利用双机调试环境对杀软内核研究
在 Windows 架构中,杀软内核驱动通常扮演着“超级裁判”的角色。它通过在内核中植入一系列通知回调(Notification Routines)和微过滤监听器(Minifilter Callbacks),将自己强行插入到系统处理关键动作(如进程启动、文件读写、内存映射)的路径上。
前言
在 Windows 架构中,杀软内核驱动通常扮演着“超级裁判”的角色。它通过在内核中植入一系列通知回调(Notification Routines)和微过滤监听器(Minifilter Callbacks),将自己强行插入到系统处理关键动作(如进程启动、文件读写、内存映射)的路径上。
分析这些驱动的概念核心可以归纳为以下三个维度:
监控点的“锚定”与“劫持”
杀软并不生成系统动作,它只“订阅”动作。分析的首要目标是确认它在内核中注册了哪些眼线。
注册回调:利用 PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine 等标准接口,确保任何新进程的诞生都必须先经过它的逻辑判断。
对象过滤:通过 ObRegisterCallbacks 监控句柄操作,防止恶意程序尝试打开 LSASS 等敏感进程的句柄。
文件过滤:利用 Minifilter 框架,在文件到达磁盘前进行扫描,这是拦截勒索软件或恶意载荷(Payload)落地的核心战场。
策略池的“匹配”与“决策”
当一个动作被拦截下来后,驱动内部会进入逻辑决策阶段。
静态特征匹配:将当前进程名、路径或证书信息与内存中的全局规则链表(如你之前看到的 MpBmDocOpenRules)进行快速比对。
动态行为评分:根据进程短时间内的 API 调用序列(如:申请内存 -> 修改权限 -> 远程注入)进行启发式评估。
内核态与用户态的通信:内核驱动(EDR Driver)通过 FilterCommunicationPort 将复杂的判定任务“外包”给用户态的高性能分析服务,并根据返回的结果决定是否给该动作判“死刑”。
“阻断”与“放行”的终极对抗
分析的终点在于理解杀软如何下达指令。
状态码注入:在回调中将 CreationStatus 修改为 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED,从内核底层撤销该动作的合法性。
上下文擦除:在恶意代码执行前,通过抹除其内存映射或强制结束其线程池来实现无感阻断。
接下来我们要通过调试内核对杀软进行初步分析
搭建双机调试环境
我的主机是window11 目标是vm的window10
打开虚拟机 移除掉打印机 这一步是必须的 不然打印机会占用位置
添加一个串行端口 注意这里必须和图里一样
然后加串口管道 和图一样就行 .\pipe\com_1
打开虚拟机用管理员启动
bcdedit /set “{current}” bootmenupolicy Legacy
bcdedit /dbgsettings SERIAL DEBUGPORT:1 BAUDRATE:115200
bcdedit /copy “{current}” /d “Debug”
bcdedit /debug “{<上一步返回的复杂到这里>}” on
win+r 运行 msconfig
windbg这样写 记住调试的window10 windbg必须用新版的
后续开机启动选择刚刚创建的 windbg有connect就是成功了
创建进程回调
在内核中,杀软通过 PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx 注册回调。每当一个新的 EPROCESS 被分配并准备运行时,内核会暂停进程,并挨个询问杀软进程的安全性,杀软会对多个角度进行检查,在后续我们也提到了
我们在windbg查看进程创建回调
1: kd> u WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx L50
WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx:
fffff80a`83ab8cf0 48895c2420 mov qword ptr [rsp+20h],rbx
fffff80a`83ab8cf5 55 push rbp
fffff80a`83ab8cf6 56 push rsi
fffff80a`83ab8cf7 57 push rdi
fffff80a`83ab8cf8 4154 push r12
fffff80a`83ab8cfa 4155 push r13
fffff80a`83ab8cfc 4156 push r14
fffff80a`83ab8cfe 4157 push r15
fffff80a`83ab8d00 488bec mov rbp,rsp
fffff80a`83ab8d03 4883ec70 sub rsp,70h
fffff80a`83ab8d07 488b0532e3fbff mov rax,qword ptr [WdFilter!_security_cookie (fffff80a`83a77040)]
fffff80a`83ab8d0e 4833c4 xor rax,rsp
fffff80a`83ab8d11 488945f8 mov qword ptr [rbp-8],rax
fffff80a`83ab8d15 4533c9 xor r9d,r9d
fffff80a`83ab8d18 488d0539e3fbff lea rax,[WdFilter!WPP_GLOBAL_Control (fffff80a`83a77058)]
fffff80a`83ab8d1f 4c894de8 mov qword ptr [rbp-18h],r9
fffff80a`83ab8d23 418bd9 mov ebx,r9d
fffff80a`83ab8d26 48895de0 mov qword ptr [rbp-20h],rbx
fffff80a`83ab8d2a 498bf8 mov rdi,r8
fffff80a`83ab8d2d 4c8be2 mov r12,rdx
fffff80a`83ab8d30 4c8be9 mov r13,rcx
fffff80a`83ab8d33 458bf9 mov r15d,r9d
fffff80a`83ab8d36 418af1 mov sil,r9b
fffff80a`83ab8d39 458af1 mov r14b,r9b
fffff80a`83ab8d3c 4d85c0 test r8,r8
fffff80a`83ab8d3f 0f848e000000 je WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0xe3 (fffff80a`83ab8dd3)
