前言

在 Windows 架构中,杀软内核驱动通常扮演着“超级裁判”的角色。它通过在内核中植入一系列通知回调(Notification Routines)和微过滤监听器(Minifilter Callbacks),将自己强行插入到系统处理关键动作(如进程启动、文件读写、内存映射)的路径上。

分析这些驱动的概念核心可以归纳为以下三个维度:

监控点的“锚定”与“劫持”

杀软并不生成系统动作,它只“订阅”动作。分析的首要目标是确认它在内核中注册了哪些眼线。

注册回调:利用 PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine 等标准接口,确保任何新进程的诞生都必须先经过它的逻辑判断。

对象过滤:通过 ObRegisterCallbacks 监控句柄操作,防止恶意程序尝试打开 LSASS 等敏感进程的句柄。

文件过滤:利用 Minifilter 框架,在文件到达磁盘前进行扫描,这是拦截勒索软件或恶意载荷(Payload)落地的核心战场。

策略池的“匹配”与“决策”

当一个动作被拦截下来后,驱动内部会进入逻辑决策阶段。

静态特征匹配:将当前进程名、路径或证书信息与内存中的全局规则链表(如你之前看到的 MpBmDocOpenRules)进行快速比对。

动态行为评分:根据进程短时间内的 API 调用序列(如:申请内存 -> 修改权限 -> 远程注入)进行启发式评估。

内核态与用户态的通信:内核驱动(EDR Driver)通过 FilterCommunicationPort 将复杂的判定任务“外包”给用户态的高性能分析服务,并根据返回的结果决定是否给该动作判“死刑”。

“阻断”与“放行”的终极对抗

分析的终点在于理解杀软如何下达指令。

状态码注入:在回调中将 CreationStatus 修改为 STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED,从内核底层撤销该动作的合法性。

上下文擦除:在恶意代码执行前,通过抹除其内存映射或强制结束其线程池来实现无感阻断。

接下来我们要通过调试内核对杀软进行初步分析

搭建双机调试环境

我的主机是window11 目标是vm的window10

打开虚拟机 移除掉打印机 这一步是必须的 不然打印机会占用位置

添加一个串行端口 注意这里必须和图里一样

然后加串口管道 和图一样就行 .\pipe\com_1

打开虚拟机用管理员启动

bcdedit /set “{current}” bootmenupolicy Legacy

bcdedit /dbgsettings SERIAL DEBUGPORT:1 BAUDRATE:115200

bcdedit /copy “{current}” /d “Debug”

bcdedit /debug “{<上一步返回的复杂到这里>}” on

win+r 运行 msconfig

windbg这样写 记住调试的window10 windbg必须用新版的

后续开机启动选择刚刚创建的 windbg有connect就是成功了

创建进程回调

在内核中,杀软通过 PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx 注册回调。每当一个新的 EPROCESS 被分配并准备运行时,内核会暂停进程,并挨个询问杀软进程的安全性,杀软会对多个角度进行检查,在后续我们也提到了

