨胀)

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE lolz [
 <!ENTITY lol "lol">
 <!ELEMENT lolz (#PCDATA)>
 <!ENTITY lol1 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;">
 <!ENTITY lol2 "&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;">
 <!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;">
[...]
 <!ENTITY lol9 "&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;">
]>
<lolz>&lol9;</lolz>

解决方法:
为了避免解析xml带来的攻击,你应该按照下面的示例代码修改你的代码
有漏洞的代码:

SAXParser parser = SAXParserFactory.newInstance().newSAXParser();

parser.parse(inputStream, customHandler);

下面的两个片段展示了可能的解决方案。你可以使用其中一个,或者两个都使用

使用"Secure processing" 模式的解决方案:
这个设置能保护你能避免拒绝服务攻击和ssrf漏洞

SAXParserFactory spf = SAXParserFactory.newInstance();
spf.setFeature(XMLConstants.FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING, true);
SAXParser parser = spf.newSAXParser();

parser.parse(inputStream, customHandler);

禁用DTD的解决方案:
通过禁用DTD,大多数的xxe攻击都可以被避免

SAXParserFactory spf = SAXParserFactory.newInstance();
spf.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
SAXParser parser = spf.newSAXParser();

parser.parse(inputStream, customHandler);

引用:
CWE-611: Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference ('XXE')
CERT: IDS10-J. Prevent XML external entity attacks
OWASP.org: XML External Entity (XXE) Processing
WS-Attacks.org: XML Entity Expansion
WS-Attacks.org: XML External Entity DOS
WS-Attacks.org: XML Entity Reference Attack
Identifying Xml eXternal Entity vulnerability (XXE)
Xerces complete features list

xml解析导致xxe漏洞(XMLReader)

漏洞特征:XXE_XMLREADER
当xml解析程序收到不信任的输入且如果xml解析程序支持外部实体解析的时候,那么造成xml实体解析攻击(xxe)
危害1:探测本地文件内容(xxe:xml 外部实体)

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
   <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" > ]>
<foo>&xxe;</foo>

危害2:拒绝服务攻击 (xee:xml 外部实体膨胀)

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE lolz [
 <!ENTITY lol "lol">
 <!ELEMENT lolz (#PCDATA)>
 <!ENTITY lol1 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;">
 <!ENTITY lol2 "&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;">
 <!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;">
[...]
 <!ENTITY lol9 "&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;">
]>
<lolz>&lol9;</lolz>

解决方法:
为了避免解析xml带来的攻击,你应该按照下面的示例代码修改你的代码
有漏洞的代码:

XMLReader reader = XMLReaderFactory.createXMLReader();
reader.setContentHandler(customHandler);
reader.parse(new InputSource(inputStream));

下面的两个片段展示了可能的解决方案。你可以使用其中一个,或者两个都使用

使用"Secure processing" 模式的解决方案:
这个设置能保护你能避免拒绝服务攻击和ssrf漏洞

XMLReader reader = XMLReaderFactory.createXMLReader();
reader.setFeature(XMLConstants.FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING, true);
reader.setContentHandler(customHandler);

reader.parse(new InputSource(inputStream));

禁用DTD的解决方案:
通过禁用DTD,大多数的xxe攻击都可以被避免

XMLReader reader = XMLReaderFactory.createXMLReader();
reader.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
reader.setContentHandler(customHandler);

reader.parse(new InputSource(inputStream));

引用:
CWE-611: Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference ('XXE')
CERT: IDS10-J. Prevent XML external entity attacks
OWASP.org: XML External Entity (XXE) Processing
WS-Attacks.org: XML Entity Expansion
WS-Attacks.org: XML External Entity DOS
WS-Attacks.org: XML Entity Reference Attack
Identifying Xml eXternal Entity vulnerability (XXE)
Xerces complete features list

xml解析导致xxe漏洞(DocumentBuilder)

漏洞特征:XXE_DOCUMENT
当xml解析程序收到不信任的输入且如果xml解析程序支持外部实体解析的时候,那么造成xml实体解析攻击(xxe)
危害1:探测本地文件内容(xxe:xml 外部实体)

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
   <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" > ]>
<foo>&xxe;</foo>

危害2:拒绝服务攻击 (xee:xml 外部实体膨胀)