fffff80a`83ab8d45 488b150ce3fbff mov rdx,qword ptr [WdFilter!WPP_GLOBAL_Control (fffff80a`83a77058)]
fffff80a`83ab8d4c 418d7101 lea esi,[r9+1]
fffff80a`83ab8d50 483bd0 cmp rdx,rax
fffff80a`83ab8d53 740b je WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x70 (fffff80a`83ab8d60)
fffff80a`83ab8d55 8b422c mov eax,dword ptr [rdx+2Ch]
fffff80a`83ab8d58 a804 test al,4
fffff80a`83ab8d5a 0f85d4010000 jne WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x244 (fffff80a`83ab8f34)
fffff80a`83ab8d60 8b4708 mov eax,dword ptr [rdi+8]
fffff80a`83ab8d63 4084c6 test sil,al
fffff80a`83ab8d66 0f84fd010000 je WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x279 (fffff80a`83ab8f69)
fffff80a`83ab8d6c 488b5f30 mov rbx,qword ptr [rdi+30h]
fffff80a`83ab8d70 488b4f28 mov rcx,qword ptr [rdi+28h]
fffff80a`83ab8d74 4885c9 test rcx,rcx
fffff80a`83ab8d77 0f8470010000 je WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x1fd (fffff80a`83ab8eed)
fffff80a`83ab8d7d f7415000400000 test dword ptr [rcx+50h],4000h
fffff80a`83ab8d84 4c8d45e8 lea r8,[rbp-18h]
fffff80a`83ab8d88 488bd3 mov rdx,rbx
fffff80a`83ab8d8b 490f45c9 cmovne rcx,r9
fffff80a`83ab8d8f e860080000 call WdFilter!MpGetImageNormalizedName (fffff80a`83ab95f4)
fffff80a`83ab8d94 4533c9 xor r9d,r9d
fffff80a`83ab8d97 85c0 test eax,eax
fffff80a`83ab8d99 0f8848020000 js WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x2f7 (fffff80a`83ab8fe7)
fffff80a`83ab8d9f 488b4f28 mov rcx,qword ptr [rdi+28h]
fffff80a`83ab8da3 4885c9 test rcx,rcx
fffff80a`83ab8da6 0f8439010000 je WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x1f5 (fffff80a`83ab8ee5)
fffff80a`83ab8dac 4c390d5decfbff cmp qword ptr [WdFilter!MpTxfData (fffff80a`83a77a10)],r9
fffff80a`83ab8db3 0f842c010000 je WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x1f5 (fffff80a`83ab8ee5)
fffff80a`83ab8db9 48ff15d0a5faff call qword ptr [WdFilter!_imp_IoGetTransactionParameterBlock (fffff80a`83a63390)]
fffff80a`83ab8dc0 0f1f440000 nop dword ptr [rax+rax]
fffff80a`83ab8dc5 4533c9 xor r9d,r9d
fffff80a`83ab8dc8 4885c0 test rax,rax
fffff80a`83ab8dcb 410f95c6 setne r14b
fffff80a`83ab8dcf 4c8b7f10 mov r15,qword ptr [rdi+10h]
fffff80a`83ab8dd3 450fb6c6 movzx r8d,r14b
fffff80a`83ab8dd7 44884df0 mov byte ptr [rbp-10h],r9b
fffff80a`83ab8ddb 4885ff test rdi,rdi
fffff80a`83ab8dde 0f84a0000000 je WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x194 (fffff80a`83ab8e84)
fffff80a`83ab8de4 488b5738 mov rdx,qword ptr [rdi+38h]
fffff80a`83ab8de8 488b45e8 mov rax,qword ptr [rbp-18h]
fffff80a`83ab8dec 488d4808 lea rcx,[rax+8]
fffff80a`83ab8df0 4885c0 test rax,rax
fffff80a`83ab8df3 0f8433010000 je WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x23c (fffff80a`83ab8f2c)
fffff80a`83ab8df9 4885ff test rdi,rdi
fffff80a`83ab8dfc 0f84db000000 je WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x1ed (fffff80a`83ab8edd)
fffff80a`83ab8e02 488b4728 mov rax,qword ptr [rdi+28h]
fffff80a`83ab8e06 4c8d4df0 lea r9,[rbp-10h]