我们在windbg查看进程创建回调

1: kd> u WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx L50
WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx:
fffff80a`83ab8cf0 48895c2420      mov     qword ptr [rsp+20h],rbx
fffff80a`83ab8cf5 55              push    rbp
fffff80a`83ab8cf6 56              push    rsi
fffff80a`83ab8cf7 57              push    rdi
fffff80a`83ab8cf8 4154            push    r12
fffff80a`83ab8cfa 4155            push    r13
fffff80a`83ab8cfc 4156            push    r14
fffff80a`83ab8cfe 4157            push    r15
fffff80a`83ab8d00 488bec          mov     rbp,rsp
fffff80a`83ab8d03 4883ec70        sub     rsp,70h
fffff80a`83ab8d07 488b0532e3fbff  mov     rax,qword ptr [WdFilter!_security_cookie (fffff80a`83a77040)]
fffff80a`83ab8d0e 4833c4          xor     rax,rsp
fffff80a`83ab8d11 488945f8        mov     qword ptr [rbp-8],rax
fffff80a`83ab8d15 4533c9          xor     r9d,r9d
fffff80a`83ab8d18 488d0539e3fbff  lea     rax,[WdFilter!WPP_GLOBAL_Control (fffff80a`83a77058)]
fffff80a`83ab8d1f 4c894de8        mov     qword ptr [rbp-18h],r9
fffff80a`83ab8d23 418bd9          mov     ebx,r9d
fffff80a`83ab8d26 48895de0        mov     qword ptr [rbp-20h],rbx
fffff80a`83ab8d2a 498bf8          mov     rdi,r8
fffff80a`83ab8d2d 4c8be2          mov     r12,rdx
fffff80a`83ab8d30 4c8be9          mov     r13,rcx
fffff80a`83ab8d33 458bf9          mov     r15d,r9d
fffff80a`83ab8d36 418af1          mov     sil,r9b
fffff80a`83ab8d39 458af1          mov     r14b,r9b
fffff80a`83ab8d3c 4d85c0          test    r8,r8
fffff80a`83ab8d3f 0f848e000000    je      WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0xe3 (fffff80a`83ab8dd3)
fffff80a`83ab8d45 488b150ce3fbff  mov     rdx,qword ptr [WdFilter!WPP_GLOBAL_Control (fffff80a`83a77058)]
fffff80a`83ab8d4c 418d7101        lea     esi,[r9+1]
fffff80a`83ab8d50 483bd0          cmp     rdx,rax
fffff80a`83ab8d53 740b            je      WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x70 (fffff80a`83ab8d60)
fffff80a`83ab8d55 8b422c          mov     eax,dword ptr [rdx+2Ch]
fffff80a`83ab8d58 a804            test    al,4
fffff80a`83ab8d5a 0f85d4010000    jne     WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x244 (fffff80a`83ab8f34)
fffff80a`83ab8d60 8b4708          mov     eax,dword ptr [rdi+8]
fffff80a`83ab8d63 4084c6          test    sil,al
fffff80a`83ab8d66 0f84fd010000    je      WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x279 (fffff80a`83ab8f69)
fffff80a`83ab8d6c 488b5f30        mov     rbx,qword ptr [rdi+30h]
fffff80a`83ab8d70 488b4f28        mov     rcx,qword ptr [rdi+28h]
fffff80a`83ab8d74 4885c9          test    rcx,rcx
fffff80a`83ab8d77 0f8470010000    je      WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x1fd (fffff80a`83ab8eed)
fffff80a`83ab8d7d f7415000400000  test    dword ptr [rcx+50h],4000h
fffff80a`83ab8d84 4c8d45e8        lea     r8,[rbp-18h]
fffff80a`83ab8d88 488bd3          mov     rdx,rbx
fffff80a`83ab8d8b 490f45c9        cmovne  rcx,r9
fffff80a`83ab8d8f e860080000      call    WdFilter!MpGetImageNormalizedName (fffff80a`83ab95f4)
fffff80a`83ab8d94 4533c9          xor     r9d,r9d
fffff80a`83ab8d97 85c0            test    eax,eax
fffff80a`83ab8d99 0f8848020000    js      WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x2f7 (fffff80a`83ab8fe7)
fffff80a`83ab8d9f 488b4f28        mov     rcx,qword ptr [rdi+28h]
fffff80a`83ab8da3 4885c9          test    rcx,rcx
fffff80a`83ab8da6 0f8439010000    je      WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x1f5 (fffff80a`83ab8ee5)
fffff80a`83ab8dac 4c390d5decfbff  cmp     qword ptr [WdFilter!MpTxfData (fffff80a`83a77a10)],r9
fffff80a`83ab8db3 0f842c010000    je      WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x1f5 (fffff80a`83ab8ee5)
fffff80a`83ab8db9 48ff15d0a5faff  call    qword ptr [WdFilter!_imp_IoGetTransactionParameterBlock (fffff80a`83a63390)]
fffff80a`83ab8dc0 0f1f440000      nop     dword ptr [rax+rax]
fffff80a`83ab8dc5 4533c9          xor     r9d,r9d
fffff80a`83ab8dc8 4885c0          test    rax,rax
fffff80a`83ab8dcb 410f95c6        setne   r14b
fffff80a`83ab8dcf 4c8b7f10        mov     r15,qword ptr [rdi+10h]
fffff80a`83ab8dd3 450fb6c6        movzx   r8d,r14b
fffff80a`83ab8dd7 44884df0        mov     byte ptr [rbp-10h],r9b
fffff80a`83ab8ddb 4885ff          test    rdi,rdi
fffff80a`83ab8dde 0f84a0000000    je      WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x194 (fffff80a`83ab8e84)
fffff80a`83ab8de4 488b5738        mov     rdx,qword ptr [rdi+38h]
fffff80a`83ab8de8 488b45e8        mov     rax,qword ptr [rbp-18h]
fffff80a`83ab8dec 488d4808        lea     rcx,[rax+8]
fffff80a`83ab8df0 4885c0          test    rax,rax
fffff80a`83ab8df3 0f8433010000    je      WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x23c (fffff80a`83ab8f2c)
fffff80a`83ab8df9 4885ff          test    rdi,rdi
fffff80a`83ab8dfc 0f84db000000    je      WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x1ed (fffff80a`83ab8edd)
fffff80a`83ab8e02 488b4728        mov     rax,qword ptr [rdi+28h]
fffff80a`83ab8e06 4c8d4df0        lea     r9,[rbp-10h]
fffff80a`83ab8e0a 4c894c2440      mov     qword ptr [rsp+40h],r9
fffff80a`83ab8e0f 448ace          mov     r9b,sil
fffff80a`83ab8e12 4889542438      mov     qword ptr [rsp+38h],rdx
fffff80a`83ab8e17 498bd7          mov     rdx,r15
fffff80a`83ab8e1a 48894c2430      mov     qword ptr [rsp+30h],rcx
fffff80a`83ab8e1f 498bcd          mov     rcx,r13
fffff80a`83ab8e22 4889442428      mov     qword ptr [rsp+28h],rax
fffff80a`83ab8e27 4489442420      mov     dword ptr [rsp+20h],r8d