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE lolz [
 <!ENTITY lol "lol">
 <!ELEMENT lolz (#PCDATA)>
 <!ENTITY lol1 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;">
 <!ENTITY lol2 "&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;">
 <!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;">
[...]
 <!ENTITY lol9 "&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;">
]>
<lolz>&lol9;</lolz>

解决方法:
为了避免解析xml带来的攻击,你应该按照下面的示例代码修改你的代码
有漏洞的代码:

DocumentBuilder db = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance().newDocumentBuilder();

Document doc = db.parse(input);

下面的两个片段展示了可能的解决方案。你可以使用其中一个,或者两个都使用

使用"Secure processing" 模式的解决方案:
这个设置能保护你能避免拒绝服务攻击和ssrf漏洞

DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
dbf.setFeature(XMLConstants.FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING, true);
DocumentBuilder db = dbf.newDocumentBuilder();

Document doc = db.parse(input);

禁用DTD的解决方案:
通过禁用DTD,大多数的xxe攻击都可以被避免

DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
dbf.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
DocumentBuilder db = dbf.newDocumentBuilder();

Document doc = db.parse(input);

引用:
CWE-611: Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference ('XXE')
CERT: IDS10-J. Prevent XML external entity attacks
OWASP.org: XML External Entity (XXE) Processing
WS-Attacks.org: XML Entity Expansion
WS-Attacks.org: XML External Entity DOS
WS-Attacks.org: XML Entity Reference Attack
Identifying Xml eXternal Entity vulnerability (XXE)
Xerces complete features list

xml解析导致xxe漏洞(TransformerFactory)

漏洞特征:XXE_DTD_TRANSFORM_FACTORY
当xml解析程序收到不信任的输入且如果xml解析程序支持外部实体解析的时候,那么造成xml实体解析攻击(xxe)
危害1:探测本地文件内容(xxe:xml 外部实体)

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
   <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" > ]>
<foo>&xxe;</foo>

危害2:拒绝服务攻击 (xee:xml 外部实体膨胀)

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE lolz [
 <!ENTITY lol "lol">
 <!ELEMENT lolz (#PCDATA)>
 <!ENTITY lol1 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;">
 <!ENTITY lol2 "&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;&lol1;">
 <!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;">
[...]
 <!ENTITY lol9 "&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;">
]>
<lolz>&lol9;</lolz>

解决方法:
为了避免解析xml带来的攻击,你应该按照下面的示例代码修改你的代码
有漏洞的代码:

Transformer transformer = TransformerFactory.newInstance().newTransformer();
transformer.transform(input, result);

下面的两个片段展示了可能的解决方案。你可以使用其中一个,或者两个都使用

使用"Secure processing" 模式的解决方案:
这个设置能保护你能避免拒绝服务攻击和ssrf漏洞

TransformerFactory factory = TransformerFactory.newInstance();
factory.setAttribute(XMLConstants.ACCESS_EXTERNAL_DTD, "all");
factory.setAttribute(XMLConstants.ACCESS_EXTERNAL_STYLESHEET, "all");

Transformer transformer = factory.newTransformer();
transformer.setOutputProperty(OutputKeys.INDENT, "yes");

transformer.transform(input, result);

禁用DTD的解决方案:
通过禁用DTD,大多数的xxe攻击都可以被避免

TransformerFactory factory = TransformerFactory.newInstance();
factory.setFeature(XMLConstants.FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING, true);

Transformer transformer = factory.newTransformer();
transformer.setOutputProperty(OutputKeys.INDENT, "yes");

transformer.transform(input, result);

引用:
CWE-611: Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference ('XXE')
CERT: IDS10-J. Prevent XML external entity attacks
OWASP.org: XML External Entity (XXE) Processing
WS-Attacks.org: XML Entity Expansion
WS-Attacks.org: XML External Entity DOS
WS-Attacks.org: XML Entity Reference Attack
Identifying Xml eXternal Entity vulnerability (XXE)

XSLT解析导致xxe漏洞(TransformerFactory)

漏洞特征:XXE_XSLT_TRANSFORM_FACTORY
当xml解析程序收到不信任的输入且如果xml解析程序支持外部实体解析的时候,那么造成xml实体解析攻击(xxe)
危害1:探测本地文件内容(xxe:xml 外部实体)

<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform">
   <xsl:template match="/">
       <xsl:value-of select="document('/etc/passwd')">
   </xsl:value-of></xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>