fffff80a`83ab8e0a 4c894c2440 mov qword ptr [rsp+40h],r9
fffff80a`83ab8e0f 448ace mov r9b,sil
fffff80a`83ab8e12 4889542438 mov qword ptr [rsp+38h],rdx
fffff80a`83ab8e17 498bd7 mov rdx,r15
fffff80a`83ab8e1a 48894c2430 mov qword ptr [rsp+30h],rcx
fffff80a`83ab8e1f 498bcd mov rcx,r13
fffff80a`83ab8e22 4889442428 mov qword ptr [rsp+28h],rax
fffff80a`83ab8e27 4489442420 mov dword ptr [rsp+20h],r8d1.文件名检查
可以看到在
fffff80a`83ab8d6c mov rbx, qword ptr [rdi+30h] ; 获取 ImageFileName 指针
fffff80a`83ab8d8f call WdFilter!MpGetImageNormalizedName
Defender 并不直接信任 rdi+30h 里的路径,而是调用 MpGetImageNormalizedName 进行格式化。这是为了防止通过路径欺骗(如符号链接、长路径名等)绕过检测。这里可以大概判断window defender可能对文件名是有鉴定的 可能是为了防止一些红队钓鱼手法?
1: kd> u WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x137 L30
WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x137:
fffff80a`83ab8e27 4489442420 mov dword ptr [rsp+20h],r8d
fffff80a`83ab8e2c 4d8bc4 mov r8,r12
fffff80a`83ab8e2f e868020000 call WdFilter!MpHandleProcessNotification (fffff80a`83ab909c)
fffff80a`83ab8e34 4533ed xor r13d,r13d
fffff80a`83ab8e37 4084f6 test sil,sil
fffff80a`83ab8e3a 7560 jne WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x1ac (fffff80a`83ab8e9c)
fffff80a`83ab8e3c 4584f6 test r14b,r14b
fffff80a`83ab8e3f 0f852c020000 jne WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x381 (fffff80a`83ab9071)
fffff80a`83ab8e45 4885db test rbx,rbx
fffff80a`83ab8e48 7542 jne WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x19c (fffff80a`83ab8e8c)
fffff80a`83ab8e4a 488b4de8 mov rcx,qword ptr [rbp-18h]
fffff80a`83ab8e4e 4885c9 test rcx,rcx
fffff80a`83ab8e51 740c je WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x16f (fffff80a`83ab8e5f)
fffff80a`83ab8e53 48ff1536a4faff call qword ptr [WdFilter!_imp_FltReleaseFileNameInformation (fffff80a`83a63290)]
fffff80a`83ab8e5a 0f1f440000 nop dword ptr [rax+rax]
fffff80a`83ab8e5f 488b4df8 mov rcx,qword ptr [rbp-8]
fffff80a`83ab8e63 4833cc xor rcx,rsp
fffff80a`83ab8e66 e8c58bfaff call WdFilter!_security_check_cookie (fffff80a`83a61a30)
fffff80a`83ab8e6b 488b9c24c8000000 mov rbx,qword ptr [rsp+0C8h]
fffff80a`83ab8e73 4883c470 add rsp,70h
fffff80a`83ab8e77 415f pop r15
fffff80a`83ab8e79 415e pop r14
fffff80a`83ab8e7b 415d pop r13
fffff80a`83ab8e7d 415c pop r12
fffff80a`83ab8e7f 5f pop rdi
fffff80a`83ab8e80 5e pop rsi
fffff80a`83ab8e81 5d pop rbp
fffff80a`83ab8e82 c3 ret
fffff80a`83ab8e83 cc int 3
fffff80a`83ab8e84 498bd1 mov rdx,r9
fffff80a`83ab8e87 e95cffffff jmp WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0xf8 (fffff80a`83ab8de8)
fffff80a`83ab8e8c 48395f30 cmp qword ptr [rdi+30h],rbx
fffff80a`83ab8e90 74b8 je WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x15a (fffff80a`83ab8e4a)
fffff80a`83ab8e92 488bcb mov rcx,rbx
fffff80a`83ab8e95 e896d1ffff call WdFilter!MpFreeString (fffff80a`83ab6030)
fffff80a`83ab8e9a ebae jmp WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x15a (fffff80a`83ab8e4a)
fffff80a`83ab8e9c 44386df0 cmp byte ptr [rbp-10h],r13b