1.文件名检查

可以看到在

fffff80a`83ab8d6c mov rbx, qword ptr [rdi+30h] ; 获取 ImageFileName 指针

fffff80a`83ab8d8f call WdFilter!MpGetImageNormalizedName

Defender 并不直接信任 rdi+30h 里的路径,而是调用 MpGetImageNormalizedName 进行格式化。这是为了防止通过路径欺骗(如符号链接、长路径名等)绕过检测。这里可以大概判断window defender可能对文件名是有鉴定的 可能是为了防止一些红队钓鱼手法?

1: kd> u WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x137 L30
WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x137:
fffff80a`83ab8e27 4489442420      mov     dword ptr [rsp+20h],r8d
fffff80a`83ab8e2c 4d8bc4          mov     r8,r12
fffff80a`83ab8e2f e868020000      call    WdFilter!MpHandleProcessNotification (fffff80a`83ab909c)
fffff80a`83ab8e34 4533ed          xor     r13d,r13d
fffff80a`83ab8e37 4084f6          test    sil,sil
fffff80a`83ab8e3a 7560            jne     WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x1ac (fffff80a`83ab8e9c)
fffff80a`83ab8e3c 4584f6          test    r14b,r14b
fffff80a`83ab8e3f 0f852c020000    jne     WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x381 (fffff80a`83ab9071)
fffff80a`83ab8e45 4885db          test    rbx,rbx
fffff80a`83ab8e48 7542            jne     WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x19c (fffff80a`83ab8e8c)
fffff80a`83ab8e4a 488b4de8        mov     rcx,qword ptr [rbp-18h]
fffff80a`83ab8e4e 4885c9          test    rcx,rcx
fffff80a`83ab8e51 740c            je      WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x16f (fffff80a`83ab8e5f)
fffff80a`83ab8e53 48ff1536a4faff  call    qword ptr [WdFilter!_imp_FltReleaseFileNameInformation (fffff80a`83a63290)]
fffff80a`83ab8e5a 0f1f440000      nop     dword ptr [rax+rax]
fffff80a`83ab8e5f 488b4df8        mov     rcx,qword ptr [rbp-8]
fffff80a`83ab8e63 4833cc          xor     rcx,rsp
fffff80a`83ab8e66 e8c58bfaff      call    WdFilter!_security_check_cookie (fffff80a`83a61a30)
fffff80a`83ab8e6b 488b9c24c8000000 mov     rbx,qword ptr [rsp+0C8h]
fffff80a`83ab8e73 4883c470        add     rsp,70h
fffff80a`83ab8e77 415f            pop     r15
fffff80a`83ab8e79 415e            pop     r14
fffff80a`83ab8e7b 415d            pop     r13
fffff80a`83ab8e7d 415c            pop     r12
fffff80a`83ab8e7f 5f              pop     rdi
fffff80a`83ab8e80 5e              pop     rsi
fffff80a`83ab8e81 5d              pop     rbp
fffff80a`83ab8e82 c3              ret
fffff80a`83ab8e83 cc              int     3
fffff80a`83ab8e84 498bd1          mov     rdx,r9
fffff80a`83ab8e87 e95cffffff      jmp     WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0xf8 (fffff80a`83ab8de8)
fffff80a`83ab8e8c 48395f30        cmp     qword ptr [rdi+30h],rbx
fffff80a`83ab8e90 74b8            je      WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x15a (fffff80a`83ab8e4a)
fffff80a`83ab8e92 488bcb          mov     rcx,rbx
fffff80a`83ab8e95 e896d1ffff      call    WdFilter!MpFreeString (fffff80a`83ab6030)
fffff80a`83ab8e9a ebae            jmp     WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x15a (fffff80a`83ab8e4a)
fffff80a`83ab8e9c 44386df0        cmp     byte ptr [rbp-10h],r13b
fffff80a`83ab8ea0 749a            je      WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x14c (fffff80a`83ab8e3c)
fffff80a`83ab8ea2 c74740220000c0  mov     dword ptr [rdi+40h],0C0000022h
fffff80a`83ab8ea9 488b05a8e1fbff  mov     rax,qword ptr [WdFilter!WPP_GLOBAL_Control (fffff80a`83a77058)]
fffff80a`83ab8eb0 488d0da1e1fbff  lea     rcx,[WdFilter!WPP_GLOBAL_Control (fffff80a`83a77058)]
fffff80a`83ab8eb7 483bc1          cmp     rax,rcx
fffff80a`83ab8eba 7480            je      WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x14c (fffff80a`83ab8e3c)
fffff80a`83ab8ebc 8b402c          mov     eax,dword ptr [rax+2Ch]
fffff80a`83ab8ebf a802            test    al,2
fffff80a`83ab8ec1 0f8475ffffff    je      WdFilter!MpCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx+0x14c (fffff80a`83ab8e3c)
fffff80a`83ab8ec7 488b45e8        mov     rax,qword ptr [rbp-18h]
fffff80a`83ab8ecb 4885c0          test    rax,rax

