境外视频软件的逆向分析
针对该视频软件在网络传输过程中的数据加密分析,以及注册流程的分析
境外视频软件某某娃主要用于观看视频,但普通用户每天的观看次数只有1次,观看体验十分不佳,于是博主尝试逆向该APP,看看能不能实现无限畅爽看。
该APP在静态分析时发现软件包内没什么东西,调用的so文件自写的也只有一个libSecShell.so,名字跟梆梆加固所用的有点像,且用jadx分析dex文件时,发现代码量很少且有stub字段,应该是加壳。软件图片如下所示:
继续分析java层代码时,发现并没有加载dex的代码,结合前面看到的libSecShell.so,该so文件应该就是负责加载dex的。尝试用IDA进行静态分析,发现代码都处于未解码状态,有可能用来SMC。反正不管怎么样,APP运行时应该都已经加载进内存里面了,尝试用frida-gadget对解密后的so文件进行dump,dump代码如下:
function dump_so(so_name) {
Java.perform(function () {
var currentApplication = Java.use("android.app.ActivityThread").currentApplication();
var dir = currentApplication.getApplicationContext().getFilesDir().getPath();
var libso = Process.getModuleByName(so_name);
var file_path = dir + "/" + libso.name + "_" + libso.base + "_" + ptr(libso.size) + ".so";
var file_handle = new File(file_path, "wb");
if (file_handle && file_handle != null) {
Memory.protect(ptr(libso.base), libso.size, 'rwx');
var libso_buffer = ptr(libso.base).readByteArray(libso.size);
file_handle.write(libso_buffer);
file_handle.flush();
file_handle.close();
}
});
} so文件dump下来后,用adb pull 到本地,用工具修复完so文件后继续丢到IDA里面进行分析,发现代码处理逻辑不像是VM的壳构造,尝试用常见脱壳方式进行脱壳。结果很顺利,是常见的壳类型,后续对dump下来的dex文件进行分析。
用reqable进行抓包,抓包很顺利,数据包的格式大致都长这样:
POST /api/app/member/user/queryDetail HTTP/2
Host: api-hlw.556736.com
X-Client-Identity: APP/2;gmp7s5;com.ptqbx.n8cf3;3.5.15;3.1.2 SYS/ANDROID;10;android FM/Google; SDI/xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx NE/WiFi LANG/zh-cn;1 OID/{{1}};{{2}};{{3}};319d7cc8ace76d17;7C:D9:5C:AB:08:9B
X-Client-Timestamp: 1783512636
X-Client-Sign: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Accept-Language: zh-cn
X-Auth-Token: TA:xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx:xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 230
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: okhttp/4.2.2
{"data":"xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx","key":"xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"}后续对X-Client-Sign,X-Auth-Token这两个自定义字段进行分析,该APP的网络通信采用的是okhttp,尝试hook一下常见的添加请求头的代码,先hook addHead查看是否使用,发现X-Client-Sign,X-Auth-Token用的都是addHead进行实现,这样就方便了。在原先的hook addHead的代码上添加上打印堆栈的代码,方便进一步定位。代码如下:
let Builder = Java.use("okhttp3.Request$Builder");
var str = Java.use("java.lang.String");
Builder["addHeader"].implementation = function (name, value) {
if(name.indexOf("X-Auth-Token") !== -1){
showStacks();
}
let ret4 = this.addHeader(name, value);
return ret4;
}; 根据打印出的堆栈,前往jadx继续下一步的定位,最后定位到X-Client-Sign的产生位置:
public static native String calSign(String str, String str2, String str3, String str4);//先拼接,然后整体计算md5
参数一:public static native String defaultID() ///api/app/applet/applet/queryAppletV2/ISO8859-1
参数二:long time = date.getTime() / 1000; //发送请求会带有时间戳
参数三: HashMap hashMap = new HashMap();
hashMap.put("appletAlias", this.appID);
hashMap.put("baseAppletAlias", Utils.getIoDefaultName()); //固定值:"io.base.v8"
String json = new Gson().toJson(hashMap); //{"baseAppletAlias":"io.base.v8"}
参数四:public static native String defaultKey(); //m9HplCStJFZMaWng
最后的拼接结果:/api/app/applet/applet/queryAppletV2/ISO8859-11782545104{"baseAppletAlias":"io.base.v8"}m9HplCStJFZMaWng具体的加密代码在native层,发现调用的libscan.so文件不在最开始的安装包里,反正运行时肯定有,前往/data/data/包名目录下找,发现存在,那就pull出来分析,发现执行的是一个标准的MD5,没啥花头。
继续分析X-Auth-Token的产生,发现该值时通过读取本地文件来进行获取,应用有读取权限的目录也就几个,继续到/data/data/包名目录下找,发现的确存在存储用户信息的文件:
尝试进行手动修改,修改完成后再重新启动APP,发现修改的值无效,APP对该文件进行了重新写入,能重新写入就说明APP知道正确的值,通过硬编码的形式进行实现不太可能,那么这个值应该就是服务端发给咋们的,查看抓到的包,发现都是服务端发给咋们的数据都是加密过的,通过来讲客户端也要能对加密数据进行解密,那么用的就是对称加密算法,把常见的加密算法都hook一边,发现触发了AES的,触发了那就继续打印调用堆栈进行定位,最后定位结果分析结果如下:
AES:key=随机产生;iv=a396202596eacb41(固定值);mode=CBC + base64的加密模式,随机生成的key通过请求体中的”key“来进行传递。
public String cryptoBody(String str, String str2) {
Timber.Tree tag = Timber.tag("TTT");
tag.i("cryptoBody key:" + str2 + " iv:" + this.iv, new Object[0]);
return EncodeUtils.base64Encode2String(EncryptUtils.encryptAES(str.getBytes(), str2.getBytes(), "AES/CBC/PKCS7Padding", this.iv.getBytes()));
}//iv的生成位置
package com.seven.movie.net.global;
/* loaded from: S:\APP_sample\HLW_rePj\com.ptqbx.n8cf3\2922540_dexfile_execute.dex */
public class CryptoHelper {
private String appKey;
public long mServerTime;
private String publicKey = "919b6b41f2814f25b5e5fb7c64b03d67602dc07001e5d42aff525c743fdf8434a8b751a7849d5dafb3c3cda4309d739bbb86702214c110a4a431df6f3b8374fd";
private String temp = "1f5cec6336a772cadf5e887eb1c9fea2675393c0986796f7628a72157b02643a9968518ee54f8171fcb074aa4bd75becc2284028c59c3a8a900d976760823105017beae3a3a1a31be16a18c0892fc1c9e05657ff16ad9c9e7888a6ce9a6fadde73ba4da0ec87a84267ed518da60978dbab3b97641c0f80f3385bf38873d35565";
private String iv = "a396202596eacb41";
private int mTerminal = 2;
//key的获取位置:
AES-key的设置位置:package com.seven.movie.net.interceptor;//本地自己生成的
import com.jess.arms.http.log.RequestInterceptor;
import com.seven.movie.net.global.HRequest;
import com.seven.movie.net.global.HResponse;
import java.io.IOException;
import okhttp3.Interceptor;
import okhttp3.Request;
import okhttp3.Response;
import org.jetbrains.annotations.NotNull;
public class SecurityDataInterceptor implements Interceptor {
@Override // okhttp3.Interceptor
@NotNull
public Response intercept(@NotNull Interceptor.Chain chain) throws IOException {
HRequest hRequest = new HRequest(chain, chain.request());
Request buildHeader = hRequest.buildHeader();
String aesKey = hRequest.getAesKey();
boolean isMainProject = hRequest.isMainProject();
Response proceed = chain.proceed(buildHeader);
if (!isMainProject) {
return proceed;
}
HResponse hResponse = new HResponse(chain, proceed);
hResponse.setAesKey(aesKey);
if (hResponse.httpCode(RequestInterceptor.parseResponseBody(proceed))) {
return hResponse.getmResponse();
}
return hResponse.checkBodyCode();
}
}
上一级: private void bodyRequest(String str, String str2, Request.Builder builder, Request request) {
CryptoHelper cryptoHelper = new CryptoHelper(SessionManager.getDefault().getDiffServerTime());
this.aesKey = cryptoHelper.getKey();那不就简单了,直接hook掉key的产生,加密逻辑也就固定了,hook代码如下:
var CryptoHelper = Java.use("com.seven.movie.net.global.CryptoHelper");
CryptoHelper["getKey"].implementation = function () {
var ret1 = this.getKey();
return "45240993c26bd4-1";
};后续用赛博厨子进行解密:
发现大部分数据已经可以进行解密,但唯独/login下的请求无法解密,继续hook加密算法+使用调用栈的方式来进行定位,最后还是定位到AES加密算法,但跟之前不同的是:
/login的请求时采用:AES:key=iv=标准md5("e701c10fc81cf92ec185b9cebe089ce1#@^@#”+"该请求的时间戳")的实现就行协商的密钥和iv,hook到时间戳的产生,把时间戳变成固定值,方便后面分析。固定好后发现/login的请求与响应中并未携带有效信息,应该是个没用的请求包。在分析服务端返回的响应中,发现了服务端会回传X-Auth-Token,并根据X-Auth-Token的值,返回用户的详细信息,请求用户信息的请求如下:
POST /api/app/member/user/queryDetail HTTP/2
Host: api-hlw.556736.com
X-Client-Identity: APP/2;gmp7s5;com.ptqbx.n8cf3;3.5.15;3.1.2 SYS/ANDROID;10;
X-Client-Timestamp: 1783512636
X-Client-Sign: fa65f4e2a78dae22c11971353973a59d
Accept-Language: zh-cn
X-Auth-Token: TA:xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx:xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 230
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: okhttp/4.2.2