fffff80a`83ab8ea0 749a je WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x14c (fffff80a`83ab8e3c)
fffff80a`83ab8ea2 c74740220000c0 mov dword ptr [rdi+40h],0C0000022h
fffff80a`83ab8ea9 488b05a8e1fbff mov rax,qword ptr [WdFilter!WPP_GLOBAL_Control (fffff80a`83a77058)]
fffff80a`83ab8eb0 488d0da1e1fbff lea rcx,[WdFilter!WPP_GLOBAL_Control (fffff80a`83a77058)]
fffff80a`83ab8eb7 483bc1 cmp rax,rcx
fffff80a`83ab8eba 7480 je WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x14c (fffff80a`83ab8e3c)
fffff80a`83ab8ebc 8b402c mov eax,dword ptr [rax+2Ch]
fffff80a`83ab8ebf a802 test al,2
fffff80a`83ab8ec1 0f8475ffffff je WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x14c (fffff80a`83ab8e3c)
fffff80a`83ab8ec7 488b45e8 mov rax,qword ptr [rbp-18h]
fffff80a`83ab8ecb 4885c0 test rax,rax2.恶意文件处理
在fffff80a`83ab8ea2 c74740220000c0 mov dword ptr [rdi+40h],0C0000022h
这里rdi就是_PS_CREATE_NOTIFY_INFO结构 偏移40h就是CreationStatus 而0xC0000022刚才就是拒绝访问的状态码 也就是说是这个判断进程是否安全
后面代码太长就不放上来了 好多一直call和jmp不停 看得我头大 就只是简单看一下
3.父进程上下文检测
fffff80a`83ab921e call WdFilter!MpGetProcessContextById
fffff80a`83ab9230 bts dword ptr [rcx+34h], 0Fh
这里前面获得了父进程id 然后赋值给r13 call了MpGetProcessContextById 应该是在检测父进程的上下文
4.文档检测
fffff80a`83ab9241 call WdFilter!MpSetProcessDocOpenRule
这里有点意外 虽然知道杀软都会防止宏病毒之类的 这里他会回溯父进程 看是不是文档编辑器 或者检测子进程是不是唤起cmd powershell啥的
可以看到 msaccess.exe powerpoint.exe acrord32.exe都是被检测的对象
5.传回用户层
fffff80a`83ab93e4 call WdFilter!MpSendProcessMessage
这里没搞明白 可能是传回用户层做云端查杀和启发式
6.特殊进程
fffff80a`83ab92ab call WdFilter!MpSetProcessExempt
fffff80a`83ab92ba call WdFilter!MpSetProcessHardening
MpSetProcessExempt是判断是否为关键进程 例如系统进程
MpSetProcessHardening是相关策略 例如禁止加载非微软签名dll
7.检测创建进程的调用者
fffff80a`83ab9300 call qword ptr [WdFilter!_imp_IoThreadToProcess]
fffff80a`83ab930c cmp rax, rbx
这个应该是防止远程创建
8.白名单逻辑
fffff80a`83ab6268 call qword ptr [WdFilter!_imp_FltParseFileName] 拿到全路径
fffff80a`83ab62a9 call qword ptr [WdFilter!_imp_RtlEqualUnicodeString] 对比是否为白文件
fffff80a`83ab62c1 call qword ptr [WdFilter!_imp_RtlPrefixUnicodeString] 对比是否在白目录下
9.设置
1: kd> dq [fffff80a`83a77990]+18 L1
fffff80a83a779a8 000013880000ea60
这里000013880000ea60就是defender默认扫描超时时间 60秒
线程回调检测
前言:被锁死的 Ring3 注入
在现代红队攻防中,传统的 CreateRemoteThread 或 QueueUserAPC 注入早已不再是单纯的 API 调用。Windows 内核提供的 PsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine 回调成了所有杀软的强力检查手段 ,很多时候线程创建基本不可能绕过了,基本只能靠发现新的滥用手法,例如前年的pool注入 我们在winbg查看注册的线程回调
u nt!PsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine L30
PspSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine
PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutineEx
PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx2
分别先后调了这些
kd> u PspSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine l50
nt!PspSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine:
fffff800`171dc580 48895c2408 mov qword ptr [rsp+8],rbx
fffff800`171dc585 4889742410 mov qword ptr [rsp+10h],rsi
fffff800`171dc58a 57 push rdi
fffff800`171dc58b 4883ec20 sub rsp,20h