2.恶意文件处理

在fffff80a`83ab8ea2 c74740220000c0 mov dword ptr [rdi+40h],0C0000022h

这里rdi就是_PS_CREATE_NOTIFY_INFO结构 偏移40h就是CreationStatus 而0xC0000022刚才就是拒绝访问的状态码 也就是说是这个判断进程是否安全

后面代码太长就不放上来了 好多一直call和jmp不停 看得我头大 就只是简单看一下

3.父进程上下文检测

fffff80a`83ab921e call WdFilter!MpGetProcessContextById

fffff80a`83ab9230 bts dword ptr [rcx+34h], 0Fh

这里前面获得了父进程id 然后赋值给r13 call了MpGetProcessContextById 应该是在检测父进程的上下文

4.文档检测

fffff80a`83ab9241 call WdFilter!MpSetProcessDocOpenRule

这里有点意外 虽然知道杀软都会防止宏病毒之类的 这里他会回溯父进程 看是不是文档编辑器 或者检测子进程是不是唤起cmd powershell啥的

可以看到 msaccess.exe powerpoint.exe acrord32.exe都是被检测的对象

5.传回用户层

fffff80a`83ab93e4 call WdFilter!MpSendProcessMessage

这里没搞明白 可能是传回用户层做云端查杀和启发式

6.特殊进程

fffff80a`83ab92ab call WdFilter!MpSetProcessExempt

fffff80a`83ab92ba call WdFilter!MpSetProcessHardening

MpSetProcessExempt是判断是否为关键进程 例如系统进程

MpSetProcessHardening是相关策略 例如禁止加载非微软签名dll

7.检测创建进程的调用者

fffff80a`83ab9300 call qword ptr [WdFilter!_imp_IoThreadToProcess]

fffff80a`83ab930c cmp rax, rbx

这个应该是防止远程创建

8.白名单逻辑

fffff80a`83ab6268 call qword ptr [WdFilter!_imp_FltParseFileName] 拿到全路径

fffff80a`83ab62a9 call qword ptr [WdFilter!_imp_RtlEqualUnicodeString] 对比是否为白文件

fffff80a`83ab62c1 call qword ptr [WdFilter!_imp_RtlPrefixUnicodeString] 对比是否在白目录下

9.设置

1: kd> dq [fffff80a`83a77990]+18 L1

fffff80a83a779a8 000013880000ea60

这里000013880000ea60就是defender默认扫描超时时间 60秒

线程回调检测

前言:被锁死的 Ring3 注入

在现代红队攻防中,传统的 CreateRemoteThread 或 QueueUserAPC 注入早已不再是单纯的 API 调用。Windows 内核提供的 PsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine 回调成了所有杀软的强力检查手段 ,很多时候线程创建基本不可能绕过了,基本只能靠发现新的滥用手法,例如前年的pool注入 我们在winbg查看注册的线程回调