{"data":"xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx:xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx","key":"xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx:xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"}对服务端响应的内容解密后可得如下结果:
"userDetail": {
"userId": 97262328,
"userType": 0,
"state": 0,
"countryCode": null,
"cellphone": null,
"email": null,
"invitationCode": "1f",
"invitationCount": 0,
"invitationLevel": 0,
"currLevelInvitationCount": 0,
"invitationNextLevelLeft": 1,
"topLevel": false,
"nickName": "",
"gender": "0",
"proMark": false,
"viewElse": 1,
"viewEveryday": 1,
"isViewNoLimit": false,
"downloadElse": 0,
"downloadEveryday": 0,
"isDownloadNolimit": false,
"isHigh": true,
"isHdHigh": true,
"isFullHdHigh": true,
"doubleSpeedPlay": true,
"castScreen": false,
"vipType": null,
"vipExpireTime": null,
"vipExpireTimeNew": 0,
"functionDTOListStr": null,
"showTitleName": "新手",
"totalRecharge": 0,
"promotionAgent": false,
"promotionSwitch": false,
"isWithdrawPwd": false,
"promotionPlatformUrl": "https:api2.lvyouynn.complatformApi",
"promotionNumber": 0,
"giveVip": true,
"giveVipDays": 3,
"invitationGiveDays": 0,
"signUpRewardType": null,
"signUpRewardNum": null,
"redeemDiscount": null,
"promoteVipSwitch": true,
"carryOutPromoteNum": 0,
"promoteNum1": 2,
"promoteNum2": 12,
"promoteNum3": 6,
"avatarId": 14,
"avatarPath": "WlRti1sAEaimg20200529fbc4079529f383b5fb700555756311ad.png",
"openWalletGoods": true,
"likeCount": 0,
"attentionCount": 0,
"fanCount": 0,
"forbiddenState": 0,
"reviewRule": null,
"shortLastPlaySize": 3,
"createPotatoUrl": "",
"identifyCard": "zj9pj7Akab1usqEk5imc59VypO20HLlZ567ACbkr8MAGEZksSVIg0SQtCPlelwd",
"canIdentifyCard": 1,
"globalCanIdentifyCard": 1,
"yellowState": 1,
"hasBigCustomer": false,
"bigCustomerTime": "[11,23]",
"attestType": null,
"attestVid": null,
"signature": null,
"upLevel": null,
"vipAuth": [
"1",
"2",
"4",
"5",
"6",
"8"
],当客户端接收到这段信息后,会将该内容写入本地文件,如图所示:
仔细分析这段回显信息,可以发现观看次数就在这段信息里,可以推断出,相关的权限校验应该都在服务端中进行,X-Auth-Token应该是唯一标识,那么后续主要就是针对如何让服务端发送给我全新的X-Auth-Token进行进一步的深入。
经过不断的APP卸载重装以及手机重装后,抓到了一个跟之前不一样的包,用于请求验证人机的消息:
POST /api/app/member/captcha/getCaptchaCode HTTP/2
Host: api-hlw.556736.com
X-Client-Identity: APP/2;gmp7s5;com.ptqbx.n8cf3;3.5.15;3.1.2 SYS/ANDROID;10;
X-Client-Timestamp: 1783510217
X-Client-Sign: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Accept-Language: zh-cn
X-Auth-Token: TA:0:xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 230
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: okhttp/4.2.2
{"data":"xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx","key":"xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"}服务端响应一个gif的图片信息,获取到验证图片上的数字后,在下一个请求中进行携带即可,那么在下一个响应中就会携带X-Auth-Token。携带验证码的请求如下:
POST /api/app/member/user/startup HTTP/2
Host: api-hlw.556736.com
X-Client-Identity: APP/2;gmp7s5;com.ptqbx.n8cf3;3.5.15;3.1.2 SYS/ANDROID;10;
X-Client-Timestamp: 1783510230
X-Client-Sign: xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Accept-Language: zh-cn
X-Auth-Token: TA:0:xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
Content-Length: 294
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: okhttp/4.2.2
{"data":"验证码加密后的字符串","key":"xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"}结合经历后的发现,服务端会回显给你X-Auth-Token只在/getCaptchaCode的请求后,请求会根据不同的设备信息,也就是X-Client-Identity进行唯一的注册,然后返回给你一个唯一的X-Auth-Token值(X-Client-Sign竟然一点用都没有,服了)。后续也就好办了,借助脚本批量生成大量X-Auth-Token。因为博主hook使用的是gadget,将手机上的frida脚本改成hook获取X-Auth-Token或者X-Client-Identity的值,让他返回自己批量注册的X-Auth-Token或者X-Client-Identity即可实现无限观看的功能(本质就是通过X-Auth-Token或者X-Client-Identity让服务端以为你是不同的账号,从而实现无限观看)。