fffff800`171dc58f 8bf2 mov esi,edx
fffff800`171dc591 8bd2 mov edx,edx
fffff800`171dc593 e8b0030000 call nt!ExAllocateCallBack (fffff800`171dc948)
fffff800`171dc598 488bf8 mov rdi,rax
fffff800`171dc59b 4885c0 test rax,rax
fffff800`171dc59e 0f8436170b00 je nt!PspSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine+0xb175a (fffff800`1728dcda)
fffff800`171dc5a4 33db xor ebx,ebx
fffff800`171dc5a6 488d0dc3d3daff lea rcx,[nt!PspCreateThreadNotifyRoutine (fffff800`16f89970)]
fffff800`171dc5ad 4533c0 xor r8d,r8d
fffff800`171dc5b0 488d0cd9 lea rcx,[rcx+rbx*8]
fffff800`171dc5b4 488bd7 mov rdx,rdi
fffff800`171dc5b7 e8b049a5ff call nt!ExCompareExchangeCallBack (fffff800`16c30f6c)
fffff800`171dc5bc 84c0 test al,al
fffff800`171dc5be 7436 je nt!PspSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine+0x76 (fffff800`171dc5f6)
fffff800`171dc5c0 40f6c601 test sil,1
fffff800`171dc5c4 0f851a170b00 jne nt!PspSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine+0xb1764 (fffff800`1728dce4)
fffff800`171dc5ca f0ff05fb022400 lock inc dword ptr [nt!PspCreateThreadNotifyRoutineCount (fffff800`1741c8cc)]
fffff800`171dc5d1 8b055dff2300 mov eax,dword ptr [nt!PspNotifyEnableMask (fffff800`1741c534)]
fffff800`171dc5d7 a808 test al,8
fffff800`171dc5d9 7509 jne nt!PspSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine+0x64 (fffff800`171dc5e4)
fffff800`171dc5db f00fba2d50ff230003 lock bts dword ptr [nt!PspNotifyEnableMask (fffff800`1741c534)],3
fffff800`171dc5e4 33c0 xor eax,eax
fffff800`171dc5e6 488b5c2430 mov rbx,qword ptr [rsp+30h]
fffff800`171dc5eb 488b742438 mov rsi,qword ptr [rsp+38h]
fffff800`171dc5f0 4883c420 add rsp,20h
fffff800`171dc5f4 5f pop rdi
fffff800`171dc5f5 c3 ret
fffff800`171dc5f6 ffc3 inc ebx
fffff800`171dc5f8 83fb40 cmp ebx,40h
fffff800`171dc5fb 72a9 jb nt!PspSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine+0x26 (fffff800`171dc5a6)
fffff800`171dc5fd e9ce160b00 jmp nt!PspSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine+0xb1750 (fffff800`1728dcd0)
fffff800`171dc602 cc int 3
fffff800`171dc603 cc int 3
fffff800`171dc604 cc int 3
fffff800`171dc605 cc int 3
fffff800`171dc606 cc int 3
fffff800`171dc607 cc int 3
fffff800`171dc608 cc int 3
fffff800`171dc609 cc int 3
fffff800`171dc60a cc int 3
fffff800`171dc60b cc int 3
fffff800`171dc60c cc int 3
fffff800`171dc60d cc int 3
fffff800`171dc60e cc int 3
fffff800`171dc60f cc int 3
nt!PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutineEx:
fffff800`171dc610 48895c2418 mov qword ptr [rsp+18h],rbx
fffff800`171dc615 4889742420 mov qword ptr [rsp+20h],rsi
fffff800`171dc61a 57 push rdi
fffff800`171dc61b 4883ec70 sub rsp,70h
fffff800`171dc61f 488b057a86cdff mov rax,qword ptr [nt!_security_cookie (fffff800`16eb4ca0)]
fffff800`171dc626 4833c4 xor rax,rsp
fffff800`171dc629 4889442460 mov qword ptr [rsp+60h],rax
fffff800`171dc62e 488bf1 mov rsi,rcx
fffff800`171dc631 48f7c2feffffff test rdx,0FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEh
fffff800`171dc638 0f85ca160b00 jne nt!PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutineEx+0xb16f8 (fffff800`1728dd08)
fffff800`171dc63e e805030000 call nt!ExAllocateCallBack (fffff800`171dc948)
fffff800`171dc643 488bf8 mov rdi,rax
fffff800`171dc646 4885c0 test rax,rax
fffff800`171dc649 0f84cd160b00 je nt!PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutineEx+0xb170c (fffff800`1728dd1c)
fffff800`171dc64f 33db xor ebx,ebx
fffff800`171dc651 488d0d18d5daff lea rcx,[nt!PspLoadImageNotifyRoutine (fffff800`16f89b70)]
fffff800`171dc658 4533c0 xor r8d,r8d
fffff800`171dc65b 488d0cd9 lea rcx,[rcx+rbx*8]
fffff800`171dc65f 488bd7 mov rdx,rdi
fffff800`171dc662 e80549a5ff call nt!ExCompareExchangeCallBack (fffff800`16c30f6c)
fffff800`171dc667 84c0 test al,al
fffff800`171dc669 0f849f000000 je nt!PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutineEx+0xfe (fffff800`171dc70e)
fffff800`171dc66f f0ff0552022400 lock inc dword ptr [nt!PspLoadImageNotifyRoutineCount (fffff800`1741c8c8)]
fffff800`171dc676 8b05b8fe2300 mov eax,dword ptr [nt!PspNotifyEnableMask (fffff800`1741c534)]
fffff800`171dc67c a801 test al,1
fffff800`171dc67e 7509 jne nt!PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutineEx+0x79 (fffff800`171dc689)
fffff800`171dc680 f00fba2dabfe230000 lock bts dword ptr [nt!PspNotifyEnableMask (fffff800`1741c534)],0
fffff800`171dc689 33db xor ebx,ebx
fffff800`171dc68b 488b0d26dacdff mov rcx,qword ptr [nt!EtwApiCallsProvRegHandle (fffff800`16eba0b8)]
fffff800`171dc692 895c2430 mov dword ptr [rsp+30h],ebx
fffff800`171dc696 4889742438 mov qword ptr [rsp+38h],rsi通过代码可以定位到
线程回调数组 (Thread):fffff800'171dc5a6 488d0dc3d3daff lea rcx,[nt!PspCreateThreadNotifyRoutine (fffff800'16f89970)]
地址:fffff800'16f89970
1: kd> dq fffff800`16f89970 L10
fffff800`16f89970 ffff8283`4800858f ffff8283`480086df
fffff800`16f89980 ffff8283`487a43ff ffff8283`487a9b2f
fffff800`16f89990 ffff8283`487a9bbf 00000000`00000000
fffff800`16f899a0 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000
fffff800`16f899b0 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000
fffff800`16f899c0 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000
fffff800`16f899d0 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000
fffff800`16f899e0 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000可以看到有5个驱动在监控线程创建
分别是
1: kd> dps ffff8283`48008580 L2
ffff8283`48008580 00000000`00000020
ffff8283`48008588 fffff80a`83aaf690 WdFilter!MpCreateThreadNotifyRoutine
1: kd> dps ffff8283`480086d0 L2
ffff8283`480086d0 00000000`00000020
ffff8283`480086d8 fffff80a`83ab5db0 WdFilter!MpCreateThreadNotifyRoutineEx
1: kd> dps ffff8283`487a43f0 L2
ffff8283`487a43f0 00000000`00000020
ffff8283`487a43f8 fffff800`1aad1010 mmcss!CiThreadNotification
1: kd> dps ffff8283`487a9b20 L2
ffff8283`487a9b20 00000000`00000020
ffff8283`487a9b28 fffff800`1ae9c5a0 KslD!tk::COSCallback::CreateThreadNotifyRoutine
1: kd> dps ffff8283`487a9bb0 L2
ffff8283`487a9bb0 00000000`00000020