u nt!PsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine L30

PspSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine

PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutineEx

PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx2

分别先后调了这些

kd> u PspSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine  l50
nt!PspSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine:
fffff800`171dc580 48895c2408      mov     qword ptr [rsp+8],rbx
fffff800`171dc585 4889742410      mov     qword ptr [rsp+10h],rsi
fffff800`171dc58a 57              push    rdi
fffff800`171dc58b 4883ec20        sub     rsp,20h
fffff800`171dc58f 8bf2            mov     esi,edx
fffff800`171dc591 8bd2            mov     edx,edx
fffff800`171dc593 e8b0030000      call    nt!ExAllocateCallBack (fffff800`171dc948)
fffff800`171dc598 488bf8          mov     rdi,rax
fffff800`171dc59b 4885c0          test    rax,rax
fffff800`171dc59e 0f8436170b00    je      nt!PspSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine+0xb175a (fffff800`1728dcda)
fffff800`171dc5a4 33db            xor     ebx,ebx
fffff800`171dc5a6 488d0dc3d3daff  lea     rcx,[nt!PspCreateThreadNotifyRoutine (fffff800`16f89970)]
fffff800`171dc5ad 4533c0          xor     r8d,r8d
fffff800`171dc5b0 488d0cd9        lea     rcx,[rcx+rbx*8]
fffff800`171dc5b4 488bd7          mov     rdx,rdi
fffff800`171dc5b7 e8b049a5ff      call    nt!ExCompareExchangeCallBack (fffff800`16c30f6c)
fffff800`171dc5bc 84c0            test    al,al
fffff800`171dc5be 7436            je      nt!PspSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine+0x76 (fffff800`171dc5f6)
fffff800`171dc5c0 40f6c601        test    sil,1
fffff800`171dc5c4 0f851a170b00    jne     nt!PspSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine+0xb1764 (fffff800`1728dce4)
fffff800`171dc5ca f0ff05fb022400  lock inc dword ptr [nt!PspCreateThreadNotifyRoutineCount (fffff800`1741c8cc)]
fffff800`171dc5d1 8b055dff2300    mov     eax,dword ptr [nt!PspNotifyEnableMask (fffff800`1741c534)]
fffff800`171dc5d7 a808            test    al,8
fffff800`171dc5d9 7509            jne     nt!PspSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine+0x64 (fffff800`171dc5e4)
fffff800`171dc5db f00fba2d50ff230003 lock bts dword ptr [nt!PspNotifyEnableMask (fffff800`1741c534)],3
fffff800`171dc5e4 33c0            xor     eax,eax
fffff800`171dc5e6 488b5c2430      mov     rbx,qword ptr [rsp+30h]
fffff800`171dc5eb 488b742438      mov     rsi,qword ptr [rsp+38h]
fffff800`171dc5f0 4883c420        add     rsp,20h
fffff800`171dc5f4 5f              pop     rdi
fffff800`171dc5f5 c3              ret
fffff800`171dc5f6 ffc3            inc     ebx
fffff800`171dc5f8 83fb40          cmp     ebx,40h
fffff800`171dc5fb 72a9            jb      nt!PspSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine+0x26 (fffff800`171dc5a6)
fffff800`171dc5fd e9ce160b00      jmp     nt!PspSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutine+0xb1750 (fffff800`1728dcd0)
fffff800`171dc602 cc              int     3
fffff800`171dc603 cc              int     3
fffff800`171dc604 cc              int     3
fffff800`171dc605 cc              int     3
fffff800`171dc606 cc              int     3
fffff800`171dc607 cc              int     3
fffff800`171dc608 cc              int     3
fffff800`171dc609 cc              int     3
fffff800`171dc60a cc              int     3
fffff800`171dc60b cc              int     3
fffff800`171dc60c cc              int     3
fffff800`171dc60d cc              int     3
fffff800`171dc60e cc              int     3
fffff800`171dc60f cc              int     3
nt!PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutineEx:
fffff800`171dc610 48895c2418      mov     qword ptr [rsp+18h],rbx
fffff800`171dc615 4889742420      mov     qword ptr [rsp+20h],rsi
fffff800`171dc61a 57              push    rdi
fffff800`171dc61b 4883ec70        sub     rsp,70h
fffff800`171dc61f 488b057a86cdff  mov     rax,qword ptr [nt!_security_cookie (fffff800`16eb4ca0)]
fffff800`171dc626 4833c4          xor     rax,rsp
fffff800`171dc629 4889442460      mov     qword ptr [rsp+60h],rax
fffff800`171dc62e 488bf1          mov     rsi,rcx
fffff800`171dc631 48f7c2feffffff  test    rdx,0FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEh
fffff800`171dc638 0f85ca160b00    jne     nt!PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutineEx+0xb16f8 (fffff800`1728dd08)
fffff800`171dc63e e805030000      call    nt!ExAllocateCallBack (fffff800`171dc948)
fffff800`171dc643 488bf8          mov     rdi,rax
fffff800`171dc646 4885c0          test    rax,rax
fffff800`171dc649 0f84cd160b00    je      nt!PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutineEx+0xb170c (fffff800`1728dd1c)
fffff800`171dc64f 33db            xor     ebx,ebx
fffff800`171dc651 488d0d18d5daff  lea     rcx,[nt!PspLoadImageNotifyRoutine (fffff800`16f89b70)]
fffff800`171dc658 4533c0          xor     r8d,r8d
fffff800`171dc65b 488d0cd9        lea     rcx,[rcx+rbx*8]
fffff800`171dc65f 488bd7          mov     rdx,rdi
fffff800`171dc662 e80549a5ff      call    nt!ExCompareExchangeCallBack (fffff800`16c30f6c)
fffff800`171dc667 84c0            test    al,al
fffff800`171dc669 0f849f000000    je      nt!PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutineEx+0xfe (fffff800`171dc70e)
fffff800`171dc66f f0ff0552022400  lock inc dword ptr [nt!PspLoadImageNotifyRoutineCount (fffff800`1741c8c8)]
fffff800`171dc676 8b05b8fe2300    mov     eax,dword ptr [nt!PspNotifyEnableMask (fffff800`1741c534)]
fffff800`171dc67c a801            test    al,1
fffff800`171dc67e 7509            jne     nt!PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutineEx+0x79 (fffff800`171dc689)
fffff800`171dc680 f00fba2dabfe230000 lock bts dword ptr [nt!PspNotifyEnableMask (fffff800`1741c534)],0
fffff800`171dc689 33db            xor     ebx,ebx
fffff800`171dc68b 488b0d26dacdff  mov     rcx,qword ptr [nt!EtwApiCallsProvRegHandle (fffff800`16eba0b8)]
fffff800`171dc692 895c2430        mov     dword ptr [rsp+30h],ebx
fffff800`171dc696 4889742438      mov     qword ptr [rsp+38h],rsi