解决方法:
为了避免解析xml带来的攻击,你应该按照下面的示例代码修改你的代码
有漏洞的代码:

Transformer transformer = TransformerFactory.newInstance().newTransformer();
transformer.transform(input, result);

下面的两个片段展示了可能的解决方案。你可以使用其中一个,或者两个都使用

使用"Secure processing" 模式的解决方案:
这个设置能保护你能避免ssrf漏洞但是不能避免拒绝服务攻击

TransformerFactory factory = TransformerFactory.newInstance();
factory.setAttribute(XMLConstants.ACCESS_EXTERNAL_DTD, "all");
factory.setAttribute(XMLConstants.ACCESS_EXTERNAL_STYLESHEET, "all");

Transformer transformer = factory.newTransformer();
transformer.setOutputProperty(OutputKeys.INDENT, "yes");

transformer.transform(input, result);

禁用DTD的解决方案:
这个设置能保护你能避免ssrf漏洞但是不能避免拒绝服务攻击

TransformerFactory factory = TransformerFactory.newInstance();
factory.setFeature(XMLConstants.FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING, true);

Transformer transformer = factory.newTransformer();
transformer.setOutputProperty(OutputKeys.INDENT, "yes");

transformer.transform(input, result);

引用:
CWE-611: Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference ('XXE')
CERT: IDS10-J. Prevent XML external entity attacks
OWASP.org: XML External Entity (XXE) Processing
WS-Attacks.org: XML Entity Expansion
WS-Attacks.org: XML External Entity DOS
WS-Attacks.org: XML Entity Reference Attack
Identifying Xml eXternal Entity vulnerability (XXE)

潜在的XPath注入

漏洞特征: XPATH_INJECTION
XPath注入的危险程度就像sql注入一样。如果XPath查询包含不信任的用户输入,那么数据库就会被完全暴露。这样就可以让攻击者访问未授权的数据或者在目标xml数据库中放入恶意数据。

引用:
WASC-39: XPath Injection
OWASP: Top 10 2013-A1-Injection
CWE-643: Improper Neutralization of Data within XPath Expressions ('XPath Injection')
CERT: IDS09-J. Prevent XPath Injection (archive)
Black Hat Europe 2012: Hacking XPath 2.0
Balisage: XQuery Injection

发现Struts 1 服务器端

漏洞特征: STRUTS1_ENDPOINT
这个类是Struts 1 的Action
曾清一个请求被路由到一个控制器中,Form对象将会被自动的实例化为http参数的对象。这些参数应该被严格检查,以保证它们是安全的。

发现Struts 2 服务器端

漏洞特征:STRUTS2_ENDPOINT
在Struts 2中,服务器端是简单的Java对象 (POJOs),这就意味着没有接口/类 需要被实现/拓展

当一个请求被路由到它的控制器的时候(像这些被选择的类),http提供的参数会被自动的映射到类中的setters中。所以,所有类中的setters都应该被看成来自不被信任源的输入,即使form中没有包含那些值。一个攻击者都被在请求中插入一些额外的值,他们会被当成对象,只要对象具有这样的setter。这些参数应该被严格检查,以保证它们是安全的。

发现Spring 服务器端

漏洞特征: SPRING_ENDPOINT
这个类是一个Spring的控制器。所有方法的注解都在RequestMapping(还有一些简化注解在GetMapping, PostMapping, PutMapping, DeleteMapping, 和 PatchMapping),这些方法都能被远程访问到。这些类应该被严格的分析,以保证暴露给远程的方法是安全的,不会被攻击者轻易攻击。

Spring关闭 CSRF保护

漏洞特征: SPRING_CSRF_PROTECTION_DISABLED
对于标准的web应用程序来讲,关闭Spring的CSRF保护显然是不安全的。
禁用此保护的有效使用场景是服务器暴露一个可以改变状态的接口,这个接口仅可以被非浏览器操控。

不安全的配置

@EnableWebSecurity
public class WebSecurityConfig extends WebSecurityConfigurerAdapter {

    @Override
    protected void configure(HttpSecurity http) throws Exception {
        http.csrf().disable();
    }
}

引用:
Spring Security Official Documentation: When to use CSRF protection
OWASP: Cross-Site Request Forgery
OWASP: CSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet
CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