ffff8283`487a9bb8 fffff800`1ae9c640 KslD!tk::COSCallback::CreateThreadNotifyRoutineEx
1: kd>
ffff8283`487a9bb0 00000000`00000020
ffff8283`487a9bb8 fffff800`1ae9c640 KslD!tk::COSCallback::CreateThreadNotifyRoutineEx重点关注WdFilter!MpCreateThreadNotifyRoutine和WdFilter!MpCreateThreadNotifyRoutineEx
(1) 逻辑入口 A:fffff80a'83aaf690 (MpCreateThreadNotifyRoutine)
这个函数通常负责基础过滤。
主要工作: 检查 MpData,如果创建者是白名单直接返回。
审计重点: 寻找 cmp 指令比对 MpData+0xF0 的地方。
(2) 逻辑入口 B:fffff80a'83ab5db0 (NotifyRoutineEx)
这个函数是关键,它能拿到 PS_CREATE_THREAD_NOTIFY_ROUTINE_EX 结构,里面包含线程的初始栈空间和起始地址。
主要工作: 进行 VAD扫描。
检测点: 它会检查 StartAddress 是否指向一个 SEC_IMAGE 映射。如果你是用 VirtualAlloc 申请内存后直接 CreateRemoteThread,这个函数会立刻识破你
fffff80a`83aaf6cf 4584c0 test r8b,r8b
fffff80a`83aaf6d2 0f84d0050000 je WdFilter!MpCreateThreadNotifyRoutine+0x618 (fffff80a`83aafca8)
fffff80a`83aaf6d8 4183fc04 cmp r12d,4
fffff80a`83aaf6dc 0f847e010000 je WdFilter!MpCreateThreadNotifyRoutine+0x1d0 (fffff80a`83aaf860)
fffff80a`83aaf6e2 65488b0c2588010000 mov rcx,qword ptr gs:[188h]
fffff80a`83aaf6eb 48ff15ae41fbff call qword ptr [WdFilter!_imp_PsIsSystemThread (fffff80a`83a638a0)]
fffff80a`83aaf6f2 0f1f440000 nop dword ptr [rax+rax]fffff80a`83aaf6d8 4183fc04 cmp r12d,4这一句以及后面的代码证明了system进程创建线程是不管的 因为4刚好就是system进程
fffff80a`83aaf707 call nt!PsGetCurrentProcessId
fffff80a`83aaf713 mov r15, rax ; r15 = 当前进程 PID (发起者)
...
fffff80a`83aaf722 cmp r15, r12 ; 比较 [发起者PID] 和 [目标进程PID]
fffff80a`83aaf72e setne byte ptr [rsp+30h] ; 如果不相等(跨进程注入),标志位置 1这里也是检查是远程还是本地创建线程
镜像加载回调数组 (LoadImage):fffff800'171dc651 488d0d18d5daff lea rcx,[nt!PspLoadImageNotifyRoutine (fffff800'16f89b70)]
地址:fffff800'16f89b70
尝试在目标机器安装火绒后调试
检查刚才的注册的回调
0: kd> dq fffff800`16f89970 L10
fffff800`16f89970 ffff8283`4800858f ffff8283`480086df
fffff800`16f89980 ffff8283`487a43ff ffff8283`487a9b2f
fffff800`16f89990 ffff8283`487a9bbf ffff8283`4ce6aebf
fffff800`16f899a0 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000
fffff800`16f899b0 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000
fffff800`16f899c0 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000
fffff800`16f899d0 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000
fffff800`16f899e0 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000安装后多了一个新的创建线程回调 ffff8283`4ce6aebf
0: kd> dps ffff8283`4ce6aeb0 l2
ffff8283`4ce6aeb0 00000000`00000020
ffff8283`4ce6aeb8 fffff800`1af1cc50 sysdiag+0xcc50一开始看线程回调全是0 后面发现安装后要重启才能生效 后续
1: kd> dps ffffbb8e`7c318b00 l20
ffffbb8e`7c318b00 00000000`00000020
ffffbb8e`7c318b08 fffff802`36cfc640 KslD!tk::COSCallback::CreateThreadNotifyRoutineEx
ffffbb8e`7c318b10 00000000`00000001
ffffbb8e`7c318b18 00790072`00740073
ffffbb8e`7c318b20 62726243`02038100
ffffbb8e`7c318b28 cccccccc`ccccccc3
ffffbb8e`7c318b30 00000000`00000020
ffffbb8e`7c318b38 fffff802`36cfc5a0 KslD!tk::COSCallback::CreateThreadNotifyRoutine
ffffbb8e`7c318b40 00000000`00000000
ffffbb8e`7c318b48 00000000`00000001
ffffbb8e`7c318b50 30614b54`02034800
ffffbb8e`7c318b58 c36c5222`0f449fd8