通过代码可以定位到

线程回调数组 (Thread):fffff800'171dc5a6 488d0dc3d3daff lea rcx,[nt!PspCreateThreadNotifyRoutine (fffff800'16f89970)]

地址:fffff800'16f89970

1: kd> dq fffff800`16f89970 L10
fffff800`16f89970  ffff8283`4800858f ffff8283`480086df
fffff800`16f89980  ffff8283`487a43ff ffff8283`487a9b2f
fffff800`16f89990  ffff8283`487a9bbf 00000000`00000000
fffff800`16f899a0  00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000
fffff800`16f899b0  00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000
fffff800`16f899c0  00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000
fffff800`16f899d0  00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000
fffff800`16f899e0  00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000

可以看到有5个驱动在监控线程创建

分别是

1: kd> dps ffff8283`48008580 L2
ffff8283`48008580  00000000`00000020
ffff8283`48008588  fffff80a`83aaf690 WdFilter!MpCreateThreadNotifyRoutine
1: kd> dps ffff8283`480086d0 L2
ffff8283`480086d0  00000000`00000020
ffff8283`480086d8  fffff80a`83ab5db0 WdFilter!MpCreateThreadNotifyRoutineEx
1: kd> dps ffff8283`487a43f0 L2
ffff8283`487a43f0  00000000`00000020
ffff8283`487a43f8  fffff800`1aad1010 mmcss!CiThreadNotification
1: kd> dps ffff8283`487a9b20 L2
ffff8283`487a9b20  00000000`00000020
ffff8283`487a9b28  fffff800`1ae9c5a0 KslD!tk::COSCallback::CreateThreadNotifyRoutine
1: kd> dps ffff8283`487a9bb0 L2
ffff8283`487a9bb0  00000000`00000020
ffff8283`487a9bb8  fffff800`1ae9c640 KslD!tk::COSCallback::CreateThreadNotifyRoutineEx
1: kd> 
ffff8283`487a9bb0  00000000`00000020
ffff8283`487a9bb8  fffff800`1ae9c640 KslD!tk::COSCallback::CreateThreadNotifyRoutineEx

重点关注WdFilter!MpCreateThreadNotifyRoutine和WdFilter!MpCreateThreadNotifyRoutineEx

(1) 逻辑入口 A:fffff80a'83aaf690 (MpCreateThreadNotifyRoutine)