Spring 中不受CSRF限制的RequestMapping

漏洞特征: SPRING_CSRF_UNRESTRICTED_REQUEST_MAPPING
通过默认的映射所有的HTTP请求方法都会被RequestMapping注解。可是,http请求中的GET, HEAD, TRACE, 和OPTIONS(可能会导致tokens被泄露)方法不会默认开启csrf保护。所以,被RequestMapping注解的可以改变状态的方法和 POST, PUT, DELETE, 或者 PATCH这些http请求方法都会受到csrf攻击。

有漏洞的代码:

@Controller
public class UnsafeController {

    @RequestMapping("/path")
    public void writeData() {
        // State-changing operations performed within this method.
    }
}

解决方案(Spring Framework 4.3和更新的版本)

@Controller
public class SafeController {

    /**
     * For methods without side-effects use @GetMapping.
     */
    @GetMapping("/path")
    public String readData() {
        // No state-changing operations performed within this method.
        return "";
    }

    /**
     * For state-changing methods use either @PostMapping, @PutMapping, @DeleteMapping, or @PatchMapping.
     */
    @PostMapping("/path")
    public void writeData() {
        // State-changing operations performed within this method.
    }
}

解决方案(在Spring Framework 4.3之前的版本)

@Controller
public class SafeController {

    /**
     * For methods without side-effects use either
     * RequestMethod.GET, RequestMethod.HEAD, RequestMethod.TRACE, or RequestMethod.OPTIONS.
     */
    @RequestMapping(value = "/path", method = RequestMethod.GET)
    public String readData() {
        // No state-changing operations performed within this method.
        return "";
    }

    /**
     * For state-changing methods use either
     * RequestMethod.POST, RequestMethod.PUT, RequestMethod.DELETE, or RequestMethod.PATCH.
     */
    @RequestMapping(value = "/path", method = RequestMethod.POST)
    public void writeData() {
        // State-changing operations performed within this method.
    }
}

引用:
Spring Security Official Documentation: Use proper HTTP verbs (CSRF protection))
OWASP: Cross-Site Request Forgery
OWASP: CSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet
CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

潜在的注入(custom)

漏洞特征: CUSTOM_INJECTION
扫描工具所识别的函数存在注射问题。应验证输入并争取转义。

有漏洞的代码:

SqlUtil.execQuery("select * from UserEntity t where id = " + parameterInput);

wiki在线有很详细的教程关于如何配置custom

引用:
WASC-19: SQL Injection
OWASP: Top 10 2013-A1-Injection
OWASP: SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet
OWASP: Query Parameterization Cheat Sheet
CAPEC-66: SQL Injection
CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')

潜在的sql注入

漏洞特征:SQL_INJECTION
输入进sql查询的数据应该通过严格的检查。在预编译中绑定参数可以更容易的缓解sql注入带来的危害。或者,每一个参数应该被正确的转义。
有漏洞的代码:

createQuery("select * from User where id = '"+inputId+"'");

解决方案:

import org.owasp.esapi.Encoder;

createQuery("select * from User where id = '"+Encoder.encodeForSQL(inputId)+"'");

引用(sql注入)
WASC-19: SQL Injection
CAPEC-66: SQL Injection
CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
OWASP: Top 10 2013-A1-Injection
OWASP: SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet
OWASP: Query Parameterization Cheat Sheet

在Turbine中潜在的sql注入

漏洞特征:SQL_INJECTION_TURBINE
输入进sql查询的数据应该通过严格的检查。在预编译中绑定参数可以更容易的缓解sql注入带来的危害。或者,每一个参数应该被正确的转义。
Turbine API 提供DSL在java代码中构建查询
有漏洞的代码:

List<Record> BasePeer.executeQuery( "select * from Customer where id=" + inputId );

解决方案(使用Criteria DSL):

Criteria c = new Criteria();
c.add( CustomerPeer.ID, inputId );

List<Customer> customers = CustomerPeer.doSelect( c );

解决方案(使用特殊方法):

Customer customer = CustomerPeer.retrieveByPK( new NumberKey( inputId ) );

解决方法(使用OWASP提供的编码方法)

import org.owasp.esapi.Encoder;

BasePeer.executeQuery("select * from Customer where id = '"+Encoder.encodeForSQL(inputId)+"'");