ffffbb8e`7c318b60 fffff802`36d36a08 KslD!tk::COSAPI::_OS_API_SHIM_ENTRY::`vftable'
ffffbb8e`7c318b68 00000000`00000000
ffffbb8e`7c318b70 ffff9702`9e669490
ffffbb8e`7c318b78 fffff802`36cfac30 KslD!tk::FreeMemory
ffffbb8e`7c318b80 20206f49`02030000可以看到火绒也是拦截线程创建的
1: kd> u fffff802`36cfc640 l50
KslD!tk::COSCallback::CreateThreadNotifyRoutineEx:
fffff802`36cfc640 488bc4 mov rax,rsp
fffff802`36cfc643 48895808 mov qword ptr [rax+8],rbx
fffff802`36cfc647 48896810 mov qword ptr [rax+10h],rbp
fffff802`36cfc64b 48897018 mov qword ptr [rax+18h],rsi
fffff802`36cfc64f 48897820 mov qword ptr [rax+20h],rdi
fffff802`36cfc653 4156 push r14
fffff802`36cfc655 4883ec30 sub rsp,30h
fffff802`36cfc659 488b3d40ea0300 mov rdi,qword ptr [KslD!tk::COSCallback::s_pInstance (fffff802`36d3b0a0)]
fffff802`36cfc660 418af0 mov sil,r8b
fffff802`36cfc663 488bea mov rbp,rdx
fffff802`36cfc666 4c8bf1 mov r14,rcx
fffff802`36cfc669 4885ff test rdi,rdi
fffff802`36cfc66c 7452 je KslD!tk::COSCallback::CreateThreadNotifyRoutineEx+0x80 (fffff802`36cfc6c0)
fffff802`36cfc66e 488d9710010000 lea rdx,[rdi+110h]
fffff802`36cfc675 488d48e8 lea rcx,[rax-18h]
fffff802`36cfc679 e83af3ffff call KslD!tk::CEResourceLock::CEResourceLock (fffff802`36cfb9b8)
fffff802`36cfc67e 33db xor ebx,ebx
fffff802`36cfc680 483b9f28020000 cmp rbx,qword ptr [rdi+228h]
fffff802`36cfc687 7d2d jge KslD!tk::COSCallback::CreateThreadNotifyRoutineEx+0x76 (fffff802`36cfc6b6)
fffff802`36cfc689 488b8730020000 mov rax,qword ptr [rdi+230h]
fffff802`36cfc690 488b0cd8 mov rcx,qword ptr [rax+rbx*8]
fffff802`36cfc694 4885c9 test rcx,rcx
fffff802`36cfc697 7418 je KslD!tk::COSCallback::CreateThreadNotifyRoutineEx+0x71 (fffff802`36cfc6b1)
fffff802`36cfc699 488b4108 mov rax,qword ptr [rcx+8]
fffff802`36cfc69d 4885c0 test rax,rax
fffff802`36cfc6a0 740f je KslD!tk::COSCallback::CreateThreadNotifyRoutineEx+0x71 (fffff802`36cfc6b1)
fffff802`36cfc6a2 448ac6 mov r8b,sil
fffff802`36cfc6a5 488bd5 mov rdx,rbp
fffff802`36cfc6a8 498bce mov rcx,r14
fffff802`36cfc6ab ff15ef2b0300 call qword ptr [KslD!_guard_dispatch_icall_fptr (fffff802`36d2f2a0)]
fffff802`36cfc6b1 48ffc3 inc rbx
fffff802`36cfc6b4 ebca jmp KslD!tk::COSCallback::CreateThreadNotifyRoutineEx+0x40 (fffff802`36cfc680)
fffff802`36cfc6b6 488d4c2420 lea rcx,[rsp+20h]
fffff802`36cfc6bb e890f3ffff call KslD!tk::CEResourceLock::~CEResourceLock (fffff802`36cfba50)
fffff802`36cfc6c0 488b5c2440 mov rbx,qword ptr [rsp+40h]
fffff802`36cfc6c5 488b6c2448 mov rbp,qword ptr [rsp+48h]
fffff802`36cfc6ca 488b742450 mov rsi,qword ptr [rsp+50h]
fffff802`36cfc6cf 488b7c2458 mov rdi,qword ptr [rsp+58h]
fffff802`36cfc6d4 4883c430 add rsp,30h
fffff802`36cfc6d8 415e pop r14
fffff802`36cfc6da c3 ret
fffff802`36cfc6db cc int 3
fffff802`36cfc6dc cc int 3
fffff802`36cfc6dd cc int 3
fffff802`36cfc6de cc int 3
fffff802`36cfc6df cc int 3实际代码巨复杂 到后面完全看不下去了 各种call 跳不停 根本看不完 技术有限只能分析到这里了
深入解析杀软内核驱动的三类回调(进程/线程/镜像加载),涵盖监控锚定、策略匹配、阻断执行全流程,并基于WinDbg完成双机调试与函数级逆向分析。
由 AI 根据全文自动生成,仅供参考,以原文为准