这个函数通常负责基础过滤。

主要工作: 检查 MpData,如果创建者是白名单直接返回。

审计重点: 寻找 cmp 指令比对 MpData+0xF0 的地方。

(2) 逻辑入口 B:fffff80a'83ab5db0 (NotifyRoutineEx)

这个函数是关键,它能拿到 PS_CREATE_THREAD_NOTIFY_ROUTINE_EX 结构,里面包含线程的初始栈空间和起始地址。

主要工作: 进行 VAD扫描。

检测点: 它会检查 StartAddress 是否指向一个 SEC_IMAGE 映射。如果你是用 VirtualAlloc 申请内存后直接 CreateRemoteThread,这个函数会立刻识破你

fffff80a`83aaf6cf 4584c0          test    r8b,r8b
fffff80a`83aaf6d2 0f84d0050000    je      WdFilter!MpCreateThreadNotifyRoutine+0x618 (fffff80a`83aafca8)
fffff80a`83aaf6d8 4183fc04        cmp     r12d,4
fffff80a`83aaf6dc 0f847e010000    je      WdFilter!MpCreateThreadNotifyRoutine+0x1d0 (fffff80a`83aaf860)
fffff80a`83aaf6e2 65488b0c2588010000 mov   rcx,qword ptr gs:[188h]
fffff80a`83aaf6eb 48ff15ae41fbff  call    qword ptr [WdFilter!_imp_PsIsSystemThread (fffff80a`83a638a0)]
fffff80a`83aaf6f2 0f1f440000      nop     dword ptr [rax+rax]

fffff80a`83aaf6d8 4183fc04 cmp r12d,4这一句以及后面的代码证明了system进程创建线程是不管的 因为4刚好就是system进程

fffff80a`83aaf707 call nt!PsGetCurrentProcessId
fffff80a`83aaf713 mov  r15, rax ; r15 = 当前进程 PID (发起者)
...
fffff80a`83aaf722 cmp  r15, r12 ; 比较 [发起者PID] 和 [目标进程PID]
fffff80a`83aaf72e setne byte ptr [rsp+30h] ; 如果不相等(跨进程注入),标志位置 1

这里也是检查是远程还是本地创建线程

镜像加载回调数组 (LoadImage):fffff800'171dc651 488d0d18d5daff lea rcx,[nt!PspLoadImageNotifyRoutine (fffff800'16f89b70)]

地址:fffff800'16f89b70

尝试在目标机器安装火绒后调试

检查刚才的注册的回调

0: kd> dq fffff800`16f89970 L10
fffff800`16f89970  ffff8283`4800858f ffff8283`480086df
fffff800`16f89980  ffff8283`487a43ff ffff8283`487a9b2f
fffff800`16f89990  ffff8283`487a9bbf ffff8283`4ce6aebf
fffff800`16f899a0  00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000
fffff800`16f899b0  00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000
fffff800`16f899c0  00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000
fffff800`16f899d0  00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000
fffff800`16f899e0  00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000

安装后多了一个新的创建线程回调 ffff8283`4ce6aebf

0: kd> dps ffff8283`4ce6aeb0  l2
ffff8283`4ce6aeb0  00000000`00000020
ffff8283`4ce6aeb8  fffff800`1af1cc50 sysdiag+0xcc50

一开始看线程回调全是0 后面发现安装后要重启才能生效 后续

1: kd> dps ffffbb8e`7c318b00 l20
ffffbb8e`7c318b00  00000000`00000020
ffffbb8e`7c318b08  fffff802`36cfc640 KslD!tk::COSCallback::CreateThreadNotifyRoutineEx
ffffbb8e`7c318b10  00000000`00000001
ffffbb8e`7c318b18  00790072`00740073
ffffbb8e`7c318b20  62726243`02038100
ffffbb8e`7c318b28  cccccccc`ccccccc3
ffffbb8e`7c318b30  00000000`00000020
ffffbb8e`7c318b38  fffff802`36cfc5a0 KslD!tk::COSCallback::CreateThreadNotifyRoutine
ffffbb8e`7c318b40  00000000`00000000
ffffbb8e`7c318b48  00000000`00000001
ffffbb8e`7c318b50  30614b54`02034800
ffffbb8e`7c318b58  c36c5222`0f449fd8
ffffbb8e`7c318b60  fffff802`36d36a08 KslD!tk::COSAPI::_OS_API_SHIM_ENTRY::`vftable'
ffffbb8e`7c318b68  00000000`00000000
ffffbb8e`7c318b70  ffff9702`9e669490
ffffbb8e`7c318b78  fffff802`36cfac30 KslD!tk::FreeMemory
ffffbb8e`7c318b80  20206f49`02030000