引用(Turbine):
Turbine Documentation: Criteria Howto
引用(sql注入)
WASC-19: SQL Injection
CAPEC-66: SQL Injection
CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
OWASP: Top 10 2013-A1-Injection
OWASP: SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet
OWASP: Query Parameterization Cheat Sheet

潜在的SQL/HQL注入(Hibernate)

漏洞特征:SQL_INJECTION_HIBERNATE
输入进sql查询的数据应该通过严格的检查。在预编译中绑定参数可以更容易的缓解sql注入带来的危害。或者,可以使用Hibernate的Criteria。
有漏洞的代码:

Session session = sessionFactory.openSession();
Query q = session.createQuery("select t from UserEntity t where id = " + input);
q.execute();

解决方案:

Session session = sessionFactory.openSession();
Query q = session.createQuery("select t from UserEntity t where id = :userId");
q.setString("userId",input);
q.execute();

动态查询参数法解决方案(Hibernate Criteria)

Session session = sessionFactory.openSession();
Query q = session.createCriteria(UserEntity.class)
    .add( Restrictions.like("id", input) )
    .list();
q.execute();

引用(Hibernate)
Hibernate Documentation: Query Criteria
Hibernate Javadoc: Query Object
HQL for pentesters: Guideline to test if the suspected code is exploitable.
引用(sql注入)
WASC-19: SQL Injection
CAPEC-66: SQL Injection
CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
OWASP: Top 10 2013-A1-Injection
OWASP: SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet
OWASP: Query Parameterization Cheat Sheet

潜在的sql/JDOQL注入(JDO)

漏洞特征:SQL_INJECTION_JDO
输入进sql查询的数据应该通过严格的检查。在预编译中绑定参数可以更容易的缓解sql注入带来的危害。
有漏洞的代码:

PersistenceManager pm = getPM();

Query q = pm.newQuery("select * from Users where name = " + input);
q.execute();

解决方案:

PersistenceManager pm = getPM();

Query q = pm.newQuery("select * from Users where name = nameParam");
q.declareParameters("String nameParam");
q.execute(input);

引用(JDO):
JDO: Object Retrieval
引用(sql注入)
WASC-19: SQL Injection
CAPEC-66: SQL Injection
CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
OWASP: Top 10 2013-A1-Injection
OWASP: SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet
OWASP: Query Parameterization Cheat Sheet

潜在的sql/JPQL注入(JPA)

漏洞特征: SQL_INJECTION_JPA
输入进sql查询的数据应该通过严格的检查。在预编译中绑定参数可以更容易的缓解sql注入带来的危害。
有漏洞的代码:

EntityManager pm = getEM();

TypedQuery<UserEntity> q = em.createQuery(
    String.format("select * from Users where name = %s", username),
    UserEntity.class);

UserEntity res = q.getSingleResult();

解决方案:

TypedQuery<UserEntity> q = em.createQuery(
    "select * from Users where name = usernameParam",UserEntity.class)
    .setParameter("usernameParam", username);

UserEntity res = q.getSingleResult();

引用 (JPA)
The Java EE 6 Tutorial: Creating Queries Using the Java Persistence Query Language
引用(sql注入)
WASC-19: SQL Injection
CAPEC-66: SQL Injection
CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
OWASP: Top 10 2013-A1-Injection
OWASP: SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet
OWASP: Query Parameterization Cheat Sheet

潜在的JDBC注入(Spring JDBC)

漏洞特征:SQL_INJECTION_SPRING_JDBC
输入进sql查询的数据应该通过严格的检查。在预编译中绑定参数可以更容易的缓解sql注入带来的危害。或者,每一个参数应该被正确的转义。
有漏洞的代码:

JdbcTemplate jdbc = new JdbcTemplate();
int count = jdbc.queryForObject("select count(*) from Users where name = '"+paramName+"'", Integer.class);

解决方案:

JdbcTemplate jdbc = new JdbcTemplate();
int count = jdbc.queryForObject("select count(*) from Users where name = ?", Integer.class, paramName);

引用 (Spring JDBC)
Spring Official Documentation: Data access with JDBC
引用(sql注入)
WASC-19: SQL Injection
CAPEC-66: SQL Injection
CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
OWASP: Top 10 2013-A1-Injection
OWASP: SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet
OWASP: Query Parameterization Cheat Sheet