可以看到火绒也是拦截线程创建的

1: kd> u fffff802`36cfc640 l50
KslD!tk::COSCallback::CreateThreadNotifyRoutineEx:
fffff802`36cfc640 488bc4          mov     rax,rsp
fffff802`36cfc643 48895808        mov     qword ptr [rax+8],rbx
fffff802`36cfc647 48896810        mov     qword ptr [rax+10h],rbp
fffff802`36cfc64b 48897018        mov     qword ptr [rax+18h],rsi
fffff802`36cfc64f 48897820        mov     qword ptr [rax+20h],rdi
fffff802`36cfc653 4156            push    r14
fffff802`36cfc655 4883ec30        sub     rsp,30h
fffff802`36cfc659 488b3d40ea0300  mov     rdi,qword ptr [KslD!tk::COSCallback::s_pInstance (fffff802`36d3b0a0)]
fffff802`36cfc660 418af0          mov     sil,r8b
fffff802`36cfc663 488bea          mov     rbp,rdx
fffff802`36cfc666 4c8bf1          mov     r14,rcx
fffff802`36cfc669 4885ff          test    rdi,rdi
fffff802`36cfc66c 7452            je      KslD!tk::COSCallback::CreateThreadNotifyRoutineEx+0x80 (fffff802`36cfc6c0)
fffff802`36cfc66e 488d9710010000  lea     rdx,[rdi+110h]
fffff802`36cfc675 488d48e8        lea     rcx,[rax-18h]
fffff802`36cfc679 e83af3ffff      call    KslD!tk::CEResourceLock::CEResourceLock (fffff802`36cfb9b8)
fffff802`36cfc67e 33db            xor     ebx,ebx
fffff802`36cfc680 483b9f28020000  cmp     rbx,qword ptr [rdi+228h]
fffff802`36cfc687 7d2d            jge     KslD!tk::COSCallback::CreateThreadNotifyRoutineEx+0x76 (fffff802`36cfc6b6)
fffff802`36cfc689 488b8730020000  mov     rax,qword ptr [rdi+230h]
fffff802`36cfc690 488b0cd8        mov     rcx,qword ptr [rax+rbx*8]
fffff802`36cfc694 4885c9          test    rcx,rcx
fffff802`36cfc697 7418            je      KslD!tk::COSCallback::CreateThreadNotifyRoutineEx+0x71 (fffff802`36cfc6b1)
fffff802`36cfc699 488b4108        mov     rax,qword ptr [rcx+8]
fffff802`36cfc69d 4885c0          test    rax,rax
fffff802`36cfc6a0 740f            je      KslD!tk::COSCallback::CreateThreadNotifyRoutineEx+0x71 (fffff802`36cfc6b1)
fffff802`36cfc6a2 448ac6          mov     r8b,sil
fffff802`36cfc6a5 488bd5          mov     rdx,rbp
fffff802`36cfc6a8 498bce          mov     rcx,r14
fffff802`36cfc6ab ff15ef2b0300    call    qword ptr [KslD!_guard_dispatch_icall_fptr (fffff802`36d2f2a0)]
fffff802`36cfc6b1 48ffc3          inc     rbx
fffff802`36cfc6b4 ebca            jmp     KslD!tk::COSCallback::CreateThreadNotifyRoutineEx+0x40 (fffff802`36cfc680)
fffff802`36cfc6b6 488d4c2420      lea     rcx,[rsp+20h]
fffff802`36cfc6bb e890f3ffff      call    KslD!tk::CEResourceLock::~CEResourceLock (fffff802`36cfba50)
fffff802`36cfc6c0 488b5c2440      mov     rbx,qword ptr [rsp+40h]
fffff802`36cfc6c5 488b6c2448      mov     rbp,qword ptr [rsp+48h]
fffff802`36cfc6ca 488b742450      mov     rsi,qword ptr [rsp+50h]
fffff802`36cfc6cf 488b7c2458      mov     rdi,qword ptr [rsp+58h]
fffff802`36cfc6d4 4883c430        add     rsp,30h
fffff802`36cfc6d8 415e            pop     r14
fffff802`36cfc6da c3              ret
fffff802`36cfc6db cc              int     3
fffff802`36cfc6dc cc              int     3
fffff802`36cfc6dd cc              int     3
fffff802`36cfc6de cc              int     3
fffff802`36cfc6df cc              int     3

实际代码巨复杂 到后面完全看不下去了 各种call 跳不停 根本看不完 技术有限只能分析到这里了