潜在的JDBC注入

漏洞特征:SQL_INJECTION_JDBC
输入进sql查询的数据应该通过严格的检查。在预编译中绑定参数可以更容易的缓解sql注入带来的危害。
有漏洞的代码:

Connection conn = [...];
Statement stmt = con.createStatement();
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery("update COFFEES set SALES = "+nbSales+" where COF_NAME = '"+coffeeName+"'");

解决方案:

Connection conn = [...];
conn.prepareStatement("update COFFEES set SALES = ? where COF_NAME = ?");
updateSales.setInt(1, nbSales);
updateSales.setString(2, coffeeName);

引用 (JDBC)
Oracle Documentation: The Java Tutorials > Prepared Statements
引用(sql注入)
WASC-19: SQL Injection
CAPEC-66: SQL Injection
CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
OWASP: Top 10 2013-A1-Injection
OWASP: SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet
OWASP: Query Parameterization Cheat Sheet

潜在的Scala Slick注入

漏洞特征:SCALA_SQL_INJECTION_SLICK
输入进sql查询的数据应该通过严格的检查。在预编译中绑定参数可以更容易的缓解sql注入带来的危害。
有漏洞的代码:

db.run {
  sql"select * from people where name = '#$value'".as[Person]
}

解决方案:

db.run {
  sql"select * from people where name = $value".as[Person]
}

引用(sql注入)
WASC-19: SQL Injection
CAPEC-66: SQL Injection
CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
OWASP: Top 10 2013-A1-Injection
OWASP: SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet
OWASP: Query Parameterization Cheat Sheet

潜在的Scala Anorm注入

漏洞特征:SCALA_SQL_INJECTION_ANORM
输入进sql查询的数据应该通过严格的检查。在预编译中绑定参数可以更容易的缓解sql注入带来的危害。
有漏洞的代码:

val peopleParser = Macro.parser[Person]("id", "name", "age")

DB.withConnection { implicit c =>
  val people: List[Person] = SQL("select * from people where name = '" + value + "'").as(peopleParser.*)
}

解决方案:

val peopleParser = Macro.parser[Person]("id", "name", "age")

DB.withConnection { implicit c =>
  val people: List[Person] = SQL"select * from people where name = $value".as(peopleParser.*)
}

引用(sql注入)
WASC-19: SQL Injection
CAPEC-66: SQL Injection
CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
OWASP: Top 10 2013-A1-Injection
OWASP: SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet
OWASP: Query Parameterization Cheat Sheet

潜在的安卓sql注入

漏洞特征:SQL_INJECTION_ANDROID
输入进sql查询的数据应该通过严格的检查。在预编译中绑定参数可以更容易的缓解sql注入带来的危害。
有漏洞的代码:

String query = "SELECT * FROM  messages WHERE uid= '"+userInput+"'" ;
Cursor cursor = this.getReadableDatabase().rawQuery(query,null);

解决方案:

String query = "SELECT * FROM  messages WHERE uid= ?" ;
Cursor cursor = this.getReadableDatabase().rawQuery(query,new String[] {userInput});

引用 (Android SQLite)
InformIT.com: Practical Advice for Building Secure Android Databases in SQLite
Packtpub.com: Knowing the SQL-injection attacks and securing our Android applications from them

Android Database Support (Enterprise Android: Programming Android Database Applications for the Enterprise)

Safe example of Insert, Select, Update and Delete queryies provided by Suragch

引用(sql注入)
WASC-19: SQL Injection
CAPEC-66: SQL Injection
CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
OWASP: Top 10 2013-A1-Injection
OWASP: SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet
OWASP: Query Parameterization Cheat Sheet

潜在的LDAP注入

漏洞特征:LDAP_INJECTION
就像sql,所有进入到ldap查询的语句都必须要保证安全。不幸的是,ldap没有像sql那样的预编译接口。所以,现在的主要防御方式是,在参数进入ladp查询之前对其进行严格的检验。
有漏洞的代码:

NamingEnumeration<SearchResult> answers = context.search("dc=People,dc=example,dc=com",
        "(uid=" + username + ")", ctrls);

引用:
WASC-29: LDAP Injection
OWASP: Top 10 2013-A1-Injection
CWE-90: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an LDAP Query ('LDAP Injection')
LDAP Injection Guide: Learn How to Detect LDAP Injections and Improve LDAP Security

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